(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberIt is a privilege to speak in this debate after my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup. It is a well-known fact that the Cross-Benchers do not toe any party line, but I can say without any hesitation that I agreed with every single word in his contribution. It is also a privilege to speak after the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Spellar. I was delighted that he raised the issue of what we are doing to counter the disinformation of the Russian regime of Putin. I raised that in the first debate that we had, two days after the invasion, and I am still waiting for a reply. When the Minister responds to this debate, I hope that in reply to the noble Lord’s maiden speech she will say something on that aspect.
My own contribution to this debate will be about the diplomatic, political and historical background to it, about which I have some modest knowledge, rather than the all-important military background, of which my experience is slight. It must be clear to any observer now that the West’s position of virtually unqualified support for Ukraine, backed up by economic sanctions and supply of funding and weapons, is getting less backing from what is known as the global South than it did at the outset of hostilities, when Russia invaded Ukraine. Some of that loss of support is due to a fairly classical game of playing two sides off against each other, which is like mother’s milk in the diplomatic services of developing countries, but some of it goes deeper and deserves careful consideration and countering. It is striking, to say the least, that so many of the states that have abstained in recent UN General Assembly votes on Ukraine, or voted against them, are small countries with larger and better armed neighbours that run the risk of being treated by them as Russia has treated Ukraine. That is pretty odd. Do they not appreciate the risk, or do they just discount it? We need to talk that through with these Governments in a calm and dispassionate way and try to persuade them that we all have a collective interest in deterring behaviour like Russia’s. It is all very well talking about a moral high ground, but the bottom line for every country tends to be its national interests.
Then there are those—a few in this House and many more elsewhere—who feel that we should push Ukraine to come to terms with Russia, accepting some pretty large losses of territory. I have just spent a few days during the Recess in the French regions of Alsace and Lorraine, and have become more familiar with their tragic historic background—conquered by France from the Holy Roman Empire in 1676, seized by the newly established German empire in 1871, returned to France in 1919, seized again by Hitler’s Germany from 1940 to 1944, and only finally at peace and in security within the post-war establishment of what has become the European Union. In between that time and during that course of events, many millions of people died because of those botched settlements and the determination to overthrow them. That is the risk of going down what could be called a Minsk III route.
Then there is the double standards argument, cited in many different forms—Suez, Vietnam, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the failure to recognise a Palestinian state and neglect of the civil war in Sudan, as well as many more expressions of what I am afraid can be described as “what about?” arguments. Some of these have validity in their own right, but not one contains a scintilla of justification for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, in blatant disregard of its own guarantee of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity when that country handed over its nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Not one of those arguments contains a smidgen of legal or political backing for bombing and seizing large swathes of Ukrainian territory inhabited by Ukrainians. There are things that can and should be done to address the double standards criticisms, but those do not alter the basic case for reversing the aggression against Ukraine.
All this leaves the impression that there is much that an active diplomacy by western countries needs to do but that there is no justification for changing our basic policy of solid support for Ukraine—quite the contrary.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, a triple congratulations is surely in order for this debate: first, to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, who has obtained a topical and substantive issue for us to cover; secondly, to the Government, for having set out so clearly in the gracious Speech the twin objectives of their European policy, a new security pact with the rest of Europe and a reset of the post-Brexit relationship with the EU; and, thirdly, to the European Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House, whose chair, the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, spoke earlier in this debate, and whose previous chair, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, set out in April 2023 a very clear agenda of what needs to find its place in such a reset.
We can now see, more unmistakably than ever, just how bad the Brexit deal that the Johnson Government “got done” in 2019 really was. It was bad for Britain’s trade and economy, bad for our relationship with the rest of Europe and bad for our influence around the world when we need it most in troubled times. Such mitigation as came with the Windsor Framework and rejoining the Horizon research programme has not altered the case for the substantial reset that the Government are now contemplating.
But we should have no illusions. Such a reset will need to be one that brings mutual benefit to both parties—otherwise, there will just be a lot of talk about cherry picking. That does not mean that every item of the reset has to be perfectly balanced; that would be to fall into the trap that Brussels has rightly criticised as the “juste retour”. But there will need to be an overall balance—otherwise, a better deal will not be struck. The Government are surely right to give priority in timing to the new security pact. That will be needed whoever wins the US election. It will need to cover security issues in the widest sense, including not only defence issues but law enforcement and the vexed issues relating to migration, which are showing so many signs of destabilising the domestic politics of too many European countries.
In responding to the debate, I hope that the Minister, who not only is responsible for defence but has experience with migration, will be able to say something about the objectives the Government are pursuing in the security pact. Are we thinking of joining more PESCO projects? Are we planning to establish a link with the European Defence Agency, such as the US has? Are we making a larger contribution to peacekeeping in the western Balkans, as the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, called for? As to the wider reset on cultural, economic and trade issues, the agenda of 2023 remains as valid as when it was put forward.
All this will take time to achieve. There will be setbacks along the way. The issues are complex and sensitive. We are asking the EU to contemplate a deeper relationship with a third country than it has ever had before. It will need to be underpinned, I suggest, by a structured framework of foreign policy co-operation, from which the previous Government shied away when the European Affairs Committee proposed it. I hope the Minister will reverse that shying away, because we will need to work closely with our European partners on a whole range of issues: Ukraine, obviously; relations with China; restoring our eroding links with what is called the global South; and handling the global challenges of climate change and pandemic diseases. We will have to do that if we are not to fall far short of what we could achieve working together collectively.
I conclude with a fourth congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge, on her very moving maiden speech.
(4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it makes no sense either to deny or condone the fact that the recent election campaign was, to all intents and purposes, a foreign policy-free zone—and that at a time when both main parties agree that the risks to our security and the challenges to the rules on which it is based, from those in the UN and Paris charters to those in the Geneva conventions on international humanitarian law, are higher than they have been for decades. A hard fact is that, although foreign policy may not be a high priority in most people’s eyes, hard choices on foreign and security policy will be thrust upon us in the period ahead. Today’s debate is an opportunity to remedy that lapse.
The two foreign and security policy issues that stand out in the gracious Speech—the reset of the UK’s relationship with its European partners and the proposal for a new security pact to strengthen co-operation on the mutual threats faced by the UK and the EU—seem to me to be worthy of wholehearted support and to measure up to the challenges of the day. The security pact, interpreting the word “security” in the widest sense to include aspects of law enforcement, merits the greater priority, not because it hinges on the outcome of the US election—it will be needed whoever wins that election—but because the ruler of Russia continues to insist on his right to seize by force large parts of Ukraine, a country whose territorial integrity and sovereignty were guaranteed by Russia in the 1990s in the Budapest memorandum when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapon. This flagrant breach of international law threatens our security and that of our fellow Europeans.
How long will it take to achieve those two objectives, and in what form and substance? It is far too soon to say or even to speculate, but I suggest that the Government might do well to engage in an in-depth process of exploratory talks with the EU and its member states before tabling proposals or entering negotiations. I hope that the issue of youth mobility will be included in that probing period, because it is not free movement, as some people say it is. The watchword throughout our reset must be to realise mutual benefits to all concerned—the very reverse of cherry picking. The Prime Minister seems to have made a good start on that at the NATO and European Political Community summits. Just remember, as we go along, the Chinese saying that the longest journey begins with the first step.
If we have learned nothing else from the horrendous events in and around Gaza from last October onwards, it is surely that neither Israel nor Palestine can hope to achieve security or prosperity without a two-state solution. It is to be hoped that the Government will throw their full weight behind the recent UN Security Council resolution designed to bring about an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages and a massive increase in humanitarian aid. On that last point, I welcome very much the decision to resume our funding for UNRWA. I hope that the Government will act with real determination against any party which rejects that UN Security Council resolution or last week’s ruling of the International Court of Justice. As to the recognition of Palestinian statehood, would that not best be achieved alongside the recognition of Israel’s statehood by those of its Arab neighbours that have not already done so at the outset of renewed negotiations for a two-state solution, so that recognition does not again become a hostage to the outcome of those negotiations?
In conclusion, it is good that the gracious Speech recognises the urgency of global climate change. What is needed now is not so much more warm words at successive COP meetings as the implementation of national commitments already entered into, our own included. It is also essential to strengthen the capacity of the World Health Organization to respond rapidly and equitably to the next global pandemic when it comes along, as it will do, and to catch up the ground lost in making progress on the UN sustainable development goals, not least by moving our own ODA contributions back towards the 0.7% of GNI to which we committed ourselves under law.
A challenging period lies ahead. We should do our best to rise to the occasion.