European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for the contributions that have been made to the debate. This short Bill has already invoked many hours of debate, so I intend to keep my remarks very brief.

I endorse the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, both as to the appropriateness of this amendment and as to the spirit in which it will be and is being received by the Government. As noble Lords will be aware, the Prime Minister gives a Statement to the other place following European Councils. We know that there will be a Council this month, and indeed quarterly thereafter. That means that a Statement will be made to Parliament at least once every quarter on European issues, and it will be repeated in this House. Of course, that is just the beginning of a much wider process over which this Parliament has control at the end of the day.

DExEU Ministers have responded to more than 600 parliamentary Written Questions, appeared at 13 Select Committees and given six Oral Statements to the House on developments regarding our exit. The Secretary of State has agreed to give evidence to the Exiting the EU Select Committee on 15 March, alongside the Permanent Secretary at DExEU, and will shortly afterwards give evidence to the Lords EU Committee on 22 March.

The Government are committed to parliamentary scrutiny, and Parliament will play a key role in scrutinising and shaping our withdrawal. As my noble friend Lord Bridges observed last week, we have had take-note debates, debates on Select Committee reports, debates in government time and Select Committee appearances. All this will continue in order that Parliament can scrutinise the development of negotiations in so far as is possible to put those in the public domain and in so far as they come into the public domain.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to secrets, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to nasty secrets. This may reflect a difference of approach, but at the end of the day there will not be any secrets. You cannot conduct such a process in secret, ultimately, and then expect Parliament to consider that it is being kept properly informed, as it should be, if you have what are termed secrets. We are committed to keeping Parliament at least as well informed as the European Parliament as negotiations progress.

A Bill to repeal the European Communities Act will follow. There will be primary legislation on issues such as immigration and customs, and a vote at the end with regard to the process on the final deal to exit.

With all that in mind, I will pose a few questions. Is the Prime Minister already bound to give a Statement to Parliament after every quarterly European Council? The answer is yes.

Have the Government been willing to give frequent Statements to Parliament? The answer is yes.

Have DExEU Ministers and other government Ministers appeared in front of Select Committees? The answer is yes.

Have the Government listened to Select Committee reports? The answer is yes; we published a White Paper in February this year.

Do the Government aim to respond to the Select Committee reports about Brexit within two months? The answer is yes.

Have the Government said they will give more information to Parliament, so long as it does not undermine our negotiating position? The answer is yes.

Then there is the core question: what is the present Bill about? The Bill is about giving the Prime Minister the authority to give notice of withdrawal from the European Union.

With great respect to the House and to all noble Lords, let us proceed and pass this Bill. It will not be improved by unnecessary decoration and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has already observed, it is not appropriate that this amendment should proceed. As I believe all Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken would acknowledge, it is not necessary that this amendment should proceed in these circumstances. Therefore, I invite the noble Lords to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank the Minister and other noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. The most helpful exchange—I mean no disrespect to the others—was to hear the noble and learned Lord Mackay support the spirit of the amendment and then the Minister say that he agreed. If I could just bottle that, that will do me nicely.

I want to make only two other points. Although there are of course report-backs after the European Council, the UK will not be there when the European Council discusses our departure. Therefore, it is the other meetings that we are interested in.

My other comment is in response to the noble Lord, Lord Spicer, who said that if we dared to suggest that Parliament rather than the Crown should take the final decision, Mrs May might call an election. I am much older than my noble friend who spoke earlier and not only did I vote in 1975 but I remember the February 1974 election very well. Edward Heath basically called an election on who governs Britain. Mrs May would not be well advised to go to the country on, “Do you want the Government or Parliament to govern Britain?”. However, that is beside the point. I thank the Minister for the tone of his response and, on that basis, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I can absolutely assure the noble Lord that we are taking into consideration not only the White Paper from Wales but the submissions prepared by the Scottish Government. All these matters have been taken into consideration in the context of our negotiating position following the triggering of Article 50. All the proposals outlined in these papers will be the subject of keen scrutiny by the Government. What we are considering today is a Bill to implement the referendum result and respect the judgment of the Supreme Court. We are not engaged in considering a vehicle for determining the terms or shape of the broader negotiations that will follow the triggering of Article 50. As has been said on many occasions, that will be a hugely important milestone for the United Kingdom but it is only a milestone, not a cut-off point. It is not the end of the process—it is merely the beginning.

Since the referendum result there has been regular and ongoing political engagement. I noticed that the Prime Minister’s very first visit following the referendum result was to Edinburgh, quickly followed by Cardiff and Belfast. I remind the House that the principles which underpin relations between the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations are set out in a memorandum of understanding. There is the joint ministerial committee which should operate—I say should—by consensus, because as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and the noble Earl have observed, it is not always possible to achieve consensus, but these bodies have that aim.

At the plenary session of the joint ministerial committee in October last year, the four Governments agreed to create a Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations, chaired by the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU. Under that structure, Ministers and officials from the UK Government and the devolved Administrations have engaged closely in the process of considering our exit from the European Union. That committee has been meeting monthly and a wide range of matters has been discussed on each Government’s requirements for the future relationship with the EU, and the future relationship between the devolved Administrations and this Government.

Over the autumn, we also undertook important work with the devolved Administrations to fully appreciate their priorities and interests. In that context we have taken account of the publication that the noble Lord referred to—namely, the White Paper from the devolved Administration in Wales, and the Brexit papers published by the Scottish Government—which was submitted to us for consideration in the context of that process.

Outside the formal processes that I have described, we have also engaged extensively with stakeholders in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to try to ensure that the interests of all these areas are reflected in our negotiations with the European Union. Ministers have regularly visited the devolved constituent nations of the United Kingdom on numerous occasions for the purposes of those discussions. They have met with a whole variety of stakeholders from SMEs to multinational companies. We have met with MSPs as well. We have tried to engage right across the areas of interest that will be touched upon by our departure from the EU.

A point that was alluded to by a number of noble Lords was how the devolved Administrations will be engaged in determining where repatriated powers should sit in the future. It is a matter of interest to all of us. We must work carefully to ensure that, as powers are repatriated from Brussels back to Britain, the right powers are returned to the United Kingdom Parliament, and the right powers are returned to the devolved Administrations—whether in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.

This will be a matter for further discussion. The Prime Minister has been clear that no decisions currently taken by the devolved Administrations will be taken from them. That is not the end point, but the starting point for this form of negotiation, and we appreciate and understand the importance of addressing how we deal with the repatriation of the acquis in due course. It is important to have these debates, but it is equally important not to tie the Government’s hands as they approach the forthcoming negotiations. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his response. My only response is to the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, where I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. The only agreement was about the way to talk and that wording is the JMC’s terms of reference at the moment. The Minister said the Government are trying to engage—I say let us try a little harder. The lack of pre-information, before the White Paper, caused a slight frisson, but maybe that is well behind us. I hope that we are marching forward on slightly firmer ground. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 27th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the Committee has heard quite enough from me so I will not speak on this other than to say that this will come up when we discuss the single market and I will reserve our comments until then. The Committee will probably know that we will not be supporting this amendment.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the amendment concerning the European Economic Area, which seeks to ensure that the UK remains a member of the EEA.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 180, 181, 197, 198, 205, 206, 231 and 232 relate to judicial commissioner approval of major modifications to warrants issued under Parts 6 and 7 of the Bill. They seek to provide additional clarity regarding the matters the commissioner must review when deciding whether to approve such a modification.

The Bill already provides for major modifications to such warrants. In the context of bulk interception, bulk acquisition and bulk personal dataset warrants, a major modification may be used to add or vary one of the operational purposes for which data may be examined under the warrant. As regards bulk equipment interference warrants, a major modification can additionally add to or vary any description of conduct in the warrant.

The Bill requires full double-lock authorisation from a Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner for any major modification to a bulk warrant. These amendments will not change that. Instead, they provide greater clarity about the matters that a commissioner must consider when determining whether to approve a modification to a bulk warrant.

The amendments specify that, for major modifications to add or vary an “operational purpose”, a judicial commissioner must review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to whether the modification is necessary, applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review and ensuring that the commissioner complies with the duties in relation to privacy set out in Clause 2, the so-called privacy clause.

In the context of bulk equipment interference, if a major modification proposes to add or vary a description of conduct, the judicial commissioner must also review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to whether the conduct authorised by the modification is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by it. The amendments are intended to ensure clarity and consistency across the Bill, and as such are to be welcomed.

The sharing of data and intelligence with our overseas partners is critical to the work of our security and intelligence agencies. Without working together with our allies, those agencies could not do their vital work of keeping us safe. Amendments 184, 185, 201, 202, 209 and 210 simply clarify the consideration that must be given by the Secretary of State before authorising the disclosure to overseas authorities of data acquired under the bulk powers in the Bill.

The Bill already places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider whether corresponding safeguards will be applied to the data that are to be shared with the overseas authority in relation to their retention and disclosure. These amendments make explicit that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the overseas authority has in place safeguards, to the extent appropriate, that correspond to those in the Bill not only in respect of the retention and disclosure of the data shared in bulk but in relation to their selection for examination. This group of amendments therefore makes absolutely clear that proper consideration will be given to the examination safeguards that are applied whenever bulk data are shared with another country. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for moving these amendments, all of which we are happy to support and some of which respond to concerns we raised in Committee.

It may assist the House if I outline at this stage the purpose of Amendment 185A, in the names of my noble friend Lord Rosser and myself, which is about safeguards for disclosing overseas-related material for our foreign allies and agencies. That is material, possibly including information sent overseas by UK residents, obtained by our security and intelligence services under bulk interception warrants. It is an amendment which we hope the Government will feel able to accept.

In Clause 142, before any information obtained under a bulk interception warrant is disclosed overseas, the Secretary of State must ensure that arrangements and safeguards are in place regarding the retention and disclosure of such material, as the Minister has outlined. These requirements correspond to Clause 141 safeguards for domestic arrangements: that is, requiring that the number of people to whom the bulk-intercepted material is disclosed, the extent of disclosure and the number of copies made is limited to the minimum necessary. These safeguards also require the destruction of such material where there are no longer grounds for retaining it.

However, unlike Clause 141 for domestic arrangements, Clause 142 for overseas disclosure provides a wide discretion for the Secretary of State, whereby she or he must ensure equivalent safeguards only,

“to such extent (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.

It could, therefore, be possible for the Secretary of State to decide that no safeguards are required in a particular case.

We recognise absolutely that the UK will need to share intelligence with overseas agencies and our amendment does not undermine the ability of UK agencies to do that. We also accept that overseas disclosure may be of a different nature, with particular political, diplomatic or security implications, all of which the Secretary of State must consider. However, the present wording is surely too wide and, if I have understood it correctly, would not be subject to subsequent review. Amendment 185A removes this very broad discretion and requires that it must appear to the Secretary of State that safeguards corresponding to the requirements under Clause 141(2) and (5) will apply in relation to disclosure overseas.

The Minister will not be surprised if I make reference to the Szabó v Hungary finding that minimum standards should be set out in law to avoid abuses of power and that,

“it would be contrary to the rule of law … for a discretion granted to the executive in the sphere of national security to be expressed in terms of unfettered power”.

The judgment notes that,

“the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion … with sufficient clarity … to give … adequate protection against arbitrary interference”.

I hope that the Government will feel able to accept the amendment as, if anything, extra safeguards may, indeed, be required where sensitive information is being disclosed abroad. We look forward to the Minister’s response on this.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for the detailed discussions—perhaps negotiations is a better word—that they have had not only with us but with other interested parties. We have sought to balance our strong desire to protect clients’ confidentiality—their ability to speak openly and honestly with their lawyer, safe in the knowledge that information will go no further —with the need to safeguard the security of citizens and free them from the threat of terrorism or other risks to life. It would be wonderful if there were a nice, absolute and clear division between those two objectives but, sadly, in the real world there seldom is.

The Bill as drafted had not got the balance right. It was tipping towards the state’s ability to access or use legally privileged information. Since then, as the Minister outlined, the amendments to Clause 2, an overriding clause which should circumvent all the powers in the Bill, will significantly safeguard privileged material. It is not an absolute, but we acknowledge movement here and in other amendments, such as the public interest test needed before approving a warrant. It would require both the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner to be satisfied that the public interest in obtaining the information outweighed that long-standing public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of legally privileged communications, but also, importantly, that there were no other reasonable means of obtaining the required information.

Similarly, we welcome Amendment 25, by which, when a warrant is requested to prevent or detect serious crime, the exceptional compelling circumstances have to relate to national security or preventing death or significant injury, and do not, as with some of the other powers, include being in the interests of the UK’s economic well-being. We are also pleased that the commissioner would have to be informed when any privileged material is retained by an agency and note that, as has just been mentioned, it can be ordered to be destroyed or for conditions to be imposed on its disclosure.

We are, however, sympathetic to the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—I cannot believe he really called himself less luminous—to allow the commissioner to differentiate between advice and, for example, the time when a phone call was made, which could be incredibly important but irrelevant to the content of the phone call. If there is a way to enable the commissioner to differentiate in that way, we hope that the Government will respond to that positively.

Finally, with regard to the so-called inequity exception, we note that any application for a warrant under this provision would have to set out the grounds for believing that communications are being made with the intention of furthering a crime, and we welcome that.

We are mindful that representatives of lawyers—speaking on behalf of their clients, because it is their interests that we are discussing—feel that the Government have not gone far enough to meet their concern. We acknowledge that, on paper, an enormous amount of progress has been made. Our concern is whether the resources, culture and mindset of the IPC will allow for the scrutiny and challenge that the words now on paper will require. I am reassured by the fact that the judicial commissioners are not just lawyers but very experienced and senior ones, so they will have a background of understanding the legal profession’s fears and long-standing views about this matter. Perhaps, when replying, the Minister, in addition to responding to the wider points made, can give an assurance that the commissioner and judicial commissioners will be appointed with a view to guaranteeing their complete independence and with sufficient resources to be able to look at these significant and demanding issues with due care and attention.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by looking at Amendments 27 and 88, which seek to insert the word “clearly” in the public interest test. On this point I concur with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, that there is a danger that this would simply muddy the waters and not clarify.

The test as set out in the government amendment is straightforward. The public interest in obtaining the information sought either outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of privilege or it does not. If the word “clearly” were inserted, that certainty would be lost. We would have to try to define what we mean by “clearly”. Logic suggests that it means that one public interest test should outweigh the other by a certain amount, as indicated by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but it is not apparent what that amount would be. This would undoubtedly lead to confusion and uncertainty. Given that such a warrant can be sought only in exceptional and compelling circumstances, where national security or life and limb are at risk, confusion and uncertainty are one thing that we cannot afford.

The government amendments set out in detail what is intended by “exceptional and compelling”. The test is explicit on the face of the Bill and it is one that works. We are also introducing a requirement for the codes to include additional information about when circumstances are to be considered exceptional and compelling, and requiring the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to keep that language under review. It is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.

The second set of amendments in this group—Amendments 56, 57, 192 and 193—seek to change the power of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to determine what happens to legally privileged material when it has been obtained by an agency and the agency wishes to retain it. First, they would provide that the commissioner has the power to impose conditions on the use of the item as well as its disclosure. Secondly, they would also require the commissioner to direct that any privileged material that has been obtained must be destroyed unless there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify its retention. These amendments raise important issues in respect of legally privileged material that is inadvertently obtained and where the agency wishes to retain it. I would like to reflect further on our consideration of these points today and to return to this issue at Third Reading.

Amendment 107 deals with communications data and seeks to provide for judicial approval of authorisations for the communications data of a person who is or is likely to be a practising legal professional. It seeks to reflect the protections provided in Part 3 of the Bill for the identity of a journalistic source, but in practice this amendment goes much further by attaching the protections to the profession rather than to the sensitive information they manage. The debates in the House of Commons and at previous stages in this House have been clear that Parliament’s view is that protection should attach to the sensitive communication or to the function being carried out and should not simply apply to the person because they are a member of some profession. For example, there was consensus that protection should apply to the journalist’s communications with a source or the client’s communications with a lawyer. This amendment would go against that consensus by providing protection to a lawyer simply because he is a lawyer.

The Bill takes a reasoned and balanced approach. It applies additional protections where appropriate; provides for judicial authorisation of the most intrusive powers and for the use of less intrusive powers in the most sensitive circumstances; and provides a powerful and robust oversight regime to ensure that powers cannot be misused. The protections provided are specific to each power under the Bill, applying protection which is appropriate to the level of intrusion represented by each power. The draft Communications Data Code of Practice sets out the additional considerations that must be taken into account when any data relate to a member of a profession which routinely holds items subject to legal provision. Indeed, Schedule 7 to the Bill requires that the code shall include such detail. In addition, the current amendment to Clause 2 puts beyond doubt the importance of taking particular care in relation to sensitive information, such as items subject to legal privilege.

Our debate has already shown the importance that the Government place on the protection of legally privileged material, but I would suggest that it is not appropriate to introduce these additional protections within the context of authorisations for communications data. I invite the noble Baroness not to press Amendment 107.

Amendment 55A, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, seeks to amend government Amendment 55. This amendment would require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to direct that any material obtained that is subject to legal privilege must be destroyed and allow the agency to retain only material that is incidental to that which is privileged.

I have already indicated in response to Amendment 57, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that I am minded to look again at whether there is more we might provide on the face of the Bill regarding the test that the commissioner should apply when making a decision about whether material can be retained. However, I would respectfully suggest that what the noble and learned Lord proposes with this amendment is not appropriate in the circumstances. It is the case that the vital intelligence that an agency may require could intrude not only on incidental material in a legally privileged communication but on the legally privileged communication in general.

I take up the example which the noble and learned Lord gave of the individual communicating with a lawyer and asking, “Can I be extradited from Greece?”. One might say, in a very straightforward fashion, that the relevant intelligence there is Greece, not that he may or may not be extradited. But what if the communication goes like this: “Can I be extradited from Greece or Albania?”, and the answer is, “You can be extradited from Greece but you cannot be extradited from Albania”. Just giving them Greece and Albania will not assist the intelligence services very much. On the other hand, the legally privileged information that he can be extradited from Greece but cannot be extradited from Albania might lead the reasonable intelligence officer to infer that the individual was more likely to be found in Albania than in Greece. It is in those circumstances that I suggest that one cannot easily divide between the two. As I have indicated, we are conscious that in these areas we can look again to see whether we can strengthen these matters. At this stage I would invite the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I was about to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Butler, on his excellent drafting of the amendments but he has slightly given away that it was not all done by his own fair hand. However, if the look on the Minister’s face is indicating that the Government might accept the amendments, we are delighted that the noble Lord’s influence from this House seems to be keeping pace with the influence that he had in his previous occupation. We are very content to support the amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we welcome the chance to revisit this important issue, which was debated in Committee.

In putting beyond doubt that deliberate wrongdoing in relation to the bulk powers will be subject to clear, criminal sanction, we accept that these amendments will provide clarity on a crucial issue. We also believe that they have been drafted in such a way that, rightly, they would not criminalise honest, well-intentioned mistakes by the staff of our security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. As such, we believe they strike the right balance and are to be welcomed. Therefore, we are happy to accept the amendments.

Brexit: Role of Parliament

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 18th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, the Government’s position is that there is no legal obligation to consult Parliament on the triggering of Article 50. That is, of course, the subject of challenge in the courts. Indeed, there will be a directions hearing in the Administrative Court tomorrow in respect of one of those claims.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, the referendum campaigns were both all-party. The challenge now falls to all of us to implement the result of that referendum. Will the Minister outline the Government’s plans to engage all parties, and indeed the Cross Benches, in the discussions that now need to take place?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Prime Minister has been very clear that it will take time for the UK Government to agree their position for negotiations in respect of the exit from Europe. They will consult widely, not only with all Westminster governmental institutions but also with the devolved Administrations, including the Scottish Parliament.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin with Amendment 15, which raises the issue of creating a new criminal offence. This was initially discussed in the other place at earlier stages of the Bill’s passage.

In the other place the Government made it clear that each of the powers in the Bill is already subject to one or more civil penalties or criminal offences for misuse. Part 1 has always contained a number of privacy protections that are central to the Bill, and it now makes clear the existing offences and sanctions that apply in respect of the different powers, such as the offences that relate to the unlawful interception or unlawful obtaining of communications data. In addition to the strict safeguards that are explicit in Part 1 of the Bill, there are a number of other additional offences that exist elsewhere in statute but apply equally to any misuse of the powers.

In response to the concerns raised in the other place and with sympathy for the Intelligence and Security Committee’s desire for clarity, the Government listened carefully and tabled amendments that now more explicitly refer to the relevant offences set out in other statutes, such as the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which applies to equipment interference, and the Data Protection Act 1998. These put beyond doubt the penalties that would apply in the event of deliberate wrongdoing by a member of a public authority.

On the basis that there are existing offences that apply to every power in the Bill, the Government are reluctant to introduce a new criminal offence that would lead to confusion, as it would overlap or duplicate those set out elsewhere. Perhaps more simply, it would be unnecessary. The powers in the Bill are varied, each with their own distinct regimes. If we sought, as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, to create one offence to fit them all, it would either be too broad and catch too much, or by being too narrow actually miss something and result in a less effective sanction. It could also lead to a lack of legal clarity and potentially hamper the effective enforcement of existing offences. The point is that one size does not always fit all.

There is a further concern. The heads of the three intelligence agencies have written to the Home Secretary and to the ISC outlining their very real concerns about the inadvertent operational impact this proposal may have. The officers working within our intelligence agencies are entirely committed to the mission of keeping the country safe. They are professional and ethical in the way in which they conduct their work. We recognise the concerns raised about potential misuse of investigatory powers, but the creation of a new offence may unnecessarily inhibit agency staff and limit their ability to operate with confidence and at pace against the numerous threats we face.

We do not disagree that intelligence officers who are exercising these most sensitive and intrusive powers should consider their actions carefully before using them, but I have seen no evidence that the dedicated men and women of our security and intelligence agencies give such matters anything less than the most careful consideration. I can quite easily see that Parliament’s creating a new offence that appears to be targeted solely and squarely at our intelligence agencies could have a detrimental impact on the confidence, morale and willingness of those persons to carry out the often dangerous yet vital work we ask them to do on our behalf. Moreover, the Government are clear that if anyone in a public authority were to act contrary to their obligations under the Bill, the matter would be taken extremely seriously. The current commissioners already ensure that they investigate and report publicly on the very infrequent cases of errors which involve serious misuse. In appropriate cases disciplinary action may be taken, up to and including dismissal, or civil or criminal liability incurred.

When these points are considered collectively, I hope noble Lords will agree that this puts beyond doubt the severe penalties that would apply in the event of deliberate wrongdoing by a member of a public authority. A new criminal offence is therefore wholly unnecessary and potentially confusing, and would adversely affect the operation of the agencies.

Amendment 16 seeks to extend the criminal offence of unlawful interception to “private” postal services. This is aimed at capturing those services which cater to more specialist clients; for example, companies that provide services to banks or lawyers. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to DX as an example of such a company. I understand the reason for the amendment and support the principle that the offence should apply to this type of company. However, these companies are already caught by the existing provision. The Bill describes a “public postal service” as one that,

“is offered or provided to the public, or a substantial section of the public”.

This includes companies that specialise in providing services to bespoke sectors, such as the legal profession or banks.

Moving on to Amendment 17, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, Clause 3 sets out the offence of unlawful interception. This is a vital safeguard that relates to one of the most sensitive powers provided for in the Bill. It underpins the protections for privacy that are fundamental to the Bill. I am afraid I cannot accept an amendment which would limit or even undermine that safeguard. The amendment would limit the offence by setting out circumstances in which it would not apply; for example, it provides a public interest defence to the offence. It would not be appropriate to allow someone to intercept the communications of another—without lawful authority—because that person takes the subjective view that it would be in the public interest. I note and agree with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in this regard. It would not be right to reduce this strong safeguard, which exists to protect individuals.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I should have come in on Amendment 16, but before the Minister moves on, the issue of the private postal service was raised by the Minister’s Scottish legal colleagues, who wrote to us. They felt that the definition of “public postal service” did not include DX. I wonder if he will agree to write to me so that the legal position is clarified, since it was good Scottish lawyers who raised the issue.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. It was raised by Scottish colleagues—Scottish colleagues with whom I do not agree—but I am quite happy to undertake to write to her. I should say it was raised by the Scottish Law Society, not the Scottish Bar.

Amendments 18 and 246 were spoken to very clearly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord Oates. While I am quite happy to write on the matter of press regulation and the commencement of Section 40, press regulation is not the purpose of the Bill. I have to make that clear in this context because while I understand the points that are being made, they do not arise directly in the context of these amendments.

Moreover, the relevant amendments are not considered necessary. There is already a criminal offence where unlawful interception takes place on a public or private telecommunications system or a public postal service. There is also a cause of action which applies in a limited set of circumstances, where the criminal offence does not apply. Where there is an allegation that unlawful interception has taken place on behalf of a public authority, a person may seek recourse through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which has the power to provide redress, including awarding damages.

Where the conduct relates to an individual who does not belong to a public authority, there are other causes of action which may be applicable. I may have misunderstood the noble Baroness that the tort which currently exists in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—allowing an individual to take action against a person who has the right to control the use or operation of a private telecommunications system and who intercepts a communication on that system—has been added to the Bill by way of Clause 8, and that happened after the debate on the Bill in the other place. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the amendments.

Turning to Amendments 20 and 21, Clauses 6(2) and 6(3) are important because they provide that where a public authority, or a telecommunications operator, is acting in accordance with a warrant properly obtained under the Bill, or the provisions of Clauses 42 to 50, they can be sure that they are not breaking any other law or required to obtain additional authorisations. This legal certainty is vital for those engaged in the essential work of keeping us safe.

The first amendment seeks to provide that future legislation could make that conduct unlawful for certain purposes. I understand the principle the noble Lords seek to achieve but I do not believe it is necessary. Nothing in the Bill prevents Parliament amending the legislation at a future date to make any of the activity unlawful or provide that some additional authorisation is required.

The second amendment seeks to amend subsection (3). The purpose of this subsection is to make clear that conduct undertaken in accordance with a warrant or which is authorised by any of Clauses 42 to 50 is to be treated as lawful. This is vital in providing companies with reassurance that by complying with a warrant they will not be acting unlawfully in relation to their regulatory obligations or other legislation. The effect of this amendment would be to provide that the conduct is lawful only for the purposes of the Bill. My concern, were we to accept this amendment, would be that we would remove the legal certainty that the companies and agencies rely on to do their job and to keep us safe. We therefore do not accept the amendment.

Amendment 84 relates to exceptions from the duty not to make unauthorised disclosures about warrants. It is absolutely right that the Secretary of State should be accountable to Parliament, even for the most sensitive decisions concerning the most sensitive powers. But when it comes to such matters, which necessarily must remain secret, it is absolutely right that Parliament provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to be held to account, while at the same time doing nothing to jeopardise national security. That is the very reason for the existence of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

To put beyond doubt that the Secretary of State is, and will continue to be, accountable to Parliament through the ISC for decisions relating to warrants, the Government amended Clause 54 and Clause 123 to make clear that the Secretary of State may disclose matters relating to warrants to the ISC. This will allow the ISC to carry out its statutory functions in holding the Government to account, while maintaining our security. It is right for the ISC to carry out this function and it would not be appropriate for disclosure to be made to Parliament as a whole. To do so would breach the long-standing principle of successive Governments to neither confirm nor deny matters relating to intelligence and security and could risk jeopardising our national security. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments.