Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 20th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support my noble friend Lady Hayman, who performed an excellent destruction of this clause. Other noble Lords have said much the same thing. I have one question for the Minister, because this is all about the Crown, but I cannot see any definition in the clause of who “the Crown” is. There are other definitions in other parts of the Bill, which include the Duchy of Cornwall, which I shall come on to in the next amendment, the Duchy of Lancaster, and the Crown Estate. It makes me think that what we are really trying to do is to go back to a time when we had “the Crown” in the shape of Henry VIII, who could do more or less what he wanted. This seems a very good start to the Government’s plan to give Henry VIII, in the shape of whoever is in charge at the time, carte blanche to do what they want.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. Before we hear from my noble friend, I want to say that Section 293 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 defines what is Crown land and goes on to make it clear what is an appropriate authority for the purposes of what is being introduced in Section 293B, down to and including,

“in relation to Westminster Hall and the Chapel of St Mary Undercroft … the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Speakers of the House of Lords and the House of Commons acting jointly”

being the appropriate authority.

I want to ask my noble friend about something because I simply do not understand it. There is an existing Section 293A, which as it stands is called “Urgent Crown development: application”; it has almost the same name as new Section 293B. I completely understand that the existing legislation does not appear to include all the provisions relating to how the Secretary of State deals with such an application and how the Secretary of State might give permission, so it is probably defective. But then I do not understand why all this is being added in and Section 293A is not being repealed. Perhaps my noble friend can explain that to me.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, looking first at this clause as a totality, I will begin by explaining briefly the purpose of the proposed measure. The purpose of Clause 101 is to update the existing provisions for development by the Crown that is of national importance and required urgently by providing a new, faster, more effective and efficient route for seeking planning permission. It also provides a new route for nationally important development that is not urgent. The objective of these reforms is to ensure that planning decisions can be made in a timely and proportionate way on development that is of national importance and is promoted by the Crown.

Let me banish what I have perceived from this debate is a misconception. A special urgency procedure for urgent and nationally important Crown development has existed in legislation for many years. The purpose of the clause is to update this route so it can be used more effectively to deal with urgent national crises and supplement it with a new route for making a planning decision for non-urgent planned Crown development which is of national importance.

The Government believe that, where a Crown development is of genuine national significance, the Secretary of State, who is democratically accountable to Parliament, should be able to make a planning decision rather than an individual local planning authority answerable to its local community. The Secretary of State is best placed to take a national, balanced and impartial view of the need for development.

Let me explain that nationally important but non-urgent applications will still be considered against the plan-led approach we advocate through the Bill, and local communities will be given their opportunity to give their views and have these taken into account. Again, there is precedent for this type of approach within Section 62A of the Town and Country Planning Act, where planning applications can be submitted directly to the Secretary of State. It is thought that this route would be suitable for development such as new prisons and extensions to the defence estate.

All sorts of hares have been set running on this provision, and it is most important for me to emphasise that the urgent route that we are introducing would be used sparingly where—and only where—it can be demonstrated that development is needed urgently and is nationally important. Those are high bars, but the route could, for example, be used for development needed on Crown land to develop medical centres in the event of a pandemic. Such development will need to be operational in a matter of weeks so decisions can be made very quickly. Other examples could include accommodation needed urgently in the event of a future influx of refugees, or military training facilities.

I was grateful to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for at least part of what he said, if not for all of it. Press reports have been misleading on the issue of housing illegal migrants. As I have said, the power can be used only for Crown development which is of both national importance and needed urgently. As I have said, this is a high bar, and Crown bodies making an application will need to justify that using this route is appropriate.

This does not concern any situation that we may currently be facing on illegal migrants. In the first place, it is worth bearing in mind that this power will not take effect straightaway, contrary to reports in the press. The Bill needs to finish its passage through Parliament and then we will need to lay regulations and produce guidance before this can properly be brought into force. That will take time. To this end, it may not be a suitable route for the immediate issue of housing of migrants to address the current immigration backlogs. In the case of asylum accommodation on MoD bases, it will be for the Home Secretary to decide whether to bring forward an application when the powers are in place.

We recognise that the procedure for this urgent route is not the same as the more commonly known statutory procedure for determining planning applications. It is therefore, I say again, a route that will be used sparingly. I say to the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, that those promoting the development must clearly demonstrate that there is an urgent need for the development, that timely decisions cannot be delivered by other planning routes and that it is therefore in the wider public interest that the planning decision is accelerated using the new procedure.

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Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

258B: Clause 102, page 130, line 28, at end insert—
“(5A) Where a subsequent planning permission (Permission B) is for localised changes to a wider development approved in the existing permission (Permission A), which would not have the effect of rendering the implementation of the Permission A physically impossible, the implementation of permission B does not preclude future reliance upon Permission A (in relation to existing or future development) outside of the area to which permission B relates.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would support the continuation of “drop-in” permissions in large-scale developments, while maintaining the “Pilkington” principle, that they must not render the original permission physically impossible.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I remind noble Lords of my registered interest as chair of the Cambridgeshire Development Forum. This group relates to planning permissions. There are a number of different amendments for different purposes and perhaps noble Lords will forgive me if I speak only to my Amendment 258B, which has a particular purpose. It seeks to provide a clear, statutory provision in relation to an area of planning law that has recently become uncertain and which if not clarified would create a number of costly and difficult consequences both for developers and planning authorities.

I will explain the background. The issue relates to large developments which are built out over a significant period; they are developments which have had a full planning permission. Of course, if development proceeds in phases with outline permission, or with a hybrid mix of outline and full permissions for different phases, the scope for varying a large development can be adjusted over time—but I am talking here about developments with full planning permission. In relation to those, it is clear that variations to that full planning permission are limited. Section 96A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 permits variations to a planning permission that are not material. Clause 102 of the Bill seeks to insert into that Act a new subsection (5) stating that planning permission may be granted in relation to an existing permission

“only if the local planning authority is satisfied that its effect will not be substantially different from that of the existing permission”.

That is not quite the same as the existing law; it is a step forward, but a very modest step in that direction. However, the issue is where a developer seeks permission within the boundary of an existing large-scale development for a significant variation to the plan. What happens where two permissions exist together in relation to the same site?

This matter arises in relation to what is known as the Hillside judgment—Hillside Parks Ltd v Snowdonia National Park Authority—to which I will return soon. The Supreme Court judgment was given in November last year, so it is quite recent. In paragraph 28, it said:

“There is … no provision of the legislation which regulates the situation where two or more planning permissions granted for development on the same site are, or are claimed to be … inconsistent. The courts have therefore had to work out the principles to be applied”.


The key case in this respect, up until now, has been Pilkington v Secretary of State for the Environment. I will not dwell on the two bungalows and the smallholding which were the subject of that case. Lord Widgery, in his judgment, stated that the test would consider

“whether it is possible to carry out the development proposed in that second permission, having regard to that which was done or authorised to be done under the permission which has been implemented”.

In a sense, what Pilkington established was the idea that permission could not continue to be valid where it had become physically impossible to implement it by virtue of a subsequent planning permission that has been consented. However, that has tended, over time, to imply that, where it is not physically impossible to fulfil an existing planning permission, it would remain valid, notwithstanding that there is an additional permission in relation to part of the site. So the general expectation has been that, where permissions relate to the same site, the issue is whether the implementation of one renders the other physically incapable of implementation. If it does, the approval of the latter would render the former invalid; if it did not, the former permission would not be invalidated.

I turn now to the Supreme Court judgment of the Hillside case in November last year. An issue for the appellants—Hillside Parks Ltd—was that the Court of Appeal had held that the original planning permission for the whole site could not be interpreted as separable. Paragraph 71 of the judgment of the Supreme Court justices said:

“We agree with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in this case that where, as here, a planning permission is granted for the development of a site, such as a housing estate, comprising multiple units, it is unlikely to be the correct interpretation of the permission that it is severable”.


Consequently, if a permission were implemented in relation to a part of a larger site, even if the rest of the original permission could be completed, the fact that the whole original permission could not be completed would render the original permission no longer valid.

The problems that arise from this were summarised in submissions to the Supreme Court by counsel for the appellants who submitted that it would cause serious practical inconvenience if a developer who, when carrying out a large development, encountered a local difficulty or wished for other reasons to depart from the approved scheme in one particular area of the site, cannot obtain permission to do so without losing the benefit of the original permission and having to apply for a fresh planning permission for the remaining development on other parts of the site. The Supreme Court justices took the view that that was indeed the legal position: that where a developer had been granted a full planning permission for one entire scheme and wished to depart from it in a material way, it is a consequence of the very limited powers that a local planning authority has to make changes that a full new permission would be required.

I am very grateful to the Home Builders Federation, which supplied a full briefing after I tabled the amendment. It supplemented my knowledge quite a bit. I hope noble Lords have received its briefing, which included several case studies to show how these consequences of the Hillside judgment last November could create cost, delay and disruption to development in large sites. I am not proposing to go through the case studies. I hope noble Lords will understand that at this late hour that would not be terribly helpful. It implies, however, with a series of examples, that the cost of a new, full application with all the attendant documentation, such as environmental impact assessments for a whole site, would be a very costly and time-consuming consequence.

Local planning authorities will not easily resource new large-scale applications for sites which they had regarded as already consented. It could mean that opportunities for desired changes, such as, in one example, to give a small builder access to part of a larger development, would not be offered if they would put the whole scheme at risk. I do not think we can even get into how difficult the community infrastructure levy or, in future, the infrastructure levy, would be to calculate in relation to such further planning permissions relating to the whole existing site. The uncertainty of whether the permission for a large site might be rendered invalid would be a serious risk to the effective delivery of major sites. Only immaterial changes on a large site would be regarded as safe: everything else would put it all at risk.

My objective in Amendment 258A is to give a straightforward statutory provision which would re-establish the position as it had been understood, i.e. that only if a subsequent permission renders the completion of an original permission physically impossible would the earlier permission be invalidated and—perhaps even more important by contrast—if it does not render the original permission physically impossible on the rest of the site, the earlier permission may continue to be relied upon in relation to the rest of that site, i.e. excluding the area to which the subsequent permission has been applied.

I am very grateful for the vocal support I have received for this amendment from the Home Builders Federation. I hope that the Minister may be able to support the intention of this amendment to the extent that she might even look to Parliamentary Counsel’s expertise to see whether my amendment serves the purpose or whether something supplementary might be moved on Report to achieve this—I hope—helpful objective. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 268 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to which I have added my name. I have to say at the outset that I have no idea whether the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, would agree with my comments, but I hope that he would.

Your Lordships have listened to, and taken part in, many debates over the years on the challenges faced by rural communities. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, and my noble friend Lord Foster of Bath have chaired committees looking in depth at these challenges. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, called for a national rural strategy, and I support this. Similarly, my noble friend Lord Foster pressed the case for there to be proper recognition of the challenges rural communities face and for the Government to have a discreet policy which recognises this. There is an industrial strategy, so why not a rural strategy?

The Government’s response was that all the issues faced by rural communities were covered under many other policy areas, so there was no need for a rural strategy. Assurances were given that all government policies would be rural-proofed. This, therefore, was a refusal to have a rural strategy—and there is very little evidence that all government policies are rural-proofed.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I will certainly reflect on that question and see what we can do.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, for his amendments, and I appreciate his concerns on a matter, which is close to his heart and to the heart of the noble Baroness opposite. While I support the intentions to lend further support to our rural economy, unfortunately I cannot accept this amendment, as it will not have the intended effect, and we believe it is unnecessary.

The permission in principle consent route is an alternative way of obtaining planning permission for certain housing-led development. When a proposed development is under consideration, it separates the matter of principle away from technical details. Our national planning policy framework strongly supports policies and decisions to promote sustainable development in rural areas. In particular, it states that to support a prosperous rural economy, local plans, neighbourhood plans and decisions should enable the development and diversification of agriculture and other land-based rural businesses.

Additionally, as set out in Section 58A of the Town and Country Planning Act, any economic development coming forward through permission in principle would have to be predominantly for housing development. Provision already exists to allow local planning authorities to grant permission in principle for economic development related to residential schemes within rural areas. Section 5A of the Town and Country Planning (Permission in Principle) Order 2017 also enables local planning authorities to grant permission in principle to any non-housing development if it is associated with residential development, and where the scale of the development and the use to which it may be put is specified.

I am aware that permission in principle is often used to test the principle of housing development within rural areas, rather than applicants going through the conventional planning application route, and these are assessed with our National Planning Policy in mind. It is a valuable tool in this respect, and I hope this provides reassurances to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and accordingly that she will withdraw his amendment on his behalf.

I turn now to Amendment 282, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, and put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, on the speeding up of the planning system. There are around 400,000 planning applications every year. The Government have heard many representations that the planning application process is too slow and inaccessible for some users—notably those without the expertise, such as everyday people. It therefore requires improvement and modernisation. The powers being brought forward in Clause 116 enable the Government to apply a more consistent, streamlined and digitally enabled approach to the way in which the applications are made, making it easier for everyday people to submit a planning application. This will also make planning data more accessible. My department is already working with local authorities to tackle the very issue that this amendment raises, working collaboratively with the local authorities through the Open Digital Planning project, which aims to increase efficiencies in the development management process through creating modern development management software. Local authorities using the software that we are trialling have seen an estimated 35% time saving in the pre-validation process, when an application is first submitted, and post-validation, when the process is to reach a decision.

Before enacting these powers, we will fully engage with the local planning authorities and the sector as a whole; given that one of the core aims of this power is to streamline the process, we will of course consider the impact on speed of decision-making. While I support the intention of this amendment, the Government are unable to support its inclusion and hope that the noble Baroness will not press it.

Lastly, government Amendments 260A and 260B provide for consequential amendments to Clause 102 to make consistent the legislation with respect to an application being made directly to the Secretary of State, in relation to new Section 73B and Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend, particularly for the opportunity to have further discussions with a view to coming back to this issue positively at Report. Drop-in permissions have played a significant part in enabling development to go ahead as people need it to do. The case law may now be clear, but it has become clear in the form in which it has developed only because there is no statutory basis for undertaking drop-in permissions in the way that they have been done for a number of years—and that is what we need to achieve. With her very kind response, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 258B.

Amendment 258B withdrawn.