Census (Return Particulars and Removal of Penalties) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 4th June 2019 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Judge]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“( ) In section 8 (penalties), after subsection (1A) insert—“(1B) A person does not commit an offence if that person does not state any particulars with respect to sexual orientation or gender identity.””

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[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, these are simple amendments directed to an issue of principle. The issue is very simple. It is a criminal offence to fail or refuse or neglect to complete the census form—note “to complete it”: that is, to answer every question. Over the years, it has come to be accepted that some of the answers should not be matters of obligation—in particular, in 2000, providing answers to a question relating to matters of conscience such as religion; or, now, in the current Bill, sexual orientation and gender identity, matters which are obviously intensely personal. The reasons are obvious and I support them.

It is plainly the intention of the legislation that each individual responding to the census will have a choice on these questions: you may choose to answer or you may not. If you choose not to answer, you will, in the words of the legislation, not,

“be liable to a penalty”.

Even if you are prosecuted, no penalty could be imposed: you would get an absolute discharge.

What, then, is the problem? Why am I making a fuss? I am making it in the company of the Constitution Committee, of which I have the privilege to be a member, which expressed its concerns in one of those very short, simple letters. In summary, it comes to this: because no legislative provision expressly decriminalises the choice not to answer, the Bill should be amended explicitly to state that such a failure is not a crime.

By letter dated 31 May, the Minister gave a very considered, lengthy reply to a very short letter. My experience is that, on the whole, those with the best points write short letters. However, ignoring that general experience, which may not be true here, I have discovered from the letter that, based on a starting point for the legislation in 2000 relating to religion—dare I point out, before we had a Constitution Committee?—the promoters of the Bill confused, conflated or perhaps simply failed to understand that the removal of the risk of a penalty meant that answering or not those questions was voluntary, and therefore there was no criminalisation. They confused crime and penalty. They are distinct concepts. Normally, the conviction comes and the penalty follows. What we have done—what is proposed here and was proposed and carried in 2000—is to wipe out the penalty but leave the crime. At the very least, it is arguable—I would say strongly arguable—that what we have now, and will continue to have without the amendments, is a crime of not answering the question but no penalty for choosing not to do so. That does not seem very sensible.

It is obvious that the Bill’s objective to decriminalise any such failure. That is the point of it and why it is supported. Why is conduct that carries no penalty and is not intended to represent even minute contravention of the criminal law allowed to disfigure it by remaining on the statute book? I respectfully suggest that that is wrong in principle. The Bill should be amended expressly to decriminalise any such conduct and any necessary amendments in relation to questions about religion in the 2000 Act made subject to identical amendments within the Bill. That is the purpose of the amendments.

It is not an answer that the Crown Prosecution Service would not prosecute. It is not an answer that if the Crown Prosecution Service prosecuted and someone were convicted, no penalty would be imposed by the court. I mention that in this context. We hear rather a lot about private prosecutions these days. If there were a private prosecution—I know that this is hyperbole; there would not be, but let us examine this as a matter of principle—the court would no doubt have in mind that on conviction there would inevitably have to be an order for absolute discharge. Of course it would. The court might rage in the way that old judges did but do not any more because they are much more polite than they used to be. It might rage against the absurdity of any such prosecution, but I respectfully suggest that it could not as a matter of certain law say that the failure to answer the question did not constitute a criminal offence. We really cannot have that situation; there must be certain law about this. We must do better and decriminalise a failure to answer such questions. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment. I apologise to the Committee that I was not able to speak at Second Reading, but the discussions in the Constitution Committee, of which I am also a member, have brought to light the seriousness of this problem within what is otherwise a highly commendable and necessary Bill. I am afraid that I have form on this subject: on 25 March 1975, I moved an amendment to the census order—it was possible to move amendments to those statutory instruments unlike to almost all others—precisely to assert the principle that, so far as the procedure allowed in that case, the state should not turn people into criminals because they had some good conscientious reason for declining to answer questions in such areas as were not fundamental to the state knowing where its population was, how many people there were and in what kind of properties they lived.

I remain of the view that it is undesirable for the state to extend its reach by way of criminal offences that put people in that position. As my noble friend did in the context of the previous debate, I hope that the guidance and what is said to people by those who hand out and collect census forms will assist in reassuring them, but, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the Constitution Committee, I believe we are legislating unsatisfactorily. The primary reason for doing so given by the Minister in his careful and lengthy letter was that, unless we made certain further provisions to tidy up other legislation, we might create a degree of ambiguity. I found that unconvincing; I do not think any court would be in any doubt as to what Parliament had intended if it phrased this part of the legislation so as to make it quite clear that it was not creating or continuing a criminal offence of failing to answer questions relating to sexual identity and gender.

Everybody seems to agree with what we are trying to do. Let us for heaven’s sake do it in a way that makes our legislation both sensible and not threatening to individuals who perhaps do not view these matters in the detail that we have been required to do today.

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[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, let me try to deal with the very serious issues raised by the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, has trumped my Second Reading story of having moved the 1981 census order by going back to 1975.

I take very seriously any amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. He will not remember this, but two years ago we crossed swords on the Higher Education and Research Bill, when he tabled an amendment which it fell to me to answer. It was on a legal matter, so it was a home game for him and an away game for me. I gave what I thought was a very considered, detailed and lengthy response to his amendment. I just looked up what he said in response:

“My Lords, we have just heard an utterly reasonable argument but, with great respect, it is wrong”.—[Official Report, 8/3/17; col. 1419.]


With a judicial flick of the wrist, in a few sentences, my argument was disposed of; a Division was called and the Government lost. Therefore, I take this amendment very seriously and I hope to set out the reasons why we have real difficulty in accepting it.

The two amendments insert two new subsections after Clauses 1(3) and 2(3), seeking to clarify that omitting to provide particulars concerning sexual orientation or gender identity is not an offence. Amendment 2 applies to England and Wales and Amendment 3 to Northern Ireland. A similar amendment was debated in another place during the passage of the Census (Amendment) Act 2000, which noble Lords may recall added the possibility of asking a question on religion to the census Act in England and Wales, and removed the penalty for non-response. That amendment was rejected, following reassurances from the promoters of the Bill, and I hope to provide similar reassurances to noble Lords today.

The short point is that the current drafting already achieves what these amendments aim to do. Unlike the amendments, they do so in a way consistent with the existing law. By removing the penalty attached to a failure to answer, the clear parliamentary intention is to remove the criminal offence. This reassurance was given in 2000, and I give it again today. “No person shall be liable to a penalty” is tried-and-tested legislative language. It was used in the National Insurance Act 1911 and the National Health Insurance Acts 1924 and 1936. It was used in the Census Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 in respect of religion. Most recently, it was used by this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament in the Census (Amendment) Act 2000. Its meaning is clear.

I shall quote what is in the letter, which some noble Lords may not have seen. It is an extract from Hansard by the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, speaking on behalf of the Government against the amendment similar to the one we are debating now. It says:

“I can assure the House that the legal opinion that my officials have taken on this matter confirms the view … that the removal of the penalty for anyone failing to provide particulars on religion makes the census question on religion voluntary, as only the criminal sanction in section 8 of the 1920 Act makes it statutory to comply with the census in the first place”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/7/00; cols. 1150.]


On the point from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, I am not aware that there is any doubt in the public’s mind at the moment, since the 2001 or 2011 census, about the status of the voluntary nature of answering those questions.

I will go on to some other reasons why we have real difficulty with the amendments. They would—inadvertently—land a pebble in what we regard as clear water. They are limited to the questions on gender identity and sexual orientation, as required by the scope of the Bill. However, the effects would go far and wide. They would imply that where the law removes the penalty alone, the intention is to leave in place the offence. That would cast doubt on what was previously clear. In this way, they would risk the voluntary nature of the religion question being called into question, both now and historically. They would entail the same risk for the Scottish census. This risk would extend to other law, historical and current, which uses the same language.

I am grateful for the close and proper attention to and scrutiny of this measure by the House, particularly the Constitution Committee. It is right that we ensure that the law is clear and coherent, and that the public are clear, as the noble Baroness said, that in refusing or neglecting to answer questions on sexual orientation or gender identity they will not be committing an offence. The Bill, consistent with the Northern Ireland Parliament’s approach in 1969, and the approach of this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament in 2000, achieves that.

If the noble and learned Lord has doubts, I am more than happy to arrange a meeting with relevant officials and other noble Lords between now and Report, to see if we can find a way through, given the narrow scope of the Bill and therefore the limitation in impact of any amendment such as the one we are debating. Against that background, and in good faith, I hope the noble and learned Lord feels able to withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Judge]

I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken, and to the Minister—I sometimes think of him as a sort of ministerial Hercules. Getting this right is not a Herculean task, and I should certainly welcome the opportunity to talk to him about it. I shall withdraw the amendment for the time being, on a wait-and-see basis.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.