Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Main Page: Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Non-affiliated - Life peer)My Lords, the amendment stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I shall speak also to some other amendments in my name and that of others that are in this group.
In his reply to the Second Reading debate on 9 November, the Minister responded positively to the serious concerns raised across the House and undertook to meet them by devising a parliamentary procedure that would,
“ensure proper public consultation and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny … We will also seek to amend the Bill to include safeguards to give independence to public bodies against unnecessary ministerial interference when performing technical functions, and when their activities require political impartiality and the need to act independently to establish facts”.
The Minister also undertook to see whether some of the bodies needed to be removed entirely from Schedule 7, and to address concerns,
“about bodies that deal with matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice”.—[Official Report, 9/11/10; Col. 184.]
The Minister explained that the detailed and expert scrutiny by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, as well as the Constitution Committee, would all need to be taken into account. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I serve, has just met. It is awaiting a human rights memorandum from the Cabinet Office and hopes to report before Report.
The Minister’s positive response was welcome. He and his advisers have been generous in meeting noble Lords for further discussions. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published its report on the Bill three days later on 12 November.
Amendment 1 is important because it would pave the way for the proposed new clause to place restrictions on the powers conferred by the Act to act by way of delegated rather than primary legislation whenever Ministers intend to abolish or interfere with the constitutional arrangements, funding or management of the many disparate public bodies within the Bill’s reach. It is more than just a paving amendment since it is linked with the proposed new clause in Amendment 175, which would set clear limits on the exercise of the wide powers delegated to Ministers by the Bill. Taken together, Amendments 1 and 175 would perform the essential purpose of making Ministers accountable to the courts for breaches of well-known standards of public administration. I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 1, or its effect, thereby leaving himself time before Amendment 175 is reached to modify his position on the further safeguards and restrictions that are needed. Amendment 1 would leave the door ajar, but it is the key that opens the door.
Our amendments, which have support from all sides of the House, need to be viewed in the context of the other amendments on public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny and approval that will together create an appropriate framework for the exercise of these wide powers. They seek to make the Bill accord with constitutional standards and good practice, respecting the different institutional competence and separation of powers between the Executive and Parliament, and between those branches of government and the independent judiciary. Taken as a whole, they seek to secure democratic accountability to Parliament and the citizen, as well as to the courts in accordance with the rule of law. Like the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, I believe that consultation should include public consultation.
If the House can agree on such a framework at an early stage in our debates, full arguments about whether particular orders should be made for this or that public body will be able to be made at the proper time by those affected and by each House of Parliament as and when a Minister finds it expedient to invoke the powers conferred by the Bill. The chilling effect on the independence and proper functioning of the bodies that need to operate independently of unnecessary ministerial interference will be greatly reduced, because Ministers will not be able to use the powers conferred by the Bill in the manner of Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell. Parliament will require them to be accountable to the courts, to the public and to each House before they may do so. That is the necessary price they must pay for seeking powers of this magnitude.
There are four restrictions in Amendment 175. They seek to protect judicial independence, respect for human rights, a sense of proportion, and the independence and impartiality of bodies whose activities require them to act independently and impartially without unreasonable ministerial interference or direction.
Subsection (1)(a) of the new clause that would be inserted by Amendment 175 would protect the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and other public bodies or officeholders who perform judicial functions. The proposed provision embodies the principles of the rule of law and judicial independence that are set out in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, but it goes further by referring, as does the Equality Act 2010, to those who perform judicial functions even though they are not courts or tribunals. That also accords with the Minister’s assurance at Second Reading that he would address concerns,
“about bodies that deal with matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice”.—[Official Report, 9/11/10; col. 184.]
I hope and expect that no Minister would wish to do otherwise.
Government Amendment 112 is narrower than Amendment 175, as it refers only to the independence of the judiciary. I hope the Minister will accept that, in principle, what he said at Second Reading needs to be reflected in the Bill on Report.
The activities of several public bodies within the Bill’s reach have been designed to promote or protect human rights. Those bodies include the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Children’s Commissioner, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the BBC, Channel Four Television Corporation, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the Legal Services Board, the Parole Board, the Sentencing Council for England and Wales and others. If Ministers were to act in a way that undermined the capacity of such bodies to promote or protect human rights, they would not, as the Explanatory Notes to the Bill explain, directly engage the convention rights but they would undoubtedly engage the convention rights indirectly. Many of those bodies have a strong case for being removed from Schedule 7 altogether, as some of the bodies have to act judicially even though they are not courts in the classic sense.
I accept that it would not normally be necessary to make express provision to compel Ministers to act in a way that is in accordance with the convention rights because that is done in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, but subsection (1)(b) of the new clause that would be inserted by Amendment 175 includes such a provision for the avoidance of doubt. The proposed provision would include the rights protected,
“by common law or equity”,
lest it be thought that such rights were abridged or reduced by the general powers conferred by the Bill. We look forward to the Minister’s response on that issue.
The formula used in Clauses 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(b) is taken from Section 3 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, so it provides that Ministers may not,
“remove any necessary protection, and … prevent any person from continuing to exercise any right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect to continue to exercise”.
Those provisions are vague, and the Explanatory Notes on the Bill are, if I may say so, opaque and much less illuminating than the Explanatory Notes that were provided for the 2006 Act. Therefore, I ask the Minister to confirm that the notion of “necessary protection” includes, as is the case in Section 3(2)(d) of the 2006 Act according to the Explanatory Notes on that provision, matters such as,
“economic protection, health and safety protection, and the protection of civil liberties, the environment and national heritage”.
I also ask the Minister to confirm that Clause 8(2)(b) is intended to include both convention and common law rights, including legitimate expectations.
The third restriction, in subsection (1)(c) of the new clause that would be inserted by Amendment 175, would require the use of,
“proportionate means to attain the objectives prescribed by section 8(1)”.
Paragraph 20 of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report draws attention to the fact that the Bill as it stands draws on the language of Section 3(2) of the 2006 Act, but that,
“significantly, the Bill does not import the other tests in section 3(2) of the 2006 Act: that the effect of the order is proportionate to the policy objective; that it strikes a fair balance; and that it is not constitutionally significant”.
The need to strike a fair balance is, I am sure the Minister will confirm, already included in the concept of proportionality, so there is no need to mention that in Amendment 175. It is also doubtful that there is any need to include a reference to what is or is not constitutionally significant, since the central purpose of Amendment 175 is to delineate the constitutional contours in the Bill. However, it is essential to include the requirement for the looser of the powers conferred to be proportionate to the legitimate aims prescribed by Clause 8(1).
The concept of proportionality is as English as apple pie, or as Scottish as haggis. The decision-maker must not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut and must not use lawful powers excessively or in a way that results in overkill. That is the basic principle used by both European courts and our own courts in giving effect to EU and convention law, and in applying the common law whereby the courts have said there is little difference between rationality and proportionality. In any assessment of proportionality, the courts leave a proper margin of discretion to the decision-maker, but it is essential to make it clear in the Bill that the powers that are delegated must be applied with a sense of proportion.
In his letter to my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester of 19 November, in response to her committee’s report, the Minister accepted that considerations of proportionality are clearly an aspect of Ministers’ considerations when having regard to the objective of securing increased efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the exercise of public functions, but he did not explain why the Bill should be weaker in that respect than the 2006 Act. The subject matter of the two measures is different, but the principle of proportionality should surely apply to the exercise of Ministers’ powers under both measures as a matter of legal obligation.
The Minister’s letter to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, in response to the report from her Constitution Committee, also seeks to justify the Government’s reluctance to include the requirement of proportionality in the Bill, as the previous Government did in the 2006 Act and in other legislation, including the Equality Act 2010, as the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, will recall. Yet the Minister acknowledges that:
“A decision which was not proportionate, or was irrational, could of course be challenged in the Courts in the normal way”.
Quite apart from the fact that the principle of proportionality has yet to be fully recognised by our courts as a general principle of administrative law, there is no justification in that letter—or, I submit, otherwise—for failing to include the same protection against the excessive use of Ministers’ powers in this Bill as in the 2006 Act. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who can be said to be a rather greater authority than I could ever be in administrative law, will want to explain further the importance of the principle of proportionality in the context of this Bill.
Our Amendment 175 also requires:
“Where the nature and activities of a public body or office require the establishing of facts or the giving of expert advice independently and impartially, the powers conferred by the Act must be exercised in a way which ensures that the public body or office remains able to act in accordance with those requirements”.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee refers to this important issue in paragraph 38 of its first report. The Government’s amendment to Clause 8 is better expressed than our amendment, but it leaves the matter to relevant consideration by the Minister and is therefore weaker.
Amendment 106 is included to ensure that the matters to be considered in Clause 8(1) apply to the exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 11 to amend Schedules 1 to 6. Amendment 109 is designed to make the protection in Clause 8(2) objective rather than subject to the Minister’s discretion. Amendment 110 would make it necessary for the Minister to act reasonably, but those amendments will probably be unnecessary if, as we hope, the principle of proportionality is included in the Bill as an objective requirement. I beg to move.
The noble Baroness makes a powerful case, but can she help me? The powers in the Bill are wide enough to deal with bodies that have outlived their useful life or are in need of substantial and radical reform. My idea is that it would be a sensible way forward to hedge the powers with sufficient safeguards. What about the noble Baroness’s approach? What happens if Ministers rationally and proportionately decide that body X has outlived its useful purpose or needs radical reform? Would not her Amendment 107 produce a situation of fossilisation?
The idea is that they should have regard to those objectives. If the objectives are no longer required, or if they could be dealt with in a different way by a different body, that would be one thing. My concern is that if we look only at the issue of independence—which I spoke about, and stressed the importance of, at Second Reading—this will not be sufficient if the power given by the Bill to a body to make sure something happens is still needed. There is nothing else in the Bill as it stands—and even with the other amendments—to make sure that those duties, for example to look after the interests of consumers in rural areas, or of vulnerable consumers, are still carried out. They must have regard to those interests, but my concern is that the purpose for which primary legislation set up these bodies, and the duties which it gave them, should be considered by the Minister before he exercises his power. In passing the Bill, Parliament must be confident that where the functions are still needed, they will still exist under the new body, which will have the same strength to safeguard whichever group of users or vulnerable people or pension members whose interests are covered by the 150 groups listed in Schedule 7. Therefore, the amendments in this group seek to ensure not only that the new bodies are independent, but that the purposes for which Parliament set up the old bodies, if they are still needed, will be retained by the new bodies, which will have the relevant powers.
My Lords, may I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord a question? By implication, I think he is suggesting that I am slightly too moderate, which may be the case. But if one takes as an example the Judicial Appointments Commission and assumes that some minor but necessary changes need to be made to its structure or administration, one has the ironclad and objective safeguards of independence as well as the other safeguard written in of objective standards. One has also the safeguards of public consultation and the need for the Minister to come before each House to justify the order on the facts, with reasons given. Is the position of the noble and learned Lord that, even with all those safeguards, nothing can be done in relation to that body except by primary legislation? If that is his position, with great respect, it seems disproportionate.
My Lords, as always the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has made a good point. But the fact of the matter is this: is the procedure set out in this Bill the appropriate way of dealing with the minor amendments to which he has referred? He has taken as an example the body which, ironically, was designed to achieve the independence of the judiciary from the Executive by ensuring that the way in which judges are appointed is separated from the Executive. What the Bill will do is say that if we want to amend or abolish that body, we will go through a two-stage process. First, we will move it to another schedule, and possibly discuss that in this House. We will then go through another process to achieve the desired amendment. If it is wrong in principle, as I submit it is, to treat a body of this sort by placing it in Schedule 7, then the fact that one day some minor amendment might need to be made to that body does not justify the treatment being proposed. The Judicial Appointments Commission justifies proper consideration because even minor amendments can affect such a body in ways that caused this House to look so carefully, in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, at how in the future we would appoint our judges.
My Lords, this has been a remarkable debate, with more than 20 speeches that will be read long after we are all dead, because the importance of this constitutional issue transcends anything that we are considering today. I am grateful to all noble Lords and to the Minister for their contributions. I will make no attempt to summarise or reply to the more than 20 speeches, although I will say that I find myself agreeing with almost everything in all of them.
Before I explain what I think is the right approach, I will respond to what the Minister has just said by noting the gains that we have made and those that we still need to make. I think that that is the most practical way of proceeding and I shall, I hope, do it quickly.
The Minister’s first point was that he wants, through government Amendment 108, to amend the Bill to safeguard the independence of public bodies in exercising certain functions by amending Clause 8 to ensure that Ministers consider, and so on. The problem with that amendment, as several noble Lords have said, is that it relies on the subjective consideration of the Minister, and that, I think, is something to which we shall have to return.
The report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee says that the additional safeguards in Amendment 108 are still too limited. The Minister helpfully explained that the Government take the report very seriously and that they are going to consider it and further detailed points, which is most welcome. He then made clear the necessary protections which the Minister must consider to be satisfied, including the independence of the judiciary. He explained that he wants to make it clear that the principle of judicial independence, as guaranteed by the Constitutional Reform Act, is not altered or weakened in any way by the Bill. That, of course, is the reassurance that one would hope for.
The Minister then dealt with my amendment which says that the powers must be exercised in a way that is compatible with judicial independence and the exercise of judicial functions. He indicated that he will take away my concerns and think about whether that can be reflected in the Bill. That is most welcome and I am grateful.
He then said that, given the concern expressed by noble Lords, he will look again at the inclusion of bodies with a judicial function in Schedule 7. He reassured us that he will bring forward amendments in relation to those bodies for a debate on the schedule later in Committee. Again, I think that the Committee will find that most welcome.
The Minister then mentioned human rights, pointing out that there is no need to refer to the convention rights in the Bill. However, that does not deal with the problem of rights going beyond the convention in common law and equity. That may be something that one needs to think about hereafter.
He then turned to the notion of necessary protection in the Bill, confirming that it extends to economic protection, health and safety, and the protection of civil liberties and the environment. That, again, is welcomed. He then turned to the important question of proportionality and said that he is still inclined to think that a specific reference to it is not needed in the Bill. I strongly disagree with that—a view that I think was expressed by several noble Lords.
The Minister dealt with the orders under Clause 11 and said that he would look again at whether there was any benefit in extending Clause 8 to apply to the powers in Clause 11. I think that most noble Lords hope that that will be done.
He then dealt again with the phrase “if the Minister considers”. However, most noble Lords have indicated that that is not good enough. The Minister said that he thought the Government’s amendment strengthening the requirements in Clause 8(2) struck the right balance, whereas he believed that the regulatory reform committee’s suggestion that it should be for Parliament would not strike the right balance. That is clearly a matter for future debate.
The Minister then turned to the interesting points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, concerning her amendments. I think that the Minister may have misunderstood the noble Baroness’s point. It is not about independence at all. She submitted that one needs to make sure that Ministers understand the core functions and raisons d’être of a particular organisation before they even think of exercising ministerial powers. That is something that the Minister may therefore want to consider.
I come to what is called the courage of my convictions. I do not need any instruction on the courage of my convictions, but I am a practical fellow and trying to think about what is the most sensible way forward. We all know that it is the practice of this House not to make amendments in Committee unless there is an extremely good reason for doing so. In this case, I want to leave breathing space between now and further proceedings in Committee—not between now and Report—to give the Government the opportunity to do the sort of things that the Minister has indicated today and which noble Lords around the Committee have also indicated. Having heard noble Lords speak, I do not think that Amendment 175 goes far enough. If I divide the Committee, I will probably win on Amendment 1, but it will serve no practical purpose unless a clear series of safeguards follows.
After a two-hour debate on matters of fundamental importance, does the noble Lord accept that it would be of value for the Committee’s opinion to be tested so that the Minister—whose open attitude is much admired by all noble Lords—and the Government generally are left in no doubt of the Committee’s views on the need for further essential safeguards to be written into the Bill?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for asking a question which I am trying to answer as I speak. The Minister will have heard everyone around the Committee. I am sure that some of us recall what was once said by Archbishop William Temple in a famous lecture: “Whenever I travel on the Underground I always intend to buy a ticket, but the fact that there is a ticket collector at the other end just clinches it”. The Minister has heard the voice of a united Committee, and I am going to be pusillanimous and much criticised for my moderation in not dividing it. However, I do so as a friend and supporter of the coalition. Unless we get the amendments that have been asked for on all sides of the Committee, this Committee will act as the ticket collector rather than myself. If we are trying to achieve a constitutional Bill that we can pass, the right way to do that is not by flexing our muscles on Amendment 1 and proceeding on that basis.
Can the noble Lord explain the difference between the strength of feeling at Second Reading—which we agreed was very strong and very united, but not tested because of the protocols of this House—and the strength of feeling today? If I understand him, he feels that he has not yet been heard properly by the Government. Why does he think that the strength of feeling today is different from that on the previous occasion and, therefore, that it will be heeded on this occasion?
I do not think that it is different. If anything, it is stronger; but it is certainly as strong as it was on Second Reading. I am trying to consider how best to persuade the coalition Government, whom I support, to make these changes. I believe that we will have more influence by not dividing the Committee. Having said what I have said, I hope that noble Lords, except those who are dying to win a vote, will hold off for now so that we can come back quite strongly—
Does the noble Lord appreciate that he might withdraw his amendment, but that the Committee might not agree that the amendment can be withdrawn when it is called?
I appreciate that. I ask noble Lords to consider that, if there were a vote, I would not be able to support it; and on that basis, I think it would be quite likely that, if my noble friends agreed with me, the vote would be lost. That would be a misfortune. I think it is much better that we stay united and that the Government listen to the Committee as a whole rather than that we play games at this time in the afternoon.
I understand the noble Lord’s dilemma as we have discussed it before. If I were asked whether the Minister will try to help the Committee, I would answer yes, because I think that he really wants to. However, I do not think that that is the problem. I think the problem is that the Government have got themselves locked into a position where this Bill in its present form is necessary to them. I would like to lend strength to the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, and winning a vote would do that.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, but in the end I have to form a judgment about how we as creditors, coming to the aid of the Government who need our support, can best produce a stabilisation grant that will enable them to do so at a time where there is this great difficulty. My judgment is that by being moderate today, we will have more credit for the future. If I am mistaken, I promise Members of the Committee that I shall not be able to be as loyal as I am today to the discipline imposed on us. Having said all that—and it is not a threat, simply a promise—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.