Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, had we debated this amendment during the last session, the night before last, we would not have had the benefit of yesterday’s report from the IPPR think tank on the subject of state aid. It reinforces the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that the United Kingdom is a restrained user of state aid when compared to other countries in the European Union. That gives the lie to some of those who believed that the European Union was restricting the UK Government’s decision on the scale of state aid in this country—and that message might be conveyed to some members of other parties in the other place who are alleged to believe that the European Union would continue to restrict industrial support activities.

I was surprised to hear the huge shopping list that the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, presented for further state aid—his is not a voice that I had imagined would be making that point. That highlights the need for a state aid strategy. If we have an industrial strategy—which we do, whether some Members opposite like it or not—the purpose of state aid is to find strategic ways of delivering it in the best possible way for the best possible good of this country and its trading environment with the rest of the world.

Whether we trade as an EU nation, through FTAs or, as some people dream of, on WTO terms—which would be a nightmare for the rest of the world—there will still, sensibly, be restrictions and rules affecting what aid we can give and what restraints we have to apply. In spirit, therefore, I support the amendment, and I am interested to hear the Minister’s response.

I have a query that will probably reveal my ignorance of the process of legislation. Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2 contains a more general injunction around statutory instruments and consultation. I wonder whether that part of the Bill may pick up, to a large extent, what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to achieve. I would be happy to be wrong about that, but it would be helpful if the Minister, either now or later, would fill us in on that.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the point the noble Lord is making and exploring on this issue, and when we explore that point, it is worth saying that much depends on our future relationship with the European Union, and how we incorporate state aid into that. If we were in the European Economic Area, we would apply EU state aid rules; that is what EEA members now do. If we were in a free trade agreement with the European Union—as Canada and South Korea, for example, are—we would do something different. State aid provisions are built into those agreements, but they are based not on EU state aid rules but on the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. That will all entirely depend on what the future relationship looks like.

The point has correctly been made that we use state aid proportionately less—about half as much, as a proportion of GDP, as the French do, and a quarter as much as the Germans. So state aid rules themselves have not necessarily restrained us from doing things. The noble Lord will be aware of the report on competition and state aids by the committee of which I have the privilege to be a member—the Internal Market Sub-Committee of the European Union Committee. The Government’s approach is, essentially, that we will replicate EU state aid rules in UK law, but we will, of course, be repatriating them so that they are exercised by our authorities rather than by the European Commission. In that context, it will be the Competition and Markets Authority, rather than any other body, which does that in this country—and it will do so independently.

If I remember rightly from the evidence that we received—I stand to be corrected if not—the Government’s intention is for this to be done by the CMA on a UK-wide basis, and not to be disaggregated to individual nations or regions. Clearly, the state aid rules themselves may have geographical parameters, as ERDF and other EU funding has done in the past, but that is a different matter. The rules on the application of state aid would be applied in this country. So we will have something considerably beyond the WTO requirements. For example—this is probably the best example and the most important for businesses—EU state aid rules would require us to have processes of notification and prior approval whereas, where WTO rules are concerned, if the Government engage in subsidy then they do so at the risk of post-hoc challenge and complaint. That is quite a different structure.

I say all that simply because, while this is an interesting issue, I am not sure whether the amendment does the job. However, I put it to the noble Lord that he might suggest that if future trade agreements of this kind, which are generally with third-party countries, were to apply state aid rules in a UK and third-party country agreement which differentiated from the WTO subsidies and countervailing measures provisions, that should be the subject of consultation and approval in this House. I cannot see why we would want to approve an arrangement for a WTO agreement on subsidies, which would simply be applied in the normal course of events. I hope that those few remarks are helpful.

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Lab)]

My Lords, a couple of the points made in the short debate on this amendment have been very wide and not actually to do with the amendment as such. Perhaps I may add a corrective: we discussed the mergers of railway companies, nuclear power companies and so on earlier today. The fact is that we look at one Chinese company against not one European company but sometimes more than one. Regarding the comment about the EEA, I am sure that the EEA will evolve while recognising that we often need one European company. It could be dressed up as something to do with either the nature of policy on mergers, competition and monopolies or with state aid policy. I put down that cautionary note because, when people say that this amendment does not do those jobs, it is clearly not intended to. However, many such wider commercial questions will have to be faced up to in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

It is. Ultimately, I believe that the choice is going to be that we either stay in the customs union and the single market of the EU or we leave, either with no agreement at all, which I hope is ruled out in short order very quickly, or with some form of government agreement, which did not secure majority support in the other place, where one-third of those voting against it did not believe that it was leaving the EU at all. I think where the people will now be informed in the decision is as I started: many of the issues are now laid bare about the consequences of leaving.

I am very happy to be a co-signatory to this amendment. I am very pleased that we in this Chamber are debating what the consequences of the actions will be. We are also clear that we want to do the least damage to the British economy and to secure for the future all the relationships that we have at the moment without the extra burdens of regulatory addition.

My final point, which the OBR report in October made very clear, is that if we went down the Government’s course and left, then there would be at least five years of adjustment to a worse scenario for GDP, even on the basis of the agreement. I am seeking to avoid that. I hope there will be consensus, at least in the first instance, that a customs union is necessary. There is no doubt of our position on these Benches that the customs union is preferable to all of those. I hope that will ultimately be the future of our country, and I believe that that is up to the people, who ultimately will have to decide this.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, I do not want to go on at length about this issue, not least because I agree so wholeheartedly with what my noble friend Lord Patten of Barnes has already said. I am always loath to do it and I hope to make it a very rare event, but I voted for the amendment to the withdrawal Bill last April. To that extent, I think this House has made its view perfectly clear: it thinks, in the context of leaving the EU, that to retain membership of a customs union with the EU would substantially mitigate what would otherwise be the damaging economic effects of withdrawal.

I do not want to get into a debate about “the” customs union or “a” customs union but, on the face of it, if we are negotiating to leave but we are negotiating to have a customs union relationship with the EU, it behoves us to negotiate without necessarily subscribing to the customs union because the customs union is a product of the treaty. We would no longer be bound by the treaty, so we have the flexibility to think otherwise. That does not turn us into Turkey, because we might choose to do things quite differently. The EU has chosen not to have agriculture within the customs union with Turkey because it is in its own interests not to do so. We have very different interests and we might choose to pursue them differently. Indeed, as one can see from the structure of the backstop, we might choose to have an arrangement with the EU that was, as Ministers are fond of saying, a “bespoke arrangement” for the management of a customs union. And why not? If we could have such a thing under the backstop, surely we could have it without the backstop.

I do not want to go on at length. I hope that those in this House and beyond who are thinking next week about what is needed to make progress from the impasse that we appear to be in at present will read this short debate. While it exposes some of the difficulties in negotiating a future customs relationship with the EU, two things should become immediately apparent. First, many of the negative consequences of leaving the EU—most especially, leaving without a comprehensive agreement in place—will be dramatically mitigated by being in a customs union. When I talk to businesses, that is absolutely at the top of their wish list, and it is true for manufacturers as well. Secondly, I hope people will realise that this does not preclude us having a trade policy of our own. What are trade policies nowadays? They are generally called comprehensive economic partnership agreements because by and large they are not about tariffs; they are about broader relationships. Especially for the UK, given that we are predominantly a services economy, for the future those agreements should be about services. We should be negotiating trade agreements about services, the movement of capital and investment, and indeed we should have a negotiation with India that includes a discussion about the mobility of workers between India and other countries. That is happening in a very powerful way: the Indians are exporting skilled young people all over the world very successfully, and we should have that in mind as part of an economic partnership agreement with other major economies. If that is true and it also gets us out of having a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, but without creating a new border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, why would we not want to do this? That is what everyone is trying to arrive at.

For the purposes of next week’s debate there are, therefore, essentially two questions. First: does offering to be party to a customs union with the European Union, as part of the future political declaration, enable us and the European Union to agree in a way that would—as they say in Brussels—have legal force? Would it enable us to put into the political declaration, and have agreed by the European Council, the kind of language and commitments that would allow it to be said that we will not enter into the backstop, if we go down that path in the future treaty? That is what it is all about: not going into the backstop in the first place. We need some reassurance that that will happen. That will automatically solve the essence of the problem associated with the backstop. If we do not have to go into it, we will have solved that issue. We will also have solved the question of unilateral withdrawal or otherwise. If we are in a customs union, we have a right to leave it. If we go into the backstop, we have no right to leave it—as it is currently constructed— and that is a very unhappy place for many who are against the withdrawal agreement at the moment.

The second question is: can we avoid the Turkey situation? It is a bit like when people talk about entering the Norway situation: we do not want to be in a position where we are simply rule-takers. With a customs union, at least we are not rule-takers on financial services and our service industry, but we are none the less rule-takers. We do not want to be in that position. Can we arrive at a customs union where we genuinely have a shared responsibility? I hope we can.

The trouble is, I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Patten. Nearly a year ago, if only the Government had listened and put into the negotiation—at the time that led up to the White Paper and after it—a discussion about a customs union. Instead they put into the White Paper the suggestion that we could have a customs union, without calling it that, where the rules of origins are effectively waived so that anything that originates in the United Kingdom is treated as if it is European, and anything that originates in Europe is treated as if it is British. This, of course, is a nonsense; the European Union would never accept it. It would never accept that it would raise the money—

[Baroness Kramer]

I am trying to understand the noble Lord. Obviously, the definition of a customs union is quite difficult and I was trying to follow his definition. Does he intend only the narrow definition of a customs union, where it essentially just deals with issues such as tariffs and excise duties, or does he intend it to include the regulatory alignment, as it often does because the terminology gets stretched? If there is not regulatory alignment there still have to be checks, which means we are back to the border problem. Would he explain what he sees as the content of “a customs union” because, if we are not removing the border problem, I struggle to understand his point?

[Lord Lansley]

When I talk about a customs union, I mean—as the WTO would interpret it—where we share a customs territory and an external tariff arrangement, and our tariffs are the same as the European Union’s. A customs union, in my book, does not necessarily imply having the same rules, regulations and standards. If we are in a customs union with the European Union, it does not mean that we do not have a comprehensive partnership agreement with them. I hope we would do and that would embrace everything from data adequacy to having the same standards. Therefore, we would have to work on the basis that we start with and maintain standards at least as good as those inside the European Union, enabling the European Union and ourselves to operate on the basis of open borders. The most important part of that is the absence of a requirement to establish rules of origin, because one is in a single customs territory that allows goods to pass across borders in that way.

I will finish my point. I am losing quite where I was; I think I was just beyond talking about Turkey. We have got to know that we are going to be in a position to be able to negotiate a customs union, that we will be able to withdraw from it in future, and that it will obviate the need for us to have a hard border with the Republic of Ireland. That is a really important position. We need to know these things and we should have had months to negotiate them. As it is, we have to arrive at something in the political declaration in weeks rather than months.