Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd November 2010 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

3B: Page 1, line 3, at beginning insert “Subject to sections (Procedure: introductory), (Information to be provided to Parliament) and (Super-affirmative resolution procedure and amendments),”

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, we are very much making progress as we reach Amendment 3B at quarter to nine tonight. This is an important amendment, and with it I speak to my Amendments 120, 124 and 125.

In view of all our discussions I think that noble Lords will agree that, when it comes to a Minister deciding to bring an order before Parliament, the information made available to Parliament and the parliamentary scrutiny procedure assume great importance. My Amendment 124 seeks to ensure that sufficient information is provided to Parliament. In it, I propose five new subsections that would ensure that Parliament would be able to have a sufficient explanation, an explanation of the consultation, information about representations, and the kind of information that is important when it comes to dealing with an order. Perhaps more importantly, my Amendment 125 seeks to put in place an appropriate parliamentary procedure for scrutiny. My amendment is broadly based on the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 and what is described as a super-affirmative procedure in it. I do not want to repeat what has been said before but that Act is highly relevant to our discussions on this Bill, because it gives extensive powers to Ministers to remove or reduce burdens resulting from legislation, including primary legislation.

I agree with the report of the Delegated Powers Committee when it said that,

“the insertion of a super-affirmative procedure cannot bring a misconceived delegated power within the bounds of acceptability”.

It went on to say:

“A single stage of consultation is clearly no substitute for the detailed scrutiny afforded by the use of a bill (the process by which the functions of many of the bodies listed in this Bill were debated and decided)”.

If we were to continue with the use of this Bill, the committee suggests that,

“the government, not Parliament, would retain the sole ability to make amendments to orders”,

although my noble friend Lord Dubs has tabled an amendment that seeks to create a procedure whereby orders can be amended. I agree with the committee that, if the legislation is rotten to its core, the insertion of a super-affirmative procedure cannot bring it,

“within the bounds of acceptability”.

However, we are trying to solve the conundrum of ensuring that these bodies are reviewed on a regular basis, which we all want. The noble Lord, Lord Renton, talked earlier about the need for a process whereby there can be minor changes; again, that seems eminently sensible. A super-affirmative procedure may be one way in which one can make the Bill more acceptable and certainly give more effective parliamentary scrutiny.

The LRR Act allows for a more extensive parliamentary scrutiny process. Section 12 sets out procedural requirements for making orders. The Minister has to consult on the order, and then lay a draft order and explanatory document before Parliament. The order’s procedure can be a choice of negative, affirmative or super-affirmative. Essentially, the Minister has to recommend, in an explanatory document accompanying the draft order, which parliamentary procedure should apply and his or her reasoning for that. The level of scrutiny recommended should depend on the views of the Minister on the complexity and impact of the order. That may be informed by representations on the proposals received during the consultation process, and the Minister’s recommendation on whether a procedure should be negative, affirmative or super-affirmative shall apply, unless either House of Parliament requires a more onerous procedure.

The key importance of the LRR Act is in the nature of the super-affirmative procedure, because that Act provides for a committee of either House, charged with reporting on the draft order, to recommend that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order, unless that recommendation is rejected by a resolution of the House. It is sometimes known as the veto procedure, although it is clearly not an absolute veto. None the less, it is a pretty powerful mechanism for scrutinising such orders. I should have thought that any Government who were faced with a view of a committee charged with considering the order that it should not go ahead would have to think very seriously about whether they wished to go forward with that order.

My amendment builds on the super-affirmative procedure and gives a number of options for a committee of either House to recommend to either House that the order be approved in its current form, or that it be amended, or that no further proceedings should be taken in relation to the draft order, or that it is more appropriate that it be progressed through primary legislation. My amendment specifies that unless the recommendation is that the order be approved, it cannot be progressed unless the recommendation is rejected by a resolution of the House. If the recommendation is that the order be amended, it may not proceed unless the recommendation is rejected or the House approves the order, as revised by the committee.

I have sought to build on the super-affirmative procedure and include some more flexibility in it. This is one of the key planks to reaching a consensual agreement on the Bill in your Lordships' House. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, is bringing some amendments, but they do not go as far as mine. It would be well worth thinking about whether a kind of super-affirmative procedure—if not with my amendment, then, I am sure, in a later amendment—can be provided for. However, the key principle here is that a Select Committee of either House should be able to take an order away, and if that committee decides that it is not appropriate for the order to go forward and that primary legislation might be more appropriate, although it is not an absolute veto, a measure such as this would provide great reassurance to your Lordships’ House.

[Baroness Thomas of Winchester]

My Lords, I am taking the highly unusual step of intervening briefly at this stage as chair of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Our latest report on the government amendments, because of the lateness of their tabling, was placed in the Printed Paper Office only this morning. I am grateful to the staff for preparing the document so quickly after our second meeting on the Bill yesterday.

If ever the committee was set up for a Bill, this was the Bill because of its skeletal nature. In our report, our view—as has been stated many times today—was unequivocal: the powers contained in Clauses 1 to 5 and 11 are not appropriate delegations of legislative power, as they would give Ministers of this and future Governments unacceptable discretion to rewrite the statute book, with inadequate parliamentary scrutiny of, and control over, the process. The committee's original report was careful not to recommend any particular course of action for the Government to take to amend the Bill to strengthen parliamentary control—contrary to what the Minister said in his letter to us. However, we set out a range of options, which were to be seen not necessarily as alternatives, as we believed that one or more might prove necessary. One option was for a form of the super-affirmative procedure that has already been enshrined—as we have also heard many times today—in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. The Government have now tabled a form of this procedure. My purpose in speaking now is to address their amendments.

In our report published this morning, we welcomed the government amendments as a step in the right direction, because they enhance parliamentary scrutiny. However, they do not address the fundamental problem that, in the committee's view, the delegated powers in the Bill—the purposes of which are not specified or limited—are not appropriate delegations of legislative power. In other words, although Ministers of this or any future Government must “have regard” to certain matters, they are not constrained by any legislative provisions. This makes the super-affirmative procedure in these amendments very different from the procedure in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006—as other noble Lords pointed out in the earlier debate. In that Act, parliamentary scrutiny is much more effective. For example, if a committee of either House recommends that no further proceedings should be taken on a draft order, any such proceedings are automatically stopped—as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, said—until and unless the recommendations are rejected by the House itself in a procedure commonly called the veto. In the super-affirmative procedure of Amendment 118, which the Government are proposing, the Minister need only have regard to any resolution of either House—a very different matter.

I will not list all the differences between the procedures in the 2006 Act and those in the Bill, as they are set out in our sixth report. Of course, there are differences in the two procedures for orders in the Bill, in Clauses 1 to 6 and in Clause 11. I will give one example to illustrate why there could be a problem with the second lot of procedures. Under Clause 11, the Minister may wish to make an order containing proposals for several bodies to be transferred from Schedule 7 to Schedule 1. During consultation, many representations may be made about one body. The Minister may be urged to amend the draft order, but to do so he must go through the whole 30, 40 or 60-day procedure again. This is unlike the procedure for earlier clauses. Rather than holding up the fate of the other bodies in the order for another two or three months, he may decide that, although he has had regard to all the contributions that he has heard, considerations of time override all representations and so he may decide to make the original order after all. It is clear from the Minister's letter to the committee that time is the crucial factor in the way that the Bill has been drafted. I understand that, having announced that there is to be a bonfire of the quangos, the Government want to light the bonfire as soon as possible. However, it is the duty of the committee of which I am chair to make sure that the match is not lit before Parliament has more effective control over the whole process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Perhaps I may respond to the noble Lord. I am grateful to him for making the point, which is perfectly valid. It is true that the powers are general in their scope within the context of a constitutional arrangement. It may well be that it will concern changes in governance and so on of a body, or its representation in the case of a body listed in Schedule 3—that is, how the governing bodies are appointed. There could be a number of different aspects. I agree that they will differ and, by necessity, that is why this has been put in the most general of terms.

We would argue that we are indeed trying to construct a special form of scrutiny for the orders that will be tabled under this Bill, and that is what our amendments seek to address. I have accepted that the comments of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published this morning mean that we need to look at this again because we want to try to do this within the context of parliamentary accountability. That is the purpose of seeking to reconsider this matter. I think that I have set out the arguments for why we are where we are and what we are seeking to do with our enhanced procedure for parliamentary scrutiny. However, it is important that whatever we determine here has to be compatible with the procedures of the other House because we would not want ping-pong on statutory instruments. That would be pretty difficult, so we need a process which is capable of operating across Parliament. That is an important consideration of which we are mindful.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I join with other noble Lords in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, for his response and for his willingness to have a look at this in the light of our debate. That is very encouraging. I am also grateful to him for the government amendments he has just spoken to, which are an advance on what is currently in the Bill. Again, that is encouraging.

However, the giveaway line in the government amendments is where it is stated that if within 30 days either House decides the order requires further scrutiny, the order cannot be proceeded with until a period of 60 days has elapsed. During that time the Minister “must have regard to” any representations—which, in the end, means that the Minister can disregard as much as he regards. The problem we have is that the government amendments do not go anywhere near the scale of scrutiny we believe is required or as the noble Baroness, Lady Thomas of Winchester, clearly expressed. Crucially, they do not contain the veto option which exists in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, as my noble friend Lord Adonis made clear, and it is that option that immeasurably strengthens parliamentary authority.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, said in his letter to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that he believes there is a difference between this Bill and the LRR Act because of what he describes as the more restrictive matter of the Public Bodies Bill. However, as he knows, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has analysed this and believes that the 2006 Act is narrower in at least two respects when compared with the powers contained in the Bill. In his further discussions the Minister might wish to reflect on his and the Select Committee’s views on that.

The Minister also said that my amendment would change the role of Parliament and he prays in aid the first report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published on 12 November. The Select Committee is well able to respond to that but I believe it is a misinterpretation of what the Select Committee report is saying. My reading of it is that after expressing concern about the lack of scrutiny, the Select Committee puts forward a number of ideas for how Parliament might enhance that scrutiny, one of which is the super-affirmative procedure; another is a procedure which would allow Parliament to amend proposed orders under the Bill; and another is a sunset clause. The noble Lord is guilty of putting together the super-affirmative suggestion and the procedure to allow amendments and to pray them in aid in saying that my amendment falls because it would allow for amendments. I am not aware of any wording in my amendment which states that the House can amend the orders. I have built on the super-affirmative procedure contained in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. That is why I do not think I am guilty of advancing the powers of Parliament in the way the Minister suggests.

The noble Lord raised the important question of the powers of this House in relation to secondary legislation. He said that, by convention, this House does not vote down statutory instruments. I dispute that interpretation. I refer him to paragraph 10.02 of the Companion which states clearly:

“The House of Lords has only occasionally rejected delegated legislation”.

It then goes on to say:

“The House has resolved ‘That this House affirms its unfettered freedom to vote on any subordinate legislation submitted for its consideration’”.

The Minister may be aware that there has been an interesting discussion between the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, the Leader of the House, and the Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments on this very matter.

The question is the extent to which the Leader now accepts the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Conventions chaired by my noble friend Lord Cunningham, which were accepted by your Lordships' House after debate. That committee’s report made it very clear that there were circumstances in which it was perfectly proper for this House to seek to defeat secondary legislation; for example, in relation to a skeletal Bill. I am convinced that it is perfectly proper for this House to seek to defeat any order under this Bill as it is now written.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I do not want to digress too much into academic discussion on conventions, but the fact that we have not done it does not necessarily make it a convention. For many years, MPs did not defeat the Government in the House of Commons, but it was not a convention that MPs did not vote against the Government. Just because we have not gone through with doing this—I have never accepted that there has been a convention—it does not mean that this House is not perfectly free if it wishes to reject secondary legislation. It is not, as is sometimes claimed, a nuclear option; it is a popgun option. It is perfectly open for the Government to come back with a fresh order, so I see no reason why we should not exercise our due powers.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, that is a very helpful intervention. The Minister said “by convention”. I am afraid that I interpret that to mean that it is a convention of this House that we do not vote down statutory instruments, which I must refute.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think that I might change my wording to “custom”.

[Lord Greaves]

Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, might consider that the relevant statistic is the number of occasions on which the House divides on such instruments rather than the number of occasions on which the Division results in their being voted down. It is clear that the House divides on instruments rather more often than it votes them down, largely as a result of this Liberal Democrat group putting matters to the vote in the previous Parliament. The number of such Divisions is not huge, but there has been a handful of them in my recollection rather than none at all. If the House accepts that it can divide, it must accept that it is capable of voting instruments down.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I have certainly noticed the reluctance of the Liberal Democrat Benches to put things to the vote; sometimes, they have to be encouraged to do so, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, found out earlier today.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, is right that a number of developments have occurred in secondary legislation. Noble Lords have been encouraged sometimes to put down non-fatal Motions, which has been very helpful. Equally, there have been votes on some orders which have been lost. However, I accept what the Minister has said—that is, it is more the custom than the convention.

Notwithstanding the seeming withdrawal of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, from what we thought was a consensual agreement in relation to Cunningham, I am clear that this House has every right to vote down an order. I am absolutely certain that, unless this Bill is heavily amended, there will be a series of votes on each organisation and the Government will find themselves in very great difficulty. We agree with the principle, which is why it would have been much better if this Bill had been sent to a Select Committee. Well, we did not win the vote. It would be much better for the Government if they were to accept a super-affirmative procedure along the lines suggested in my amendment. They will find, in the end, that that will be a much more satisfactory way of dealing with these matters than with the implied possibility of each individual order having extensive debate and votes at the end of it.

The Minister has very kindly said that he will consider very carefully the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the debate that we have heard tonight. I believe this to be one of the most important debates in the whole Bill until we get to Schedule 7, Clause 11. That debate clearly ought to be in prime time and it would be right for me to withdraw the amendment; I am sure that we can have good constructive discussions between now and Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3B withdrawn.