Defence: Budget

Lord Howell of Guildford Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, I have two points to make. First, your Lordships have rightly come to recognise that in the modern age it is the powers of persuasion and influence—so-called soft power—that can play a major or even decisive part in projecting our influence, safeguarding our interests and ensuring our national security and safety. It is also being recognised by noble Lords that the UK has enormous soft power assets although, frankly, we are not using them nearly as well as we might be.

We are today a staggeringly successful world influence in many areas, and we remain more determined than ever to play our part internationally. Moaning American generals are quite wrong when they say that Britain is in retreat. That is nonsense: we are not. Frankly, though, it is extremely damaging nonsense and the mythos is catching hold. Where the generals have a point, and what our recent soft power report made crystal clear, is that without the back-up of efficient hard military power our soft power is useless. The two work together. We call it “smart power”. Weak military power, or hard power with holes in it, simply undermines our authority and appeal, however persuasively we try to make our case.

My second point is that I am afraid I not at all fond of targets. This may be spitting in the wind when NATO is so keen on the 2% figure, but spending targets always distort. It is outcomes on which we should focus. Some of us opposed the 0.7% of GNI to be spent on aid; we argued that this might lead to millions being rushed into poorly planned international programmes just to meet the targets, and so exactly it is proving. As the official aid watchdog confirms, spending targets distort results—a point ignored by zealots who do not apparently care or understand how modern development works. Similarly, the much-vaunted 2% defence spending target may or may not produce solid national defence. A figure of 2% of GNP could well conceal huge procurement inefficiencies and has certainly done so in the past, while less than 2%, if well-designed and spent, may deliver a superior capability all round.

It is the results in terms of our efficient armed might that matter. What we just cannot afford, and what weakens us all across the board, are the kinds of gaps and hollowing out in our hard-power defence shield described so well and eloquently by my noble friend Lord Sterling.