European Union Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

The House of Commons is entitled to amend amendments that we have made in this House, but did not do so. The Labour Party did not do so because it did not want people outside to get the impression that it was against consulting them about losing further powers to the European Union. That is the real reason behind it.

I know that the House wants to get on, but I just want to say that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, referred to Greece. Of course, it is very clever to do that because we know the appalling state that the eurozone is in at present. He made the reasonable point that if it were a unitary state the Commission would have examined the accounts of the Greek Government. It had the opportunity to do so before Greece was admitted to the eurozone, but it did not do it because it was a politically driven decision. It wanted as many countries in the eurozone as possible, whether they were broke or, like Germany, prosperous. We should be very careful when using the present crisis to undermine the Bill. I would like it to go further but it is the best we are going to have, and I hope that the House will not insist on the amendments on this occasion.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate and I will be extremely brief. I rose to speak only because so many of my noble friends have made rather powerful speeches, but ones with which I disagree. I take very seriously the point made about moving too far in favour of plebiscitary democracy. One has to agree that that is a real danger. Balanced against that has to be the fact that the seeping away of the power of Parliament to the European Union is also an extremely serious issue. I agree in general that referendums should be held largely on constitutional issues because they are a good way of settling how we live with each other and how we are governed.

We had quotations from the side opposite and from Cross-Benchers in earlier debates from Edmund Burke and the judgment of members of the legislature. One might quote back at them Tom Paine, who argued that constitutions belong to the people: that it is not for politicians to decide the rules by which government is conducted—sovereignty comes from the people. While I think that referendums should be on constitutional issues—important constitutional issues, as has been said—the totality of our relationship with Europe is a huge constitutional issue. It is therefore right that referendums should play a part in that.

That poses the question: is it right that we should have in this Bill so many different powers and so many different issues all rolled into one that might, as has been said, give rise to a flood of referendums on trivial issues? I do not believe that that will be the consequence of this Bill. That has been said before in our proceedings on the Bill, so I shall not go on about it at any great length. I will say, however, that that will not happen because: first, these measures are likely to come in packages; and, secondly, there are reserve powers—reserved to the nation state and left out of the previous treaties of Lisbon, Nice and Maastricht—because individual countries in the past have wanted to preserve them, and not necessarily Britain. There are other countries in the European Union, and one can look through the minutes of the constitutional convention leading up to the Lisbon treaty to see how some other countries in the past have argued for the veto to be preserved in certain areas. This is not just at the insistence of British politicians.

[Baroness Quin]

The noble Lord said that he could foresee referendums dealing with issues in packages. In those circumstances, how are people who agree with one issue but disagree with another supposed to vote?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

That question was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, earlier in the debate. The answer is: just as they vote in elections. They have to decide on five or six issues in an election. In the past, there were referendums in other countries on treaties in which they had to decide on a series of questions raised by those treaties. I repeat my point that where a veto exists, it is not necessarily just at Britain's insistence but because other countries, too, wanted it.

Thirdly, I think we will have referendums only where a British Minister agrees with the proposition that will be put to the people of this country, and where the Government believe that they can win the referendum. For that reason, and with great respect, I do not agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that our flexibility in negotiations will be impeded because a certain area is covered by the possibility of a referendum being held on it. If a Minister wishes to argue in favour of something, presumably he is confident that he can sell it to the public. If he cannot sell it to the public, and they are going to disagree with it, perhaps he should think carefully about whether it should be advanced at all. Therefore, although I agree with the general proposition that we do not want to go down the road of having a massive extension of plebiscitary democracy, I do not think that that will be the consequence of the Bill. That assertion has been repeated many times, but the argument is not convincing and I urge my noble friend to support the Government on this.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, I hope that I will be forgiven if I say that I have a faint feeling of having been here before—and forgiven also for not responding to every strongly held view and argument put forward in this debate that was put forward again and again in the past. The Government and I regard some of these arguments as deeply flawed and consider that they do not understand or come to grips with the realities of political life today, either here or in the rest of the European Union. I will also deal briefly, as is the custom, with the Motion—it is not the custom to make long second speeches on a Motion—and with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, which goes very much further than anything standing against the Government’s Motion that the amendments be resisted.

On the decisions involved in Clause 6, none is in the grey or insignificant category. They are all there for very strongly established reasons that are largely supported by many other countries. Many vetoes are maintained because the signatories to the Lisbon treaty did not want them to go into the QMV category. They are there because their use could only ever provide for a transfer of competence and power from the UK to the European Union—for reasons that we have explained from this Dispatch Box and that many of my noble friends have explained again and again—and so should be subject to the referendum requirement.

It is difficult to accept that any of the decisions in Clause 6 would not be significant in constitutional or economic terms. Those who say that it stretches their imagination to understand the significance of the measures listed in Clause 6, or Schedule 1, which springs from it, surprise me. Surely a decision on whether to give up our vetoes on, for instance, the multiannual financial framework, border controls or joining the single currency—I refer now to the amendment of the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Triesman, not to the main one that accepts them—would all fall, under Amendment 13B, into the bracket of something that had to be judged according to whether or not it was significant. This is a completely unnecessary process. Clearly they are of the most profound significance.

I know that the shadow Minister for Europe said on Monday that he considered other items in Clause 6 to be not so important. He exempted the important three—border controls, the European currency and one other—but dismissed the others as paperclips and minutiae. We do not accept that analysis. We firmly believe that the other issues are also of great significance and, when understood in terms of their impact on jobs, work and the processes by which our law system operates, certainly could be subjects of conversation in the pub in Burton-on-Trent, where the noble Lord, Lord Lea, has been listening to conversations.

On the European public prosecutor, I know that it is regarded by some of my noble friends, and by some noble Lords opposite, as not being of constitutional or economic significance. However, it is because it involves affording a supranational body the ability to prosecute citizens of this country within the scope of its own criminal justice system in respect of alleged crimes affecting the EU's financial interests. Someone must decide what that financial interest is and whether the crime has been committed. Is that a paperclip or minutiae issue?

What about the vetoes listed in Schedule 1? Why are they not significant when they all relate—that is why they are there—to the red lines adopted by successive Governments, fought for very hard by the previous Government and sustained by this Government, covering foreign affairs, security and defence policy, economic and tax policy, including issues of the EU's budget, which all of us admit is a red-hot issue, social security, employment policy, justice and home affairs policy, and citizenship and elections? Are these all minutiae, paperclip decisions and things that are never discussed in any pub? I have to ask where some of my noble friends, and some noble Lords, have been if they think that these matters are of no significance, because they include not only domestic issues, where after all Parliament can make and unmake laws, but transfers of power, sovereignty and competence that would almost certainly be irrevocable—in fact, they would be irrevocable.

The amendment before us would, for instance, allow the British Government to relinquish their veto over decisions relating to the multiannual financial framework without first getting the consent of the British people. That is a hugely important decision that Members in the other place were particularly concerned with, and rightly so. The Minister for Europe rightly pointed out that the forthcoming decision on that framework will in effect set budgetary decisions and ceilings for the next five to seven years of the EU's life and development. Are these minutiae, paperclip decisions or matters that people will not understand? I ask my noble friends and noble Lords who think that these matters are insignificant to think again. Their significance is obvious.

It is vital that these matters remain subject to unanimity and that whichever British Government are in office—this matter should be above party—continue to have the right of veto. Similar views are taken in almost every other country in the European Union. We all know what happens when one gets casual about the veto and lets it go. This was the case in the surrender of the veto on Article 122 of the TFEU, which opened the way to fearsome, huge and titanic new financial commitments to the funding of Europe in its present financial difficulties.

The amendment before us would reduce precisely the clarity that we all seek. It would also risk the possibility of judicial review on a decision by the Minister not to consider one of these clear-cut decisions to be significant. The so-called pragmatic flexibility that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, keeps reminding us about and seeks could well be impeded by his own amendment. He would end up in a quagmire of pragmatic flexibility of his own making. It was too much of this pragmatic flexibility approach in the past that caused antagonism—the turn-off, if you like, of popular support for the European Union and for Ministers’ actions. The ministerial discretion that some of my noble friends and noble Lords call for has become the ministerial indiscretion and undermining of trust and support for the European Union that we are trying to correct.

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[Lord Radice]

The House of Lords is a very effective revising Chamber and has proved that on this Bill by making it better and more manageable than it was at first. However, the House of Commons has not accepted our amendments, except in the case of the definition of parliamentary sovereignty—I congratulate the noble Lord who so ably pioneered the provision that we have now just passed. We have just rejected the idea of confining referendums to major issues. Therefore, there is a case for a sunset clause.

This Bill is an attempt, as the people who introduced it in the House of Commons have made quite clear, to bind successor Governments, and it involves a major extension of referendums. In a sense, it is a major constitutional innovation. Noble Lords who have so ably supported Governments of the past in Europe have said to us that we should take seriously the danger of marginalisation that might arise from the Bill. Therefore, there should be a reassessment mechanism in it. I consider that we have a new, mild and flexible version of that in this amendment, which it would be very useful to Parliament to have. We should go beyond what the Labour Government introduced, which has been mentioned already; that is, a committee report on whether a Bill has been effective. Perhaps that should be part of the process, but we should then go on, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said, to have a mild version of a sunset clause.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, sunset clauses are appropriate in some legislation: for example, when one has emergency legislation and Governments take exceptional powers. Those powers may have an effect on civil liberties for instance. Counterterrorism Bills sometimes have such an effect. However, this is not emergency legislation; it is legislation that seeks a long-term and permanent change in our relationship with Europe.

There is another reason why a sunset clause would be inappropriate. It is in effect, as proposed, a reversal of primary legislation via a resolution. It is a fast-track procedure for removing legislation. In a way, it is a bit like the Article 48(6) provision in the European Union treaty which this Bill is designed to act as a safeguard against.

One is either for or against this legislation, and many noble Lords have given reasons, powerfully and eloquently, why they are deeply opposed to it. However, they cannot have it both ways. To suspend the legislation, either in whole or in part, is to fudge the decision. If noble Lords do not agree with the legislation, they cannot hide behind amendments that would allow the referendum requirement to be taken out while maintaining the appearance and the structure of the legislation giving effect to consultation and decision by the people.

As the noble Lord who speaks for UKIP said, this will arouse suspicions among some members of the public that Parliament is taking away the right to be consulted while giving the appearance that that right still remains. I can think of nothing that would be more likely to undermine trust than to maintain the legislation on the statute book but incorporate into it a provision that would take the guts out of it.