Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 23rd January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 6 and 19 in this group. The questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Lennie, in moving Amendment 1 are very sensible. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

According to today’s press, we are now 15 years behind on the commitment that we would reach £1 trillion of trade within a decade. It is now estimated that the target set by the coalition in 2012 will not be achieved until beyond 2035. This highlights the fact that we are starting to see the consequences of the significant non-tariff barriers introduced by this Government over recent years. Therefore, it is vital that mechanisms are as streamlined as possible for procurement and the rest of the trade agreements.

Amendment 6 is designed to probe the discrepancies in threshold levels in the Government’s procurement legislation, currently going through the House of Commons and which has been through scrutiny in the House of Lords. It probes why they are different for those seeking procurement opportunities for Australia as compared with those seeking them here at home. If you are a business seeking to bid for procurement in the UK, you now have to operate under quite a markedly different approach from that if you are looking for procurement opportunities within Australia.

I welcome the Minister’s letter to noble Lords, which he promised at the end of Second Reading and fulfilled. It highlights what we knew: that, factually, there is a difference in the threshold levels. The letter simply states that Australia was not willing to have the same thresholds as us, and so we simply said that we would have its thresholds. What did we get in return? If this is a concession to Australia then surely we got something in return as far as access is concerned.

The report on the agreement from the Australian Parliament’s treaties committee makes for interesting reading, as does our own report from the House of Lords International Agreements Committee. The Australian report is 225 pages long and can be summarised as: “We got a good deal.” Our House of Lords report, which is 36 pages long, can be summarised from our point of view as: “No, we didn’t.”

The Australian report highlights the fact that the Australians wanted to maintain their levels of thresholds—that was very clear. Thresholds are important; a considerable amount of scrutiny that we did on the procurement agreement was about whether the procurement would be below or above the threshold. If it is below the threshold, the reporting mechanisms, the contracts approach, and the way that schemes or pooled contracts can be put together are different. So we now have a higher rate for Australia.

At Second Reading, I raised the fact that this was done by subcentral contracting bodies. The Minister’s letter to me says that in effect I was wrong in saying that Australia was unique, because Canada has the same approach as Australia’s—but not for subcentral levels. The agreement that we rolled over for Canada for the CETA agreement, has the lower threshold, and we have now gone to the higher one. We are simply trying to find out what we got in return for providing a concession to Australia over the threshold levels. The higher threshold means that there will be extra complexity for businesses.

Amendment 19 is simply a probing amendment on the point that was raised earlier on the Procurement Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which was simply trying to seek protections. If we try to change this Bill and its mechanisms for the good, those changes will be protected by the Procurement Bill, which, as the Committee will be aware, will automatically repeal this one. We have the rather ridiculous situation that we are in Committee for a Bill that will be automatically repealed by a Bill that is going to go into Committee in the House of Commons. This is a mechanism to try to protect any of what we do. On that basis, I hope the Government might be minded to accept Amendment 19, or indeed they might have their own mechanisms or commitments, so that we are not wasting our time in Committee.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, three important issues arise from the limited number of amendments here, and I want to say something about each of them.

I shall start with the last amendment, Amendment 19. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, referred to the debates on the Procurement Bill, in which many of us participated. We are in a situation where the Procurement Bill will in due course repeal this legislation. We can see the timing a little more readily now: all being well, we should complete the passage of this Bill and I hope it might reach Royal Assent if not by the end of February then certainly very early in March.

The Procurement Bill in the other place still has a substantial amount of work to be done, and doubtless it will return here with amendments. That being the case, I suspect it would be rash to assume that it would pass before late May at the earliest, especially since the Session is to run longer. The Procurement Bill brings its provisions into force two months after the Bill itself is enacted, so in my view we could be in July at the earliest, and maybe in August or September, before the relevant provisions and the repeal take effect.

That being the case, there seems to be a perfectly good rationale for this Bill being used to create the necessary regulations. One matter that we did not get quite clear in our previous discussion is that this Bill, once enacted, can be used to make regulations. Those regulations will subsist even though this Act will subsequently be repealed by the Procurement Act, as it will become. So there is a purpose in passing the regulations in the meantime. There is a particular purpose, which I will not trespass into, relating to the relationship with Scottish legislation. The fact that this Bill can be used to make those regulations is particularly helpful.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, knows that I agree with the proposition that, if an amendment were to be made in this House to this legislation, it would be inappropriate for it to be automatically repealed. However, we secured assurances from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe to the effect that the Government under those circumstances would make whatever changes might be necessary to the Procurement Bill in another place. I am hoping that my noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston will have a similar briefing and a similar reassurance to give us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord; as usual, he is extremely perceptive. The point I am seeking to make is that, under the GPA, subcentral and regional bodies are covered. We have existing arrangements under the previous EU rules for subnational bodies, and we currently have subnational special drawing rights with the EU. My question is: what impact will the higher threshold that we have conceded to subregional bodies within Australia have on those businesses? I fear that it means a great deal of complexity, so, for us to say back to the Government that they should be having discussions with Australia to bring the thresholds down, rather than just give up, would make sense for British businesses.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Well, obviously, if we were in the course of further discussions through the Joint Committee arrangements on the free trade agreements to modify the agreements so as to reduce the thresholds, I imagine that there would be some benefit to our businesses—but that is not the position we are in at the moment. I certainly do not see that we can arbitrarily and unilaterally impose different thresholds through our legislation. The Minister will have to confirm if I am correct, but I did not understand it to be the case that the WTO general procurement agreement gives us existing access to entities in Australia’s procurement below the federal level. I stand to be corrected if I am wrong about that, and I have no doubt that the Minister will have the briefing to tell me if I am wrong. For those purposes, I just do not agree with Amendment 1 as moved.

[The Minister of State, Department for International Trade (Lord Johnson of Lainston) (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to be speaking in what is my first Bill Committee in your Lordships’ House. I start by saying how grateful I am for the engagement that I have had with the noble Lords, Lord Lennie and Lord Purvis, since Second Reading of this important Bill. I am also grateful to them for tabling the amendments in this group. I also thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for those extremely helpful interjections.

As we have heard, this group deals with how the Bill impacts on the UK’s procurement rules, both now and under the Procurement Bill, which is currently awaiting Committee in the other place, once it is enacted. I recognise the concerns raised by noble Lords on protecting UK contracting authorities and the importance of the discussions we are having in this Committee. Having listened to the contributions of noble Lords today, I hope to reassure the House that these amendments are not required. Perhaps I may begin by thanking this House’s International Agreements Committee for its valuable scrutiny of the Australia deal, the report on which stated:

“The Government has been broadly successful in incorporating its objectives on procurement into the agreement and we welcome the procurement chapter.”


On Amendment 1, on general effect, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lennie, I reassure the House that these powers cannot make changes beyond what is necessary to implement the procurement chapters of the Australia and New Zealand agreements, while ensuring that the UK procurement system continues to function. I think my noble friend Lord Lansley covered that in his comments. Rather than conferring unnecessary powers on the Government, Clause 1(2) and (3) ensure that, when the regulatory changes are made, they do not have the effect of creating a separate, parallel set of regulations for Australia and New Zealand suppliers alone. This is the concept of conformity.

As a member of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement—the GPA—the UK, as has been discussed, has a most favoured nation obligation to not discriminate in its treatment of businesses from different parties to the GPA. To meet this obligation, the changes needed to the procurement rules resulting from the Bill need to apply to all GPA parties, as I think we have also discussed. This is laid out in the Explanatory Notes, which, for useful repetition, I restate:

“This will ensure procurement regulations remain uniform and coherent by not imposing different or conflicting procurement procedures on contracting authorities for procurements covered by the FTA, and ensure the UK can implement its obligations in the FTA in a way that is consistent with the UK’s other international procurement obligations.”


The Bill will lead to a wider range of protections for tendering parties and, ultimately, better value and choice for our procuring entities. The changes will make the system simpler, which is something all parties desire.

Turning to Amendment 6 on the equalisation thresholds, I understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, about these agreements placing additional burdens on suppliers—and, frankly, contractors or contracting parties—by having a different threshold to that in the UK’s procurement regulations. I have great sympathy with his objective. However, I hope to persuade the noble Lord that his amendment is unnecessary and, in doing so, show that the UK can meet its market access commitments in both the Australia and New Zealand free trade agreements and can bring these agreements into force.

Amendment 6 proposes that no regulations can be made in respect of subcentral procurements that are valued above the threshold amount specified for such procurement in the Procurement Bill. The value I have here is 200,000 special drawing rights. By not allowing any regulations to be made for subcentral procurement with a value in excess of the threshold amount, the UK would not be able to give effect to its market access commitments—my noble friend Lord Lansley covered this very successfully—for all subcentral procurement under the UK-Australia FTA, because the threshold for subcentral procurement is 330,000 SDR; or any subcentral procurement under the UK-New Zealand FTA, valued at 200,001 SDR or more.

Having different thresholds—after our discussions, I took this away and investigated it—between parties is commonplace in the GPA, as we have discussed. For example, as I believe I mentioned in the letter sent to the noble Lord, at subcentral level the UK has a threshold of 200,000 special drawing rights, as do New Zealand and Japan, while Canada and Australia have a threshold of 355,000 special drawing rights.

On the question of whether the different threshold values between the UK rules and the FTA present a burden to UK contracting authorities, let me reassure the Committee that, under the current UK procurement rules, the only threshold that contracting authorities need to worry about is the one in the UK rules. That is the core point. This is because the SDR thresholds set out in the FTAs themselves determine the contracts that, in the event of an Australian or New Zealand supplier wanting to challenge a UK procurement procedure, are eligible to be addressed by UK domestic courts. So, effectively, this simply allows the concept of challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

I do not see this group of amendments as doing anything other than enhancing and improving the Bill. They will not wreck the Bill, but they could make a considerable difference to how the public and farming communities view the implementation of the Bill, and I hope the Minister will agree.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it may be that I am not paying sufficiently close attention, but it struck me as rather odd that the starting point was a discussion of the advice that was given to the Secretary of State on 13 April last year by the Trade and Agriculture Commission in relation to the Australia deal and on 16 June last year to the Secretary of State on the New Zealand deal. The purpose of that advice was to answer a number of questions. To characterise them generally, they were, “Do these agreements undermine our statutory protections and our ability to protect animal welfare and human health?”—and, to characterise again, the short answer in each case was “No, it does not”. So it seems me that the starting point, not least of Amendment 3, is undermined. It seems wholly unreasonable to ask for a report from the Trade and Agriculture Commission when the TAC has already had the opportunity to give its advice to the Secretary of State.

The second thing that is missing from the debate so far is that Ministers have been very clear, not least in the letter that I think was sent to the International Trade Committee in the other place and to our International Agreements Committee, that they are committed to a monitoring report on both these agreements every two years and to a comprehensive evaluation five years after the coming into force. Some of these amendments look for earlier and more frequent reporting. I have to say, earlier reporting seems to be misplaced. It is going to take time to understand the impacts of these agreements, not least because, for example, the tariff rate quotas that are available for some of these products have not yet been absorbed, so the starting point for thinking about what is the base case for the impact of the agreements must at least allow for the possibility that, in the absence of the agreements, there might have been some increased importing from Australia and New Zealand using existing TRQs.

The third thing I want to say is about George Eustice, who I like. We have worked together, and I enjoyed working with him, but I have to say two things. Number one, if you subscribe to my view of collective responsibility—I see former Ministers in their places—it does not stop when you leave the Government subsequently. You subscribe to collective responsibility when you enter into government and you enter into collective decision-making. In my view, I stick to that—even, in my case, extending it to my coalition friends. If George Eustice did not agree with the decision that was made in relation to either of these agreements, the time to leave the Government and to leave collective responsibility was then, not at a subsequent point when he is on the Back Benches.

The second point to make about him—clearly, he said things that people will say are interesting for the future, not least on the setting of deadlines, while the Government have moved away from that idea—is that the principal argument he made about the risks associated with the agreement and food standards was the risk of the importation of hormone-fed beef. His argument that this was a risk was only because we might subsequently enter into the CPTPP and, under it, we might be subject to an investor state dispute resolution that would force us to dispense with our ban on the import of hormone-fed beef. These are extremely unlikely propositions. As the TAC made absolutely clear, despite the fact that a proportion of beef cattle in Australia are fed hormone growth promoters, none of them—nor their products—may be imported to this country, because we have a ban. So the risk presently does not arise.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

That is the heart of the problem—as we will go on to consider in the next set of amendments. Since we left the European Union, there have been no checks at our frontiers to show to what extent the meat coming into this country observes the criteria to which my noble friend referred.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My noble friend simply makes the point that the Government should implement the legislation that exists. We have no need to change the legislation to ban the import of hormone-fed beef or the use of hormone growth promoters on beef imported into this country, since the legislation already exists. The point is its implementation—and messing about with this Bill does not change that at all.

I have one final point. As I turn to the CPTPP and sheep farmers, I should say that my sister-in-law is a sheep farmer in north Wales. She may take a view about the New Zealand agreement, principally because of lamb imports, but she has never mentioned it to me. She probably thinks that it is a pretty remote risk compared with the many risks that she has to put up with on a daily basis.

I am UK chair of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group; my noble friend Lord Howell, who is sitting on the Front Bench, was one of my predecessors. My Japanese friends tell me that we are making good progress on our potential accession to the CPTPP. There are clearly issues. In this context, if one were critical of the Government, it would be on the risks associated with the precedent of tariff liberalisation—to the extent that it was offered in these agreements—being used by other counterparties as a basis for their negotiations, not least through the CPTPP. They may seek that in the schedules that they are looking for from us before we are allowed to accede to the CPTPP. Notwithstanding that reservation, in the view of my Japanese friends, other aspects of the negotiations stand a fair chance of being completed in the first half of this year.

On the basis of what the Government have already said about impact assessment and reporting in the future, I think the amendments in this group in particular are not required.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I rather agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. There are two points to bear in mind, particularly about the agricultural concern. First, Australia is a very long way away; and, secondly, the big market for Australia and New Zealand is due north of them in East Asia, not over here.

I do not see even the hill farmers in Britain suffering seriously. I do not think that this will be a major target market for Australia and New Zealand. Let us remember the scale. This is a very marginal agreement. It is not a bad deal, but it is certainly not a big deal. It will not change much in our economy; even on the Government’s own estimates of the increase in GDP that might result as a consequence of these two agreements, it is really marginal.

So I am very doubtful about calling for a raft of impact assessments; it seems to me that that is not really necessary. The one amendment that might be necessary is Amendment 18, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, which takes us back to procurement standards. I can see a case for that, but not for looking sectorally across the agreements and calling for impact assessments in every case.

It would be reassuring if the Government could say something about the non-precedential nature, in their view, of the agricultural agreements with Australia and New Zealand. We read that the Canadians and the Mexicans are pricking up their ears and asking for the same terms that we have given to Australia and New Zealand. Those countries are much closer, and a major target market for both is Europe. If one were to look beyond them to, say, Brazil, Uruguay or Argentina, then I would say that the hill farmers in Britain would have a real reason to be concerned, if the Government were to follow the precedent of their deal with Australia and New Zealand, which is going to come in slowly, over time, and will be pretty marginal in its economic effects. If that were to be applied to trade with Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, there would be very serious effects on UK agriculture.

What we most need from the Government is not an impact assessment of the effect of the deals that they have done but an undertaking that, since very different considerations would apply, they would do very different deals with other future partners.

Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 9th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am glad to follow my noble friend for these purposes, the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, as we are fellow members of the International Agreements Committee. I ask noble Lords to bear with me, as I am the fifth member of that committee to speak in this debate. I hope not to repeat too much of what my colleagues have said but, in so far as the scrutiny of these two agreements is concerned, the committee in this place was able to produce a report in June last year, which was debated here on 11 July. To that extent, I think that many of the criticisms of the scrutiny of these deals were of the other place, rather than here. They have been scrutinised here, as was demonstrated by that debate, in a timely fashion under CRaG.

My friend the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, referred again to the importance of the Government having a trade policy document, and referenced the New Zealand Trade for All strategy. This was the first agreement entered into by New Zealand after the publication of that policy document. That demonstrates the benefits of a high-quality document. I was rather struck that noble Lords have been quoting George Eustice, the former Secretary of State at Defra, who I will refer to later. It was important when he said that we should look at strengthening the role of Parliament in scrutiny and perhaps even agreeing the negotiating mandate. My noble friend Lord Frost referred to that. As he said, countries such as Japan and the US, and the European Union, all use their parliamentary processes to their advantage. As my noble friend said, we do not want disagreements to be suppressed within government and then erupt afterwards, with Ministers saying, as George Eustice did, that we gave away far too much for far too little in return. I do not happen to agree with him but that is not the point. We should be able to see what the Government’s objectives are in trade policy—not necessarily the detailed negotiating trade-offs but certainly the objectives. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, said, we can illustrate that by reference to examples. We ask about matters such as the Government’s approach to investor-state dispute settlements but all we get in reply is, essentially, the conclusion that they have reached on any individual negotiation, not what the Government’s approach is in general.

The result was different in different agreements, depending upon the approach of the other counterparties. There are a number of illustrations of that. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, chair of the EU Affairs Committee, was here a moment ago. That committee and the International Agreements Committee have a right to expect that we are consulted soon about what the Government’s policy is in relation to carbon border adjustment mechanisms and the implementation of emissions trading schemes, not only between ourselves and the European Union but on the impact that the policy will have on our trading policy more generally. If we do not do that, we will find that, as a consequence, it is potentially one of the largest non-tariff barriers being erected across the globe, alongside the issue that the noble Earl raised about the Inflation Reduction Act in America.

This has been an interesting and wide-ranging debate. In the rest of what I have to say, I want to focus on the Bill itself. This has been a great debate, and I have much enjoyed it, not least the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Swire. We overlapped for only 14 years in the other place. I hope that perhaps we will overlap a little longer in this place—who knows, as he is not 74? It is a great pleasure to have him here and the benefit of his experience in our debates.

It is not in my register of interests, but I should say that my sister-in-law is a sheep farmer in north Wales. Even over Christmas, she did not raise the question of the Australia or New Zealand trade agreements with me at all, so I do not know what her view on these may be—just as well, perhaps.

Those of us on the International Agreements Committee welcomed these agreements as being of high quality and demonstrating what can be achieved; that is also my personal view. There is a feeling that some of the 32 chapters were included without sufficient substance and that the substance will have to be added over time. For example, I thought that the innovation chapter in the agreement with Australia was a very good thing, but we will not know what it is going to mean for some time to come. I hope it will mean something pretty substantial.

This Bill simply provides the power to implement the procurement chapters—chapter 16 in each of the two agreements—and it is necessary because the powers are not there already. Once the Procurement Bill passes, the powers will be available in that legislation to do this by statutory instrument in the future; the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, made this point earlier. The Procurement Bill means that we will not see primary legislation for purposes such as this in the future. I think that is probably correct, because the changes in our domestic legislation are relatively modest. In future, this kind of thing should be done by statutory instrument, as long as—taking the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr—it is done by an affirmative procedure, because there will be a whole range of changes. The other place implements the tariff changes, and this place looks at things such as the procurement changes and a whole raft of others, but we should be doing such things by affirmative procedures wherever possible. That will enable us to exercise some control if need be—if there is a serious problem—at each stage. I hope that the ratification process will be under way by then; we will have seen it under CRaG. If there are serious problems associated with an agreement, we should know beforehand.

I said I wanted to refer to George Eustice again; I am going to mark the card of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, in advance of his speech, because he referred to George Eustice’s speech at Oral Questions. The point that George Eustice was making was that he believed a problem with the agreements was that they could lead to hormone-fed beef coming to this country but that this would also be possible under the CPTPP. I do not think he is right about that. In any case, it is not a problem associated with the Australia and New Zealand free trade agreements; it is an issue we need to address in the CPTPP. That is when it comes up. What is the dispute resolution mechanism under the CPTPP? If necessary, that would need to be addressed by our Government in the context of that agreement itself.

I took part in the passage of the Procurement Bill and tabled amendments which would have limited the nature of the repeal of this Bill by that one in due course. The problem is not that the Procurement Bill will take future powers instead of this Bill but the way it repeals it. The Procurement Bill will repeal:

“An Act of Parliament resulting from the Trade (Australia and New Zealand) Bill that was introduced into the House of Commons on 11 May 2022.”


So if we amend this Bill, it will be repealed by the Procurement Bill in due course. This is not a satisfactory procedure. The assurances that we received in this House from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe during the passage of the Procurement Bill were that, if we amend this Bill, the Government will look to ensure that any necessary changes might be made to the nature of the repeal during the passage of the Procurement Bill in the other place. I ask my noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston simply to reiterate, if he may, that same reassurance.

I am not aware of a necessity for amendment. In the other place, the Official Opposition supported the Bill, and the amendment they were looking for was for further impact assessments. As my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister rightly said, the Government have committed themselves—and I hope my noble friend will further commit the Government—to two-year monitoring reports and a five-year comprehensive evaluation of both agreements. Frankly, that should be sufficient for this purpose, so I do not think we need to amend the Bill to make that happen.

From my point of view, there are issues that we have raised and issues that I feel strongly about in the agreement. For example, there is the fact that we managed to get an agreement with Australia before the European Union did; perhaps that is one of the benefits of Brexit. However, is it not ironic that, for example, the geographical indications element of our agreement is wholly dependent on the European Union securing changes in the Australian geographical indicators regime so that we might take advantage of it? It is ironic and regrettable. It is just one more of the many illustrations of how we want to see what our trade policy should be and, in future, to see that we scrutinise not only the deal that the Government return with but the negotiating mandate that they take with them in the first place. In those circumstances, I think we would find our overall scrutiny and the support we were able to give to the Government’s trade policy all the better, all the stronger and probably all the more effective internationally.

Education Recovery

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Monday 7th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord raises an important and tragic consequence of the pandemic. I visited a school about two weeks ago where 70% of the students were close bereaved. In this regard, the task of schools is immense. The money that I have outlined—the universal catch-up money, the £650 million which is in schools’ banks now—can be spent on additional pastoral support. We announced during Mental Health Awareness Week that we have invested £17 million to train up mental health support leads in more than 7,800 schools. I note that bereavement is not a mental health need, but it may be that that workforce also does bereavement support.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I refer to my interests as recorded in the register. My noble friend will be aware that many disadvantaged pupils lose ground over the summer in terms of both their physical fitness and their academic ability compared to their better-off counterparts. Even at this late stage, can the Government take action for this summer to roll out nationally much more strongly pioneering work—like the work promoted by Mayor Andy Street in the West Midland—to bring the facilities of schools in the summer to the benefit of disadvantaged pupils for physical activity, meals and catch-up academic work?

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend is correct. We have now had three reports from the government-sponsored research by Renaissance Learning and EPI in relation to disadvantaged children falling behind. In addition to the summer schools that I have outlined, it seems that the majority of secondary schools have bid to do summer school for their incoming year 7. The holiday activities fund has now been rolled out across all local authorities so that children can get the balance of nutrition, activity and some education.

Education Return and Awarding Qualifications in 2021

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Monday 1st March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, we are encouraging secondary schools to aim the summer school programme at incoming year 7s, because that is the transitional year. We have given them £200 million in funding to do this. Using existing staff, who might want to come in and be paid, is an option, as is using supply teachers, volunteers or other people. This is up to the schools. We are encouraging them to run these programmes and we are providing them with the resources to staff them as they choose.

[Lord Lansley (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I should declare an interest, in that I have one child taking A-levels and one taking GCSEs this year. So far as they are concerned, I trust their teachers; I think they will be rigorous and accurate. But, generally speaking, there is a sense of uncertainty associated with the exam boards’ quality assurance process. I heard what my noble friend said about that, but the scale of the interventions by the exam boards has to be just right. Too little and they have no impact, too much and effectively the exam boards will override the judgments made by teachers and head teachers. Can my noble friend give us any more information about the scale of the quality assurance activity by exam boards?

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, how many times the exam boards decide to intervene will be up to them, in terms of how many random and how many risk-assessed interventions. But I can assure the noble Lord that this is an assessment based on evidence. The exam boards will be training teachers in how to do this; they will be giving exemplar materials—for instance, “This is an example of a grade A essay in history”; and they will be given grade descriptors. We are hoping that all of these, along with the declaration that the head teacher will have to sign, will provide the assurance—but it will be for the exam boards, overseen of course by Ofqual, to do the external quality assurance.

Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to these two amendments and I will be brief. I agree with every word that my noble friend Lady Brown just said. I add my thanks to Ministers and the Bill team, who have been very gracious and given of their time generously to discuss these issues. I have nothing to add to what my noble friend Lady Brown said about Amendment 31, about which I wholly agree.

I also agree with what she said about Amendment 32, but I have one more point to add. It arises out of the report of the Constitution Committee into the Trade Bill. Talking about the formation of the Trade Remedies Authority, it states:

“While we recognise the pressing timescales and uncertainties concerning Brexit, in constitutional terms, creating and empowering an important public body in such a manner is inappropriate”.


I very much agree with that assertion. I therefore regard Amendment 32 not only as a mechanism for debate but as a partial cure for the problem that the Constitution Committee has unearthed in its report. I therefore see it as being an attempt to try to somewhat address that problem. Can the Minister comment on that and, if she feels the amendment should not be agreed, how we should address the itch that the Constitution Committee identified?

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will make three very quick points. First, we need to be clear that Amendment 31 simply tries to attach the words “special consideration” rather than “take account”. It is not that all the factors are not there; they are, and they will be considered. The point is that special consideration should be given to this. It is not necessary to do that, because the nature of the structure in Schedule 4 would suggest that that precisely would be the case. I cannot therefore support the amendment. Temperamentally, I want to support Amendment 32, but I fear that in practice there will be many such regulations and it would not be the best use of time for this House and the other place repeatedly to engage in approving regulations of this kind.

I am interested in whether the Minster has anything to add on the potential announcements today on tariffs, which we foreshadowed last week. It is said that all the existing remedies presently imposed by the European Union would be continued, even under a no-deal scenario, by the United Kingdom. I want to inquire—the Minister might choose to reply by letter—to what extent it will be sustainable for us to do that when the remedies will have been assessed in relation to the European Union as a whole, rather than to the United Kingdom itself. For example, an increase in imports leading to injury to an industry might well be applied by the European Union in relation to an industry in Italy or Spain, but it would not be appropriate for such a remedy to be applied in the United Kingdom. That would very rapidly be open to challenge if we do not get the Trade Remedies Investigation Directorate, which is up and running in the Department for International Trade, on the case, so that we can, if we have to—I hope we do not—apply remedies on the basis of an investigation with UK, rather than EU, data.

[Baroness Fairhead]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Cambridge, and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, for tabling their amendments and clarifying in advance their concerns with me and the ministerial team.

Before I respond fully to the amendments, I will take the opportunity to draw your Lordships’ attention to the steps that the Government have taken to ensure that the UK is ready to deliver a fully operational trade remedies system by exit day. The Government have brought forward legislation under the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 to establish the UK’s trade remedies system in the event that we leave the EU without a withdrawal agreement. These regulations also temporarily confer trade remedy functions on the Secretary of State until the Trade Remedies Authority, the TRA, is legally established.

Staff already recruited to DIT with the intention of transferring to the TRA on Royal Assent of the Bill, including those trained as investigators—the key function of this body—will carry out their functions as the Trade Remedies Investigations Directorate within the department. The directorate started work on 6 March and will deliver trade remedies functions in house pending legal establishment of the TRA.

Let me repeat that this arrangement will only be temporary. As noble Lords will appreciate, this is a necessary and pragmatic operational contingency to ensure continuity of protection for UK businesses. This must remain the Government’s priority. It is right that we plan for all eventualities, including where, for whatever reason, the TRA is not legally established under the Bill by 29 March.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, I profoundly believe that we should not leave the European Union without a deal in place, but making this amendment to the Bill would not prevent that. Such an outcome would have to be stopped in another place with legislation or through the revocation of Article 50, and this amendment does not bear on that. Unfortunately, in that unhappy event, the amendment would remove from us the power to implement, for example, the agreement that has been reached with Switzerland. It is not ideal, but it is there. It has been entered into in good faith by us and by the Swiss on the basis that, in the event of no deal, we have to have that measure available.

I am afraid that it is also not true, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, suggests it is, that the Bill is entirely occasioned for the eventuality of no deal. It enables us, for example, to establish the Trade Remedies Authority—we have just heard about the valuable work that it is doing—and it implements the Agreement on Government Procurement, which is a very large-scale issue for British services companies and others which want to be able to bid internationally under the WTO for such contracts. The amendment would stop this Bill coming into force, and we would therefore be unable to ratify the international Agreement on Government Procurement in the way that we were intending, and it would deprive businesses of the opportunities that that would provide. Much as I heartily concur with the intention behind the amendment, it would not have the effect that is sought.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I just want to make a point about the ability to have the regulations on the Swiss agreement. The Government are not using the likely regulatory powers under this Bill to ratify the Swiss agreement, so I do not think that the noble Lord is accurate on that point. They are using the CRaG process, not this Bill.

[Lord Lansley]

My noble friend the Minister may know what their intentions are but, as I understand it, in a number of instances—and I think the Swiss are among them—they will use what are effectively not just bilateral agreements with the Swiss but the opportunity to roll over the EU-Swiss agreements into UK-Swiss agreements, and the power here is available for that purpose.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, it is also worth pointing out that, in the event of an accidental no deal—which I hope will not happen—the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, this afternoon would be relevant as well.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

59: Schedule 4, page 19, line 27, at end insert “following a report from the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons”

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be the back-marker on Report. Amendment 59 inserts text into the schedule that sets up the process for appointments to the Trade Remedies Authority, so that the chair can be appointed by the Secretary of State,

“following a report from the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons”.

In effect, this includes the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority in the list of appointments that are subject to pre-appointment scrutiny.

I do not do this lightly. There are about 1,000 senior public appointments, only 50 of which are subject to pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees. The Cabinet Office guidance on this was amended then reissued in January. Paragraph 8 sets out three criteria, the first of which says that such appointments should be for,

“posts which play a key role in regulation of actions by Government”.

This clearly must be satisfied as it determines one of the essential roles of the Department for International Trade in investigating and recommending trade remedies. Secondly, the appointments must be,

“posts which play a key role in protecting and safeguarding the public’s rights and interests in relation to the actions and decisions of Government”.

This instance may not be about the public, but certainly it ticks the box for the business community, which would regard the TRA as one of the most important bodies impacting on its interests in relation to the actions of the Government. Thirdly, the guidance says that appointments subject to pre-appointment hearings must be,

“posts in organisations that have a major impact on public life or the lives of the public where it is vital for the reputation and credibility of that organisation that the post holder acts, and is seen to act, independently of Ministers and the Government”.

Noble Lords will recall that, at a much earlier stage, we debated whether this body should be independent. The Government, having looked around the world, decided that the Trade Remedies Authority should be independent, and seen to be independent. We have three ticks in the box. This is clearly an important appointment; for the Department for International Trade, it must be regarded as the most important appointment. I do not know of any other posts that it is presently asked to scrutinise prior to appointment. This seems a perfectly reasonable way to proceed; nor does it constrain Ministers too far, as we have discovered. Ministers have to consult and liaise with Select Committees, respond to them and take account of what they have said, but they do not have to do what a Select Committee says and in quite a number of instances have not done so. Ministers can still make the appointments that they consider to be the right ones. I do not feel that I am holding the Government back from doing what they need to do. I am just encouraging them to include this appointment in that list. I beg to move.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I support the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and congratulate him on the succinctness with which he has made his point. I have been confused for some time as to why the department might resist this. He has made the points exactly as I would have done. This is a key role with a public-facing responsibility and will hold the Government to account on issues of great importance. Indeed, it is the only body that the DIT will have as a marker; it behoves the department to raise the TRA to the appropriate level so that it is seen to have the importance that the department claims for it. For these reasons, it is absolutely right that we have an established routine that the person selected by the Minister to be the chair of this body—we are not expecting the same to happen for the chief executive or more junior staff, just the chair—should be seen by the International Trade Committee. As he says, it is a courtesy in some senses because the Minister can still appoint should they wish to do so. I support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fairhead]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their continued engagement with the work to establish the Trade Remedies Authority. I trust that I am able to provide reassurance that we are taking proper steps to set up this important body in the right way.

I turn first to Amendment 59, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. We listened carefully to the points made by them and other noble Lords in Committee about how best to ensure that the senior leadership is as independent as possible. This includes the appropriate role for the International Trade Committee. That is why I am pleased to announce that the Secretary of State is content for the International Trade Committee to conduct a pre-commencement hearing of the TRA chair. This hearing will take place after the Secretary of State has appointed the TRA chair, but before the chair has taken up their position. I further reassure the House that this offer of a pre-commencement hearing by the International Trade Committee will apply to all future TRA chairs, not just the first one. We hope that this will ensure that the ITC has the appropriate role in scrutinising any individual appointed to that position.

I turn now to Amendment 60, for which I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Cambridge, and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. There are three key issues at hand that I would like to address. The first point is independence. Having had discussions with the noble Baroness and the noble Earl, I will say that independence really matters. We are committed to creating an independent TRA that all our stakeholders can trust and that will be seen as an independent body by third countries. We have taken clear steps to achieve this, including establishing it as a non-departmental public body in the first place, which is different from other organisations around the world, and giving it the appropriate separation from Ministers. We are ensuring that it has an independent board. That is why the Secretary of State will be required to follow the tried and tested Cabinet Office Governance Code on Public Appointments when appointing all non-executive TRA board members.

As this House will be aware, that code enshrines the independence of those members by explicitly stating:

“All public appointments should be governed by the principle of appointment on merit”.


TRA board members must be appointed based on their ability, not the stakeholder group or interest that they represent. The Commissioner for Public Appointments will regulate all non-executive appointments to the TRA, providing independent assurance that the Secretary of State follows the code’s strict rules on making such appointments based on merit and the public interest. While TRA non-executives may well have had experience representing certain stakeholders, we believe that that alone cannot be the reason why they are appointed. To do otherwise would jeopardise the true independence of the board, particularly as this is an investigative body.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brown, referred to the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. We do not feel that it is appropriate to draw parallels between the TRA and the Office for Students. The primary function of the Office for Students is to protect the interests of students, whereas the TRA has been set up to protect UK industry from unfair trading practices, which it will do by undertaking independent and impartial technical investigations into whether these practices have occurred. While this will ensure that manufacturers are protected against unfair trading practices, the TRA has not been set up specifically to protect the interests of those manufacturers or other groups.

The second point relates to skills and experience. I assure your Lordships that we are committed to making sure that the members are best placed to oversee this new function. That is why, when appointing the non-executive members of the TRA, the Secretary of State will have regard to ensuring that the board has the right balance of skills and range of experience. I will do more than pause, as requested by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. She has wide experience of sitting on boards in both the public and private world, and it is having that right balance and mix of skills and experiences that is most important. Moreover, this process does not happen behind closed doors. To ensure transparency, the requisite skills and experience for each non-executive appointment will be set out in individual TRA job descriptions that will be published in accordance with standard practice.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, raised a question about the TRA having regard to guidance, and we have included clear statutory restrictions on the Secretary of State’s ability to issue guidance to the TRA. That includes setting out specific circumstances in which the Secretary of State can publish guidance. For example, they cannot publish guidance in relation to a specific case. That is also why the Secretary of State must consult the TRA before publishing guidance, and explicitly have regard to its independence, impartiality and expertise.

These skills and experience requirements include, among others, strong and effective leadership, astute business awareness and an understanding of the complex domestic and international trading environment which the TRA will be operating in. However, we believe that specifying a detailed list of desired experience in statute risks restricting the Secretary of State’s ability to appoint individuals, and the chair and the board’s ability to appoint executives with other relevant experience not detailed here. It suggests that only those criteria listed in legislation are desirable, and may inadvertently displace others. That could create a problem if, in the future, a TRA non-executive was needed to fill a skills or experience gap not covered on the list.

On stakeholders, let me reassure the House that we understand the need to ensure that stakeholders’ interests are accounted for properly. We have also taken clear steps to ensure this. That is why the TRA chair’s job description, and terms and conditions, make clear that he or she will be expected to communicate with stakeholders and incorporate their perspectives into TRA board discussions where appropriate.

We specifically recognise the importance of the devolved Administrations in building the UK’s independent trade policy. That is why we have made several key commitments to ensure they, too, have an appropriate relationship with the TRA and DIT. These include sharing the TRA’s annual report with each devolved Administration, seeking suggestions for the optimal way to recruit TRA non-executives, and suggesting to the TRA chair that the board undergoes specific devolution-focused training. The Welsh Government of course have passed a supplementary legislative consent Motion in the Welsh Assembly, indicating their support for the TRA provisions in this Bill.

As we are reaching the end of Report, I will make some concluding remarks. This stage has provided us with a valuable opportunity to test and improve the detail of this important Bill. I thank your Lordships for that and look forward to Third Reading next week. Having said that, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for her response to this short debate. It is fitting that we have further evidence in her response of the constructive and positive way in which Ministers have listened to the debate and sought to meet the concerns raised. That has been evident throughout our discussions.

I apologise—I should have declared an interest. I am the UK co-chair of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group, and in that context Sir David Wright, who is the chair-designate of the Trade Remedies Authority, was a member of that board and a former ambassador to Japan, so I know him. It will be evident from those who know him that the purpose of this discussion is not in any way to question his suitability for the post—far from it—but rather the process by which his successors are to be appointed in years to come. In that context I was grateful for the specific nature of the assurance my noble friend was able to give.

The difference between a pre-appointment hearing, in circumstances where the Secretary of State is minded to appoint somebody who is then seen by the Select Committee, and a pre-commencement hearing, where the Secretary of State has appointed somebody but the post has not been taken up, is a distinction without a difference in circumstances where the Secretary of State could proceed in any case. There is a benefit in such appointments being taken up by those seen by Parliament as well as by the Executive, not least having been seen positively in the context, not of trying to second-guess the Secretary of State’s choice of the right person but of understanding at the outset, before somebody takes up the post, how they propose to approach it, their suitability for the tasks, and what objectives they are looking for—what kind of outcomes they are hoping to achieve. In that respect, what my noble friend was able to say adequately and fully meets the purposes that I was raising in my amendment, so I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fairhead]

I understand the point that the noble Lord is making. As we have always said, we will seek to balance the protection of our consumers and downstream users from the possible price impact of no deal. The tariff regime will be subject to the approval of the House, and secondary legislation to give effect to the tariff will be laid in line with the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. The Government aim to secure a deal, so we hope that that announcement will not be required.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down, I draw the attention of the House to Amendment 10, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, which relates to tariffs. It permits a debate of the kind that I think the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was hinting that he wanted. It seems to me that we do not start on 29 March without a schedule. We have notified a schedule to the WTO, and it is in line with the EU’s external tariff. On that basis, we should talk about it later rather than now. We know where we start from. The issue is to what extent we might vary—that is, apply a rate of duty lower than the EU’s external tariff at some point after 29 March were we to leave without a deal.

[Baroness Fairhead]

I thank my noble friend for his clarification. That is indeed true but I think he will also accept that, if we were aiming to have a deal, we would not need to publish. If we got to a stage where no deal looked likely, clearly we would have to provide the information that he and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Henig (Lab)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 3 and 4 and speak in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. We had a wide-ranging debate in Committee about standards and Members from across the House argued that we should not allow standards to fall in a whole range of important areas, as outlined in the amendment. The Government’s reply was to agree in principle. The Minister said at the time that the Government were committed to high standards and that they were the right policy for the country, but that they should not be written in the Bill. When asked why not, she was unable to give a convincing reply.

It is essential that we take this opportunity to ensure that existing standards in a number of areas cannot be lowered as a result of the Bill and that that is made explicit in the Bill. One reason for that comes down to the issue of trust. In 2017, the Trade Secretary promised that the United Kingdom would not lower the standards. He said:

“We have made very clear we are not going to see reductions in our standards as we move forward, partly because British consumers wouldn’t stand for it”.


But at the same time, the self-same Trade Secretary has prioritised a trade deal with the United States. It is no secret that the prime aim on the United States’ side will be to negotiate lower food standards with the United Kingdom to enable their food products to flood in to the UK. There is no secret that that is their ambition.

Asked about this last weekend, when asked about food standards, the Trade Secretary replied:

“The question is not about safety”.


This is a bigger issue than the safety or not of a way of preparing food, which is also subject to rules at the World Trade Organization: it is about the decisions we make between the EU and United States approach to regulation. It is about the barriers to trade that that may impose, the impact on our producers and, most of all, the level of trust over trade policy.

The absolute worst way to make significant changes would be through the power under the Bill, because that would cause huge resentment and distrust of United Kingdom trade policy, which would damage our long-term prospects of achieving consensus and wide support for trade deals in future. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, under the Bill, the Government could make any change they liked to any regulations as long as it was relevant to implementing a trade agreement and that tariff changes are handled by another piece of legislation. Let us take the much cited chlorinated chicken, which she mentioned, beloved of the United States.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, surely the point is that the Bill relates only to agreements in place before exit day. There is no agreement on chlorinated chicken or with the United States, so any such argument is irrelevant to the Bill.

[Baroness Henig]

The noble Lord is clearly prescient, because I am just about to cover the very point he raises. As I said, let us take the question of chlorinated chicken. There is nothing to stop Ministers making that change in implementing existing trade agreements. For example, perhaps Mexico would want us to declare that we will accept chlorinated chicken in return for continuing our trade agreement. There is nothing to stop a country with which we have an existing agreement asking for that in future as a part of the rollover, which is what I think he was asking about. Slightly more far-fetched, perhaps, there may be a change of Minister. Perhaps the current Secretary of State for Transport takes over at trade and makes the change by mistake. Who knows?

That is why it is so important to agree the amendment. Major changes in standards in all these important areas should not be covered under the Bill: they need to be fully discussed in terms of our future trade relationship with the United States and the EU in the light of the terms under which we depart from the European Union and with the involvement of a wide range of businesses, trade associations, producers, consumers and local communities. The Bill should not allow a departure from standards, and that is why I put my name to the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

My Lords, in Committee there were a number of amendments, including one in my name, which sought to make the case that some of the agreements that we are party to by virtue of our membership of the EU are significant for the economy as a whole and certain sectors of the economy. Some have a greater impact on some of the nations and regions of the UK and, therefore, to understand the impact of our trading policy it is necessary to have the report. So I welcome the Government’s position, as outlined by the Minister.

However, there are a couple of areas where I would wish to press for further information. One area relates to comments I made earlier about the status of the vast majority of the agreements to which we are party and have signed prior to exit day but which we are looking to replicate or agree after exit day. These will not necessarily be considered as continuity agreements—a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe.

The agreement with Japan is a good example. It has been in force since 1 February and, given all the powers under this Bill, is a candidate to be considered as a continuity agreement. The Japanese Government have said that they do not wish it to be a continuity agreement but a new trade agreement. Under the Government’s amendment, how would that be reported on? It would not come under its remit. That is one of many examples.

[Lord Lansley]

I declare an interest as the UK co-chair of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group. My understanding of the Japanese Government’s position is that they have made it clear that the procedures that are required by the Japanese Diet for a treaty would make it impossible for them to bring this forward as an agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan in the event of a no-deal exit. They would require it to be considered as a new treaty because we were no longer members of the European Union or covered by the withdrawal agreement. Were we, however, to sign the withdrawal agreement and to have a transition period, the Japanese Government, in their view, could consider it to be a rollover agreement during the transition period.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

9: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Preferential trade schemes: parliamentary approval
(1) The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 is amended as follows.(2) In section 32 (regulations etc)—(a) after subsection (3)(a) insert—“(aa) the first regulations under section 10 (preferential rates given unilaterally),”,(b) in subsection (3)(b) omit “that section” and insert “section 8”.”

[Lord Lansley]

I am glad to have the opportunity to speak to Amendment 9 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Amendment 9 follows our constructive discussions in Committee and outside the Chamber with the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and his colleagues on the question of the trade preference scheme, typically referred to as the generalised scheme of preferences in the European Union context.

A generalised scheme of preferences or the trade preference scheme established by this country would be one intended to give unilateral access to our markets for the products of some of the least and less-developed economies, assisting in their economic progress.

In so far as we have been discussing continuity, the intention is for the United Kingdom to maintain some continuity between the European Union preference scheme and a future preference scheme in the United Kingdom. However, I want to talk about where there may be scope for differences. If noble Lords want to look at the measure, it can be found in Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. That is why the amendment amends that Act, not to interfere with its revenue-raising functions but in relation to the scrutiny to be applied to regulations to establish a trade preference scheme.

Under that Act, when the Government bring in a trade preference scheme, the first such regulations will be subject to an affirmative procedure. As I understand it, the scheme may be established in line with the existing European Union preference scheme. However, it will be helpful for me to raise a number of issues with the Minister to give him a chance to put the Government’s intentions on record—as he helpfully did on the last group—about the character of the regulations and the extent of detail to be provided.

First, when we looked at Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, we found it very difficult to relate that directly to what is in the EU’s preference scheme. That is mostly because the EU’s preference scheme does not include those countries with which it has association agreements that effectively supersede and replace the unilateral preferences. They have entered into bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

Whereas “least-developed countries” corresponds directly and derives from a UN classification, the list of “other eligible developing countries” is referenced to a World Bank classification, “among other things”. It is not the same as the classification by the World Bank. In particular, it would be helpful if my noble friend would confirm whether it is the Government’s intention to follow the EU practice and to identify in that category a sub-category of “vulnerable developing countries”. I think the intention of the unilateral scheme of preferences is to support economic development in circumstances where they are not the poorest countries of the world but none the less have significant issues—often they are structural or governance issues—that require additional preferential support.

Secondly, can access to preferences be suspended or withdrawn, as Section 10 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act makes clear, in recognition of or in consequence of human rights abuses in those countries or in relation to United Nations sanctions? Will the regulations make that clear?

Thirdly, what is the situation where the availability of this unilateral system of preferences none the less gives rise to dumping? I remember way back in 1981 that I was responsible in the Department of Trade and Industry for the generalised scheme of preferences as it applied to chemical products. The dumping of petrochemicals produced in Middle Eastern countries illustrated this point: the fact that one is a developing country does not necessarily mean that one does not have the ability to have serious competitive issues with producers in this country.

Where preferences might lead to dumping, or to subsidy, or to an increase in imports that could give rise to injury to markets and producers in this country, will the Secretary of State under the regulations be required to ask the Trade Remedies Authority to investigate any such complaint? As is the case elsewhere in the Act, will the Secretary of State be required only to act and to implement remedies in so far as the Trade Remedies Authority itself determines that there is a need to act and in line with its recommended remedy? It is not clear in the 2018 Act that the Trade Remedies Authority is required to be used by the Secretary of State in relation to the preference scheme.

Will the first set of regulations make clear the overall structure of the preferences scheme? Will it also make clear the structure in relation to specific products from developing countries, which are not to have the unilateral nil duty of tariff but are to be treated as graduated products? This sometimes happens for reasons of relative competitiveness or due to the need to protect industries in this country—as might, for example, be the case with textile imports from India or Bangladesh. Will the availability of the preferences for those graduated products be specified in the regulations, so that the two Houses can look in detail at the way in which the preference scheme is to vary in relation to certain sectors and certain countries, which might give rise to differences between the EU scheme and our scheme? Clearly there are graduated products, particularly in the agricultural sphere, where the protection afforded is to southern European producers for certain agricultural products that have no relevance in the United Kingdom. This could be true for industrial products as well.

As was said in the previous group of amendments, that is my list. I hope the regulations will include—but not necessarily be limited to—those details. There may be other issues that noble Lords will want to make sure are set out by the first regulations. It will be helpful for us to have an idea because, depending on circumstances, it may not be long before the shape of the trade preference scheme becomes clear in detail, not just in its overall application, as was set out in the 2018 Act.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I rise briefly to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which I have signed up to. The meeting that he referred to was extremely helpful in drawing out some of the confusion that emerged during our first debate in Committee. The issues of how countries get on to the lists, how the lists get managed and shaped, and how the changes might come forward were all explored carefully; we now have a much better understanding. In these lists, there are bound to be curious decisions which do not seem to match up to one’s perspectives. I was in Tanzania on holiday recently and it certainly did not come across as one of the least-developed countries, although clearly there are issues around how it will progress and develop its own trading arrangements.

The point behind the amendment is to get on record some further points that have emerged. The noble Lord was kind enough to suggest that we might have further questions, but his all-encompassing knowledge and brilliant, incisive questions are quite enough for me.

--- Later in debate ---

There will be an opportunity to look at how we should respond to and reform the generalised scheme of preferences going forward, but this will be a matter for future negotiations. In the trade White Paper, we invited people to make representations, and a number of representations were received on areas in which the GSP could be improved and these included areas such as rules of origin, which could be considered. As I have said, we believe that there are opportunities to look at ways in which the scheme of preferences could work better for the world’s poorest countries going forward, but our first priority is to ensure that the preferences which exist already—helping approximately 70 developing countries to export to the UK—are maintained; that is the objective of this Bill.

[Lord Lansley]

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for their contributions to this short debate, and for the discussions that we had, which were not so short but were extremely helpful in clarifying many of the issues; they have enabled us to be brief today. I am grateful to my noble friend for his responses to my questions, which were very satisfactory.

I have two things to say. First, what he described as the role of the Trade Remedies Authority seems an appropriate one and mirrors what would be the case with other countries who are not part of the GSP scheme. I hope he implied that the Secretary of State would follow the TRA’s recommendations on the extent to which the preferential access is suspended or withdrawn; this can lead to a rate of duty that lies between nil and the standard rate—the most favoured nation rate. It is not necessarily in excess of the most favoured nation rate, as my noble friend said, but might fall somewhere between the nil rate and the MFN rate.

On the second point, I completely understand that noble Lords might expect us to start with a preference scheme that mirrors the European Union scheme and then consider the extent to which we can, or need to, change it in order to improve it—to address both the different circumstances of EU industries relative to those of developing countries and some characteristics of the scheme itself. Given that the legislation is structured so that the first regulations get affirmative processes and subsequent regulations do not, I hope that that will not inhibit Ministers from trying to consult proactively, as they have done through the White Paper and otherwise, on how the preference scheme could be improved if and when—there is definitely an “if” as well as a “when”—we come to establish a trade preference scheme that is the UK’s own scheme, rather than one which simply reflects the EU scheme. However, on the basis of the very helpful response from my noble friend, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

10: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“The customs tariff: parliamentary approval
(1) The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 is amended as follows.(2) In section 32(3)(b) (regulations etc)—(a) leave out “an increase in” and insert “to vary”, and(b) after “section)” insert “from that which is in the United Kingdom’s Schedule notified to the WTO”.”

[Lord Lansley]

Amendment 10 stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. In Committee, we did not discuss what tariffs the United Kingdom would apply if we were to leave without a deal with the European Union. Since Committee, although Ministers have not published a proposal—notwithstanding some hints that they would—we are told something about it by virtue of reporting by Sky News. I do not know whether that is true or not; I tend not to rely on media reports for these purposes. As it happens, I tabled Amendment 10 before Sky News started reporting anything of this kind, because it seemed that noble Lords would want to talk about what such a tariff structure might look like.

This amendment relates to the implementation of import duty under Section 8 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. There are regulation-making provisions in Clause 32 of that Act, which specify that the first regulations under the Act require an affirmative procedure in this case, and that the affirmative procedure should also be used when there is an increase in duty in the standard case. For these purposes, “standard case” means when there is not a preferential rate or a tariff-rate quota, or when something is not subject to trade remedies. In that sense, it is what my noble friend referred to in the last group as an “MFN rate”. That is the standard case for these purposes.

The provision currently says it would be an affirmative procedure when there is “an increase in” that duty. The effect of Amendment 10 is to change that, so that it would be an affirmative procedure for any regulation that sought “to vary” the rate from the rate set in the schedule notified to the WTO. One of the points I hope to make is that this enables us to say something about the shape of how we might approach the situation if there is no deal. If we remain in the transition or implementation period, we will clearly abide by the EU external tariff. Depending on the nature of the future relationship with the EU, we may continue to be within a single customs territory and, by implication, within a single EU external tariff. That does not necessarily reflect the Government’s point of view, because they appear to want to be able to reduce tariffs below the EU rate, even though we remain in a single customs territory. This is a debatable proposition, which we will perhaps debate later but not on this group.

In this amendment, there is an expectation that, if we leave without a deal, we will start with our schedules to the WTO being those that we have notified—as I said right at the beginning of our proceedings today, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. They are essentially in line with the EU external tariff. My proposition is that there is no need for this; indeed, there would be significant detriment if we did not maintain those schedules. Under the WTO rules, we should have what is known as a bound rate, which is in line with the EU external tariff. The bound rate is the one that we are, in this sense, bound not to exceed. However, that does not mean that that is the rate that is applied. It is not widespread, but it is entirely normal practice under the WTO rules to have not only free trade agreements of the kind which are contemplated under Article XXIV, which lead to preferential arrangements, or the kind of preference scheme that we were just talking about for the less developed countries, but also to apply a rate of duty that is lower than the rate which one is bound to under the schedules for the WTO.

The proposition I put to your Lordships is that we should be thinking constructively about how to use the flexibility under the WTO rules to vary the applied rate of tariff from the bound rate, if we were in the unhappy circumstances of leaving without a deal. We would leave the bound rate, the WTO schedule and the EU external tariff where they are, in the expectation that, even if we leave without a deal, we may enter into a relationship with the European Union with a customs relationship which might require us not to vary from the EU’s external tariff—we would just leave that alone for the time being. In the short term, this would enable us to reduce tariffs on products from around the world which are presently subject to a higher tariff or to tariff-rate quotas. It would enable us to offset what is otherwise a significant risk of overall price increases for UK consumers.

The reasoning of course is that the EU will not change its external tariff. If we leave without a deal, we will be subject to the EU’s external tariff. Roughly half of our imports come from the European Union; a significant proportion of those—for example, cars—will have a 10% tariff applied. To turn it the other way round, UK producers would be in the unhappy position of being subject to increased costs when they try to sell. What we do not want to happen is that, simply by virtue of leaving, we impose high tariffs, leading to higher costs for UK consumers.

When people have speculated about what the tariff on a no-deal basis might look like, in some quarters they have tended to say, “We cannot lower our tariffs because the consequence of that is that we will have given something away unilaterally, which would prejudice our ability to enter into bilateral trade deals with other countries”. This is not the case. If we proceed by having an applied rate that is lower than the bound rate, first, it will become apparent to us and other countries to what extent liberalised, lower rates of duty stimulate imports from those countries, in some cases in competition with the EU at a level of duty which it has not been able to match in the past. It will begin to tell countries, and us, what the impact of lower rates of duty might be on trade between those countries.

Secondly, those countries would know that, if no bilateral deal was brought to a successful conclusion which then gave a preferential rate of duty to the United Kingdom under a free trade agreement, we could restore our applied rate back to the bound rate. They would then lose the benefit we had given them in the short run. In a nutshell, the short-run benefit of lowering tariffs not only potentially offsets what might otherwise be price increases but enables us to demonstrate to other countries what the benefits of a bilateral deal in the long-run might look like.

My expectation, and the expectation of most developed economies, is that the bound rate and the applied rate will converge in the long run. They are generally the same thing, but we are not required to have them as the same thing. It gives us an opportunity to vary rates and see what the future might look like. In the short run, it also gives us the opportunity to vary the rates of duty from those in the EU tariff to give specific benefits on things such as agricultural products or some industrial products where the protection that is required for European producers does not apply to UK producers. In that way, we can start to benefit from lower rates of duty where the European Union does not currently offer that option to us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I thank my noble friend for moving the amendment. The noble Lord is right: my noble friend has raised, effectively, three issues that need to be examined. One is the level of tariffs. In that regard I will probably disappoint my noble friend by referring back to my noble friend Lady Fairhead’s response from the Ministers’ Bench to the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to set out a timetable for when those tariffs might become known. She made her points and they stand on the record; I probably do not need to repeat them. I also draw to the attention of the House The Implications for Business and Trade of a No Deal Exit on 29 March 2019, which was published on 26 February. On this occasion I draw my noble friend Lord Lansley’s attention to the section on tariffs, beginning at paragraph 31 and continuing into paragraph 32, which explores some aspects of the setting of tariffs.

Those are two aspects on the level of tariffs, but I now turn to some of the specifics to which my noble friend referred. He asked about the status of the common external tariff applied by the WTO. The noble Lord is correct that we have notified our bound tariff schedule to the WTO. Our bound schedule represents the upper limits of what tariffs the UK could apply on imports. If, for example, our bound schedule says 10% for product X, we could choose to apply 9%. The Government have yet to announce their applied tariffs for a no-deal scenario, but the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is correct to say that on leaving the EU we will be free to set out tariffs within the parameters of the bound schedule that we lodged last year.

The EU’s common external tariff—as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—is the EU’s version of its applied tariff schedule. These are the tariffs that will apply to UK exports to the EU in a no-deal scenario. My noble friend also referenced the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, which states that the first time a tariff is set, and whenever an import duty rate increases, the made affirmative procedure will apply; otherwise the negative procedure will apply.

These amendments would make the made affirmative procedure apply in different circumstances. In the case of Amendment 10, that would be any time the rate of import duty diverged from the bound commitment made by the UK to the WTO; in the case of Amendment 14 the made affirmative procedure would apply in all circumstances. However, under both amendments it is currently stipulated that the setting of the tariff would remain a matter for the other place. The Act ensures that the scrutiny procedures applied to the exercise of each power are appropriate and proportionate, taking into account the extremely detailed nature of the tariff and the frequency with which it may be changed. The tariff is long and complex; it currently contains 17,000 types of goods and is more than 1,000 pages long. The EU tariff is subject to regular, almost daily, amendment, so the current balance of the chosen procedure reflects that understanding.

Once again, I express the Government’s appreciation to my noble friend Lord Lansley for moving this amendment, giving us the opportunity to expand on our positions and put those additional remarks on the record. I hope that is helpful and reassuring to him, and that he feels able to withdraw his amendment at this stage.

[Lord Lansley]

I am grateful to my noble friend, and to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. This debate has been very helpful, and the takeaway from this—one I am grateful to my noble friend for confirming—is that the bound schedule has already been notified to the WTO. People need to be very clear about the fact that if we leave without a deal and the Government come forward and say, “These are the tariffs that we intend to apply”, they are not varying the WTO bound rate but saying that, on a most favoured nation basis, they will apply these rates. That provides a basis for negotiations on preferential schemes that could emerge over time. I read the document about the implications of no deal for tariffs, and it is correct: the Government must balance the desirability of supporting liberalised trade, with benefits for consumers through price and choice, with protection for producers in this country. That will be a delicate balance to strike. If people are aware that we can behave in this way with an applied rate that varies from the bound rate, it removes the argument that by applying a lower rate in the short run we have prejudiced our ability to conduct trade negotiations with other countries in the future—we have not done that. If we get rid of that argument, it helps to shift the balance in many cases in favour of lower rates in the short run, rather than higher rates. I am most grateful to my noble friend for his response. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly simply to explain why I do not feel I can support the proposed new clause, although generally speaking I agree with the views that have been expressed in its support. I shall indicate what I could support with some changes to the new clause. I shall deal first with proposed new subsection (9), which makes the ratification of the agreement subject to approval by resolution of both Houses. This provision, in fact, goes much further, as the noble Lord will appreciate, than the procedure set out in the 2010 Act with regard to the approval of treaties, but I welcome the principle and I have no difficulty with it. However, I have a question which I hope the sponsors of the proposed new clause will address. I may have overlooked the answer—it may be staring me plain in the face. What happens if the Lords decline approval but the Commons approve the trade agreement?

There is no provision in the Bill to deal with that situation, and it would be profoundly unattractive if the House of Commons were to approve the trade agreement and the House of Lords were to refuse it, the result being that the trade agreement could not pass. This is actually dealt with specifically by Sections 20(7) and 20(8) of the CRaG Act of 2010, but there is no similar provision in the new clause. Because the procedures between the new clause and CRaG are fundamentally different, I do not think you could simply import the procedures in CRaG to the new clause. Perhaps I might seek guidance from the mover of the amendment on how to resolve a difference of opinion between the two Houses.

To move very quickly to proposed new subsections and (1) and (4), so far as the former is concerned it is very good idea that the negotiating mandate should be placed before an appropriate committee and discussed in both Houses of Parliament. It is a splendid idea, and I also agree with the supporting procedure set out in the proposed new clause. The one thing I do not agree with is that the negotiating mandate should be made subject to approval of the committee or the House. That is an undue restriction on the ability of the Executive to negotiate. I would say yes to consideration and discussion, but no to express approval.

The same point relates to proposed new subsection (4). I see no reason why the agreement of the appropriate committee should be obtained before the matter is put to a vote under subsection (9), because that subsection is already a parliamentary lock on the agreement. Why, therefore, should there be a pre-agreement by the appropriate committee before it goes to both Houses of Parliament? It seems to me that that restricts the ability of Parliament to do that which it thinks is right, and it is unnecessary because the parliamentary lock already exists.

To summarise, I cannot agree with this new clause, but I could agree with it if the principle of consideration and discussion were substituted for that of express approval in subsections (1) and (4).

[Lord Lansley]

I thoroughly agree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham in his argument. I will add one thing. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association just a few weeks ago brought together people from across the Commonwealth to discuss a number of issues. The meeting I attended was a discussion on the ratification of treaties. It was clear that Australia and New Zealand—which of course have a long continuing history of negotiating their own trade agreements—still use the prerogative power as the basis on which the Executive enter into a trade agreement, but they do it in the context of continuing scrutiny, oversight and an approval process following implementation of legislation.

What I read in the White Paper last week went a long way towards replicating that in a very satisfactory way—that is, we would do those things in a similar way to Australia and New Zealand such as the outline approach being presented, reports on rounds and negotiations being reported back to Parliament and of course an approval process. It is perfectly reasonable to wait on the two Houses of Parliament to tell the Government what they think should be the committee processes by which these are considered. Australia, for example, has a joint standing committee on treaties, which looks at the way treaties are ratified. I do not think it is the case that mandates are being taken all over the world; some of the countries that have the greatest constitutional consistency with us do not have a mandate. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was right about scrutiny and oversight, but he elided them with the necessity for Parliament to issue a mandate. Under our constitutional processes we should not be issuing a mandate, and the proposed new clause falls on that count.

[Lord Bilimoria]

My Lords, at the heart of this is Parliament taking control. What has been a problem for the past two and two-third years is that the Executive have continually tried to bypass and bully Parliament, whether with Article 50 or the statutory instruments that are going through now. This is really frightening. I am sorry to say to the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Hannay, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, but there is a big difference between Australia and New Zealand, and, for example, the United States of America. Not only does that country undertake a meaningful public consultation before negotiating, but it releases all the negotiating text to a large representative panel and subjects the deals to an affirmative vote by Congress, which is also entitled to amend deals unless it waives its right. That is Parliament having a say. That is transparency. The European Union, with its mostly mixed agreements, needs ratification by member states. It is crucial that we accept these amendments, to make sure, in the words of the Brexiteers, that we take back control.

Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, if I may add something to this group of amendments, first, I say well done to the noble Lord, Lord McNicol. He passed the first test: one of the Opposition’s central jobs is to know which subjects should be raised in Committee and make sure that they are raised. He has done us a service by doing exactly that.

Turning to these two amendments, neither is practical as drafted, but we can probably leave that to one side and focus on what we want to achieve on rules of origin. The first reason it is not mentioned in detail in this Bill is that Section 17 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act effectively puts the rules of origin requirements into law. They are the same, as far as I can see, as would apply generically to rules of origin under the revised Kyoto convention. The country of origin must be identified as that country or territory in which the last substantial process took place. But that does not really answer the point.

This is where we come to the existing international trade agreements that we might roll over. They will have been constructed on the basis that any processing that took place in the United Kingdom was processing within the European Union. We cannot assume that, when these international agreements are rolled over—whenever that will be, but a couple of years from now, I hope—products originating in the United Kingdom will be defined as including processing inside the European Union. We will have become a third-party country. That is unless, in the form that they rolled over, the countries with which these agreements have been made, and with which we enter into our future agreement, accept that origination should be cumulated between us and the European Union.

If I am asking a question of my noble friend the Minister it is: can we look to cumulation between the United Kingdom and the European Union as being a feature of the rollover agreements, such that, from the business point of view, what they have understood to be the situation prior to exit day becomes the situation after exit day? That is essentially what we are looking for.

Declaring an interest, 28 years ago I was deputy director-general of the British Chambers of Commerce. That movement was and is responsible for the issuing of certificates of origin, so it understands this rather well. Of course, that applies outside the European Union at the moment. If we are in a customs union, all those problems go away, but we had that debate on day two of Committee.

If we must deal with this issue, I say to my noble friend that I hope the Government’s discussions with the British Chambers of Commerce have been productive. I know that two years ago, the movement said that, given the nature of international supply chains, ensuring that a “Made in Britain” badge can continue to be displayed proudly on products originating in this country will require us to re-enter some complex definitions of the relationship between international supply chains and origination in the United Kingdom. It also said that it was happy to work with government to look at how that might be achieved in future. I hope that this will come forward in our discussions on Report to demonstrate that the Government have an idea of what future trade agreements might say about origination to ensure that the “Made in Britain” scheme is not frustrated in circumstances where we think of a product as British.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, on taking his place and on his performance today. Given his history, I am sure that negotiating procedures in your Lordships’ House will be less turbulent than in other places where he has worked. I thank both him and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for giving us the opportunity to, in my case, put questions to the Minister and probe the issue.

In particular, what will be the position in the interim period of our leaving the European Union? My noble friend the Minister pointed out in our debate— on Monday, I think—that there would be a period for these agreements, having been initialled, to be signed and approved by the relevant Parliaments. My understanding is that if we leave under World Trade Organization rules, agreements in this interim period will be on the basis of non-discrimination. So, if we, as a third country—my noble friend Lord Lansley correctly identified that we would be—chose to extend agreements to current European Union members and said, as many noble Lords have suggested, that we wished to impose zero tariffs, those agreements would have to be extended on a reciprocal, non-discriminatory basis. Is my understanding correct? In an interim period of what might be one or two years before such agreements are rolled over, whatever our preference, whatever we offered to our existing European partners would have to be offered to every other country with which we wished to trade, on the basis of non-discrimination. I do not think we have grasped that point. Obviously, it would be helpful to understand the implications for our trading arrangements.

There is deep concern among the farming community that tariffs imposed could be as high as 40% for certain products and 60% for lamb, at a time when we are exporting more meat than we ever have, historically. That would hit our producers particularly hard. It is causing real hardship in the hills because many of our farmers do not know whether to produce lamb; the supply of lamb to the home market could dry up. We would therefore import more lamb, beef and pork at a time when we should be increasing our exports there. I simply want to take this opportunity to seek answers to those queries from my noble friend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fairhead]

I hoped and believed that I had addressed that question. The answer is yes: that certification would continue as it currently does. That is the information I have but if the situation is any different, I will write to the noble Lord.

[Lord Lansley]

I hope my noble friend will forgive me for interrupting. Just so that we are absolutely clear on which question we are having answered, it is about reciprocity. If, in relation to these agreements, we in this country are treating EU content as UK content and having it accepted as such, the question that we are looking to have answered is: will the EU’s continuing agreement with that same third-party country mean that UK content is treated as EU content for the purposes of its origination?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fairhead]

I stress one more time that this legislation is not about no deal. It is about making sure that we have the capability and powers to implement, whatever happens. Plan A is for a deal and the clauses in the Bill aim to achieve the powers and make sure that we can put them into effect. We have to be prepared for no deal. I reiterate that it is not the desired outcome, but we have to make sure that the Bill has the ability to cover both.

I hope that the statement I have made, and my answers to questions, have provided clarification and some reassurance to the Committee, and I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw—

[Lord Lansley]

If my noble friend will permit me, I wanted to ask one question. I know we are not debating future agreements but the manner in which rules of origin are to be established in UK legislation in future. We should work with the chamber of commerce movement to try to make that work with the business community as well.

My noble friend might also like to note that Clause 6, which was new Clause 17 on Report in the other place, was an amendment tabled by Dr Phillip Lee, the Conservative Member for Bracknell.

[Baroness Fairhead]

I thank my noble friend for that clarification. I should have said that it was not a government amendment. But I take the point.

I meant to respond to that question. We are trying to do whatever we can to provide help to SMEs and other organisations to help trade. That includes working with them on procedures and practices which will reduce the cost of, and barriers to, trade. I confirm that we are actively engaging with the chambers. If it is not on this particular point, I will take that back to the department and make sure that we include this too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I thank the noble Lord for that. It does indeed take us back to the debate we had last week, and I hope he remembers that I gave certain reassurances on that point. What I can say—without having the details in front of me—is that, as he knows, there is ongoing dialogue with the devolved Administrations to ensure that they are kept fully in touch with what we are doing. That will be the general tenor of the ongoing discussions as we look forward to FTAs.

I would like to pick up on some of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, in the last debate as they are relevant to this point. He asked how our approach differs from the role of the European Parliament in EU trade negotiations. He may well know this but I shall spell it out: the European Parliament’s role operates in relation to EU trade policy. We are offering scrutiny for the UK Parliament at every stage of the process in a way that is appropriate and proportionate to the UK constitutional context. In the UK, the power to make treaties is a power held by government, but the context of the negotiations will be different. The European Commission negotiates free trade agreements representing the interests of the 28 member states. It is given the mandate to do so by the Council, and final agreements are approved by the European Parliament and the Council before they can come into force. UK-only free trade agreements will be negotiated by the elected Government in the best interests of the UK. The Ministers responsible for the negotiations are directly accountable to Parliament.

[Lord Lansley]

My noble friend might also reflect that there is some truth in what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, reminded us of in previous debates. American negotiators often find there is significant benefit in having what I think they describe as “Congress reserve” in negotiations—what we might call “parliamentary reserve”. That sense of engagement with Parliament during the course of negotiations is important in itself. What happened last night in another place might give anybody engaged in such negotiations pause for thought; it is important that they know during the negotiations that they can take Parliament with them.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

I said at the beginning that this is likely to be a wide-ranging debate; my noble friend’s remarks will indeed be fed into the processes being considered at the moment.

I would like to address a question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who asked what access parliamentarians would have to negotiating texts. We take seriously our commitment to keeping Parliament apprised of the Government’s negotiating intentions. That is for the purposes not just of transmitting information but of inviting scrutiny and allowing Parliament and its committees to take informed views. While we support Parliament’s important scrutiny role, Ministers have a specific responsibility, which Parliament has endorsed, not to release information that could undermine our negotiating position. On transparency more generally, I reiterate our commitment to a transparent approach. We are developing proposals for the release of updates on negotiations; we will bring these forward shortly.

Let me say more about the consultation process, an issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. The amendments also seek to ensure wide consultation on FTAs, which is a good idea; indeed, that is the approach the Government are taking. We conducted one of the largest consultation exercises ever undertaken for the new FTAs we are considering with partners without an existing FTA with the EU—the US, New Zealand and Australia—and for our potential accession to CPTPP. This included a 14-week public consultation open to all businesses, individuals and other organisations in the UK and abroad, and 12 outreach events throughout the UK, including in each of the devolved nations. We have also conducted ongoing engagement with stakeholders on trade policy, including “town hall” style briefings, roundtables with different groups of stakeholders, regular stakeholder briefings and webinars designed to engage with smaller and regional stakeholders.

I would also like to touch on impact assessments. I do not propose to address—

Brexit: EU Free Trade Agreements

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fairhead]

My Lords, the Government’s policy remains to have a deal and an implementation period. If that is pursued, there is confidence that those agreements can be continued. That is in the interests of our businesses and our consumers. My urge would be that we find a way to a deal, so that that process can happen in a clear way. As for no deal, I have been clear in this House that timing is extraordinarily tight and our confidence would be much greater if there was an implementation period.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend the Minister rightly said, participating in the withdrawal agreement in a treaty with the European Union will enable us to be treated as if we are continuing in the free trade agreements currently in place between the European Union and third countries. We will participate in those through the mechanism of the withdrawal agreement. However, does she agree that many of those third countries are not keen to publish what they regard as their arrangements with the United Kingdom in the event of no deal, not least because they do not know what our relationship with the European Union will look like immediately after a no-deal exit? Under the most favoured nation rules, they would expect in the short term to be able to benefit from whatever arrangements we arrived at with the European Union.

[Baroness Fairhead]

I thank my noble friend for that question. He is absolutely right. An example referred to in another place was Turkey. As your Lordships will know, Turkey does not have a normal free trade agreement; it is part of a customs union. Therefore, it is particularly difficult to agree continuity with Turkey until we know the exact terms of the relationship with the EU.

Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, had we debated this amendment during the last session, the night before last, we would not have had the benefit of yesterday’s report from the IPPR think tank on the subject of state aid. It reinforces the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that the United Kingdom is a restrained user of state aid when compared to other countries in the European Union. That gives the lie to some of those who believed that the European Union was restricting the UK Government’s decision on the scale of state aid in this country—and that message might be conveyed to some members of other parties in the other place who are alleged to believe that the European Union would continue to restrict industrial support activities.

I was surprised to hear the huge shopping list that the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, presented for further state aid—his is not a voice that I had imagined would be making that point. That highlights the need for a state aid strategy. If we have an industrial strategy—which we do, whether some Members opposite like it or not—the purpose of state aid is to find strategic ways of delivering it in the best possible way for the best possible good of this country and its trading environment with the rest of the world.

Whether we trade as an EU nation, through FTAs or, as some people dream of, on WTO terms—which would be a nightmare for the rest of the world—there will still, sensibly, be restrictions and rules affecting what aid we can give and what restraints we have to apply. In spirit, therefore, I support the amendment, and I am interested to hear the Minister’s response.

I have a query that will probably reveal my ignorance of the process of legislation. Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 2 contains a more general injunction around statutory instruments and consultation. I wonder whether that part of the Bill may pick up, to a large extent, what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to achieve. I would be happy to be wrong about that, but it would be helpful if the Minister, either now or later, would fill us in on that.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the point the noble Lord is making and exploring on this issue, and when we explore that point, it is worth saying that much depends on our future relationship with the European Union, and how we incorporate state aid into that. If we were in the European Economic Area, we would apply EU state aid rules; that is what EEA members now do. If we were in a free trade agreement with the European Union—as Canada and South Korea, for example, are—we would do something different. State aid provisions are built into those agreements, but they are based not on EU state aid rules but on the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. That will all entirely depend on what the future relationship looks like.

The point has correctly been made that we use state aid proportionately less—about half as much, as a proportion of GDP, as the French do, and a quarter as much as the Germans. So state aid rules themselves have not necessarily restrained us from doing things. The noble Lord will be aware of the report on competition and state aids by the committee of which I have the privilege to be a member—the Internal Market Sub-Committee of the European Union Committee. The Government’s approach is, essentially, that we will replicate EU state aid rules in UK law, but we will, of course, be repatriating them so that they are exercised by our authorities rather than by the European Commission. In that context, it will be the Competition and Markets Authority, rather than any other body, which does that in this country—and it will do so independently.

If I remember rightly from the evidence that we received—I stand to be corrected if not—the Government’s intention is for this to be done by the CMA on a UK-wide basis, and not to be disaggregated to individual nations or regions. Clearly, the state aid rules themselves may have geographical parameters, as ERDF and other EU funding has done in the past, but that is a different matter. The rules on the application of state aid would be applied in this country. So we will have something considerably beyond the WTO requirements. For example—this is probably the best example and the most important for businesses—EU state aid rules would require us to have processes of notification and prior approval whereas, where WTO rules are concerned, if the Government engage in subsidy then they do so at the risk of post-hoc challenge and complaint. That is quite a different structure.

I say all that simply because, while this is an interesting issue, I am not sure whether the amendment does the job. However, I put it to the noble Lord that he might suggest that if future trade agreements of this kind, which are generally with third-party countries, were to apply state aid rules in a UK and third-party country agreement which differentiated from the WTO subsidies and countervailing measures provisions, that should be the subject of consultation and approval in this House. I cannot see why we would want to approve an arrangement for a WTO agreement on subsidies, which would simply be applied in the normal course of events. I hope that those few remarks are helpful.

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Lab)]

My Lords, a couple of the points made in the short debate on this amendment have been very wide and not actually to do with the amendment as such. Perhaps I may add a corrective: we discussed the mergers of railway companies, nuclear power companies and so on earlier today. The fact is that we look at one Chinese company against not one European company but sometimes more than one. Regarding the comment about the EEA, I am sure that the EEA will evolve while recognising that we often need one European company. It could be dressed up as something to do with either the nature of policy on mergers, competition and monopolies or with state aid policy. I put down that cautionary note because, when people say that this amendment does not do those jobs, it is clearly not intended to. However, many such wider commercial questions will have to be faced up to in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

It is. Ultimately, I believe that the choice is going to be that we either stay in the customs union and the single market of the EU or we leave, either with no agreement at all, which I hope is ruled out in short order very quickly, or with some form of government agreement, which did not secure majority support in the other place, where one-third of those voting against it did not believe that it was leaving the EU at all. I think where the people will now be informed in the decision is as I started: many of the issues are now laid bare about the consequences of leaving.

I am very happy to be a co-signatory to this amendment. I am very pleased that we in this Chamber are debating what the consequences of the actions will be. We are also clear that we want to do the least damage to the British economy and to secure for the future all the relationships that we have at the moment without the extra burdens of regulatory addition.

My final point, which the OBR report in October made very clear, is that if we went down the Government’s course and left, then there would be at least five years of adjustment to a worse scenario for GDP, even on the basis of the agreement. I am seeking to avoid that. I hope there will be consensus, at least in the first instance, that a customs union is necessary. There is no doubt of our position on these Benches that the customs union is preferable to all of those. I hope that will ultimately be the future of our country, and I believe that that is up to the people, who ultimately will have to decide this.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, I do not want to go on at length about this issue, not least because I agree so wholeheartedly with what my noble friend Lord Patten of Barnes has already said. I am always loath to do it and I hope to make it a very rare event, but I voted for the amendment to the withdrawal Bill last April. To that extent, I think this House has made its view perfectly clear: it thinks, in the context of leaving the EU, that to retain membership of a customs union with the EU would substantially mitigate what would otherwise be the damaging economic effects of withdrawal.

I do not want to get into a debate about “the” customs union or “a” customs union but, on the face of it, if we are negotiating to leave but we are negotiating to have a customs union relationship with the EU, it behoves us to negotiate without necessarily subscribing to the customs union because the customs union is a product of the treaty. We would no longer be bound by the treaty, so we have the flexibility to think otherwise. That does not turn us into Turkey, because we might choose to do things quite differently. The EU has chosen not to have agriculture within the customs union with Turkey because it is in its own interests not to do so. We have very different interests and we might choose to pursue them differently. Indeed, as one can see from the structure of the backstop, we might choose to have an arrangement with the EU that was, as Ministers are fond of saying, a “bespoke arrangement” for the management of a customs union. And why not? If we could have such a thing under the backstop, surely we could have it without the backstop.

I do not want to go on at length. I hope that those in this House and beyond who are thinking next week about what is needed to make progress from the impasse that we appear to be in at present will read this short debate. While it exposes some of the difficulties in negotiating a future customs relationship with the EU, two things should become immediately apparent. First, many of the negative consequences of leaving the EU—most especially, leaving without a comprehensive agreement in place—will be dramatically mitigated by being in a customs union. When I talk to businesses, that is absolutely at the top of their wish list, and it is true for manufacturers as well. Secondly, I hope people will realise that this does not preclude us having a trade policy of our own. What are trade policies nowadays? They are generally called comprehensive economic partnership agreements because by and large they are not about tariffs; they are about broader relationships. Especially for the UK, given that we are predominantly a services economy, for the future those agreements should be about services. We should be negotiating trade agreements about services, the movement of capital and investment, and indeed we should have a negotiation with India that includes a discussion about the mobility of workers between India and other countries. That is happening in a very powerful way: the Indians are exporting skilled young people all over the world very successfully, and we should have that in mind as part of an economic partnership agreement with other major economies. If that is true and it also gets us out of having a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, but without creating a new border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, why would we not want to do this? That is what everyone is trying to arrive at.

For the purposes of next week’s debate there are, therefore, essentially two questions. First: does offering to be party to a customs union with the European Union, as part of the future political declaration, enable us and the European Union to agree in a way that would—as they say in Brussels—have legal force? Would it enable us to put into the political declaration, and have agreed by the European Council, the kind of language and commitments that would allow it to be said that we will not enter into the backstop, if we go down that path in the future treaty? That is what it is all about: not going into the backstop in the first place. We need some reassurance that that will happen. That will automatically solve the essence of the problem associated with the backstop. If we do not have to go into it, we will have solved that issue. We will also have solved the question of unilateral withdrawal or otherwise. If we are in a customs union, we have a right to leave it. If we go into the backstop, we have no right to leave it—as it is currently constructed— and that is a very unhappy place for many who are against the withdrawal agreement at the moment.

The second question is: can we avoid the Turkey situation? It is a bit like when people talk about entering the Norway situation: we do not want to be in a position where we are simply rule-takers. With a customs union, at least we are not rule-takers on financial services and our service industry, but we are none the less rule-takers. We do not want to be in that position. Can we arrive at a customs union where we genuinely have a shared responsibility? I hope we can.

The trouble is, I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Patten. Nearly a year ago, if only the Government had listened and put into the negotiation—at the time that led up to the White Paper and after it—a discussion about a customs union. Instead they put into the White Paper the suggestion that we could have a customs union, without calling it that, where the rules of origins are effectively waived so that anything that originates in the United Kingdom is treated as if it is European, and anything that originates in Europe is treated as if it is British. This, of course, is a nonsense; the European Union would never accept it. It would never accept that it would raise the money—

[Baroness Kramer]

I am trying to understand the noble Lord. Obviously, the definition of a customs union is quite difficult and I was trying to follow his definition. Does he intend only the narrow definition of a customs union, where it essentially just deals with issues such as tariffs and excise duties, or does he intend it to include the regulatory alignment, as it often does because the terminology gets stretched? If there is not regulatory alignment there still have to be checks, which means we are back to the border problem. Would he explain what he sees as the content of “a customs union” because, if we are not removing the border problem, I struggle to understand his point?

[Lord Lansley]

When I talk about a customs union, I mean—as the WTO would interpret it—where we share a customs territory and an external tariff arrangement, and our tariffs are the same as the European Union’s. A customs union, in my book, does not necessarily imply having the same rules, regulations and standards. If we are in a customs union with the European Union, it does not mean that we do not have a comprehensive partnership agreement with them. I hope we would do and that would embrace everything from data adequacy to having the same standards. Therefore, we would have to work on the basis that we start with and maintain standards at least as good as those inside the European Union, enabling the European Union and ourselves to operate on the basis of open borders. The most important part of that is the absence of a requirement to establish rules of origin, because one is in a single customs territory that allows goods to pass across borders in that way.

I will finish my point. I am losing quite where I was; I think I was just beyond talking about Turkey. We have got to know that we are going to be in a position to be able to negotiate a customs union, that we will be able to withdraw from it in future, and that it will obviate the need for us to have a hard border with the Republic of Ireland. That is a really important position. We need to know these things and we should have had months to negotiate them. As it is, we have to arrive at something in the political declaration in weeks rather than months.

Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I sense there has been a bit of a change in the composition of the House—I cannot imagine why, because we have reached some of the more interesting elements of the Bill. Had the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, who is absent, been present, he might have learned quite a lot. That will help me avoid the more sharply put questions.

Amendment 27 is a probing amendment in the sense that it is there to invite the Government to set out their plans, should they be necessary, in relation to GSP, the EU’s generalised scheme of preference. It is open to a wider range of issues, and in his dual capacity as Minister responsible for development, the noble Lord, Lord Bates, might well have a view that will add to our overall understanding of where we are. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has a similar amendment, although it is much more detailed and sharply drafted than mine is, and I look forward to hearing his comments.

It can be said in very few words that one of the things that one gets by being part of the EU is participation in schemes of the type that is being discussed here, which is an attempt to try to bring some sort of structure and order to the way in which trading relationships can sometimes impact on development activity and vice versa, by recognising that very often a good trading opportunity in a developing country is perhaps going to do more than any amount of aid, however well delivered and whatever focus it has. On the other hand, the impact of either favourable tariffs, reduced costs or support for various aspects of work on the trading side of that relationship can have quite a devastating effect.

It is to the credit of the EU—and I am sure that Ministers have been heavily involved in the shaping of the way this goes—that the GSP arrangement is being set up so that it is constantly monitored. We have recently seen the interim relationship of that. In short, the results are broadly supportive of the way the EU has taken forward this programme, with some reservations in the sense that it is probably too soon to say quite what some of the outcomes will be. It is recognising that there are longer-term benefits that will not be picked up by short-term measuring techniques, and of course there are dangers that come in relation to trying to focus too narrowly on some of the econometric figures without thinking about some of the wider social issues.

The GSP relationship, combined with Everything But Arms arrangements, is a way of seeing development happen in a constructive and progressive way, which is something that we support. In moving this amendment, I invite the Government to respond to the thoughts behind it. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, in following the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I am grateful for his kind remarks about my amendment. I was not required to produce any amendments and I produce relatively few but, by virtue of his responsibilities, he has to produce quite a lot of them so I think we will forgive him for the sighting shot that, in a sense, many of these amendments are at this stage.

The generalised scheme of preferences, for those who are reading our debate afterwards—I am sure that many will do so—is about giving preferential tariff reductions to developing countries to stimulate their economies and their exports to the European Union, as one of the world’s largest potential markets. It can be fairly said that it is something that we subscribe to and that we encourage. For that reason, in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018, the Government and Parliament have already legislated for a preference scheme in the future. Therefore, that is not the issue, which is why my amendment is structured in the way that it is. The issue is: how do we go about this? That is the point of Amendment 27. How far should the United Kingdom’s preference scheme—that is, the unilateral preferential tariff rates that we offer to developing countries—be structured in such a way as to correspond directly to what is presently the generalised scheme of preferences as reflected in EU regulations?

The starting point for this is that the EU regulations will last until the end of 2023. For the purposes of this debate, I am going to assume that we are not in a customs union with the European Union, because if we were that would automatically solve this problem. Therefore, we are outside the customs union and we have to make our own decisions about to whom we give a preferential tariff rate and when we vary from it. We did not have a debate here on the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act because it attracted financial privilege, so we are getting the benefit of that now. Quite a lot of the debate on the relationship with developing countries focuses on tariff reduction. That is important but, for the least developing countries, the objective is nil tariffs on—as it is expressed—everything but arms and ammunition. That is reflected in Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. For the other developing countries—the eligible developing countries, as they are known—there is an objective to try to reduce tariffs to the fullest extent possible. That is already in there.

But of course the issue then is: under what circumstances do we depart from that? The fact that the GSP says nil tariffs does not mean that in all circumstances that is maintained. The European Union has not done this, but the regulation would permit the European Union to suspend the nil tariff, or indeed to withdraw the preferential rate, in respect of transgressions on the part of other states. That is a possibility where a country has flagrantly been abusing human rights. If a country chose to produce large numbers of goods for export to other countries on the basis of a flagrant disregard for child labour laws, for example, should one continue to offer a preferential rate? Many of us would say that we should not necessarily do that. We should then suspend the preferential rate in some circumstances where human rights abuses and the rule of law have ceased. The European Union has not permitted countries to be in the Everything But Arms GSP, so we have to make those judgments under those circumstances.

The point of my Amendment 65 is to say, as we proceed, that we should start with a scheme that conforms to the structure of the EU regulation, because everything is starting from the position of continuity—that happy word—but we would have the ability to move on. We may make our own judgments about the circumstances in which we would suspend or withdraw the preferential rate. It might apply in the circumstances I described. It might equally apply if we had to safeguard the industry of the United Kingdom. The same would be true in the EU, but we might choose to do it in different circumstances. For example, last week the EU applied a safeguard measure in relation to imports of rice from Cambodia and Myanmar. That may not be something that we in the United Kingdom would choose to do because we do not take the same view about rice production in this country as, for example, they do in southern European states. There will be differences and we will have industries to protect, but we do not necessarily have to follow the same approach as the European Union.

As a way of proceeding, my amendment would insert into the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, under those circumstances, that the Government should come forward to Parliament, make a report and seek views before proceeding down the path of suspending or withdrawing this preferential rate, because we should be participants in that discussion.

There should also be an intention before January 2024—when the EU regulation expires—to look independently from the European Union at what our future structure on preferential rates should be. In my amendment I suggest that the Government should report to Parliament by the end of 2022 on their proposals, with a view to legislation being passed by the end of 2023 for introduction from 1 January 2024. Of course, EU competence has dominated this area of policy, but the time will come for Parliament to think about what our trade policy looks like in terms of unilateral preference rates for developing countries.

It is quite difficult even to work out the relationship between our structure of preferential rates and the EU’s. Simply to say continuity is probably misleading because I cannot actually find absolute correspondence between the benefiting countries under the EU’s standard generalised scheme of preferences, or what it calls its GSP+, which is for eight vulnerable countries. I cannot even find that we can correspond between that and what is set out in Schedule 3 to the Act. For Everything But Arms, the list is the same, so we know where we are with that. I think I found 28 EU countries that benefited from the standard GSP or the GSP+, but 43 countries that are intended to benefit from what is referred to in Schedule 3 to the Act as “other eligible developing countries”. The difference is obvious: the EU does not include formally the GSP countries which, by virtue of other agreements, have access to tariff reductions that are at least as good as would be available under the GSP—for example, it has association agreements with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and so on.

For us to replicate the EU’s GSP would mean significantly fewer countries having access to the GSP and to those preferential rates than would be the case in the European Union. I just say gently to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that that is another reason why he and I will have to go away and think about our amendments again. It is not about reproducing the GSP regulation or the EU’s list. It is about ourselves arriving at a full list of the developing countries, particularly those which are not the least developing but countries eligible for the GSP that should get preferential rates but at the moment get them through other EU agreements. Those are not necessarily free trade agreements that will get rolled over. I am not aware that this is necessarily the case for all these association agreements; it may be for some, but not necessarily for all of them.

Therefore, I commend Amendment 65 to the extent that it raises the issue of having our own scheme, consulting on it and asking Parliament when we have to change the preferential rates. I do not commend it to the extent that I think it can be adopted at this stage, but I think we should come back to it. I hope Ministers will be willing to look at that and how they would go about managing the preferential scheme in the future.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Lansley, for bringing this issue to your Lordships’ House. We support greatly the spirit on these Benches. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, used a contemporary example of rice. In another life a long time ago, I worked in the sugar industry for seven years. Of course, sugar is wrapped into this so deep that it is still embedded in there. On his point about the transition from us being part of a European scheme to going into a wholly United Kingdom scheme, I know that the pressure on that commodity alone would be huge, given the past relationships and previous problems that some sugar-producing countries have had within the European regime. That is just one commodity. His point is clear: that this is not a simple issue but one that requires a great deal of thought, but that thought must be had and is worth having. We support this process and will involve ourselves if necessary in how this gets taken forward. Clearly, we want to be part of a future regime that has these objectives, but the means with which to produce that are not necessarily as simple as they might look on first appearance.