National Security Situation

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, who speaks with real authority and from recent experience on the Kurds in northern Syria. It is also a privilege to take part in a debate in which two senior national security experts—the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones—have taken part, and one in which a distinguished former Foreign Secretary has taken part, together with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, who presumably has now inherited from Lord Healey the status of the best Foreign Secretary we never had.

I can speak with no particular authority about Syria—I am an amateur—but I am tempted by what the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, said to go a little further than I did in our discussion on Monday’s Statement, when I could speak only about Syria. My theme is the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Glasman. It is about realism and how I think we need to be a bit more realistic, so I will end up exactly where the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, did at the end of his speech.

I am not clear what our strategy on Syria is now. The one thing that is clear is that it is failing. We are against the Assad regime. We are also against ISIS, which is being beaten by the Assad regime and its Russian and Iranian supporters. We say that we support the Kurds, who were the most effective indigenous anti-ISIS force, but we are doing nothing to stop them being killed by the Turks, who are our NATO allies. Iranian influence, huge in Baghdad now, as the noble Lord, Lord Glasman, said, is growing fast in Syria. The risk of an Iranian/Israeli conflict grows every day, as this week’s Israeli air strikes show, and the proxy Saudi/Iranian war in Yemen continues with very heavy civilian casualties.

What is the UK trying to achieve? Saturday’s strikes were brilliantly executed, I certainly do not agree that Parliament should have been consulted in advance and I have no doubt about the legality of the action. But the Prime Minister went out of her way in her Statement to make clear that they were not about regime change, yet, as far as I know, our policy is to call for regime change in Syria. It has been our policy for a number of years; there have been no signs of it succeeding, but we still parrot the cry, “Assad must go”.

Under Foreign Secretary Hague, we recognised a Syrian Government in exile. Where is that Government now? Under Foreign Secretary Hague, we told the rebel Syrian national army that we would assist them. Where was that assistance and where is that army now?

Breaching our normal practice, we derecognised the regime in Damascus and withdrew our embassy. Assad is still there; we still are not. I see no sign that we have any influence on the Syrian Government. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, said, we need to recognise that Assad has won. Of course his is a loathsome regime; I am absolutely not an apologist for the man and I understand the rationale for Saturday’s strikes. The Chemical Weapons Convention is important and worth protecting, yet I am uneasy about the strikes.

What was it about this breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Assad regime, unlike previous ones—the Minister spoke of four; Human Rights Watch talks of 50—that triggered a punitive response? I hope it was not just the presence of a television camera. By attacking only chemical weapons sites and stores—no military camps, no containments, no headquarters and no military hardware such as tanks, rockets or artillery—do we risk creating the perception that the regime may kill with impunity provided it does not use chemical weapons?

What were the political and military effects of the strike? I doubt if it won hearts and minds in Syria. Militarily, I was thinking over the weekend about Henry Fox in 1757 attacking the raid on Rochefort under Pitt as breaking windows with guineas. I am uneasy about hit-and-run raids. The middle ground between engagement and disengagement is murky territory. In Iraq, engagement and regime change clearly failed, 500,000 died and the Iranians now call the shots in Baghdad. But in Syria, disengagement, no boots on the ground, proxy forces and bombing has worked no better, with another 500,000 dead in country or on the long, tragic refugee route to an unwelcoming Europe.

I do not know what the answer is. I am not an expert on the region, I cannot answer my own questions, but I have been asking for a couple of years for answers from the Government and I have five particular questions to put today. First, I think we must drop the pretence that present policy on Syria may still succeed. William Pitt’s triumph in 1759 came when he dropped the policy and completely overturned the strategy that he had been following at the time of the Rochefort raid. We must accept that Putin, Rouhani and Erdoğan are in charge, Assad will stay there as long as they prop him up and, if he goes, it is they who will pick his successor. Do the Government agree?

Secondly, that means we have to talk seriously to all three of them. I do not believe any of them wants the disintegration of Syria and, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, I am not sure that Russian and Western interests are always a zero-sum game. The Russians will of course want to retain the influence they have secured and their bases at Tartus and Latakia, but I do not think they want to be sucked into the sort of quagmire that the Americans are in in Afghanistan. I can envisage Russia brokering a compromise between Iran and Israel, with Iran’s Shiite allies being allowed to remain in Syria provided they keep their distance from Israel. That may be wrong, but I should like to know what the Government think. Do they feel that we should be in dialogue with the Russians about Syria?

Thirdly, what about a peace process? We should be realistic about the Geneva process, which plainly does not work, and consider some association with the Sochi process, which might work. Do the Government agree?

Fourthly, since American policy in Syria is likely to remain capricious, since Syria is Europe’s neighbour, not America’s, and since we and the French have historic responsibilities there, I hope that the Government are seeking a common Anglo-French analysis and prescription and will then seek to sell it to wider Europe. A Europe traumatised by the refugee crisis might respond to an Anglo-French lead.

Finally, I hope that the Government will quickly revisit the decision to withdraw the embassy from Damascus. Diplomatic contacts with friends are useful; with foes, they are vital.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

We certainly believe that Mr Assad needs to be a part of the negotiations leading to a long-term solution, as I shall explain. There needs to be a transition to a new, inclusive and non-sectarian Government who can protect the rights of all Syrians and unite the country, but we are pragmatic about how to achieve that.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

In my time in the Foreign Office, recognition was not a seal of approval; the recognition was that somebody was in control. We have a mission in Pyongyang and in all sorts of places where shaking hands might not be what the noble Earl would wish to do, but that is what we are paid to do. We diplomats are paid to find out what the other lot are up to, and it is most important in relation to one’s foes.

[Earl Howe]

I take the point, but I repeat that our view is that there needs to be a transition to a different regime, despite everything the noble Lord has just said. Syria’s future must be for Syrians to decide.