Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 11th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

It is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bew, who has made the important point—strangely ignored by all the lawyers who have spoken so far—that we are subject to conflicting international agreements that cannot be reconciled without breaking, in part, some of them.

We all agree that there should be no infrastructure or checks at the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Why? Not just because they would disrupt trade but because they would be a provocation to republicans and would probably be blown up, threatening the whole peace process. By the same token, we should all agree that there should be no border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It disrupts a far larger volume of trade and, as we have seen, it is provocative to unionists and is gravely undermining the Belfast agreement. As it happens, Article 6.2 of the protocol commits both parties to avoid infrastructure at the ports and airports of Northern Ireland to the extent possible—but the EU ignored that and actually invoked legal procedures to require the introduction and building of checkpoints at Northern Ireland ports.

The EU’s only legitimate interest in the protocol is to protect its internal market. At present, the threat to its market is imaginary, and in the future any threat would only come from third-country goods which incur a lower tariff to enter the UK than the EU tariff, from goods, if any, which are subject to lower standards in the UK market than are required under EU law, and a minority of those two groups of goods which are actually destined for the Republic. If this Bill provides an equal, or possibly greater, protection against these pretty minor threats, the EU has no pragmatic reason to insist on retaining the complex procedures envisaged under the protocol. Moreover, under Article 24 of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, to which all EU states adhere,

“where two or more alternative measures are reasonably available for fulfilling the policy objective”,

the least trade restrictive measure must be taken—an obligation which the EU is in fragrant breach of.

But some in the EU have an illegitimate reason for hanging on to the protocol, which is to make sure that Britain suffers for Brexit. That raises the question: can we lawfully, unilaterally, replace the Northern Ireland protocol by other measures which meet the EU’s legitimate objectives, avoid a hard border and protect the Belfast/Good Friday agreement? I believe we can do so.

First, the sole justification for the protocol was to uphold the Belfast agreement. As the former Lord Chancellor pointed out, the very first article of the protocol says:

“This Protocol is without prejudice to the provisions of the 1998 Agreement”.


So, as he said, the Belfast/Good Friday agreement takes precedence over the protocol. The UK, as guarantor of the Belfast agreement, has not just a right but a duty to ensure that, where the protocol threatens the Good Friday agreement, it is changed—preferably by agreement, but if not, otherwise—as envisaged in Article 13 of the protocol.

Secondly, the protocol is intrinsically temporary; the EU itself said so. It said that no permanent agreement with a member state can be reached under Article 50 —only temporary and transitional relationships. That is why we had to leave first before we could negotiate the permanent trade and co-operation agreement. The then Solicitor-General told Parliament:

“article 50 of the Treaty on European Union does not provide a legal basis in Union law for permanent future arrangements with non-member states.”—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/18; col. 547.]


So, he went on, if someone were to mount a challenge to the protocol on the basis that the EU said that Article 50 is not a sound basis for a permanent agreement,

“I tell you frankly, Mr Speaker, they are likely to win”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/18; col. 555.]

That was pretty emphatic advice from a lawyer. If the EU now repudiate that doctrine, then the protocol was negotiated in bad faith, which itself is grounds for us to replace it.

The reason the protocol is undermining the Belfast agreement is that it lacks the consent of the unionist community, who see it as undermining the Act of Union itself. Indeed, the court in Northern Ireland has ruled that the protocol “subjugates” the Act of Union.

What should a state do if it finds that its obligations under one treaty conflict with those under another treaty or with its own constitutional law? Let me answer that question in the words of the European Court of Justice in the Kadi case. The court affirmed that,

“although the Court takes great care to respect the obligations that are incumbent on the Community by virtue of international law, it seeks, first and foremost, to preserve the constitutional framework … it would be wrong to conclude that, once the Community is bound by a rule of international law, the Community Courts must bow to that rule with complete acquiescence and apply it unconditionally”—

what is right for the EU is surely right for the UK too.

In short, we have a right and a duty to replace this protocol—preferably by agreement; if not, unilaterally—under EU law because it is temporary, under the EU’s own doctrine that international obligations must be subordinated to supreme constitutional laws by the Act of Union, under the protocol itself which says that the Belfast agreement takes precedence over the protocol, and under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, of which the EU is in breach. So I support this Bill.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I completely agree with the noble Lord, particularly in relation to his tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. In his absence—as his junior as it were—I draw this Committee’s attention to the quite extraordinary report of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory and Reform Committee to which reference has been made before, particularly at Second Reading, but it bears repetition. Its seventh report of this Session says at paragraph 4 that this is

“a skeleton bill that confers on Ministers a licence to legislate in the widest possible terms.”

It continues:

“The Bill represents as stark a transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive as we have seen throughout the Brexit process. The Bill is unprecedented in its cavalier treatment of Parliament”.


That is quite an extraordinary criticism of this legislation. It is made not by novices but by highly experienced and respected Members of your Lordships’ House across party lines. I find it deeply regrettable that the Government should think it appropriate to continue with a Bill that has attracted such cross-party criticism.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I came into Parliament nearly 40 years ago and was told first of all that you should never ask a question to which you do not already know the answer. Now that I have been here so long, I feel that I can take the risk of asking some questions to which I do not know the answer, about a very important aspect of the Bill that has just been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

There are two criticisms of the Bill, the first being that it is allegedly against international law. I do not believe that and have not really heard any answers to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bew. What happens when you have two conflicting international obligations? The second criticism is that it relies, very largely and to an almost unprecedented degree, on Henry VIII clauses. Historically, I am very reluctant to rely extensively on Henry VIII clauses, and I was rather shocked by the committee report to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just referred.

The questions that I want to ask, and to which I do not know the answer, are: first, what is the alternative in the context in which we are to have open-ended Henry VIII clauses; and secondly, why did the Government not adopt that alternative? I assume that the alternative to the Henry VIII clauses is to spell out in detail, in primary legislation, what you intend to do, but the context in which we are doing it is that we are simultaneously legislating and negotiating.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said that we cannot do that. It seems to me perfectly compatible with the doctrine of necessity to do that. We have to do something, we need the power to do something, we have taken the legal power to do something, but we would like that something to be negotiated if possible. So we are simultaneously negotiating and legislating. If we spell out in primary legislation, in detail, the outcome that we want to get, in the context of a negotiation that involves give and take, we either have to spell out the maximum we want—what we want to take without any give—or the minimum we are prepared to accept: what we are prepared to give without any prospect of taking.

In this unusual situation of having to have the legal powers to act while we are negotiating and hoping for a negotiated solution, I am not sure what alternative there is to what the Government have done. I would be grateful to hear what noble Lords would do who share my reluctance to rely on Henry VIII clauses. Effectively, we are saying we are recreating the royal prerogative in the negotiation, giving the Government a free hand, while giving them the power to take legislative action if those negotiations do not achieve a satisfactory result.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, there has been much discussion today, and it goes back to the issue of democratic deficit and how we deal with what Northern Ireland’s public representatives cannot deal with. There is a very simple solution. Under the Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, amended by the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, provision was made for the institutions according to a three-stranded approach: the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, the North/South Ministerial Council, and the British-Irish Council, with east-west, north-south, and internal to Northern Ireland being addressed.

At the moment, we have no Northern Ireland Assembly, no Northern Ireland Executive and no North/South Ministerial Council that would hold these matters to account and address that democratic deficit. I would say to the DUP: there is a duty and an obligation to ensure, working with all the parties in Northern Ireland and both Governments, that those institutions are up and running. That will allow all of these issues to be adequately addressed by the MLAs who were duly elected in May.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, but, before doing so, I repeat what I said the other day: I feel extreme discomfort about the extensive reliance on Henry VIII clauses in this legislation. I sit near enough to the Convenor to almost feel partly convened on the issue of Henry VIII legislation: he and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, did suggest how this particularly egregious example of it could be constrained a little. However, I think neither was here when I posed the question of what the structural alternative was, in the context of negotiations, to relying on Henry VIII legislation. I still await a satisfactory answer to that question.

To return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, I share an interest with him in the EIS, because I was the Secretary of State who introduced them. I had forgotten that I was until he reminded me. Indeed, slightly earlier, when I was invited to speak on the 25th anniversary of their formation, I found that I was the warm-up act for Mike Yarwood at that event. But they are important and have been useful. They, at present, will cease under EU legislation unless that EU legislation ceases to apply in this country.

I want to make a general point, which I made earlier: the protocol is intrinsically temporary under European law. The Europeans themselves said, while we were negotiating the withdrawal agreement, that they could not, under Article 50, enter into a permanent relationship with the United Kingdom. Any arrangements reached under that agreement could only be temporary and transitional. Consequently, the protocol is transitional and temporary and not permanent. Indeed, in Mrs May’s protocol, it specifically said in the recital that the withdrawal Act, which is based on Article 50, does not aim to establish a permanent future relationship between the EU and the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

It is elementary as a matter of diplomacy and of international law that a country is perfectly entitled to reach a new agreement in the circumstances as they then exist. That is what happened when the protocol was agreed. Both sides agreed a mechanism in Article 18 for ensuring democratic consent.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for effectively giving way. He rightly said, both in his letter to the Times and his remarks today, that, as long as there was good faith, fair enough, but if good-faith negotiations failed to reach an agreement—not if there was any lack of good faith, I think—we would be entitled under Article 62 to repudiate the treaty.

Certainly, the EU is showing a lack of fulsome good faith in two respects. First, it is refusing to accept in the current negotiations that any change to the protocol can be made—only to its implementation. Secondly, it is repudiating its original position that it could not enter into a permanent arrangement, which was the whole basis of the negotiations we entered into under Article 50. It is now trying to make something which was intrinsically temporary, and which it said could be only temporary and provisional, into something permanent. I would have thought that, in both respects, had the British Government taken such positions, he and his friendly noble Lords would have denounced it as an appalling demonstration of bad faith.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

If the noble Lord’s position is that the EU is acting in bad faith, the United Kingdom, if it takes that view, is perfectly entitled to use the procedures set out in the protocol of independent arbitration—if it does not like that, it can go to the Court of Justice—to resolve any dispute. What the United Kingdom cannot do is ignore the dispute resolution mechanisms that are set out in the protocol and simply make an assertion that it thinks there is no good faith. Indeed, I had not understood it to be the position of the Government at the moment that there was no good faith. They are about to enter into negotiations.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, this has been unusual in the debates that we have had so far in that far more has been said that I can agree with than that I disagree with. I even found myself agreeing with two-thirds of what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, which is unusual. He is undoubtedly right that the negotiations cannot really be going as well as we would all like to hope, and as so many commentators and Ministers imply they are, as long as the EU has not been prepared to change its negotiating mandate. It will not allow a single jot or tittle of the protocol to be changed under its existing mandate, even though the protocol itself envisages the possibility of it being changed in part or in whole. That surely has to change. Maybe it has de facto; maybe the EU is agreeing to talk beyond its mandate. Let us hope that that is the case.

The disappointing aspect of the debates so far is that I have been waiting throughout for any coherent response from noble Lords, in their very powerful speeches about the illegality of what we are doing, to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, in particular as to what happens when there is a conflict between two international obligations, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, implied that there is between the obligations that we have under the Belfast agreement and those that we have under the protocol. I have not heard any direct response to that question: what do you do when you have conflicting international legal obligations?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord but the Committee has heard repeated explanations of what the answer is. The answer is that the protocol contains Article 16, which allows for a process to commence by which disputes can be resolved with an arbitration process. That is the answer. There is no conflict because the protocol provides a mechanism for addressing conflicts.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for sidestepping the question by saying that he does not need to answer it because there is an article in the protocol that means you do not have to answer on what happens when there is a conflict between two international obligations. Clearly, however, the Government and many noble Lords from the Province who have spoken think that there is a conflict and it cannot be solved just by invoking Article 16. If it can, fine; that is wonderful.

The other related question that we have not had a response to is the point made by the Lord Chancellor in the other place that Article 1 of the protocol specifically says that in the event of a conflict between the Belfast agreement and the protocol, the Belfast agreement takes precedence. I have not heard any response to that, nor to the point, which I might be alone in making, that the whole protocol is intrinsically temporary. We know that because the EU told us that it could not enter into a permanent relationship with us because we were then a member state and it could not, under Article 50, enter into a permanent relationship with a member state; it could be only temporary and transitional. That is why the protocol itself contains provision for it to be superseded, but I have heard no response to that point from anyone.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

I heard the responses given to my noble friend so far, which he seems reluctant to accept. If he does not agree that the Article 16 process would be a way of resolving some of these conflicts that have arisen and caused problems, in what way does he feel that the passage of the Bill would itself resolve those conflicts, or indeed support the Good Friday agreement?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I certainly do not say absolutely that Article 16 is not the way to proceed, but I have spoken to lawyers much respected by people in this House—unfortunately I do not have their permission to give their names—who told me that we should not go down the Article 16 route because it would be a nightmare.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Why?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I will put the two in touch discreetly and thereby not betray confidences.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord and I am grateful for his patience, but it really is not good enough, when this Committee is debating these matters, for him to say that there are problems in using Article 16 but not tell us what they are.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am saying that there may well be problems. Indeed, I asked the noble Lord the other day, down the corridor, whether he was of the opinion that Article 16 could be used to solve all the problems. If it can be, fine; I am not ruling that out. However, if it cannot be, then the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is there on the table, and the issue raised by the Lord Chancellor is there on the table. Whatever about that, the protocol is intrinsically temporary. The whole basis of the negotiations that we entered into on the withdrawal agreement was that a permanent agreement could not be entered into in the withdrawal Act with the United Kingdom covering trade or other matters; that could happen only after we had left. Therefore, anything in the withdrawal agreement was intrinsically transitional and temporary.

Again, I have not heard a response on that today. I wait to be interrupted with a response to the point. Usually, it comes from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who wrote Article 50, but he has forgotten what the alternative is.

These are important issues. We need to know why we were told one thing, that this was temporary, and now are told another thing, that it is permanent. Until we get an answer to those questions, I do not know that our debate can proceed as productively as it ought to. There are other more general points which I would like to make but I will save them for another batch of amendments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has indeed been a very wide-ranging debate, but I will comment specifically on the amendments themselves.

The DPRRC refers to the power contained in Clause 18 as “strange” and notes that

“Despite its being highly unusual”


there will be “no parliamentary oversight” whatever. This was the subject of some debate in another place, with much head-scratching as to what the Government were trying to achieve. Indeed, we cannot know that, because they have not offered a clear justification. A former head of the government legal service, Sir Jonathan Jones KC, described this as a “do whatever you like” power, but why is it needed in the first place? We have no definition of “conduct”. Can the Minister have a go at giving us a definition today? If that is not possible, can we have a detailed explanation ahead of Report?

In the Commons, the Minister tried to insist that concerned MPs had misconstrued the intent and that Clause 18 simply makes clear that Ministers will be acting lawfully when they go about their ministerial duties in support of this legislation. I cannot remember any other legislation where the Government have felt it necessary to clarify that Ministers are acting lawfully. Until recently, we took it for granted that this was always the case. Therefore, is this power an admission that the Government’s approach to the protocol is incompatible with international law and, as a result, in conflict with the Ministerial Code’s requirements to comply with the law?

There were a number of very interesting contributions in this debate. I highlight that of the noble Lord, Lord Empey, which was very constructive, about bringing into the process which is being embarked on by the UK Government respected people from Northern Ireland. I am interested to hear the Minister’s reaction to the proposals made by the noble Lord. The noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, gave a rather chilling example of the stakes we are dealing with and how important it is that we take every opportunity we possibly can to resolve the current position. This has been an interesting debate, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister.

When the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, says that he is miles away from the situation, I have known him long enough to suspect that there is a wee bit of code there. He is probably actually pretty close to knowing what is going on, and I suspect that he is right. I worry, because the Government are not engaging widely, as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said, or consulting. We have not had sight of what is on the table; we know what the EU has put on the table but not what the UK Government have put on the table. My fear is that, if the Government told us what was on the table, many people would be disappointed that they are only technical talks. Some people want them to be negotiations.

That comes on to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. I respect and understand his disagreement with the Government’s position—the Government want to mend it, not end it, and, as I understand it, the noble Lord thinks there is a more substantial issue with that. Ministers have said they want to fix it, not nix it. If you want to mend it, not end it, there are mechanisms, but there are also mechanisms if you want to end it. As Article 13 of the protocol states, it lasts as long as it lasts:

“Any subsequent agreement between the Union and the United Kingdom shall indicate the parts of this Protocol which it supersedes”—


so, if there is another treaty, this ends. There is nothing special about that; that is every treaty. A treaty lasts for as long as it lasts, and if there is a subsequent treaty then there is a subsequent treaty. So the noble Lord’s beef is not with us; it is presumably with the Government in order to open up the element of the withdrawal agreement and the associated TCA that he thinks are in contradiction.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Would the noble Lord deal with the Article 50 point? If it is intrinsically temporary and transitional, can it last for ever?