Trade Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Lansley
Main Page: Lord Lansley (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Lansley's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think that this is a very good amendment and I will come to the substance of it in a second. I just want to make two points by way of introduction. First, here we are at the beginning of February—a new week and a new month—and we are still in an absolutely ludicrous position, presenting an almost unbelievable picture to the world of a country with a Government doing their best to damage their own economy. Every day we have new evidence of this. Today we had the worrying story from Nissan. Many of us who have focused on the mess the Government are in could speak on the subject for hours.
There is another example from the last few days. We say that when we leave the European Union we want to sign trade agreements with those countries which currently have trade agreements with the EU. One of those countries is Japan. Japan has just signed a trade agreement with the EU. At the very best, I suppose, if the Japanese were to give us exactly the same terms—which is unlikely because our bargaining power vis-à-vis Japan is nothing like the power that the EU has—it would take a minimum of five years, and probably nearer 10, to conclude this deal. So the Government are saying that we are walking away from a trade agreement in order to spend a vast amount of time and money and suffer a lot of uncertainty before perhaps, in many years’ time, finally reaching another trade agreement that may not be as good as the one we now have. I put it to the Government: what kind of reason or logic is that? What a way to run a state. What a way to look after not only this generation but future generations of British people and make sure that they have a viable economy on which they can actually base a reasonable standard of living and a reasonable level of public services.
The Government are already under attack in this place, quite rightly, for their delivery of public services. We had a very interesting series of Questions earlier about the health service. The Government are undermining the future ability of the British economy to deliver the wealth we need to maintain our public services at acceptable international levels. This is quite apart from the impact of their policies on individual wealth and prospects for individuals who want to travel or study abroad or benefit from all the other freedoms we will be giving up. It is a very serious matter. The muddle the Government are in about the damage that is being done makes the whole picture even more disgraceful—that is the only word I can use.
I think my noble friend’s amendment is excellent. I agree with everything he said when he introduced it—and that noble Lords on both sides of the House said—about the importance of services. We all know that they are 80% of the British economy. But I have one question. Why has he not put goods in there as well? It seems to me that exactly the same principles apply to goods. I just looked at the amendment, and if you were to add the words “goods” wherever “services” are mentioned, you would not produce any particular anomalies or logical or linguistic problems. I do not know why goods have been left out of this particular picture. As I said, exactly the same principles apply. We want there to be no new barriers—that sums up everything. “Barriers” includes tariffs, quotas and non-tariff barriers, so the ground would be covered quite well by doing that.
My noble friend rather implied that he was putting forward this amendment in order to have a debate on an important subject—which is a very worthy thing to do in this place. Perhaps I have that wrong, but it sounded as though that was what he had in mind, and we are of course having that debate at the moment. However, it seems to me that it would be even better if we got this proposed new clause on to the statute book. We would be doing a very good day’s work for the country if we could manage to do that. Therefore, I ask my noble friend why he came to his decision. I am sure that there must be a very good reason, which perhaps I am being foolish in not anticipating, but I do not understand why we do not include goods.
These debates are becoming extremely unreal. One likes to think that one’s service in Parliament, whether in the Commons or in the Lords, is based on being clear in one’s mind and discussing and working out with colleagues what is the best policy for this country. But we have a Government who are not pursuing the objective of the best policy for this country. We have a Government who are destroying British industry and commerce where they can—so it is a very unreal situation. I do not know how much longer this country can go on in the hands of people who take that attitude when they have in their charge the very considerable, and in my view very important, responsibility of governing the United Kingdom to the benefit of our citizens both of today and of tomorrow.
My Lords, in following the noble Lord’s remarks, perhaps I may say that the unreality of debates in Committee on this Bill will be exacerbated if we not only have amendments that, quite properly, raise relevant issues that are not presently included in the Bill but we then use them as the basis for a wide-ranging debate on every occasion. Let us not do that. On occasion, we in this House look broadly at what the resolution to our current impasse might be, but we also have a responsibility to use our time well on this Bill to try to ensure that it is effective legislation, because we might need it.
In that context, there is a very simple reason why trade in services is not in the Bill: the General Agreement on Trade in Services is multilateral, not plurilateral, so there is no need to legislate for this as it is something we are a party to only by virtue of our membership of the European Union. That is why the government procurement agreement has got into the legislation. If that were true for the General Agreement on Trade in Services, that would have to be included as well, but it is not; every member of the WTO is a member of the GATS.
However, the question is: do we want to legislate to mandate the Government in the negotiation on a future free trade agreement to seek to provide for a continuing and complete reproduction of our current relationship with the European Union, or at least to the extent that the amendment asks for that? As far as I can see, it asks for it up to mode 3—it does not include mode 4 arrangements, which allow for natural persons to be present in other member states—thus excluding the free movement of individuals for the purpose of the delivery of services in other member states. Therefore, it is not a continuity amendment, or at least it cannot be presented as such.
From the point of view of Ministers, broadly speaking at the moment it is important for us to understand to what extent free trade agreements that might be reproduced by way of continuity agreements in the event of a no-deal exit might lead to the perverse situation whereby we have greater service sector access to third countries than we do to the European Union, which would mean considerable dislocation for service industries in this country.
Finally, much as I wish that we were staying in the European Union and continue to argue that we should be in a customs union with a degree of regulatory alignment—we will come on to that briefly later—I certainly would not go as far as the amendment implies, which is that effectively we should be rule-takers on services with the European Union. That could be a very unhappy place for us to be, given that services make up 80% of our economy, as has been said. The fact that we are in a customs union for goods will therefore not preclude us from engaging extensively in discussions on trade in services with third countries, which is where much of the action may well be in future trade negotiations.
I am grateful for this opportunity to raise the issue of free zones. I thought I was likely to end up moving this amendment at about 10 pm last Wednesday, so it is a pleasure to have it on in prime time but, recognising the value of this time, I will be as brief as I can.
The point about this amendment is that free zones were legislated for way back in 1979. Indeed, they featured, not least during the 1980s, as part of a broader industrial strategy. I do not propose today to debate the merits or otherwise of free zones, because there are arguments that cut both ways. They are, by their nature, a distortion: they distort the customs and regulatory framework in favour of specific geographical locations. None the less, there can be significant benefits associated with that happening in circumstances where one needs to advantage certain geographical areas. That is why, for example, they have been used in the past, and are used widely around the world, in relation to some more disadvantaged economic areas, and specifically in relation to ports of entry—not just seaports but airports and the like. The reasoning there is that the ports of entry to an economy are often in competition not so much with other parts of the geography of that country as with other ports in neighbouring areas.
The European Union has a general disinclination towards free zones because the single market effectively creates one single customs territory. Arguing against myself, if we were to be in a single customs territory with the European Union, the question of free zones would probably not arise at all—but if we are not to be, it ought to arise. Under these circumstances, it would be good to legislate in the Bill to encourage Her Majesty’s Treasury to bring forward both a consultation allowing the merits of free zone designation and its use in this country to be debated, and proposals to Parliament about how that designation might be deployed.
There are ports that are interested in this, and the Treasury’s approach—that it is happy to consider free zone designation under the 1979 legislation—is understandable. But it is for the ports themselves to decide whether they wish to do this. I understand some ports may wish to; Teesport and Humberside are interested, and Associated British Ports is interested. If we leave the European Union and do not form part of a customs territory with it, they may well bring forward proposals. In the interests of the legislative approach to this, we should have something that encourages that to happen as quickly as possible in an ordered way. That is why the deadlines in the amendment are swift: to initiate a consultation within three months, and to report on that consultation within six months. In quite short order after exit day, we in this country could see to what extent our ports would need and benefit from free zone designation to enable them to compete more effectively with other ports—not least those on the other side of the North Sea or the English Channel.
That is the reason we should think about this. Those bringing their goods to Europe have never previously had to think about customs or other formalities, or the imposition of duty on those goods if they are brought to the United Kingdom and then re-exported elsewhere in Europe. Unfortunately, they may have to think about that.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. As he rightly says, free ports are distortionary by definition. If you create a free port close to another port, one will survive and the other will probably disappear altogether. Does he think his Government would be tempted by the thought that they could say, “If we have a local MP who votes for us and supports this Government, we will make the port free; but if we have an MP who dares to vote against us, we will make the port unfree and ruin it”?
The noble Lord will observe that the amendment seeks a consultation on the part of the Treasury, and that consultation would undoubtedly enable these issues to be explored on an even-handed basis. In the scenario I was describing, any port would be free to come forward and seek designation. It is not something that would be handed out on the basis of any partiality; rather, it would be done by examining the cases made by those ports. The point is that whereas in the past we may have concluded that there was no basis for introducing such a distortion into our economic activity, if and when UK ports are principally having to compete in international trade with other European ports, we may conclude that it is not a distortion to trade inside the United Kingdom. Actually, it is an aid to competitiveness for the United Kingdom in relation to ports elsewhere in Europe. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for moving this amendment. He has managed to get on to prime time in this territory. I once represented a seat on Teesside, which is very close to my heart. The idea has been advocated by the excellent mayor there, Ben Houchen, and by some of the local MPs, such as Simon Clarke and Rishi Sunak.
To reassure my noble friend, the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979—CEMA—allows for the designation of free zones, as he mentioned. The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, which the Government passed through your Lordships’ House last September, allows HMRC to make regulations regarding goods kept in a free zone. Under CEMA, operators are free to apply to become a free zone. The Government are open to any ideas that might deliver economic advantages for the UK and will continue to examine the role that free zones may play as part of this. Assuming that we will have an independent trade policy, we will be able to have these types of examinations and innovations.
Existing customs facilitations in the UK offer the same benefits as free zones, but are not geographically limited and can be accessed anywhere across the country, thereby potentially having more widespread benefits for the UK as a whole. For example, a manufacturer could import materials for its products and store them in a customs warehouse anywhere else in the country, without duties being paid on them. The manufacturer or its supply chain could then use those materials in its manufacturing process under inward processing relief and could export the finished goods without any UK customs duty ever having to be paid. Those existing facilitations, therefore, avoid the distortions to which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, referred, which can arise from free zones where a manufacturer or its supply chain would be required to locate on the same site to benefit.
The UK’s ability to formulate a free zone that diverges from the Union customs code will depend on the future relationship with the European Union. The Government have also been clear that it is a commercial decision for operators to make on whether they want to apply for designation of an area as a free zone, and we will review any applications made. I am not able to be more helpful than that to my noble friend at this point, much as I may wish to be.
Since there is no recent substantial experience of free zones, does my noble friend not think it would be helpful—if we arrive at the point where we exit the Union customs code—for the Government at least to initiate a consultation to look at the criteria that would be applied in examining the designation of free-zone status?
My noble friend will be aware that “consultation” has a specific meaning now in legal terms, which is quite an onerous responsibility of the process. We could seek ways to discuss—perhaps with BEIS as part of the industrial strategy—or to engage with others who are interested. He mentioned Humberside, Teesside and others, and I think we could look at ways in which that could be done. I am very happy to take that thought back to the Treasury and write to him further on that.
Once again, I am grateful to my noble friend and that is a very welcome comment. I look forward to further discussion about that but, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I just want to say a word on this. I will not add much, because the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, has illustrated the nature of the issues here very well. I would just emphasise that, if the Government are looking to vary Clause 6 as it came from the other place, it is important for them to do so while recognising the importance of seeking to maintain and maximise our co-operation and partnership on medicines and clinical matters across Europe. There are issues such as European reference networks for rare diseases, which are valuable mechanisms for co-operation; there is work together on clinical trials and the implementation of the clinical trials directive.
As far as the European Medicines Agency is concerned, none of us realistically expects that, if we leave the European Union, we will have mutual recognition of authorisations between the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency in this country on the one hand and the EU on the other. Even if we were to offer to recognise European Medicines Agency authorisations in this country, I do not think that will be offered, because the European Union will not contemplate a third country providing what it regards as the equivalent of its own authorisations with its own control of data and jurisdiction under the European Court of Justice. That is not going to happen.
However, from early on in the negotiations it was clear that we should aim, if possible, for the scientific evaluations presently carried out by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, prior to the authorisation process, to continue to be done by the MHRA. That is not presently anticipated by the European Medicines Agency, and that is one of the reasons why the Dutch, Germans, French and others are gearing up their medicines regulatory authorities to do much more of this work. They recognise that—to give perhaps the maximum illustration—over 40% of the work on the authorisation of medical devices across Europe is done by the MHRA, and an even higher percentage for the more complex and significant medical devices. It is far from the case that this can be readily adopted and delivered in other EU member states. It is in their interests and ours to continue to work together—something like 80% of the total work is in the scientific evaluation rather than in the subsequent authorisation process.
I know Ministers are continuing to think about how we can achieve this level of co-operation, and I hope that, in that spirit, even if Clause 6 does not end up providing this mandatory structure for the negotiations, Ministers will be forthcoming none the less about how we might make progress in the direction that the noble Lord in his amendment is aiming for.
My Lords, I start by thanking my noble friend Lord Lansley, who has paved the way quite well for some of the remarks I will make on this issue. This amendment, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raises an important issue which the Government are committed to addressing, and that is our future relationship with the European Medicines Agency.
Medicines regulation is inextricably linked to the UK’s fantastic life sciences sector. The UK has one of the most productive health and life sciences sectors in the world. The sector is critical to the UK’s health and economy, contributing over £70 billion a year and 240,000 jobs across the country.
We have been clear since the referendum result that our overarching aim for medicines and medical device regulation is underpinned by three clear principles: first, that patients should not be disadvantaged; secondly, that innovators should be able to get products to the UK market as quickly and simply as possible; and, thirdly, that the UK should continue to play a leading role in promoting public health. This is why the Government, in their White Paper The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, set out their aim to secure active participation in the EMA. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used the word “imperative”, and that is very much noted on this side.
However, the clause binds our hands ahead of negotiations with the EU on our future relationship. We have always been clear that continuing to share our skills and expertise is the best outcome for UK and EU patients. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, cited part of the political declaration; that declaration underlines the UK and EU’s mutual commitment to working together in the future on medicines regulation, and to negotiating the UK’s ongoing co-operation with the EMA. That particular area was raised by my noble friend Lord Lansley, but I will go slightly further, because the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, picked up on the word “co-operation”. I say again that we want to retain a close working partnership with the EU to ensure that patients continue to have timely access to safe medicines and medical devices. The political declaration explicitly makes allowance for a spectrum of outcomes and commits both the UK and the EU to exploring the UK’s relationship with the EMA.
The Government, as I said earlier, set out their ambitions for the future relationship in the July White Paper, making it clear, again, that we are seeking participation in the EMA. I can provide the Committee with some additional detail, however, some of which has been alluded to by my noble friend Lord Lansley. The UK is seeking an agreement that will allow the UK regulator to be able to conduct technical work, including acting as a “leading authority” for the assessment of medicines, and participating in other activities, such as ongoing safety monitoring and the incoming clinical trials framework.
I hope these brief comments provide enough reassurance to the Committee. Given that continued EMA participation is already a negotiating objective of ours, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary. The Government are already committed to ensuring that, after we leave the EU, UK patients can access new medicines at the same rate as they do now.
My Lords, following the excellent speeches we have just listened to, beginning with my noble friend Lord Stevenson, I support this group of amendments and appeal to the Minister seriously to consider reversing the ERG amendments, not just for the detail and well-founded points and reasons that have already been made, but because the Government did not choose to accept them. They were foisted upon them, because of the arithmetic and politics of the situation, and wanting bigger fish to fry. As a result, we have a defective Bill, even by the Government’s own objectives. I ask the Minister seriously to consider on Report, rather than facing a possible vote and even defeat given the cross-party support that exists, getting the Bill back to where it was before the ERG plundered it.
My Lords, what connects this group of amendments is that they are European Research Group’s amendments in the Commons that were accepted by the Government. I do not think they should be treated by my noble friends on the Front Bench as if they all had the same merit or otherwise.
The single UK customs territory, which is now Section 55 in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, specifies that there should not be a separate customs territory between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Frankly, I cannot see the circumstances in which this House or the other place would find this acceptable. That being the case, I cannot see any merit in this House seeking to ask the other place to think again about that issue. I do not think anybody in the other place is proposing to revisit it, so my suggestion is that we do not go down the path of thinking that Amendment 79 has merit.
I do not disagree about Amendment 80. I listened with care, but I would not like to try to explain it to somebody else and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is right about that.
I support Amendment 77 because I cannot see any good grounds for why legislation should require the Government to seek new primary legislation to have a customs union of any character with the European Union in the future. If, for example, we want to have a customs union with the United States of America, it could be done by an Order in Council. There is no basis for a distinction of that kind, other than the politics of the moment, and legislation should not be governed by the politics of the moment. If there is a proper process for the scrutiny and approval of a customs union, it should be set out in legislation and apply to any other country with which we establish a customs union and not discriminate and impose additional requirements specifically in relation to the European Union.
That just leaves Amendment 78. I confess I saw this being slightly of the moment, in that it was intended to entrench into statute the provisions in the Chequers White Paper relating to reciprocity in the collection of import duties on behalf of the European Union by the United Kingdom. But as I understood the White Paper, it did not necessarily mean that the European Union would collect import duties on our behalf. There was some suspicion on the part of our colleagues in another place that the negotiations might lead to such an eventuality, and that we would collect duties for the European Union but they would not collect duties for us, so they put this into the legislation. Frankly, that is not where the negotiations are now. We are either in a customs union or we are not; I do not think we are going to be in some sort of asymmetric customs arrangement of that kind. Nobody is debating that presently.
Amendments 77 and 80 have merit. I hope they are not going to be pressed at this point, but my noble friends should certainly think carefully about amending them when we come to Report to enable the other place to think again.
We discussed the customs union last Wednesday. That was the day before an interesting report was produced, principally by German economists at the Ifo Institute. I was encouraged by it, not least because I agree with it. It basically said that, to break the deadlock, both sides have to move from their red lines. In the United Kingdom’s case, that means no longer excluding the possibility of being in a customs union with the EU. In the European Union’s case, it means not treating such an arrangement necessarily to mean that the United Kingdom has to remain a member of the existing customs union or the Customs Union Code. They therefore propose the establishment of a European customs association, in which both the United Kingdom and the member states of the European Union would have voting rights. As a consequence, in the event that the European Commission operated as the representative of the European customs association, it would do so based on a mandate in which the United Kingdom continued to exercise the same kind of authority it presently exercises on the European Union’s customs arrangements.
This customs union would extend only as far as the present custom union applies inside the European Union. The document Hard Brexit Ahead: Breaking the Deadlock contains precisely the kind of discussion we have been having. It is not about whether we are in the customs union; it is what a customs union between the United Kingdom and the European Union might look like in the future.
It is doubly encouraging to see that not only put forward but put forward by prominent German economists. I hope that Ministers will continue to look at that in the time available before they have to come back and talk once more to the other place about what the next meaningful vote should be on.
My Lords, if we are going to anticipate the longer group of amendments, which impact on Schedule 4, I will say a word about Amendments 103A and 107A, which are in my name.
I shared, I confess, the view of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for quite a long time. The conclusion I came to is that we pretty much have to accept the structure which says that we have an independent Trade Remedies Authority, rather than one integral to the Department for International Trade. The analogy is with competition activity. The European Commission runs its own competition regime from a directorate-general of the Commission, with a commissioner in charge. We may think that is right or wrong, but the point is that it is internationally recognised that in that respect, the Commission operates at a significant remove from the day-to-day political pressures in a single country. In this country, we do not operate on the basis that we have a government department providing the competition authority; we do it independently. There is a better analogy there. There is also the analogy of the International Trade Commission in Washington, which is recognised as operating independently of the day-to-day political pressures that otherwise might be exercised in the US Administration or if it were subject directly to Congress. There are analogies that cut both ways, but I am persuaded that having a separate Trade Remedies Authority is best.
It is tricky, because we do not have that many people who are very good at managing trade remedies. We are going to end up with one set of them in the Trade Remedies Authority and another set sometimes in the Department for International Trade having to judge the recommendations being made by the Trade Remedies Authority. I am not quite sure that we shall have enough people to do all those tasks. I hope we do, but it will not be immediately obvious.
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 states that a chief executive of the Trade Remedies Authority is to be,
“appointed by the Chair with the approval of the Secretary of State or, if the first Chair has not been appointed, by the Secretary of State”.
My Amendment 107A would simply leave out paragraphs 17 to 23, which all relate to the circumstances where a chief executive is appointed by the Secretary of State. We do not want to leave in statute for the longer term that the Secretary of State may appoint the chief executive. It should be the responsibility of the board. That is generally true for most other independent bodies of this kind. I do not see any reason why we should trespass across that if the independence of the Trade Remedies Authority is integral to its function.
All this seems to have been written in the expectation that it would become law at about the same time as the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill did back in September. Back then, there was not a chair-designate of the Trade Remedies Authority, nor was there a chief executive-designate. We now have both. There is no practical reason why the chair cannot be appointed alongside other members of the board, so that they can take responsibility for the appointment of the chief executive. I see no grounds for leaving in the Bill this statutory provision compromising the body’s independence.
My Amendment 103A would specify that, when the Secretary of State came to approve the appointment of a chief executive as proposed by the chair of the board, that should be subject to a report from the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons. I looked at the January 2019 updated guidance from the Cabinet Office on the 50 leading appointments made with pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees. Back in 2008, when I was Secretary of State in the Department of Health, we had seven such appointments, which I think was the largest number of any single department. The Department for International Trade has no such appointments—it is quite a new department—but this is its principal body. In so far as the Select Committee on International Trade is to have a view, it seems that it should have a view about the chief executive and the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority. To be honest, I may have got the amendment wrong; it may be that it is better that the chair be appointed by the Secretary of State following a report by the International Trade Committee—forgive me if I have got it in the wrong place—as the chair is more likely to be the person who should be the subject of scrutiny by the committee. I may reserve that point, as distinct from what is written in Amendment 103A.
I cannot see a good reason why there should not be such scrutiny. The criteria seem threefold: is it important, does it have impact, and does it require independence? All three seem to apply in the case of the Trade Remedies Authority. The amendment would not require the approval of the Select Committee; it would simply require a hearing to take place and a view to be expressed. We know from precedent that on nine occasions Select Committees have made a negative report on appointments proposed by Ministers. In six of those cases, Ministers have proceeded in any case. The amendment is not to prevent Ministers making the appointment that they wish to make; it is to give the Select Committee in another place an opportunity to make a report on the proposed appointment of a chair.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 101A and 103B in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Kinnoull for adding his name to both amendments and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for supporting 101A. I have two further amendments in the next group—do not worry, I am not suggesting that we amalgamate these, but I will provide some common background that applies to all four amendments before I speak briefly and specifically to Amendments 101A and 103B.
Materials are very important to us. I happen to be a materials scientist, so I would say that. They are important economically and strategically: obviously, they are the start of the supply chain for anything we manufacture. Advances in materials underpin the technologies and devices we depend on, from the structures and blades of wind turbines, to batteries for electric vehicles, to materials which allow the slow release of drugs in the body, to materials that enable faster communication of data—do not worry, I shall not give a long list. While we have world-leading academic expertise in materials, many of our materials industries are under pressure, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, highlighted. Many of these industries share some common features and it is these common features that make the Trade Remedies Authority so important for them.
Many, such as steel and ceramics, are energy-intensive, so as we decarbonise our economy they will increasingly need to invest in new technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, hydrogen-fired kilns and things to drastically reduce or eliminate their CO2 emissions. They are affected by our very necessary requirements for high environmental standards. Many are located in economically vulnerable parts of the country and, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, mentioned, many have experienced serious problems in the past arising from dumping and subsidy by overseas Governments. Current world trade issues, such as the US-China trade dispute, resulting in overproduction in many areas in China, and Brexit, are understandably causing concern.
So our materials producers, along with many other industry sectors, welcome the establishment of the Trade Remedies Authority in the Bill. They think the UK needs a strong and independent authority to investigate alleged dumping and subsidy cases and to recommend remedies. Producers need to know that the TRA will be a body that understands the impacts of dumping and subsidy on UK companies, to give them the confidence to continue with their investment programmes—investment that will be critical to delivering the Government’s clean growth strategy. We have already heard a bit about the definition of the membership of the TRA and its governance. Both Clause 10 and Schedule 4 make the independence of the TRA a very clear objective. However we have already heard that this does not sit entirely comfortably with the chair and non-executives being appointed entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State. By contrast, the TRA will have wide discretion in the way it conducts trade remedy investigations, which is clearly crucial for its independence.
However, in combination, these factors build a degree of uncertainty into the system for manufacturers. A strong message about the composition of the TRA board, giving assurance that individuals with current experience in the manufacturing industry, from both a management and worker perspective, would be there alongside trade remedy experts, economists, academics, legal experts and people with other relevant skills would help remove uncertainty and risk for UK producers. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, reminded us, because trade remedies have been a Brussels competence, trade remedy expertise is likely to be in somewhat short supply in the UK. It is critical that the TRA board is not made up mainly of theoretical modellers and economists but has a real balance of theory, analysis and practical, hands-on experience. The recent move by the Government to accept the principle of involving those most affected by trade policy in its development—for example, through the recruitment of a diverse stakeholder strategic trade advisory group—is very welcome. Trade remedies should be no exception, with both producers and trade unions involved.
Amendments 101A and 103B would ensure that both manufacturing and trade union experience are present on the TRA board, and that there is consultation with stakeholders before appointments are made. I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that the Government recognise the benefits of this broad approach for the TRA membership.
We can be relatively brief on these amendments; they are substantial in their drafting, and the points have been made so we do not need to repeat them. We have been dealing until now with the procedures and set-up of the new body. These are proposals for guidance on some of the ways in which future policy might be developed and taken forward. Having said that, Amendment 85 follows an exchange in the other place, where it was confirmed that there would be an appeals mechanism, but there is still no reference to that in the Bill, as far as I can see. This is a suggestion for a way in which the appeals mechanism—which should be there or, as agreed in principle, will be there—against decisions by the TRA and the Secretary of State might be set out. I offer it to the Government for their consideration.
I am not clear. Is the noble Lord’s intention behind the amendment that the Upper Tribunal would look at the merits of the decision or simply at the processes? Are we simply talking about a judicial review process?
I will get through this very quickly and then questions can flow in. Amendment 85, which has already been accepted, therefore sets out an appeals process for the Government to respond to. Amendment 86 relates to how these are disposed of and the procedures for that. The two go together and will be difficult to separate, but again the Government must take that forward.
We have already had reference to how recommendations from the TRA for action or no action would be based on two issues—an economic interest test and a public interest test—but we do not have any definition of those. They are obviously good ideas and sensible approaches, around which decisions can be placed, but the narrow question of what they constitute and, more importantly, how they would be kept in scope with how people’s views change over time, is not dealt with in the Bill. Therefore, Amendment 87, which deals with the public interest test, and Amendment 88, which deals with the economic interest test, set out not so much the detail of what they consist of but the process under which they might be organised.
I agree that the public interest test is not defined anywhere, but is the economic interest test not defined in paragraph 23 of Schedule 5 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his interventions, which are always helpful, but I was going on to say that the economic interest test is different from the public interest test because some aspects of it are fleshed out. But the intention of Amendment 88 is to extend that slightly to ensure that two things happen. The first is that there should be a consultation about what the economic interest test is among those whose interests might be affected by it. Those involved in,
“employment, economic health and prosperity, and productivity”,
which includes trade unions, businesses and consumers, should be consulted on how one constitutes the economic test.
Secondly, it is important that the test must reach not just for a national economic view but down to a regional, or even sub-regional, point of view. The suggestion would be for the devolved Administrations and for the various regions of England to be parts of a group that could respond on things. Clearly, an economic test dealing with a small aspect of the ceramics industry based in a particular area will be different from one dealing with a major national employment issue.
Again, these amendments are not meant to be accepted as written, but they are probing suggestions to get the Government to flesh out in more detail their thinking behind this.
We always talk about what is in the public interest but never define what that means. I am not trying to define it. I am saying that it would be useful to have a process under which, from time to time, a Secretary of State who wished to employ that as part of the process for the TRA had to consult and then come forward with proposals through Parliament for what that constituted. That is what these amendments are all about.
Finally, Amendment 89 in my name suggests that TRA investigations can be considered complete only when they involve the devolved Administrations and the devolved authorities. I hope that will also commend itself to the Government. I beg to move.
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for interrupting him. Of course, there is a requirement to have proper appeals, as has just been elegantly explained by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, but I was interested in whether they had to be the subject of special tribunals or whether they could in fact be fitted into the existing court system. My main concern as a former business person is with speed. Sometimes tribunals, public interest tests and so on can be a field day for lawyers and the whole thing can take a very long time. That is not what we want. We want to be able to make sure that the interests of our industries and other players are properly protected.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is absolutely right that the economic interest test is present in both Schedules 4 and 5 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. As set out there, the test seems to me to be capable of being, and is required under the legislation to be, taken down to the level of individual industries, looking specifically at affected industries and consumers and the likely impact on particular geographic areas or particular groups. It seems to me that the economic interest test is already capable of being disaggregated in the ways that the noble Lord is calling for.
The noble Lord and I have joined together on the issue of the public interest test in the past. I am not sure that you can define it in advance—that is the difficulty with it. Trying to write down what public interest the Secretary of State has to weigh up seems to be intensely difficult, as distinct from the economic interest test. It might include defence industries and security interests, and we see that coming through in relation to competition. We also see it in broadcasting and competition regimes. There are a range of competition-specific public interests, and I do not think that we are necessarily looking to restrict the test in that way in this legislation. Frankly, we might be better off simply looking at it and, if there are particular public interests that have to be protected as time goes on, we should perhaps have the power to add to them by way of regulation, as is the case with competition legislation.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord McNicol, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, for tabling these amendments. I take the opportunity to clarify initially that the Trade Bill does not set out the policy framework that the TRA will be responsible for operating. These provisions are already set out in the TCBT Act 2018, including the economic interest test, which places a requirement on the TRA to consider the wider economic impacts of imposing measures on other affected groups, such as downstream users and consumers.
The economic interest test provides continuity from the Union interest test in the current EU system. However, we listened carefully to concerns that the Union interest test is, for example, too opaque and does not set out how different interests are to be considered. Therefore, as my noble friend Lord Lansley correctly stated, the Act specifies the economic factors which must be considered under the test, and that will provide businesses with greater clarity over how the test is applied. That is what business has asked us to do. In terms of the public interest test, I can only endorse what my noble friend Lord Lansley said.
In addition, there is an explicit presumption in the Act that, where injury is caused by dumped or subsidised goods, the TRA will make a recommendation to the Secretary of State for the imposition of measures. The Government amended the legislation during its passage to make that absolutely clear. The burden of proof rests on the TRA to show that measures will be detrimental to the wider economic interest; otherwise it must make a recommendation, and any failure to do so will be subject to appeal. I assure your Lordships—particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, who raised this matter—that this presumption will have the effect of ensuring that special consideration is given to the injury caused to UK industry by imports of dumped or subsidised goods. I wanted to say that explicitly in Committee here because I know of some of the concerns in the ceramics industry.
The Act also places the same presumption for the imposition of measures on the Secretary of State and makes clear that the Secretary of State can only reject the TRA’s recommendations for measures on public interest grounds, or where he determines that the economic interest test is one the TRA could not reasonably have made. Any such decision can be appealed by interested parties and must be explained in a Statement to the other place.
With respect to Amendment 87, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I remind the Committee that we are committed to ensuring that our industry receives protection. That is why we will transition those EU measures that matter to UK industry, including on steel, ceramics and chemicals, into our system once we have our own, independent trade policy. We will monitor the effectiveness of the trade remedies system and, if we find that it is not working as it should, we will of course make any changes necessary.
As I mentioned before, I am sure that the Committee will understand that the public interest issue is not something we can review or consult on. What constitutes public interest will change depending on the economic and geopolitical circumstances of the day, and the Government must have the flexibility to respond to such changes. This is a power that we expect to be used in rare cases and, when it is, again the Secretary of State will be required to lay a Statement before the other place justifying its use.
Your Lordships have raised rightful questions on the role of the devolved Administrations in relation to trade remedies. Importantly, the economic interest test mandates that account must be taken of particular geographic areas, as well as other economic matters that may be considered relevant. This will ensure that the impacts of measures on different regions—including Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and regions of England—are given due consideration where appropriate and will include any information that is shared, or issues that are raised, by the devolved Administrations.
Further, regarding Amendment 89, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I reassure the Committee that any party not defined as an interested party may register its interest in a particular case with the TRA and will then become a contributor. This will include the devolved Administrations. Contributors will be invited by the TRA to submit relevant information, which it will be obliged to take into account in the investigation as appropriate. My officials will advise the devolved Administrations when an investigation is opened by the TRA, which will alert them to the need to take a decision on whether or not to register.
Where the TRA terminates an investigation without recommending the imposition of measures, it is required to publish details of its recommendations and decisions. Contributor status will mean that DAs will automatically be notified by the TRA of actions it has taken. But I recognise that they will also—rightly, in their capacity as devolved government—have an interest in the decision made by the Secretary of State, including in having an opportunity to offer views on relevant public interest considerations which he should take into account when arriving at a decision. I can confirm that my officials will work with their colleagues in the devolved Administrations to put appropriate arrangements in place.
I turn now to Amendment 90B and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, for tabling this amendment. As I have explained, the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act has already been considered, and passed, by the other place, which has accepted that the negative procedure is the appropriate scrutiny mechanism, as we discussed earlier.
With regards to Amendments 85 and 86, the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, is right that there should be an appeals process; indeed, this is necessary to be compliant with our WTO obligations. We do not support the amendment, but I assure noble Lords that there are already powers in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act to establish an appeals system for the UK’s trade remedies system, and my officials have been working closely with the MoJ to develop a clear, transparent process. I completely accept the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, about how critical this is. I also agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that speed matters to companies too.
There will be an initial consideration when an appeal is raised by the TRA, followed by a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. This ensures that basic administrative errors can be resolved more quickly and effectively than moving straight to the tribunal, so limiting those cases to more substantial issues of law. It combines independence, as required by WTO law, with the advantages of a proportionate and efficient system. As the Secretary of State informed the International Trade Select Committee in his letter of 14 January, the judicial route for appeals will be to the tax chamber of the Upper Tribunal. The Tribunal Procedure Committee, the responsible statutory body, has recently completed a consultation on the rule changes required to allow the Upper Tribunal to hear trade remedy cases. Once that process has been fully completed, the necessary appeals statutory instrument will be laid in due course and scrutinised in the normal way.
Our proposed regime draws on international best practice from comparable WTO members. Its measures provide for the assessment of whether there was an error in law based on the evidence that was available to the decision-maker at the time, and some include processes akin to the TRA’s reconsideration.
I hope my responses have provided reassurance to your Lordships and that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, did me a great favour by alleging that I had partial paternity of this amendment, but I will leave that to one side. It is a very simple amendment, setting in statute the view that has been expressed twice by this House, by massive majorities, and once in the House of Commons last week: that leaving the European Union on 29 March by default without an agreement should be excluded. That is what this amendment proposes to do. It does not prevent this Act, as it would be, coming into effect in the event of the meaningful process being successfully completed in the other place. Nor does it do so if the other place should, in the extraordinarily unlikely circumstances, actually decide that we should leave without a deal. However, it rules out leaving by default as a condition for the entry into force of the provisions in this Act. No more needs to be said, and I have a feeling that we may wish to debate that rather more decisively on Report.
My Lords, I am speaking on behalf of my noble friend Lady Altmann, who is unable to be here and asked me to extend her apologies. I think she would have shared the view of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that Amendment 98 would not prevent our exit without an agreement, which is the default situation under the statute law as it remains, but it would certainly enable one to put into the equation consideration of the damage and chaos that would result if one were to leave by default without an agreement and without the statute book and continuity agreements being in place. Both Houses would have to think hard about that. It is a contest between different visions of what kind of chaos might ensue. Unfortunately, that is essentially where we are.
My noble friends on the Front Bench have done a grand job, not least in keeping us on track, wherever possible, in understanding the importance of getting this legislation into the right structure rather than being distracted too often and too far into discussion of Brexit. I think we agreed at Second Reading that the Bill is occasioned by Brexit but is not really about it; nor, technically, is it about the future processes and structures of free trade agreements. Their approach has enabled us to have what I think will be some interesting, positive and constructive discussions on Report, arising out of this Committee, when we can really focus on one or two specifics. My noble friends will have been given an indication of what kinds of considerations will be important to the House in thinking about free trade agreements as they come along.
My Lords, I realise that the hour is late, but I rise to support Amendment 98, which would make it much more difficult for the Government to preside over a default no-deal Brexit, and to encourage the development of alternative strategies.
Due to the failure of the Government to develop a credible Brexit strategy, there is now a grave danger of the UK crashing out of the European Union on 29 March—in just over 50 days’ time—as the default option. This would have truly devastating consequences. However, because of the Brexit-related legislation already on the statute book defining exit day as 29 March 2019, it is possible that Parliament will not have the powers to stop it happening.
The amendment would therefore put a limitation on the commencement of the Trade Bill and provide that Clause 2(1), which gives the Government powers to implement international free trade agreements, can be implemented only on the condition that either: Parliament has approved a negotiated deal; the Government have requested an extension of Article 50; Parliament has approved a no-deal departure; or Parliament has voted for a second referendum. It would also offer your Lordships’ House a chance firmly to reject the possibility of the UK crashing out of the EU in a no-deal scenario.
The hard Brexiteers of the European Research Group, who assert that no deal would be an acceptable option, argue that Britain’s trade outside the EU is increasing at a much faster rate than trade with EU countries. However, this ignores the fact that measuring growth starting from a much lower base is always higher in percentage terms. They also fail to mention that trade with non-EU countries is not a binary choice and has been boosted by the EU’s own trade agreements with those countries, from which the UK benefits as an EU member—witness Germany’s spectacular trade increases with China, for instance. If noble Lords have any doubt about this, they should look at the website of the Department for International Trade. In the case of the recent trade agreement between the European Union and Canada, we read:
“UK trade with Canada up 14% since new free trade agreement introduced”.
This is a reference to CETA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, which was signed in 2017 after seven years of negotiations. EU free trade agreements with non-EU countries such as Canada, South Korea and Japan were negotiated with the leverage and weight of the 500 million-strong market of the whole EU, which the UK will lose after Brexit. Brexiteer fantasies about WTO rules ignore the complexity of the necessary reallocation of the UK’s share of EU tariffs and quota schedules, which will require difficult negotiations. They also disregard the application of rules of origin to UK goods trying to enter the EU market, which the Government have previously estimated could cost firms between 4% and 15%.