Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Main Page: Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Lester of Herne Hill's debates with the Scotland Office
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as I indicated at Second Reading, I am extremely uncomfortable with the proposed shift from a merits-based to a judicial review standard of appeal from Ofcom decisions, and I very much support these amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Indeed, he has made the case so thoroughly and strongly that I can be extremely brief.
It is inappropriate that in a market as innovative and fast moving—indeed, fast changing—as telecommunications, it should not be possible to test decisions made by the regulator not just on their legality but on their correctness and fairness in terms of the merits of the issues raised. As the noble Lord mentioned, I have received briefings both from Ofcom and from a group representing the bulk of the telecoms industry and industry more widely, through the CBI, as well as from the technological sector through techUK.
I remain slightly baffled at the apparent contradictions between the arguments cited by the two sides. I would encourage the Minister to look very carefully at these arguments to establish as clearly as possible where the evidence points—perhaps one could describe it as the merits of the case—before proceeding towards allowing only judicial review-based appeals.
I will not go through the detailed arguments because there is not a single one on my list that the noble Lord did not cover better that I could hope to do. However, from what I have heard, I am far from convinced that the proposed narrowing of the appeals standard will benefit either consumers or investors—and we need a great deal of investment in this sector—let alone the wider national interest in fostering a fair, competitive and vigorous telecommunications marketplace. I am therefore happy to support either or both of the proposed amendments. I hope the Minister will have another careful look at this issue and consider introducing amendments of his own, designed to ensure that important issues relating to the merits of Ofcom reviews can be properly challenged.
My Lords, I support these amendments, which seem a very good compromise. They ensure fairness and balance and avoid the very narrow approach of judicial review regardless of merit in any circumstances, without going into the substance of matters in a way that would turn the review into a whole general appeal. For those reasons, I am glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, is taking part in this debate. He will know a great deal about the subject from his private practice as well as his public practice. This is a good compromise. It may be that the Government can come up with something better, but this is certainly better than Clause 75 as it stands.
My Lords, I am not a lawyer—I feel a bit uncomfortable joining this debate; I am sure there are issues it is much beyond my abilities to deal with. But I say to the Minister before he responds, the point made about the degree of concern in the industry is important. This is a big and complicated Bill with many different aspects. It reaches far into aspects of our digital world. This clause, however, is the one that has generated the largest number of responses and—to judge from the meetings I have had with people—the most anger.
In a sense, so what? If it is the right decision, it should go ahead. However, it is clear that there is a lot of support for the current situation, even though there are arguments against it. The point was made time and again that the existing arrangements seem to work well, so why are we changing them? The industry, as I said, is pretty well united against it. One or two are speaking up for it but they do not represent the majority of voices we have heard.
There is also a real danger that—particularly at a time of uncertainty over technological change and regulatory positioning—having a period when we deliberately create confusion and delay until the new guidelines, or baselines, are established, is probably not the best way of making progress. Uncertainty over a long period will affect investment, which is not what we want. So there are reasons for asking the Government to be very clear that this is the right way forward.
We all share the same wish: we want an efficient and trusted regulator that can deal with this complicated, fast-moving and complex area. But it would be quite improper to have a situation in which there was a very limited right of appeal on any case determined not to have been carried out correctly—not so much about the judicial aspects, but on the merits of the case; in other words, where the evidence does not support the decision that has been taken.
I do not understand quite what the difficulties are. I have looked back over comments made by the noble and learned Lord when he was Advocate-General for Scotland. He is on the record in a number of places and a quick search with an algorithm of some complexity, which I could not possibly describe, reveals him to have said several things about judicial oversight. As it has developed, he says, it has,
“provided us with a flexible standard of oversight, which in many senses is wide-ranging”.
However, judicial oversight is the issue and that is what we have to emphasise. He might like to reflect on that in relation to what has been said. There are other things—I will not quote them as I am sure he is embarrassed enough already, or perhaps not. But the issue needs bottoming out—there is a serious point at its heart. There are issues that will affect the whole nature of the business we are regulating in this manner which need to be resolved.
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for raising this matter because it has generated a great deal of heat and debate in the context of the Bill. I appreciate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, with respect to the number of responses there have been. I just emphasise that judicial review is a form of judicial oversight, and a very effective one, but I will elaborate on that in a moment.
We are aware that the major telecoms operators in particular, and their agents, have lobbied vigorously and in detail on this point. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, brought out many of the points that have been made by their agents in the course of that vigorous and detailed lobbying. I shall not go into the detail of Ofcom’s position on this. It has expressed its position very clearly and we understand it. What I would say is that there is no single position for all utility sectors, and both judicial review and appeals on the merits may be used in the same sector for different kinds of appeals. It is not a black and white situation.
The Government’s case is not that this change is needed to ensure consistency with other utility sectors but that the public interest will be best served in the communications sector by an appeals regime that focuses on errors which Ofcom is alleged to have made, rather than asking the court to reach a different conclusion. Let us remember that Ofcom is a qualified regulator and its decisions are entitled to respect. They are informed decisions and they are not irrational. They are not determined on the toss of a coin. That is why judicial review is an appropriate approach.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also talked about consumers. I find that interesting. Perhaps I may refer briefly to the Which? response to Clause 75. It sees this measure as one of the most important currently contained in the Digital Economy Bill, saying that it will give the regulator the power and confidence to take the necessary actions to protect consumer interests without fear of costly and lengthy litigation procedures. Introducing a judicial review standard for appeals in telecoms will mean that decisions made by Ofcom in the interest of consumers should be easier to implement and quicker to take effect. That is a reflection of Ofcom’s own view of the matter. This is not necessarily about coming to the aid of Ofcom but about recognising these matters from the perspective of the consumer. That is extremely important.
Currently, appeals brought under Sections 192 to 196 of the Communications Act against Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are decided “on the merits” by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. That exceeds and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, acknowledged, effectively gold-plates Article 4 of the EU framework directive, which requires that the merits of the case are duly taken into account in any appeal. That is not quite the wording of the proposed amendment.
The result of this over-implementation is an unnecessarily intensive and burdensome standard of review that can result in very lengthy and costly appeals litigation, which in turn can hinder timely and effective regulation. Some of the appeals that have taken place have done so over extraordinarily lengthy periods. Of course, the very large communications operators are in a position to fund that sort of appeal process. Clause 75 will change the standard of review so that the Competition Appeal Tribunal will decide appeals against Ofcom’s decisions by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review and, in particular, judicial review of other administrative actions. This will focus appeals on the key questions of the legality and reasonableness of Ofcom’s decision-making.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, suggested that there might be cases in which there was simply no merit in a decision. If that was so, and if Ofcom proceeded without reliance on the facts of a particular case, that would be amenable to review under a judicial review standard.
Judicial review itself varies according to whether or not there is a European element. If the review is about a case where free speech under the convention is concerned or an EU directive is concerned, then judicial review embraces the principle of proportionality. However, if it is not about a case where European law can be involved—either system of European law—under the deciding case law, judicial review does not apply the principle of proportionality. In other words, it still—in my view, wrongly—does not look at whether the means employed to pursue a legitimate aim are necessary to achieve that aim. Is not what I have just said an indication of the unsatisfactory nature of relying on judicial review as the solution?
With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, I have to say no, because here we are dealing with judicial review in the context of the EU framework directive, which requires that the merits of the case are duly taken into account in any appeal, therefore effectively introducing the issue of proportionality into that process. Therefore, even if there are cases which some might criticise as involving too narrow an approach to judicial review, that does not apply here. This is an incidence in which the issues of proportionality will arise in the context of judicial review. By taking this route, we are applying an appropriate standard to Ofcom’s decision-making.
As has been acknowledged by noble Lords, this is a fast-moving sector, and regulation needs to be able to keep pace with technological and market changes. This is rather difficult when appeals can drag out for a year after a regulatory decision has been made. As the UK’s expert regulator in the telecommunications sector, it is right that Ofcom itself should be given an appropriate margin of appreciation by the tribunals. That is why we have an expert regulator there—so that it can make an informed decision that should be given an appropriate margin of appreciation by the Competition Appeals Tribunal.
A judicial review basis for appeals is intended to be a flexible process that will ensure that those affected by Ofcom’s regulatory decisions can still challenge those decisions effectively within the framework of Article 4 of the EU framework directive. A number of Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are already appealable only on a judicial review basis. I made the point earlier that, with regard to individual regulators, you can find instances in which there is a merits-based appeal for some matters and a judicial review standard in respect of others.
By changing the standard of review to reduce over-lengthy and costly litigation, this clause will enable consumers to benefit sooner from the outcome of decisions made by Ofcom in pursuit of its statutory duty to further the interests of consumers. I emphasise that: one of Ofcom’s statutory duties is to further the interests of consumers. The clause will also remove a significant potential barrier to the participation of smaller communications providers in the appeals process, benefiting smaller, “challenger” communications providers. Again, they are inhibited by the prospect of massive merits-based appeals going before the Competition Appeal Tribunal.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has tabled two alternative approaches. Amendment 215 would replace the existing “on the merits” standard with a requirement for the tribunal to take,
“due account of the merits of the case”.
I acknowledge that the amendment essentially replicates the wording of Article 4 of the EU framework directive, albeit it is not identical to it. While this would in one view remove the gold-plating of the existing standard in a technical sense, the Government consider that it would not lead to any substantive change in approach. That might be why this proposal is being pushed so hard by the major operators in the telecoms sector. It would not, therefore, result in quicker appeals, timelier implementation of regulatory decisions or resultant consumer benefits.
Amendment 216 would alternatively replace the existing “on the merits” standard of appeal with a list of specified grounds. The tribunal would be able to uphold an appeal only where it was satisfied that Ofcom’s decision was wrong on one or more of these grounds. However, as noble Lords may be aware, the previous Government consulted on a similar approach in 2013 and we do not consider that this approach has merit. On balance, we consider that such an approach would risk significant satellite litigation if it were to be introduced—about the nature of the new standard of appeal, for example, which could lead to longer appeals and further regulatory delay. A standard of review based on judicial review principles, including the principles of proportionality in the context of the application of the European directive, which is well understood and used in many other sectors, will minimise this kind of uncertainty. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, this is a paving amendment for this group of amendments. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones asked just now what the appropriate collective description of Queen’s Counsel is. I was pondering that; at first, I said to myself, “Avarice”, but then I thought that the true answer would be given by The New Yorker book of cartoons, which had a cartoon of a lawyer looking at his client and saying, “How much justice can you afford, Mr Pitkin?”
The Committee will be deprived of several speakers who cannot be here today, who have supported this amendment and the others in the group. They include the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Inglewood, who asked me to apologise on their behalf.
I explained in previous debates why I believe that statutory underpinning is needed to protect the BBC’s independence and viability, free from political interference. During the take-note debate on the draft BBC charter on 12 October 2016, I expressed the hope that the drafts would be amended. I pointed out that the central problem with the Government’s proposals for the charter—raised across the House by, for example, the noble Lords, Lord Fowler, Lord Inglewood and Lord Best, former chairs of the Communications Committee, the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, Lord Burke, Lord Pannick, Lord Colville and the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and my noble friends Baroness Bonham-Carter and Lord Foster of Bath—is that there are no statutory criteria or requirements that must be met in the charter or the agreement with the Secretary of State.
I noted that the draft charter and agreement did not put the Government under any duty to ensure that the BBC remains independent. They contain no obligation to ensure that the BBC is properly funded to perform its public functions. There is no commitment to avoid further top-slicing of the licence fee after the transfer of the cost of free licence fees for the over-75s, which will have a serious adverse effect on the BBC’s funding and programming—a 20% to 25% cut in licence fee funding. In my view, that was unseemly and deeply regrettable, but it is now too late to reverse it.
I criticised the lack of an independent process for appointing the members of the new unitary board on merit, to prevent cronyism. I warned that Ministers remained able to determine what “distinctiveness” means. There was no protection for the BBC against much richer competitors, challenging the current and future BBC programming. Powerful criticisms to similar effect were made across the House, but the Minister did not give ground on any of those points. The new charter and agreement were brought into force completely unchanged. As the Minister may confirm—I hope that he will—the Government retain the right to make further inroads into the BBC’s revenue by transferring responsibility, including liability and costs, for any public expenditure.
I also spoke during the Second Reading debate on the Bill on 13 December 2016—I am becoming something of a BBC charter bore in this House. I explained that what I meant by statutory underpinning is that Parliament should prescribe the basic principles protecting the BBC’s independence and viability as a public service broadcaster. I concluded by describing myself as an optimist and expressed the hope that the Government will sympathise with our moderate and practical approach. I am still optimistic that we may reach agreement with the Government on a protective framework of principles during the remaining stages of the Bill’s passage. That would be in the Government’s, and the public, interest.
A question raised by these amendments is one of principle, to which I would be grateful for the Minister’s reply. The question is this: is statutory underpinning of a royal charter both possible and legitimate? I hope he will confirm that the answer is yes.
There are several precedents for a combination of legislation and charter, notably the Leveson legislation on the print media and the National Citizen Service Bill. Both provide underpinnings for royal charters, although no doubt civil servants will come up with clever arguments as to why they are different. However, I am not raising that question but the question of principle: is there any reason in principle why statutory underpinning is incompatible with the idea of a royal charter?
In his letter to me of 4 January, for which I am grateful, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, claimed that the Government had increased the BBC’s freedom, “to use its money as it sees fit”. I should be grateful for his confirmation that the BBC’s revenue from the licence fee is indeed the BBC’s and not the Government’s money, and for his assurance that there will be no further raid by this Government on the BBC’s revenue. Will he also confirm that without legislation, a future Government would be free to make further raids: in other words, that the most he can do is give an assurance about this Government? The Minister went on to say in his letter that the Government remain of the view that any statutory underpinning to the charter which would expose the BBC to party political pressures would not be in the interests of an independent BBC. There is a whiff of the Brexit debates about that statement. Ministers exercising monarchical prerogative powers claim to be better able to protect the interests of the BBC than Parliament. I agree that the BBC needs to be protected against politicians, whether in or out of office. Ministers are as susceptible to party political pressures as other MPs, and the BBC needs to be protected against both. If the amendments are agreed to, they will give protection and can be abolished or weakened only by a future Act of Parliament. I submit that Parliament’s use of its legislative powers provides better protection than ministerial assurances, which in any case are outlived when the Government change.
I turn now to the specific amendments and hope that the Minister will be able to reply to each of them at the appropriate point. I introduced them in some detail in my speech at Second Reading, so I will not bore the Committee by going through them again. I simply wish to explain to those who are interested what the amendments are designed to. Your Lordships will see that Amendment 217 on the Marshalled List is simply a paving amendment to provide the statutory underpinning that follows. Amendment 218 deals with the independence and funding of the BBC. I am not going to read out the whole amendment—some of it can be found in the royal charter, but in my view all of it ought to be in legislation. If it can be in the royal charter, I am puzzled as to why the Government believe it should not find its way into the Act of Parliament. For example, subsection (2) would insert proposed new section 198ZC, in which new subsection (1) states:
“The BBC is to be independent in all matters concerning the content of its output, the times and manner in which its output is supplied, and the governance and management of its affairs”.
Does the Minister agree with that? I am sure that the answer is yes. Proposed new subsection (2) goes on:
“The Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, the BBC, OFCOM, and all other persons and bodies with responsibility for matters relating to the governance and establishment of the BBC must ensure that the BBC is able to operate independently from Ministers and other public authorities in the United Kingdom”.
Again, does the Minister agree with that? I would expect him to say yes.
Proposed new subsection (3) states:
“In carrying out the duty … the Secretary of State and other Ministers of the Crown must not seek to influence the BBC’s decisions; and … must have regard to the need to defend the BBC’s independence; and the need for the BBC to have the financial and nonfinancial support necessary to enable it to exercise its functions”.
Does the Minister agree? Surely, he does. Then, in carrying out the duty, the Minister,
“must have regard to the need for the public interest to be considered in regard to matters relating to the BBC”.
Again, I see no cause for controversy.
Proposed new subsection (4) states:
“The Secretary of State must make available to the BBC sufficient funds, through the licence fee and otherwise”—
because there are other ways of funding apart from the licence fee—
“to enable the BBC to perform its functions and public purposes as a public service broadcaster”.
I cannot see any conceivable controversy about that notion.
Proposed new subsection (6) states:
“The licence fee is to be for the exclusive benefit of and use by the BBC to fund the performance of the BBC’s functions and public purposes”.
Again, I should have thought that was obvious. Then there is indexation, but I do not need to pause for that.
I will come to that. Of course, future Governments will have to make their own arrangements in negotiations with the BBC. The BBC licence fee is a tax. Of course, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the elected Government have a say in how taxes are raised and spent.
The Minister has twice said that the licence fee is a tax. What is the basis of that? I would have thought that the licence fee is a service charge for a service provided to those who pay the licence. That does not sound like a tax. It is not imposed by the Treasury. It is a service fee. When I watch television, because I am old I no longer have to pay, for some reason—that is another matter—but I cannot understand how it can be regarded as a tax. By calling it a tax, surely the Minister is making a threat about future inroads into the BBC’s revenue.
I certainly do not intend to make threats and I am hardly in a position to do so. I called it a tax because it is so classified by the Office for National Statistics. It is regarded officially as a tax.
The funding agreement announced last July included a number of measures which will increase the BBC’s income—for example, the closure of the iPlayer loophole and the increase of the licence fee with inflation. In combination with the transfer of funding for the over-75s concession, this means that the BBC will have a flat cash settlement to 2021-22, not a 20% cut. Indeed, the director-general said in July last year:
“The government’s decision here to put the cost of the over-75s on us has been more than matched by the deal coming back for the BBC”.
The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, would endanger the effectiveness with which the BBC can be governed, and weaken the incentives for the corporation to strive for excellence and efficiency, as well as public support for the BBC’s funding.
As noble Lords know, both Houses had many opportunities to shape the future of the BBC throughout the charter review, and the Government appreciate that valuable input. But we remain of the view that the royal charter in its current form has served the BBC extremely well over many decades. The BBC agrees. The BBC’s director-general, Tony Hall—the noble Lord, Lord Hall—has welcomed the new charter, saying that,
“we have the right outcome for the BBC and its role as a creative power for Britain. It lays the foundation for more great programmes and journalism”.
With that, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. I am not at all surprised and I remain optimistic. What I shall now do is read very carefully all the points he has made, look at the amendments that we have been discussing, strip out anything which can reasonably be objected to in the opinion of the Government and those taking part in the debate, and come back to the matter on Report—
If it is helpful, I am very happy to meet and discuss this.
What I am hoping will happen is that Lord Hall of Liverpool—the director-general—will meet Ministers himself. He has been quoted in particular ways now and I will not attribute any views to him, because that would jeopardise the independence of the BBC, but I very much hope that he will meet the Secretary of State and explain privately what he thinks about these issues. From my point of view, as a would-be midwife, all I am trying to do is create a framework of principles which do not have any of the detrimental effects that the Minister has pointed to. I will seek to do that, and I hope that it will not be necessary on Report to divide the House. I am optimistic enough to believe that a thinking, open-minded Government in discussion with the BBC could come up with some statutory underpinning that would give a framework of principles without these detrimental effects. On that basis, I shall withdraw this amendment and will not pursue others in the group.
I apologise to the places, their populations and to the noble Lord, Lord Hall, himself. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Best, for his amendment. I agree with the object, but not the means. In fact there are not three but four options open to the Minister. The first, and most pathetically moderate, is of course my original one in Amendment 219, where I borrowed from the way that we deal with judicial salaries and revenue by proposing in new subsections (9) and (10) that “the board”—that is to say, the BBC board—
“must publish a recommendation to the Secretary of State on the amount of funding that the Secretary of State should make available”.
This is on the basis that the BBC should know best what it needs. Then the Secretary of State publishes,
“a response to each recommendation made under subsection (9)”.
If this is rejected, we are in a completely hopeless position so far as this subject is concerned.
My problem with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Best, is that it is a bit odd to give the regulator the function of recommending an increase in the licence fee. That is why I have produced Amendment 222A to create an independent body—the licence fee commission. The disadvantage of this is that we do not like creating a whole lot of new bodies unless there is some very important reason. Then the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and Lord Wood of Anfield, have a more modest way of achieving the same thing: they would have a BBC licence fee commission to do it. Those are, I think, the four options. My own view is that the Government should now accept one of them or come up with a formula of their own that we can agree on Report. I am optimistic that this will happen, so I am now watching this space with great enthusiasm—and suspense.
My Lords, I support the drift of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Best; I think that we need a proper, open, rigorous and transparent means of setting the level of the licence fee.
A little bit of history is that we did have a commission in the late 1990s, when the then Government appointed Gavyn Davies, a very distinguished economist and later chairman of the BBC, to do just that. As you would expect, he produced a searching, rigorous report. A further little bit of history is that he made a recommendation, and the Secretary of State, as you expect in politics, lowered the recommendation; as you do not expect, it went to No. 10, and the then Prime Minister not only upped his Secretary of State but recommended a level for the licence fee which was higher than that which Gavyn Davies recommended. It was the famous RPI plus 1.5% for seven years settlement, which allowed the BBC fully to enter the digital age. It was the process that Gavyn Davies led that enabled the Prime Minister to make a considered judgment.
However it is done, that body needs to look at the total environment. The most important issue in British broadcasting today, barely discussed at all, is the long-term decline of UK production. It is not going up; it is going down. It is going down because of the economic position of ITV and Channel 4. Any discussion of the level of the licence fee should look not only at the BBC but at the totality of the broadcasting production environment in the UK.
Some suggest that the licence fee should be linked to the RPI. There can, from time to time, be good reasons for that. I think that, strategically, it should be linked to GDP. The BBC performs a fundamental role in society, like the Armed Forces. We have a view of GDP and the investment we should make in the rest of the world; we should have a view in relation to GDP of how much we invest in our most important public service broadcaster. When GDP is stretched, as it has been over the past 10 years—though, thankfully, it is going up again—and if the country’s economy is suffering a reverse, then the BBC’s revenues should go down. If the country is prospering, so should the BBC—so should society’s investment in its most important public service broadcaster.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who tabled these amendments today, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Best, and the Communications Committee, which he chaired. I am also grateful for the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Birt, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, on the future of the licence fee itself and how it may be arranged in the future, which is slightly separate from the debate we are having today about the process for doing it. I accept that, as technology changes, the way it is structured may have to be changed in the future. I hope we can have debates on that separately at some stage in the future. I am also grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Stevenson, for their amendments.
Today we are debating a new nuance regarding the BBC licence fee. On a number of occasions, Members of the House have been clear that they would like to see an end to what some have called “midnight raids” on the BBC licence fee, and we have listened to that. The BBC’s new charter regularises the BBC’s future financial settlements for the first time, and the next one will be in five years’ time. In the meantime, there will be an inflation-linked increase.
The current charter also requires the BBC to provide data ahead of each licence fee settlement to inform the Government’s decision. It is, therefore, explicitly clear that the BBC will be able to make its case and the Government of the day will be able to consider that. It also follows that anyone with valuable views and thoughts on the subject, including noble Lords—many of whom I know have experience in these matters—can share these views with the Government when the time comes.
The noble Lord, Lord Best, suggests that Ofcom should recommend what the level of funding for the BBC should be, and he proposes further that there should be a public consultation on the appropriate level of funding. It is entirely appropriate that the assessment of the BBC’s funding needs and the subsequent level of the licence fee should remain a matter for the Secretary of State. As I said before, the licence fee is a tax paid by the licence fee payer, and taxation is a matter for the elected Government rather than an unelected regulator. It is right that the Government should have some responsibility for decisions that affect the tax bills of UK citizens, as I have set out before. We would be setting potentially odd incentives for the BBC’s regulator if—as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, pointed out—it would now also be called upon to make funding recommendations. The now-abolished trust model showed that mixing regulatory and strategic functions breeds confusion and conflicting incentives. The consensus has been that this has not worked and we do not want to recreate this model.
Ofcom needs to concentrate on regulating the BBC effectively. The noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Stevenson, have both proposed the establishment of an independent licence fee commission to make recommendations to the Secretary of State. We agree with the sentiment of independent advice. The Government stated in their White Paper, published last May, that they would consider taking independent advice at the next settlement should it be appropriate. However, that is a matter for the Government of the day. As with Ofcom, it would not be appropriate for an independent commission to make recommendations on level of taxation.
As I listen to the noble Lord, the problem arises when he says, “That would be a matter for the Government of the day”. All this is very interesting and relevant, but none of it is binding. Effectively, the Minister is putting forward perfectly reasonable ideas for the future, but none of them has any bite. None of them is binding unless Parliament makes it so. I am afraid it is a question of wriggling to find ways of avoiding any parliamentary underpinning at all. It is that which everyone who has spoken in this House, but one, believes to be wrong. Therefore we will have to come back to it on Report.
I understand the point the noble Lord is making; he illustrated it right at the beginning of his speech in the previous debate. This is a matter of principle: whether we think statutory underpinning is the right mechanism for the royal charter for the BBC. I acknowledged to him that in some cases it might be, but I did not agree that it was appropriate for the BBC. I take his point and his due warning about Report. I agree it is relevant to this, but we have established that we have a disagreement on that point of principle. As for binding future Governments, of course we do not want to do that, and, in fact, we cannot.
The next question is that of public consultation on the settlement or the level of the licence fee. As noble Lords will appreciate, funding a public service is not a straightforward topic for public consultation. For example, the recent charter review found that almost 75% of the public consider the BBC’s programming to be of a high quality, but just 20% said that they would like to see the licence fee rise in line with inflation, thus helping the BBC maintain these high standards. Public consultation, therefore, needs to be approached with due sensitivity.
The BBC’s funding needs are a very complicated and technical issue, as we have seen at every licence fee settlement. The judgment about the overall package is a fine one. It should therefore remain for the elected Government to decide how to approach reaching an appropriate level of BBC funding in a detailed and extensive negotiation with the BBC. As I have said, this resulted in a position that the director-general has said is a strong deal for the BBC that gives it financial stability.
Finally, Amendment 223 seeks to remove the ability of the BBC to set age-related licence fee concessions in the future. I have already explained that the licence fee is a tax and it is right that the Government should retain the ability to determine the outline priorities of what it should be spent on. The BBC explicitly sought responsibility for the age-related licence fee concession. Removing the BBC’s ability to determine this policy—for which it will pay—simply prevents the BBC being the master of its own destiny. I believe it is particularly arbitrary to withdraw the BBC’s ability to set this concession without knowledge of what the overall funding package for the BBC will be at that future point. I do not believe that that is in the BBC’s interest, now or in the future. With those explanations I hope that, for the time being, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.