Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2017

Lord Jopling Excerpts

Tuesday 21st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jopling (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure this debate has been immensely enhanced by the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Levene, who has just sat down, whose huge experience is of massive value to all of us. I begin by reminding the House that for many years I have been a member of the delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where I am currently chairman of one of the committees.

It is only seven weeks or so since we had our last defence debate, but in view of continued tensions which confront us it is timely that we have another one today—I pay tribute to my noble friend the Minister for that. That is especially so when one contemplates what I describe as the “arc of trouble”, which stretches from the Baltic states in the north, through the Middle East and North Africa, to the Atlantic Ocean, where Nigeria continues to struggle with Boko Haram. Not all of it, but much of this tension, which has increased in recent times, stems from Russia’s increasing posturing and provocation, and I will concentrate most of my remarks on Russia.

This increased provocation by Russia comes despite a faltering economy, which we should remind ourselves has been compared in scale to that of Spain and which is mainly a consequence of crude oil prices that are near $50 a barrel. At the same time we are seeing burgeoning defence spending—admittedly from a comparatively low base when we remind ourselves that Russian defence expenditure only four years ago was less than that of the United Kingdom—and an intensification of Moscow’s military build-up throughout the entire region from the Arctic through to the Mediterranean. We have seen evidence of their tinkering in Libya recently.

Our allies in NATO and the east continue to feel threatened by the hard power imbalance in their neighbourhoods. Russia has the ability rapidly to amass significant forces on its border, and continues to mount anti-access and area-denial capabilities in the Baltic, Black Sea and Mediterranean regions. The Russians have threatened nuclear strikes against NATO allies and have withdrawn from or violated key arms control agreements. In addition, very importantly, they have developed a highly sophisticated propaganda and disinformation campaign, often blatantly distorting facts and the truth—a matter I shall return to in a few moments.

One cannot help feeling that, with the mounting threat from Russia, the NATO allies are relatively sleeping through all of this, and it is not helped by the continued uncertainty which comes from Washington. That is not only down to the wild and sometimes contradictory tweets and speeches from the President himself but down to this period of uncertainty in the formation of a new Administration in the United States. In the past, it has often taken up to June before all the political appointments are made, but last week, upstairs in the International Relations Select Committee, of which my noble friend Lord Howell is chair, we heard evidence that the current appointments in the United States are proceeding very slowly and that some of the most senior Pentagon political offices remain unfilled.

Perhaps one of the few firm messages, though, to come from Washington recently is President Trump’s dissatisfaction at the poor response to the target declared at NATO’s Welsh summit of moving towards 2% of GDP going to defence. When the noble Earl, Lord Howe, opened the debate, he referred to the five states whose defence spending comes to less than 1%. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, in his speech, talked about the need to name and shame those that do not spend even 1%. Unfortunately, he did not name them, and therefore I will. It has been implied in the past that it is bad manners and not very friendly to name the backsliders, but it is Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Slovenia and Hungary that currently spend less than 1%. That is a disgrace, particularly given that some of those countries are extremely wealthy and really ought to be moving towards the Welsh summit target. Indeed, some of them, particularly Belgium, seem to be spending less each year, which again I would have thought was indefensible.

This has been said before, but I repeat that it is a sad reflection on our European friends that after Brexit —I speak as one who was not in favour of it—80% of the spending on NATO’s defence will come from non-members of the European Union. That is also a disgrace. However, one constructive and praiseworthy development in recent times has been the decision to deploy battalion-size battle groups in the three Baltic states and Poland. I have expressed concerns in the past about the delay in their deployment, and I am very relieved that the first of the UK-led contingent has already arrived in Estonia. I have felt for some time that these months, which we are in the middle of now, covered a dangerous period of change and uncertainty which could have encouraged Mr Putin to make another provocative incursion one way or another.

I have two particular questions to ask the Minister. First, will he tell us when the Estonian deployment of UK troops will be complete? Will he tell us when it is expected that the other deployments—I am thinking of the Canada-led one in Latvia, the German-led one in Lithuania, and the United States one in Poland—will be complete? These deployments, although small in size, will provide an essential tripwire, which should warn Moscow that to engage with them would have immediate Article 5 implications.

Finally, I referred earlier to the propaganda and misinformation programme which the Russians are so good at. I ask the Minister to confirm that all preparations have been made, alongside our Estonian battle group deployment, to have adequate back-up of Russian speakers and media facilities to counter the inevitable sniping and vilification which we can be assured that the Russians are bound to spray over them in the months and years ahead.

NATO: Member State Spending

Lord Jopling Excerpts

Wednesday 1st February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jopling (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Lord for having instigated this debate. I congratulate him on that and would like to follow on from some of the points that he has helpfully made. It is timely that we should have this debate so soon after the change in the Administration in the United States. Quite frankly, there has not been too much to cheer President Trump for over the past few weeks. However, we must begin by expressing a sense of relief that during the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington, he managed to bring himself to say that he has 100% support for NATO. That is most welcome and a relief. We must especially commend him for again raising the way in which some NATO states, especially in the European sector, remain freeloaders in supporting NATO.

As the noble Lord said, it was only two years ago, in 2014, that all the NATO countries solemnly got together at the Welsh summit and committed themselves to spending 2% of GDP on defence. Following on from what the noble Lord said about the UK spending 2%, according to the statistics in the most helpful Library briefing pack, current UK spending on defence is 2.1%. When the Minister replies, will he say whether the Government believe that this is the correct figure? If it is, surely it kills all the arguments of those who say that in justifying 2% we are loading various other costs on to the defence budget. The costs to which the noble Lord referred—pensions is one—are easily absorbed in the excess over 2% which the UK is now spending.

Where have we got to two years after the Welsh summit? I find it quite extraordinary that four European states are still spending less than 1% of GDP on defence. For many years I have been a delegate to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I was very recently vice-president and I am currently chairman of one of the committees and a member of the standing committee and the bureau. For years it has been thought rather bad form and bad manners to draw attention to those states that do not shape up. The time has come to put the record straight. Let us put it on the record now. According to the statistics in the Library’s briefing, Slovenia is still spending 0.94%, Spain 0.91%, Belgium, if you please, 0.85%, and Luxembourg, one of the richest countries in Europe, 0.44%—less than half of 1%.

The noble Lord referred to the background we face, with Russia rattling its sabre on NATO’s eastern frontier. Following the outrageous transgressions of Russia in recent years in Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea and Ukraine and, as the noble Lord said specifically, in placing highly offensive weapons in the Kaliningrad part of Russia next to the Baltic states, it is worth pointing out that NATO is responding to the situation, which reflects the urgency that NATO clearly feels. We are in the process of deploying battalion-sized battle groups to three Baltic states and Poland—the United States leading the one to Poland, Canada to Latvia, Germany to Lithuania, and the United Kingdom to Estonia. The battle groups will be in place in order to ensure that any offensive action by the Russians in any of those states in taking on the battle groups will be a clear transgression of Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

I have already referred to the member states who spend less than 1% of GDP on defence, but, there are 14 who are still spending less than 1.5%. The figures on page 5 of the Library briefing are extraordinarily helpful. They include rich countries which should not be in this position. I have already referred to Belgium and Luxembourg in the under 1% group, but those in the under 1.5% group include rich countries such as Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

One might ask what they are doing to put defence spending closer to their solemn commitments. This makes dismal reading. Looking again at the statistics the Library has produced, in the last year Belgium has decreased its spending by 5.3%, Croatia by 8.8% and Poland, surprisingly, by 7.8%. It is a dismal picture—it is a disgrace, quite frankly—given the antics of Mr Putin as we see them. I hope the Government will tell us of the positive and timely steps they are taking to name and shame, as I have tried to do tonight in the House, and that they will use every effort to persuade these countries in the strongest terms to come to the figure they all solemnly agreed two years ago at the Welsh summit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Soley]

I accept that clarification; it is very helpful. I must admit that I am more concerned in a way about things such as pensions, particularly civilian pensions. What on earth are we doing including those in defence spending? If I was in Luxembourg right now, I would be thinking very hard about our accountancy system. I say to the Minister and to my own Front Bench that we should ask all NATO members to spell out what is included in that defence spending. I would not expect to see pensions and contributions to United Nations peace- keeping. We should take quite a hard line on that because, if we did, the figures would look much worse, but at least we could address the matter more seriously.

[Lord Jopling]

It might be helpful to have what the noble Lord suggests, but also let us point out that if defence spending is 2.21%, which the Library says it is—that same figure appeared in the Times only a few weeks back—it is worth roughly £4 billion, which is a massive amount of spending on top of the 2%.

[Lord Soley]

I understand and accept that point, which the noble Lord made very clear in his contribution, but I simply say that if we have a system where we include such things as defence expenditure, first, it opens the door to other countries which are paying in very little to do exactly the same—if they are not already doing it—and, secondly, it does not really help to say, “Well, because we’re spending a bit more, it covers that up”. Covering it up is not the answer. We are here to hold Governments to account, as I am sure the Minister will know. The aim is not to have accountancy of this type. That is where the Government have to answer.

I want to conclude on a wider point which is entirely political. We have talked about the potential threat from Russia, terrorism and other issues. What we do not look at in this current debate about Brexit is how Europe will change. We are so focused on the changes that the United Kingdom has to make, but we need also to focus on what will happen in the European Union, which cannot stay the same as it is now unless it is to have more problems of the type it has had with Brexit. There is discontent in Europe for a variety of reasons—they are not all the same as those here, but many are similar.

One of my concerns in this context was brought out by Mr Tusk’s comments on Mr Trump. He said that we should now see the United States as one of the risks faced by Europe. That is a dangerously unwise statement to make, but where it is true is that there is a problem about the relationship now between the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. We need to think that through in other areas. My strong view is that we need a settlement where Britain comes out of the European Union—I do not think that there is any going back on that in the near future; some people may disagree—but it does not come out of Europe. We must recognise that we need, and Europe needs, a very close relationship—indeed, a special relationship—between the EU and the UK. One way to do that—and it is not discussed in the present debate about Brexit—is via our expertise and our contribution in defence and international relations. Europe needs that as much as we do. In the current situation, we need to do more than just step up to the plate; we need to take a lead on defence and international relations in a way that not only reassures Europe that we are not walking away from it but helps cement what will have to become a special relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

For all those reasons—and I recognise the economic priorities around—we need to increase the spending, not to get back to Cold War proportions but to recognise the threat from President Putin and the threats in the rest of world. I would also make a special plea for paying a bit more attention to how all the nations within NATO account for the money they provide. It is not sufficient to say that it is all right to use it for pensions and United Nations peacekeeping. If we allow that philosophy to go any further, let us not be surprised if other countries use it, too. That is a seriously bad idea for all of us.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Jopling Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jopling (Con)]

My Lords, speaking towards the end of this debate, and finding myself squeezed between two of the most highly regarded and admired Mandarins of the Foreign Office, I feel rather like orange juice, if I can put it that way.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hilton, referred to the fact that during the second Iraq war I was chairman of Sub-Committee C of the European Union Committee, which dealt with defence and foreign affairs. A few weeks before the war, we were in Washington. As a consequence of what we saw and heard, I returned and spoke in the same debate on 18 March 2003 to which the noble Lord, Lord Wright, has just referred. In that speech I dissociated myself from the Labour Government, my own Front Bench and from the United States’s plans for war. We had no vote but, if we had had one, I would have voted against the war. Looking back on it, then and now, I had, among many reservations, particular reservations about WMDs, the intelligence, the legality and the United States’s new arrogance which I noticed at that time, although I had no reason then to doubt the intelligence that we were getting. Like most people, there was no reason to do that.

However, tonight I want to concentrate especially on what I regard as the wicked lack of preparation for the post-military phase. It is a separate chapter, reflecting an astonishing lack of planning by all concerned, together with what seems to me an apparent lack of interest in preparing for that phase. It reflects a period of political leadership which I think marks the lowest point in competence in both the United States and the United Kingdom that I have ever lived through. In the United States, George W Bush, who I believe one can argue is the worst United States president in my lifetime, left two unwinnable wars and a major financial crisis behind him. In the United Kingdom, we had a Government led by a Prime Minister who allowed himself to be led by the United States into supporting its policies like a pet sheep, and who, having agreed to go to war, consistently failed to plan for the post-military phase. I may say that my own party at that time had the most unconvincing leadership I have ever known in my lifetime.

I draw attention to a few of the facts which come out of the Chilcot report which demonstrate that crucial lack of planning for the post-military phase, which, of course, has led to the current chaos. I give a few examples from either the main report or the summary.

As early as 9 September 2002, Mr Hoon went to meet Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington, armed with a departmental briefing on the post-conflict phase. Chilcot tells us there is “no indication” that he raised it at all.

A little later, on 17 January, Mr Straw sent a paper to the Prime Minister about the aftermath of the military phase. Chilcot says:

“Mr Straw did not give due consideration to what might constitute a satisfactory plan for the UK and whether UK participation in military action should be conditional on such a plan”.

Following that report—it is all connected—Sir David Manning is quoted as saying to the Prime Minister:

“I don’t think they affect your decision in principle”,

to which the Prime Minister replied, “Agreed”.

Moving into 2003, I was again struck to read the quote from the memoirs of the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson. He says that in January 2003, he asked Mr Blair,

“‘What happens after you’ve won? … You can go in there, you can take out Saddam but what do you do with Iraq? You’re going to have a country on your hands. I don’t know what your plan is. I don’t know how you are going to do it. Who is going to run the place?’ Tony replied: ‘That’s the Americans’ responsibility. It’s down to the Americans’”.

Moving on to 19 February, Chilcot says:

“There is no indication that, when Mr Blair discussed Iraq with President Bush on 19 February, he raised either post-conflict planning or the post-conflict role of the UN”.

These are damning comments on the preparation for that war, and are, if I may say so, exactly the things that bothered me so much and which caused me to dissociate myself from the mood at that time.

Moving on to 6 March, Chilcot says:

“On 6 March, Mr Blair chaired the first”—

mind that, the first—

“Ministerial meeting convened solely to address humanitarian and other post-conflict issues”.

He goes on, in Paragraph 781, to say, “No decision was taken”.

In the same Cabinet meeting, on 6 March, it says in the Chilcot report:

“For the first time, Mr Blair requested a consolidated UK plan for post-conflict Iraq, including the key decisions for Ministers to take”.

That is on 6 March, days before the war began. On 21 March, shortly after the debate in this House, Chilcot says:

“The Inquiry has seen no evidence that a cross-government humanitarian plan for Iraq was ever produced”.

Moving on to 12 March, the report says:

“The draft objectives and guiding principles for post-conflict Iraq were resubmitted to Mr Blair for approval on 12 March. No decision was taken and there is no indication that Mr Blair discussed the objectives and principles with Ministers. In the absence of a decision from Mr Blair, post-conflict planners remained without clear Ministerial guidance on the nature and extent of the UK’s post-conflict commitment”.

These are, quite honestly, dreadful indictments of what happened at that time. You may say, “This was all the British side of things”, but, to be truthful, the Americans were no better. In the report, on 18 March, when Major General Cross came through to London on his way to the region, he is quoted in Paragraph 1075 as saying:

“I was as honest about the position as I could be, essentially briefing that I did not believe post-war planning was anywhere near ready. I told him that there was no clarity on what was going to be needed after the military phase of the operation, nor who would provide it. Although I was confident that we would secure a military victory I offered my view that we should not begin that campaign until we had a … more coherent post-war plan”.

The Americans are equally culpable on this. In the speech—I am sorry I am taking so long—that I made on 18 March, I made the point when I said:

“When we were in Washington”,

with that committee,

“several people admitted that too little thought has been given, and too late, to what will happen afterwards”.—[Official Report, 18/3/03; col. 171.]

On 23 February, there had been an article in the New York Times regarding the Bush Administration’s new office of post-war planning, which held a secret session,

“to assess the government’s plans for securing and rebuilding Iraq if Saddam is overthrown”.

This last paragraph is, I think, crucial. I reminded the House at that time that the,

“office will be directed by”,

General Garner. That was only a few weeks before the conflict started. The post had already been refused by Dr David Kay,

“a former chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq, who had considered taking it. He was quoted as complaining that promoting democracy had too little priority in the new office and that the mission itself was under-financed and poorly staffed”.—[Official Report, 18/3/03; col. 171.]

The American approach to the post-military phase is lamentable.

It is a sorry and outrageous story of political leaders ignoring advice and pressing ahead with foolish and ill-prepared military adventures. They were consistently warned, on both sides of the Atlantic. Now we are harvesting the whirlwind. Is Iraq a better place? I have to say to my noble friend who opened the debate that a number of us in this corner of the Chamber rather raised our eyebrows when we heard him say that it is a better place. There is chaos in Iraq and in the region, and terrorism is rampant. What should our lessons be? Our lesson is a simple one—political leaders should not take on these sorts of adventures purely on their own. They must do so in an infinitely more democratic way in the future.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Jopling Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jopling (Con)]

My Lords, I suppose this debate, inevitably, is dominated by the referendum, and to begin with I will just make two short points on that.

First, I will repeat what I have said to your Lordships before. I have listened to Brexit supporters banging on about what to them seems the holy grail of politics—that one should not give up national sovereignty—but I never hear them question, or refer to, the greatest delegation of national sovereignty which is involved in the United Kingdom’s universally supported membership of NATO. We should remember that to send our troops into harm’s way under the leadership of foreign commanders is a far greater delegation of national sovereignty than anything which arises from the European Union.

Secondly, it is not so much that Brexit could lead to war, as some have said, but rather that one of the main influences which has led to 70 years of comparative peace among the great nations of Europe has been the creation of the European political community, whether through NATO, the Council of Europe or the European Union itself. We dismantle that European community at our peril.

On a wider field, I want to refer to my concerns over the increasing instability in the Middle East. Of course, we are all conscious of that great arc of instability in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia, and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. However, having visited Saudi Arabia some time ago this year and Egypt more recently, and having had the opportunity to talk to the leadership in both, I am concerned about other trends. In Saudi Arabia, I was struck by the intense loathing of Iran—I have not been to Tehran in recent years, but I guess if one did go, one would find it mutual. The Saudis are very concerned that the recent nuclear deal and the release of frozen funds will mean that Iran is likely to use some of that money to promote terrorism to the disadvantage of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi economy has been seriously hit by lower oil prices. The deputy crown prince, who is now the coming man there, has been put in charge of the budget. It looks as though serious economies are likely, and the nation may well have to face extremely unattractive options in the future. It has already agreed to a partial privatisation of Aramco. The House of Saud could well come under greater pressure in the time ahead.

I am also concerned about possible greater instability in Egypt. There are some pretty horrible things going on in Sinai, where the Egyptians are holding jihadi prisoners in intolerable conditions. The recent terrorist attacks on aircraft going to or from Egypt have almost closed down the tourist industry, and they face a very serious economic situation. Again, they are extremely concerned about the vulnerability of their 2,000 kilometres of borders with Libya and Sudan, and about the incursion of Daesh terrorists in the immediate future. It is also a fact that their Saudi friends may not be able to be as generous to them as they have been. Currently, President Sisi is extremely popular but, again, nasty options clearly lie ahead for his Administration. I say in passing that I was surprised that the Egyptian leadership did not see the Russian malevolence and intrusion in quite the same way that we do, and seem much friendlier to Russia than one finds at home.

My instinct is that there could be further instability in future, particularly with regard to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. I hope the Government are aware of these increasing dangers.