European Union Committee Report

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I believe that this may be the first occasion on which the House has debated the work of its EU Select Committee over the previous three years. Whether it is or not, it is surely a debate worth having. I welcome the participation in it of our two distinguished and effective chairs during the period in question—the noble Lords, Lord Boswell and Lord Roper, who have both preceded me.

It is a debate worth having because it has been alleged frequently in the House by at least one of its Members that the work of the committee is worthless and because it is also suggested that the resources devoted to the work of the committee are excessive. I believe that neither of these criticisms is well founded, but it is right that a member of the committee, such as me, should be ready to defend that view in debate and not simply to assert it. I was a little disappointed to see that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, made only a cameo appearance some moments ago— 10 seconds, I think. He may have gone off to get a string of garlic to hang round his neck before facing such dangerous people around the Table. If he has not, I wish that he would come and substantiate some of his claims in the sort of debate that we are having.

I will focus first on the work of the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, Health and Education, which I have the honour to chair, and to whose members both past and present—I note that at least two of them are here—I pay tribute for their hard work and effective contributions. During the period in question, the sub-committee produced two major, thematic reports: on the European Union’s internal security strategy and on the European Union’s drug strategy. A third on the general approach to mobility and migration will be published within the next month. Since it has not yet been adopted, I will make no further reference to it in this debate.

In each of those thematic reports we have addressed European Union policies that are still being formulated and shaped, and we have thus aimed to contribute to that process, not merely to commenting after the event. I believe that we have had some success. In our work on the internal security strategy, we focused mainly on counterterrorism, civil protection and cybersecurity. Our overall conclusion can be summed up in a single, very brief phrase: Britain’s internal security neither begins nor ends at the water’s edge. We strongly recommended that a cybercrime centre be established within the existing Europol agency and not as a separate free-standing agency, and it seems likely that the Commission will accept that advice when it brings forward proposals for the development of Europol early next year. During this and other work we have done, we have formed a high opinion of the work of Europol and of its use and value to this country. That view will certainly be relevant when we take up the Protocol 36 opt-out decision in the next few weeks.

On the drugs strategy, as in so many areas with which our sub-committee deals—internal security and migration are others—we found ourselves in a policy area where there are mixed competences and where the principle of subsidiarity is alive and well and is actually being applied. We did not think in any of those cases that the boundary between the European Union as such and national competences should be shifted; rather, we thought that the European Union’s input should be better focused and less broad-brush. We called for a wide and inclusive public debate on drugs. I wish I could say that that call has been heeded, but it has not. The paucity and poverty of public debate on drugs is truly shameful.

In addition to those thematic reports, the Lisbon treaty has heaped on to our plate a whole range of new responsibilities reflecting the fact that now, for the first time in the EU’s history, national Parliaments have been given a clear role in the EU’s legislative processes. Thus, we not only intervened in a yellow card subsidiarity procedure in respect of the draft seasonal workers directive but we produced opt-in reports on the passenger name recognition directive and on the proceeds of crime directive. On the first of those, our recommendation to opt in was accepted by the Government; the second has not yet been so, but I very much hope that it will be at the adoption stage. In one area—the data protection directive—I fear that the Government failed to implement their commitment under the Ashton-Lidington undertakings to provide time for a debate before the opt-in period expired. That was lamentable. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, accepted that that had been an error and the Government’s decision to opt in was in any case what the committee had recommended. Least said, soonest mended.

In conclusion, I shall turn to two matters that fall outside the purview of my sub-committee. First, there is the EU’s multiannual financial framework, which has been referred to by other speakers, on which the main committee has spent much time and effort. The European Council’s failure at the end of last week to reach agreement was regrettable but not surprising—nor was it unprecedented. The gaps between the different groups in the Council were too wide to bridge at one attempt. That was exactly what happened, too, in December 1987, but it did not prevent a satisfactory agreement being reached in February 1988. The problem is that these budgetary negotiations really are zero-sum games: one country’s gain is another’s loss and the overall common interest tends to get overlooked as the competition for resources becomes more acute.

Our committee supported the Government’s aims to achieve a real-terms freeze over the next seven years. We did not consider that a cut was either desirable or achievable. The fact that the Prime Minister was able to work together with a group of like-minded member states was admirable and greatly increases the chances of an ultimate outcome with which the UK can live, even if it may contain some difficult compromises. Failure to reach agreement in the new year, particularly if the UK were alone to be responsible for that, would not, I believe, be in this country’s interests given that in the absence of an agreed MFF the European Union would have to fall back on an annual budgetary system that could well produce higher figures and an even less desirable distribution between policies.

The second matter, to which several other noble Lords have referred, is the decision that the House took earlier this year to cut the resources allocated to EU scrutiny and to abolish one of the Select Committee’s sub-committees. To have taken that decision shortly after the Lisbon treaty had considerably increased the overall work of European scrutiny and just when national Parliaments had gained a foothold in the EU’s legislative process was, I would say if I was being polite, counterintuitive. I would call it aberrant. I trust that when these matters next come up for review—for example, at the beginning of the next Session—that lamentable decision will be reversed. Unless the Minister, in replying to the debate, is tempted to retreat into procedural obfuscation and to argue that this is a matter for the House and not for the Government, I urge him at least to make it clear that the Government want to see the work of the EU Select Committee properly resourced and up to the challenges that it faces in the years ahead.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I stand corrected. I am not sure whether the justice and home affairs inquiry has yet taken evidence from the Irish Government, who have a clear stake in the question of the opt-out or the opt-in. It may be that the Irish Government—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Just to enlighten the noble Lord, as he has effectively asked a question, the call for evidence does address the Irish dimension. It will, of course, be a matter for the Irish Government to decide whether or not to offer evidence. I do not think that we should go around telling other Governments what they should do. It has been made clear to them that evidence would be extremely welcome.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Lord very much for that. I happen to know that there are those within the Irish Government who are enthusiastic about coming to give evidence, and I look forward to them accepting the invitation that has been made.

The wider issue we all face is the gap between globalisation—internationalisation—and publics who regret the extent to which power is slipping away from local control. Last summer I read an excellent book by Dani Rodrik, the Turkish economist who is now at Harvard, on the limits of globalisation in which he talks about the underlying contradiction between popular desire for stability, local control and understanding what has happened, and the driving forces of a global economy—the global social elite, immigration, et cetera—that appear to be taking power away from the local level and sweeping away autonomy, identity, sovereignty and democratic accountability. That is the tension that we all face. In the United States the American Tea Party takes it out on international law, international organisations and the federal Government. In Britain, by and large, our often disturbed and discontented public take it out on the European Union. Part of what we have to do is address that contradiction to see how far we can persuade our public that some of the regulation that now appears to them to be imposed from the European Union is unavoidable, desirable and necessary, and to persuade the European Union in return that it should not attempt to regulate everything in sight or expand its competences too far.