Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who highlights quite clearly the central proposition in Amendment 38, tabled in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie. It is about limiting the control of Ministers under the Bill by ensuring that the Northern Ireland Assembly is given necessary approval of the conduct in relation to the provisions within the Bill.

Amendment 38 seeks to amend Clause 18, “Other Ministerial powers”, to ensure a limitation of delegated powers to Ministers—the very issue that was discussed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—and to ensure that

“the exercise of the Minister’s power to engage in conduct in relation to any matter dealt with in the Northern Ireland Protocol that is not otherwise authorised by the Act to a motion approving the conduct in the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

It throws up the accountability issues relating to the Northern Ireland Assembly—I hope that all the institutions will be up and running eventually—and would ensure that devolved regions and nations have particular control in relation to this issue.

It is worth noting that there were two important developments in the long road of the protocol. Today, the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, met in the margins of the climate conference in Egypt and agreed to work together to end the turmoil in relation to the protocol. Also today, at the meeting of the UK-EU Parliamentary Partnership Assembly in this building, Vice-President Šefčovič said that if this Bill were to become law, the UK Government would put Northern Ireland’s unique access to the EU market of 450 million customers at risk.

I again urge the Government to put this Bill into cold storage and ensure that there is renewed political vigour given to the negotiations. It is only through joint negotiations that all the issues around the protocol in relation to east-west issues and to trade between GB and Northern Ireland can be satisfactorily resolved to the benefit of all businesses and people in Northern Ireland.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, when the purpose and the intended effect of a clause are unclear, it sometimes helps to look at the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. These are produced, of course, by the Government, and are designed to explain. But if we look at the Explanatory Notes to Clause 18, we see that the confusion and uncertainty are even more manifest.

Look at paragraphs 96 to 98 of the Explanatory Notes. Paragraph 96 tells us that:

“Clause 18 clarifies the relationship between powers provided by this Bill and those arising otherwise, including by virtue of the Royal Prerogative.”


That is what Clause 18(2) says. Paragraph 97 deals specifically with Clause 18(1). It says:

“Subsection (1) provides that Ministers can engage in conduct (i.e.”—


and I emphasise that it is “i.e.” and not “e.g.”—

“sub-legislative activity, such as producing guidance) relevant to the Northern Ireland Protocol if they consider it appropriate in connection with one or more of the purposes of this Bill.”

If that is the intended purpose of Clause 18(1), why not say so? Why not limit the scope of Clause 18(1) specifically to say that Ministers can produce guidance? We could then have a debate about whether it is properly drafted, whether it is too broad or whether there should be some controls. I am afraid that what we find in Clause 18(1) bears no relationship whatever to what the Explanatory Notes tell us that Clause 18(1) is designed to achieve. My conclusion from that is that there must be real doubt here; that Ministers know what Clause 18(1) is designed to achieve and are reluctant to be specific because they do not want proper controls on the scope of their powers.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

To follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I wonder whether one route might be for the Minister to give us a glimpse behind the veil. What were the instructions given to parliamentary counsel? In other words, what were they asked to achieve by means of Clause 18(2)?

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[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, this has been unusual in the debates that we have had so far in that far more has been said that I can agree with than that I disagree with. I even found myself agreeing with two-thirds of what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, which is unusual. He is undoubtedly right that the negotiations cannot really be going as well as we would all like to hope, and as so many commentators and Ministers imply they are, as long as the EU has not been prepared to change its negotiating mandate. It will not allow a single jot or tittle of the protocol to be changed under its existing mandate, even though the protocol itself envisages the possibility of it being changed in part or in whole. That surely has to change. Maybe it has de facto; maybe the EU is agreeing to talk beyond its mandate. Let us hope that that is the case.

The disappointing aspect of the debates so far is that I have been waiting throughout for any coherent response from noble Lords, in their very powerful speeches about the illegality of what we are doing, to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, in particular as to what happens when there is a conflict between two international obligations, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, implied that there is between the obligations that we have under the Belfast agreement and those that we have under the protocol. I have not heard any direct response to that question: what do you do when you have conflicting international legal obligations?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord but the Committee has heard repeated explanations of what the answer is. The answer is that the protocol contains Article 16, which allows for a process to commence by which disputes can be resolved with an arbitration process. That is the answer. There is no conflict because the protocol provides a mechanism for addressing conflicts.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for sidestepping the question by saying that he does not need to answer it because there is an article in the protocol that means you do not have to answer on what happens when there is a conflict between two international obligations. Clearly, however, the Government and many noble Lords from the Province who have spoken think that there is a conflict and it cannot be solved just by invoking Article 16. If it can, fine; that is wonderful.

The other related question that we have not had a response to is the point made by the Lord Chancellor in the other place that Article 1 of the protocol specifically says that in the event of a conflict between the Belfast agreement and the protocol, the Belfast agreement takes precedence. I have not heard any response to that, nor to the point, which I might be alone in making, that the whole protocol is intrinsically temporary. We know that because the EU told us that it could not enter into a permanent relationship with us because we were then a member state and it could not, under Article 50, enter into a permanent relationship with a member state; it could be only temporary and transitional. That is why the protocol itself contains provision for it to be superseded, but I have heard no response to that point from anyone.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I certainly do not say absolutely that Article 16 is not the way to proceed, but I have spoken to lawyers much respected by people in this House—unfortunately I do not have their permission to give their names—who told me that we should not go down the Article 16 route because it would be a nightmare.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Why?

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I will put the two in touch discreetly and thereby not betray confidences.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord and I am grateful for his patience, but it really is not good enough, when this Committee is debating these matters, for him to say that there are problems in using Article 16 but not tell us what they are.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I am saying that there may well be problems. Indeed, I asked the noble Lord the other day, down the corridor, whether he was of the opinion that Article 16 could be used to solve all the problems. If it can be, fine; I am not ruling that out. However, if it cannot be, then the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is there on the table, and the issue raised by the Lord Chancellor is there on the table. Whatever about that, the protocol is intrinsically temporary. The whole basis of the negotiations that we entered into on the withdrawal agreement was that a permanent agreement could not be entered into in the withdrawal Act with the United Kingdom covering trade or other matters; that could happen only after we had left. Therefore, anything in the withdrawal agreement was intrinsically transitional and temporary.

Again, I have not heard a response on that today. I wait to be interrupted with a response to the point. Usually, it comes from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who wrote Article 50, but he has forgotten what the alternative is.

These are important issues. We need to know why we were told one thing, that this was temporary, and now are told another thing, that it is permanent. Until we get an answer to those questions, I do not know that our debate can proceed as productively as it ought to. There are other more general points which I would like to make but I will save them for another batch of amendments.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on the amendments and the wider context. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, the noble Lord, Lord Caine, and I always look down the list to see when the first group in Committee will be. We know that the clock will strike an hour because of the context that will be set in relation not just to the amendments in front of us but opinions on the particular Bill. Like the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I will focus on the specific amendments. Where I can add a degree of Ahmad colour, I will seek to do this in the best way possible.

As I and my colleagues have said, to pick up on a key point on the ultimate nature of the Bill, the reasoning behind the Government’s approach is that the Bill is consistent with our obligations in international law and supports our prior obligations to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, as has been said in various parts of today’s debate—and very eloquently by my noble friend Lord Lilley.

I will begin with Amendment 36, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on the issue of the powers. In the Government’s view, Clause 18 is not an extraordinary power. It simply makes clear, as would normally be the case, that Ministers are acting lawfully in this case. This point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and others and I will attempt to put some colour on this—I do not know whether it will be to noble Lords’ satisfaction. Clause 18 is included because the Government recognise that the Bill provides, in a way that is not routinely done for other legislation, for new domestic obligations to replace prior domestic obligations that stem from our international obligations. Those international obligations are currently implemented automatically by Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That conduit pipe currently constrains—and in the Government’s view could cause confusion in the future—how Ministers can act in support of the Bill. The Government put forward that Clause 18 is to provide clarity on that point.

I note the DPRRC’s view on the issue of delegated powers, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, highlighted again in his contribution. However, it is the Government’s view that the power being proposed here is within the normal scope of executive action. To provide a bit more detail, this would include, for example, direct notifications from Ministers to the EU. While I am sure—I am going to hazard a guess as I look around your Lordships’ House—that I may not have satisfied every question on that, I hope that that has provided a degree more detail.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Can I press him for a moment on what I understand to be his explanation for Clause 18, which is that otherwise there may be some concern that the exercise of powers is not consistent with Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018? I think that is what the Minister said.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I would put it slightly differently. That is the section I referred to, but it is to provide clarification in that respect. The noble Lord will interpret that in the way that he has, but I have sought to provide clarity on why the Government’s position is that this should be included.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Could I complete my point? I am very grateful to the Minister but I am puzzled by that explanation, because the Bill already deals specifically with this subject in Clause 2(3). I remind the Minister that it states:

“In section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 … after subsection (3) insert … This section is subject to”


this Bill. Therefore, with great respect, I do not understand why one needs Clause 18 to address exactly the same point.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I suppose that, with any Bill, the challenge for the Government is often to provide added clarification. That is exactly what we are doing, perhaps to emphasise the point that the noble Lord himself has highlighted from other elements of the Bill. I am sure that the noble Lord will come back on these issues, but if I can provide further detail on the specific actions that this would thereby permit, I will. As I said, it is a point of clarification, and I will write to the noble Lord on this point.

The best way I can sum up Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is that it is a well-trodden theme in the context of the Bill. The positions and different perspectives on this issue are noted. All I add is that the Government’s intention is to ensure that the powers—the ability for a Minister of the Crown to issue guidance to industry or provide direction to officials in relation to the regime put in place under the protocol—reflect their ability to carry out their responsibilities. In this case I can see no reason why Ministers should be able to issue “appropriate” direction in relation to trade with the EU via the short straits but only “necessary” directions over the Irish Sea.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I have already said that the Bill does nothing to affect the procedures applying under the CRaG Act 2010. I have been clear on that and it is specifically in front of me as I speak.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

If that is the case, would the Minister be sympathetic to an amendment on Report that puts that in the Bill?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I think my priority is to complete Committee. Of course, I look forward to Report and the amendments proposed and that is when we will have further discussions on this matter—

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I draw attention to the suggestion that Clause 20 should not stand part. During these Committee debates, we have addressed a number of extraordinary provisions in the Bill that give exceptional powers to Ministers, but Clause 20 really does take the biscuit, if that is a parliamentary expression. Let me emphasise what it provides. It provides that the role of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg is excluded, which we will all have a view about, but it goes on to say that Ministers can, by regulations, recreate the role of the European Court of Justice. Is it not quite extraordinary that a Minister should be able, by regulations, to confer a power on an external body to sit as the final judicial body determining issues that are relevant for the purposes of English law? Whether you agree with the role of the Court of Justice or disapprove of it, it cannot be constitutional for a Minister of the Crown to have an exceptional power to decide who and what is the final court of appeal for this country.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and add that it seems quite astonishingly narrow-minded and short-sighted to want to be rid of the European court in these circumstances. We heard at length last week about the effect on electricity, but there is a wider effect.

May I just put in a word of defence of the European court? I happened to visit it on numerous occasions. It has made some extraordinarily sensible decisions that have affected this country and particularly women, which is one of the reasons I support it. It is quite extraordinary that a Conservative Government, who I always thought had a broad view, should be quite unbelievably narrow-minded, and that some quite erroneous view of sovereignty should be taking over from the crucial role that the ECJ has to play in the work we are considering.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

If the role of the court of justice is, as the Minister puts it, a major obstacle because of democratic deficit, as he describes it, can he please explain to the Committee why Clause 20(3) would give an express power to Ministers to make regulations which would provide for a role for the court of justice? Surely that is inconsistent with what he just said.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising the point. The Government have always anticipated that the United Kingdom courts will be the final arbiter. The clause to which the noble Lord just referred your Lordships provides for the creation of a reference mechanism, but United Kingdom law would ultimately prevail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, addressed us on Amendments 42 and 43A. I argue that those proposed new clauses are in some respects unnecessary and in some aspects of their drafting inappropriate. Article 14(b) of the protocol already requires the specialised committee to

“examine proposals concerning the implementation and application of this Protocol from the North-South Ministerial Council and North-South Implementation bodies set up under the 1998 Agreement”.

That is an appropriate and valuable role. We submit that, by contrast, the noble Baroness’s amendments would create a statutory obligation for the United Kingdom to support

“proposals relating to the regulation of goods made by the North/South Ministerial Council and other North-South implementation bodies”.

That would cede control over the United Kingdom Government’s stance in the joint committee to a council in which the Irish Government sit. We consider that that would be inappropriate. The Government already ensure that representatives from the Northern Ireland Executive, as I said, are invited to meetings of the joint committee which discusses specific Northern Ireland matters, and which is attended also by the Government of Ireland. Therefore, we submit that there is already ample opportunity for representations to be made at the joint committee from both north and south.

We submit that the aspects of new clauses obliging the Government to lay reports before Parliament are also unnecessary. The Government have committed already to lay Written Ministerial Statements in Parliament before and after each meeting of the joint committee, and already do so. We also provide explanatory memoranda on matters to be discussed at joint committee meetings.

There is a more fundamental objection yet. The Bill is designed to restore the balance across all three strands of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. The analogy with the milking stool has already been made: the three legs are of equal importance. To further empower the north-south dimension to the comparative detriment of the east-west dimension, as the amendment would do, will, we submit, exacerbate the problems facing Northern Ireland and undermine that delicate balance of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. In that spirit, I urge the noble Baroness to not move her amendments.

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[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I keep hearing the words “democratic accountability” and then I look at the Bill and I cannot find any. We have listened as Clauses 4 to 21 have been debated in this Chamber. If we add those clauses together, we have a lamentable lack of democratic accountability. I expect it will be said, “Ah well, as always, the House of Commons can reject any regulations” and so on; and, “We have a long history of how there are 16 different ways in which the regulation-making powers can be exercised.” To that, I will say: but they have not exercised that power since 1979. This is not democratic accountability; this is quite extraordinary legislation, passing huge amounts of power into the hands of the Executive. Others have spoken. Clause 18 creates tertiary power—guidance—which is not quite a regulation of the sort we are talking about but can create matters that require compelling attention from those who have to abide by the guidance.

Let me just look at Clause 22(1), because it makes what has gone so far rather trivial. It states:

“Regulations under this Act may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including provision modifying this Act).”


I then add the words “and any regulations made under it”, because that follows. What it means is that the Bill, having been successfully enacted, could be dismantled by the Government two weeks later. It could be dismantled by a Government three years from now or by a Government 10 years from now. It could restore the very thing that the Bill says it is trying to get rid of—all in the hands of a Minister making regulations under the Act. That is not Henry VIII. I have lost count; I have tried to add it up in different ways. Is it Henry VIII plus Henry VIII for Clauses 4 and 5? That comes to about Clause 79. It cannot be. Is it Henry LXIV, because it is Henry VIII squared? This is an extraordinary power when the Bill is already riddled with Henry VIII powers. I am not jesting about this. The Bill provides for its restoration at any time that the Government of the day choose, or any part of it, or some of it along with other legislation. That is not how we should legislate. Should we not be ashamed of ourselves?

Parliament gave Henry VIII the power to bastardise his first and second children, to say that he was the Pope in England and that he was God’s messenger on earth, to decide the succession, and to say that the monasteries should all come down—the widest act of criminal damage this country has ever seen. Then he produced a Bill giving him the power, by proclamations, to create new laws. I shall not read it all out. What did the successor to that Parliament do? It said no. There was a battle, but in the end that power had this proviso to it put in by the Commons:

“nor that, by any proclamation … any acts, common laws (standing at this present time in strength and force) nor yet any lawful or laudable customs of this realm … shall be infringed, broken or subverted, and specially all those acts standing this hour in force which have been made in the King’s Highness’s time”.

He was not allowed to modify an Act of Parliament by proclamation.

We do not have proclamations anymore; we have statutory instruments. We have regulation-making powers that amount to a modern form of proclamation. We must not agree to clauses of this kind in any Bill. Those that we have agreed to—shame on us. We must not agree to this one. We must insist on the determination and, in its case, the courage shown by the 1539 Parliament not to give the King the powers he wanted. We must not give the Government the power they want in this clause.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, as we go through this Committee, we are discussing clauses that confound constitutional principle in ever more astonishing ways. I entirely agree with what was just said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. It is quite extraordinary that we should be asked to approve a clause that would confer power on a Minister to make by regulations

“any provision … including provision modifying this Act”.

The Committee has heard a number of powerful speeches over its four days explaining why it is wasting parliamentary time in analysing the Bill when it is a sideshow to the need to resolve the dispute with the EU. Whatever view you take about that issue, what is a manifest waste of time is for this Committee, and for Parliament on Report, at Third Reading and in the House of Commons on ping-pong if it comes to that, to debate, amend and approve legislation after lengthy debate, only for Ministers to have the power to say, “I don’t care about that. Parliament might have agreed it, but I’m going to set it aside. I’m going to substitute something else.” What is the point of parliamentary debate if that is what a Minister can do?

Indeed, such is the breadth of this provision that a Minister would have a power to substitute in the Bill something that he or she approves of that has been specifically rejected by Parliament. Parliament might have passed an amendment against the views of the Government, yet, under this clause, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, two weeks or three years later the Minister can say, “That may be what Parliament has done, but I’m going to insert something different”. As the noble and learned Lord said, we really have to take a stand. This cannot be right in principle and it cannot be acceptable to Parliament.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I want to add to the two speeches that have just been given, with every word of which I agree. The Minister may say that we are being hypocritical, as was said earlier, because there have been earlier Bills where we have allowed Henry VIII clauses; but I have been in this House since 2006 and in my time I have never seen a Bill anything like this one, with enhanced Henry VIII powers—or Henry LXIV powers. To my knowledge, in my time we have never had a Bill that has gone so far beyond what one might almost call the “normal” Henry VIII clauses. I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. It really is time that the Government stand back and ask, “Is this actually reasonable? What is it that we are trying to do?” It is utterly unacceptable.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Perhaps I could invite the noble Lord, when he writes to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to explain why it is appropriate for Ministers to have the power to make regulations to modify this very Act. Can he specifically address how Clause 22(1) fits with the clause mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, Clause 22(3), which contains the express exception:

“Regulations … may not create or facilitate border arrangements”?


Yet, as I understand this Bill, Ministers under Clause 22(1) could simply disapply Clause 22(3). It would be completely otiose. What is the point of having a restriction in the Bill that a Minister, by regulation, could simply disapply?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I shall of course cover the specific point the noble Lord has highlighted, as well. I appreciate that it is for the Government to make the case on the specific provision contained in the Bill to ensure that we can, as far as possible, satisfy the issues and the questions being raised.

Clause 22 sets out the general scope and nature of the powers contained in the Bill. This will ensure the powers have the appropriate scope to implement the aims of the Bill. The clause sets out that regulations made under the defined purpose of the powers in this Bill can make any provision—this was a point noble Lords made—for that purpose that could be made by an Act of Parliament. This includes amending the Bill, as the noble Lord has just pointed out, or making retrospective provision.

As the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said, the clause confirms that regulations under this Bill may not create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that feature, at the border, either physical infrastructure or checks and controls that did not exist before exit day.

Subsection (6) provides that a Minister can facilitate other powers under this Bill to be exercisable exclusively, concurrently or jointly with devolved Administrations. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised a specific point just now, which does require clarification on two elements within the clause. I will make sure that they are covered.

A concern was raised about the ability of the Government to work with the devolved Administrations. As I said on an earlier group, the former Foreign Secretary wrote to the devolved Administrations and we are engaging with them on the implementation and provisions of this Bill. It is the Government’s view that these new powers are necessary to make the regime work smoothly and to provide certainty to businesses.

While recommending in Committee that this clause stand part of the Bill, I recognise that, while we share moments of humour in Committee, it is right that these detailed concerns were tabled in the way they were. This allows the Government—