Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft instrument forms part of the Government’s work to ensure there are functioning domestic laws in the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal on cross-border co-operation on family law. The instrument relates solely to the Government’s no-deal exit preparations. Again, should we reach an agreement on our future relationship with the EU, the Government will review the instrument and amend or revoke it as necessary at the end of a transition period.

This instrument gives effect to a commitment that I gave on behalf of the Government during the debate on 29 January on the Government’s main no-deal family law instrument, the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. That family statutory instrument has now been made. It puts in place the arrangements in cross-border family law cases that will apply if we leave the EU without a deal. That instrument revokes the retained EU law in relation to Brussels IIa and the maintenance regulations and makes consequential changes to domestic law, including changes to ensure that the jurisdiction rules for cross-border maintenance matters are restored to their pre-EU form.

This small amending instrument addresses a technical issue raised by family law stakeholders. Some family law stakeholders have raised concerns that by the amendments to the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 made by the main family instrument, we have inadvertently narrowed the jurisdiction of the court and the range of financial remedies that the court may order when compared to the position that currently exists under the EU maintenance regulation. That was not the Government’s intention. Without fixing this issue, the consequence would be that in some cases the court would be limited in terms of the financial remedies that it may grant. For example, the court would be able to make an order only for periodical payments and not for a lump sum or a property settlement or transfer. I extend thanks to the family law practitioners for bringing this issue to our attention.

While the existing approach is workable, the Government have decided to address those concerns to ensure that jurisdiction grounds and remedies are not reduced as a result of a no-deal exit because these are jurisdiction grounds and remedies that emerged after we had engaged with the relevant EU regulation. The instrument therefore amends the principal 2019 regulation so that, post exit without a deal, the courts in England and Wales or Northern Ireland will be able to order all types of financial remedies available under the Act or the Northern Ireland order in circumstances where either a parent, a guardian or the child is habitually resident or domiciled in England and Wales or Northern Ireland at the date of the application. The amendments also ensure that the court has jurisdiction to order a financial remedy in respect of a child where the parents are not married, in a similar way to when child maintenance is being considered ancillary to divorce.

The impacts of the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 were set out in an impact assessment published on 24 January 2019. This instrument amends those regulations so that the unintended impact of the amendments to the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 on the court’s jurisdiction and remedies is rectified. As amended, the impact of the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 will be as described in the original impact assessment. In other words, we had assumed that they would operate in the way in which they now operate in light of this supplementary instrument.

As I said, the instrument addresses concerns raised by stakeholders. My officials met these stakeholders to discuss their concerns. A draft of this instrument was provided to the statutory Family Procedure Rule Committee. Its members include some of the family lawyers who raised these concerns about the amendments to the Children Act 1989 and they were invited to comment on the draft. Those comments were taken into consideration before the instrument was finalised and laid. In addition, my officials have spoken to officials within the devolved Administrations.

In these circumstances, I stress that this is a highly technical instrument, which is intended to take us to the point we believed we would get to with the principal instrument. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment which the regulation seeks to make is obviously highly desirable. However, I have a question for the Minister, because I cannot for the life of me see how it achieves its purpose in expanding the financial remedies available under domestic legislation. As far as I can see, the only passage which might possibly have a bearing is Regulation 2(2)(a), where we are told that the words,

“in relation to matters relating to maintenance”,

are being deleted. Without more context, it is extremely difficult to see whether this achieves what the regulation seeks to do. I am happy to take the Minister’s assurance that it does, or perhaps he can explain it a bit more. It is characteristic that these instruments are so economically worded that, without a whole lot of legislative material in hand, it is sometimes hard to make sense of them.

Cross-Border Mediation (EU Directive) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

First, this instrument is not concerned with the role of the court: it is concerned with the role of mediation outside the court. Secondly, it is not usual to discover mediation as a form of resolving a child abduction case. The very nature of an abduction is such that the parties are not amenable to agreeing a voluntary mediation to resolve the matter. We have already made provision for civil orders in relation to child abduction.

With regard to criminal orders, it is impossible to replicate the existing provisions of EU law because, under the relevant provisions of EU law, an EU court would not recognise an order from a UK court in any event, and therefore it would give false hope to a party to grant them an order that was not enforceable. Overall, therefore, my answer to the noble Lord is that mediation does not impact directly on the sort of issue that has been raised. We recognise the importance of trying to ensure, as far as possible, that there are means of enforcing child abduction orders. The only qualification if we leave without a deal is that there would be no right of the originating court to make an order that trumps the order of the court in the country to which the child has been abducted. That is simply because in the absence of reciprocity, it is not possible to make such an order enforceable. Otherwise, my understanding is that we will be able to proceed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I think I am right in saying that we are party to a treaty about child abduction that extends well beyond the EU. I have had experience of a case involving abduction where one of the parties was resident in Australia and the other one in Norway, which, of course, are outside the EU network. We have rules about the speed at which cases can be dealt with, but the basic treaty arrangements are unaffected.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble and learned Lord is quite right. The Brussels convention on these matters reflects the terms of the Hague convention to a large extent. The one qualification is the element to which I referred about the trumping order, which is not available under the Hague convention. However, it works very effectively in respect of non-EU states and there is no reason it should not continue to operate. I believe that a week or so ago, I addressed these matters in this House when moving other regulations relating to exit, so I hope I have not contradicted myself since then.

Finally, although the confidentiality provisions in the EU directive will no longer be law in the context of mediation in England and Wales, it is usual for parties, when agreeing to mediation, to have an agreement on confidentiality as well. Indeed, even in the absence of such agreement, there is a provision from the High Court in the case Farm Assist Ltd in 2009, which says that such a confidentiality obligation would be implied in any event. It would, of course, be subject to the interests of justice, but we are not going to lose entirely the benefit of the confidentiality provisions if we leave without a deal. In these circumstances, therefore, I beg to move.

Mutual Recognition of Protection Measures in Civil Matters (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, about half-way down page 3 there is a reference to “participating Member State” and that it means “a Member State other than Denmark”. Am I right in thinking that, although it is dealt with specifically there, there is no change as far as Denmark is concerned because it does not participate in the EU regulations? Is it purely a matter of drafting that this provision appears?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The position as I understand it —I mentioned this earlier—is that pursuant to Article 22 of TFEU, Denmark has an opt out from all of these issues but has a bilateral agreement with the EU in respect of them. I have been corrected. It does not have a bilateral agreement in respect of this one but it does with the others—I apologise—and that is why Denmark is excepted.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

It is really a clarification in the drafting—it does not change anything. That is my point.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is entirely right.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Revocation etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The terms of the instrument make it perfectly clear that it is to apply in the absence of a deal. My department is certainly well aware of the scope and application of the instrument, which is why I made it clear in opening that this instrument will apply in the event of there being no deal. However, in the event that there is a withdrawal agreement of some kind, clearly that would not be a situation in which the instrument would be required.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I do not want to cause any difficulty, but why does paragraph 1(2) refer to the transitional period? There will not be a transitional period if there is a hard Brexit and no deal.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It does not refer to the transitional period as proposed in the withdrawal agreement: it refers to a transitional period that will apply for the purposes of this particular instrument in order to ensure that there is no immediate cut-off for EU lawyers in the United Kingdom. It is for that particular purpose that this particular regulation allows that, and it is considered that that is allowable under the GATS regime as well—in other words, we are allowed a period of time to transition to a point where European lawyers registered in the United Kingdom come to find themselves in the same position as third-party country lawyers.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his positive contribution to the debate, to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their observations on this amendment, and to the noble and learned Lord for moving it.

From the very outset—I go back to the Law Commission’s 1994 report on structured settlements—it was intended that a provision of this kind to depart from a prescribed rate should be very much the exception rather than the rule. Clearly, it recognised that it would be both expensive and time-consuming if the prescribed discount rate could regularly be the subject of challenge on the basis that there might be another more appropriate rate for any number of reasons. That goes some considerable way to explaining the position of the Court of Appeal in the case of Warriner v Warriner.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, I referred to a guillotine, but I qualified it with the words “almost complete”—this is a deficient guillotine; it is not a complete guillotine. I said that because, for example, the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session, the appeal court in Scotland, in Tortolano v Ogilvie Construction, indicated that there may be cases in which the power to depart from the prescribed rate can be applied—but I accept that they will be wholly exceptional. In Tortolano, the court suggested that there might, for example, be a need to take account of a claimant who had to pay tax in a foreign jurisdiction, and that impacted upon the valuation of the award.

These are wholly exceptional circumstances, but the provision in Section 1(2) of the Damages Act 1996, which would be preserved by the words in subsection (2) of the proposed new Section A1, would allow for those wholly exceptional circumstances where the judiciary would be entitled to exercise an inherent discretion in order to achieve justice between the parties. It is in these circumstances that I would resist the amendment; I recognise that there may be room for taking this further, although I have been unable to identify it so far, to ensure that we can perhaps more clearly identify circumstances in which the exception would be applicable.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, indicated, the Bill will be considered in the other place, and I and my officials would be content to explore further with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, if he wishes to do so, whether the provision might be improved in some way. However, I have difficulty with that because I am concerned that if we intrude too much into this quite exceptional discretion, there is a risk of encouraging unnecessary and expensive litigation over the appropriate rate in individual cases.

On that basis, and recognising the point that the noble and learned Lord makes, I invite him to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who have taken part in this short debate. I am grateful in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his suggestion that this might be considered a little further when the Bill moves to the other place. It is a very difficult issue and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has indicated, it is very hard to find another form of words which can address it.

I am concerned about putting into the Bill something which raises false hopes. The circular from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers indicates that it was trying to find something in the wording which is not really what the Minister was talking about. We are not dealing with cases of exceptional injury within the domestic system, which is what the association was talking about. I take it from the Minister’s reply that he would not encourage people to have a go at changing the discount rate between reviews, which would be contrary to the idea of laying down certain rules for application while the reviews subsist.

It is a very tight issue as to whether there is a point in this provision at all. But having heard what has been said, and with particular thanks to the Minister for his reply today and for the way in which he has listened to me on two occasions, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, it is for me to say what will happen to my Amendment 89DAA, which is an amendment to Amendment 89DA, moved by the noble and learned Lord the Minister.

I want to make a few short points. First, I want to pick up on a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he will not accept the opprobrium that was visited on the Scottish Ministers for the way they conducted themselves in these negotiations. Having had discussions with Michael Russell and the Lord Advocate—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the points I put forward in my introduction to my amendment were sincerely held. Those points were not made to cause trouble. The Lord Advocate in particular gave advice on his reading of the Scotland Act; Michael Russell, for his part, was entirely genuine in his points about principle as well. That should be clearly understood.

When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was junior to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As he pointed out, if I appeared with him, I would speak first; it would then be his function, as my senior, to speak second. Quite frequently, I found that when he spoke, he refined the kind of argument that I was attempting to put forward. It took on a slightly different—rather more attractive, perhaps—appearance after he had refined it. As he pointed out in his speech, the points that I made about the construction of Section 30 and the other sections do not really apply in the situation with which we are dealing here. I was grateful for his remark that the situation is unique and not seeking in any way to undermine the devolution settlement. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for making the same point that there is no question of this being the thin end of the wedge or in any way seeking to undermine the devolution settlement, to which he wishes to adhere. These remarks should help a lot in reassuring those in Scotland on how they should approach the continuing discussions. I was glad to hear from the Minister that the door is still open; I think that the Scottish point of view still regards the door as open too.

Perhaps this debate has refined things and shown that the purist argument—that of principle—does not really apply here. This is not about trying to construct the market that we were trying to construct in 1998, which was done by separating out the bits that mattered for that market into Schedule 5 so that they were clearly identified. We are dealing with a different, rather more subtle, situation in trying, as the Minister said, to create a functioning internal market with what has come back to us from Europe. That requires a rather more subtle approach that is not really dealt with in the Scotland Act, for understandable reasons. That being so, I hope very much that the way forward will be pointed by our discussion this evening. Without any further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I intervene to raise a point that I have spoken to the clerk about. Noble Lords might recollect that earlier in the evening I gave a passing imitation of a rabbit in headlights. The reason for that was that it appeared to me that the amendments in group three had been moved and agreed without me speaking to them—which is absolutely ideal, as far as I am concerned. They are highly technical amendments, but I felt I should mention that to the House, lest any noble Lord wishes me to speak to them. As I said, they have been agreed, but noble Lords did not have an opportunity to hear my dulcet tones on the subject.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I have put my name down in support of the amendment. The arguments which led me to do that are those which I set out when I was moving my amendment earlier this evening, so I need not take up the time of the House in repeating them. What I said earlier is the full explanation as to why I put my name down.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendments, which are pertinent given the different positions of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the imminent timing of votes in their legislatures that will address consent.

The Government have been clear that they wish to make the positive case for consent for this Bill. We have not just talked about our commitment to making that case but have shown it. We have engaged in extensive discussions with the devolved Administrations and have now introduced the amendment to Clause 11 that we have just discussed at some length to try to meet the expectations of the devolved legislatures. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will accept that our commitment to the legislative consent process is reflected in the agreement that we struck with the Welsh Government last week.

This is the legislative consent process in action. We have put forward policy objectives; we have worked through the differences, and we have found an appropriate compromise. As a result, the Welsh Government have recommended that the National Assembly for Wales grant legislative consent to the Bill when it votes on this matter, I believe, on 15 May. The Welsh Government agree that our amendments now strike the right balance between providing legal certainty and maximising assurances to the devolved legislatures on how we will jointly manage the process of powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas. Of course we are disappointed that we have not been able to reach the same agreement with the Scottish Government, but this, I suggest, is not for want of trying. I stress again that time remains for the Scottish Government to join this agreement, so that we can all demonstrate that we have done what we consider to be the responsible thing in this context.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,

“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,

which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.

Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses (EU Committee Report)

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is absolutely correct, but the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, brought this out more fully when he distinguished between cases in the pipeline and those that arise post Brexit. As paragraph 91 of the joint report points out, there will essentially be agreement—or consensus; let me put it that way—on how we deal with existing cases at the point when we leave the European Union. But there is no desire to see us walk away or wind down the existing regulatory regime.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, posed two questions in the context of the Government’s response, where we talk about a “close and comprehensive agreement”. It cannot be a mirror of what is already there, because of the jurisdiction of the CJEU, but “close and comprehensive” is what we seek.

The noble and learned Lord’s first question was whether we could give an assurance that the aim is to achieve the same degree of certainty and predictability. The answer, I would suggest, is yes. The aim is most certainly to achieve that. I assure him that there will be no cliff edge. We have no desire for there to be any cliff edge anywhere, but that will be the subject of negotiation because we are now entering the second phase. Perhaps it is more important to point out that the Government’s aim in this context is to ensure that we have certainty, predictability and continuity.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

What would happen if at the end of the time-limited implementation period it had still not been possible to achieve what the noble and learned Lord said in answer to my first question?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If at the end of the transition period there had been no agreement, there would be no basis for reciprocal enforcement pursuant to Brussels Ia, Brussels II and those regulations, because we would no longer be a member of the EU for those purposes. That would appear to follow. Nevertheless, there would still be recourse to the Hague convention, although I am the first to accept that the convention provisions do not replicate or achieve the level of predictability and certainty that is in the Brussels regulations.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does that not just heighten the importance of achieving agreement during the implementation period as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I absolutely concur, which is why we and the EU have expressed a desire to move forward to the second phase of negotiations as swiftly as possible. I emphasise that this is about reciprocity. It is about the interest not only of the United Kingdom but of the EU. It appears to me that those interests will eventually prevail.

I am afraid that I keep on getting a note saying that I have one minute to go and I keep on stretching that one minute. I have not expressly addressed all points raised by noble Lords, but perhaps I may touch on one or two. I entirely concur with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that one cannot negotiate in public. We can express our intentions and our aims, but it is very difficult for us to give a running commentary about where we are on these issues any more than on other issues, but I underline our aims in this context.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, referred to the delay in the Government’s response to the report. I apologise for that. The report was followed by the general election and then by the Summer Recess. The government paper was issued on 22 August, when I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was invited to take part in a briefing on the matter, but I accept that it took until the beginning of December for the response to be published.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about progress in “discussions”. These are not discussions; these are negotiations. The noble Lord is a very experienced lawyer and knows perfectly well that one cannot have or maintain a running commentary on such matters when one is hoping to achieve consensus at the end of the day. However, we verily believe that we will achieve certainty and predictability, which, I emphasise again, is our aim.

I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and her sub-committee for the report.