UK-EU Customs Union

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 29th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, is surely to be congratulated on his timely choice of topic. The hard fact is that both this House and the other place will be debating how to remedy the lamentable post-Brexit deal struck in 2019 for the foreseeable future. I welcome most warmly the maiden speaker who preceded me, the noble Baroness, Lady Gill, and the three who will succeed me.

What I regret about the scope of our debate is its failure to address the single most urgent issue in our relationship: the security relationship with other European countries. With Putin continuing his aggression against a democratic European country—Ukraine—and doubts over the attitude of President Trump on this and other issues, there is no time to lose on strengthening European security co-operation and the European pillar of NATO. The failure to agree the first step along that road at the end of last year was totally regrettable and does not reflect well on either side, most prominently, in my view, on the European Union.

I hope the Minister, in replying to this debate, will borrow a phrase from a previous Prime Minister of her party and say that we will not take no for an answer and will persevere with our efforts to build that stronger security relationship.

Many of the items agreed at last May’s UK-EU summit as part of the reset are extraordinarily welcome, and I hope the Minister will give the House an update on the state of negotiations and on the preparations for the next meeting in that series, scheduled for this summer.

The veterinary agreements are clearly essential to remove the many sanitary and phytosanitary obstacles hampering agri-food trade in both directions. The energy agreements on our emissions trading schemes and on co-operation over interlinking connectors and the development of renewable energy projects in the North Sea will equally be mutually beneficial. The EU’s introduction of cross-border adjustment measures a few days ago makes it essential that we avoid those sea bans becoming yet another non-tariff barrier to trade when we need similarity of treatment to prevent the diversion of imports into the EU and resulting damage to ourselves.

A mobility agreement for young people moving in both directions would be a welcome complement to the decision to rejoin Erasmus+. Should we balk at the need to accept, in some areas, continuous adjustment to changes in EU rules? I do not believe so. After all, any British-based company that trades into our largest overseas market, the EU, is already having to meet those rules. There is no impediment to our having stricter rules than the EU. When the Minister replies, can she say where the consultation over rejoining the pan-European rules of origin convention has got to and when the Government will announce a decision on that? I will not comment on the customs union issue, because there is nothing like enough clarity yet on what that might entail to form a judgment. I will listen carefully to those in this debate who support going down that road.

It is often said by commentators that the EU does not rate the reset of the UK-EU relationship as being very high among its crowded order of priorities. No doubt there is some truth in that, but it is not the whole truth. The changes in geopolitical circumstances since the referendum in 2016 have made it more necessary to build a solid new post-Brexit relationship, capable of greater load bearing than the one agreed in 2019. It is essential that we show a firmness of purpose and a restoration of trust and do not repeat the errors of earlier years by squabbling among ourselves over the details of the way ahead.

Palestine Statehood (Recognition) Bill [HL]

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 14th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I am speaking to give strong support to the Second Reading of the Bill proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, on Palestinian statehood. Why is that so? It is because without recognition of that statehood as part of what has come to be known as a two-state solution to the Palestine-Israel dispute, there will be no lasting peace, justice or prosperity for the countries of the Middle East, and for any interim solution, such as currently under negotiation over Gaza, to prosper, there has to be a horizon of a long-term solution, which I argue is a two-state one, however far away that horizon may be. As for what is sometimes known as “thinking outside the box”, such as Trump’s riviera ideas, they are simply illegal, immoral and impractical. They have no supporters in the region apart from the Netanyahu Government in Israel.

For many years as a loyal British diplomat, I defended the idea that the recognition of Palestinian statehood could come only at the end of a process that settled by negotiation the vexed issues of territory, security, refugees, governance and the status of Jerusalem. So long as Yitzhak Rabin lived, that was a realistic prospect, but he was assassinated for supporting a two-state solution. Since then, the idea of holding back the recognition of Palestinian statehood has become a mirage abandoned by an increasing number of countries around the world, some of them our fellow European democracies. Our Government seem to some extent to have moved down that road too, since they now talk of the recognition of Palestinian statehood at some undefined point during two-state negotiations. However, that step is now in limbo thanks to the refusal of the Israeli Government to contemplate any negotiations for a two-state solution, although I salute those brave Israelis who have this week put their names to a position that is more favourable to a two-state solution.

What sequencing of decision-making, which does not consist simply of the recognition of Palestinian statehood, but goes beyond it to achieve the recognition of Israel’s statehood by every Arab country in the Middle East, could be contemplated and have some chance over time of being achieved? It could be realised by an international conference bringing together all the Arab countries of the region and a wider range of world powers to relaunch two-state negotiations. At that conference, all participants would recognise the statehood of all others, thus bringing about Israel’s recognition of Palestine and Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel—to mention the most prominent lacunae in the present arrangements. Negotiations on territory, security, refugees, governance and the status of Jerusalem would then resume, but within the irreversible framework of two states.

The present Bill could help to make that possible without transgressing the unacceptability of giving any governmental or security role to Hamas following its horrendous breaches of international humanitarian law in October 2023 and since; nor would it contain any trace of anti-Semitism since it would treat all states of the region on an equal basis. I hope that with arrangements such as that in mind this Bill could be given an unopposed Second Reading, and I would like the Minister to address the route that I have suggested we might move towards when she replies to the debate.

Europe: Youth Mobility

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 30th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Moraes, on his maiden speech. Our paths crossed a little over 10 years ago when he, as a Member of the European Parliament, and I, as the chair of a committee of this House responsible for justice and home affairs, were doing our best to mitigate the somewhat impetuous effort of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to remove the UK from all justice and home affairs legislation. I am glad to say that we were successful then, although we were thwarted by the Brexit process. I welcome the noble Lord to this House, where I am sure he will make a major contribution.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans is also to be congratulated and thanked for securing this timely debate on the potential for a UK-EU mobility partnership as part of the Government’s reset of our post-Brexit relationship with the EU, and for his most helpful and illuminating introduction to the debate. This debate is all the more necessary as it provides an opportunity to clear away some of the quantities of disinformation that have swirled around the subject since the idea surfaced in Brussels early last summer, well ahead of the July election here.

To clear up one of those bits of disinformation, the idea has not yet been put to the UK by the EU in any formal sense. It was an idea that the Commission raised with the EU member states, and to which they got a reasonably positive response, but it was not put to us—except by journalists—because there are no current negotiations going on between the UK and the EU, so there was no need to respond to it, positively or negatively. The then Labour Opposition chose to react to it—quite unnecessarily, I have to say—in a way that was interpreted more negatively than was justified.

The second piece of disinformation is that the concept of mobility partnerships for particular age groups and professions is not understood as being as widespread as it is around the world. In no case does it amount to full free movement, and it is often numerically capped. So far as the EU is concerned, the Commissioner who will now be handling the matter in the new Commission, Maroš Šefčovič, made clear last week that any UK-EU scheme would not—I repeat “not”—amount to free movement.

Having got rid of those two main pieces of disinformation, it surely makes sense for the Government to consider carefully the pros and cons of such a mobility partnership. I hope the Minister will say that they will now do that, so that we are in a position to engage constructively if and when the idea is raised with us in the reset negotiations.

So far as your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee is concerned, the idea was studied in the process of preparing the report we made to the Government and the House in April 2023. I was serving as a member of the committee at the time, and we concluded that the idea made a lot of sense and would be in the UK’s interest. When the then Government reacted to our conclusion, they did not agree, but they were a different Government. Our report, which was subscribed to by a committee of all parties and none, is surely therefore worth looking at again now.

Since the time of that report by your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee, I would suggest that the case for giving positive consideration to a UK-EU mobility partnership has become much more compelling. Following our departure from the EU almost five years ago to the day, the opportunities for those in this age bracket to be likely to be covered by any mobility partnership have shrunk dramatically on both sides of the channel. Brexit has deprived them of many of the openings they had when we were a member of the EU.

School visits have virtually collapsed; access to the ever more successful Erasmus scheme, to which other non-EU countries belong, has lapsed; knowledge of other European languages in this country has continued to slide; the activities of performing artists of all kinds have been hit hard; and young professionals in a whole range of specialisations have ceased to have easy access to jobs on both sides of the channel. That is a pretty sorry litany, and I could go on. Moreover, the sign of interest in a mobility partnership with us, which we have heard from Brussels, means that there is a good chance that such an approach would fulfil one crucial characteristic for success in negotiation: mutual benefit to both sides.

The time has surely come to stop sucking our teeth, to stop repeating constantly the mantra “We have no plans for a mobility partnership”, and to give the whole idea a thorough and open-minded consideration. After all, we might discover some help there for the Government’s top priority of stimulating growth.

Finally, on a more general point, it does not make sense and is not in our national interest for us to debate every idea for improving the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU as if it was a rerun of the damagingly divisive debates we had between 2016 and 2019 over the principle of our EU membership. The debate we are having today is not part of that and should not be treated as if it was.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

It is also the case that many foreign Governments have big stakes in listed companies, so any express concerns about those companies could be litigated on the basis that they were influenced by the disapproval of a substantial fellow investor. If pension schemes became open to legal challenge in the way that I have described, it would have a chilling effect on the high standards of corporate governance and corporate responsibilities, which the Government claim to support. I hope the Minister will therefore accept this simple amendment to allow proper stewardship by local government pension funds without the threat of litigation hanging over them.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of the noble Baroness who has just spoken on Amendment 45, as well as Amendment 27 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has eloquently drawn to the attention of the Committee, this is another of the points at which this legislation’s handling of Israel arises. The issue is the elision that has been made by the Government between the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories—the West Bank, the Golan Heights and east Jerusalem. Within the Occupied Territories there is a mass of illegal settlements, which the international community and the British Government regard as illegal. A whole rash of outposts have now been established from those settlements, which are also illegal. The elision between the State of Israel and the settlements is causing infinite trouble to this Bill, and I hope that the Minister will find some way to sort this out, because it really needs to be sorted out.

There is no disagreement, between the Government and those of us who wish to see this sorted out, about the settlements in the West Bank, Golan and east Jerusalem. We all agree that they are illegal under international law. I think we therefore agree—the Minister was very clear about this at Second Reading and when it came up in earlier amendments—that for British companies, pension funds or whatever else to invest in those illegal settlements, even unwittingly, would be to create an illegality. Presumably, the Government do not want a British company or a British pension fund to do that—and I hope that we would not want it either.

These amendments would make it somewhat easier for the bodies covered by the Bill to make sure that they were not being drawn into illegality in any way and thus acting in a way that would be contrary to government policy. I hope that the Minister will give careful consideration to the issue, because I am afraid that the elision between the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories is really damaging to the Bill’s prospects.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I have made no secret that this is a bad Bill that is badly drafted, and I spoke against it at Second Reading. In this debate, my suggestion that we should not agree Clause 12 is narrowly focused.

Local government pension schemes should be treated in exactly the same way as every other funded occupational pension scheme—the point made by my noble friend Lady Blackstone. I agree totally with the amendments tabled by my noble friends, and I certainly support their proposals, but my question is: do we need separate legislation to cover the local government pension schemes? My strong view is that we do not; the schemes should all be treated the same. They should come under the same rules as the fiduciary duties on trustees or committees —whoever is responsible for taking the decisions—and they should be the same across the board.

I tabled my clause stand part notice just to ask what the effect would be of not having this provision. Would it mean that I achieve my objective and that, should the provision be removed from the Bill, the local government pension schemes would be treated like other pension schemes? I suspect not. I suspect that I would need a more detailed amendment that would place local government pension schemes under the same responsibilities and law as occupational pension schemes more generally. That is my objective, and I hope that we can have this debate again on Report so that all pension schemes are treated the same.

I listened carefully to the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, but I think her argument fails. First, there are private employers whose employees are within the local government pension scheme. Equally, there are public bodies whose pension schemes are not covered by this legislation, most obviously the universities superannuation scheme. So the division between the sheep and the goats in this respect is arbitrary. There is no consistency about—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I am slightly puzzled by the Minister’s statement that the Government wish to avoid any territorial connection, since the Government themselves have placed large chunks of territorial description in the Bill. Could the Minister enlighten us on that? After all, it is the Government who have put down a Bill that talks about Israel and elides Israel with the Occupied Territories, the Golan Heights, east Jerusalem and the West Bank. Although they have confirmed their view that the settlements in all those areas are illegal, and therefore that investment in those settlements would be illegal too, it is the Government who are specifying this matter territorially. By all means, take the whole lot out—that would be fine.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

As I was trying to explain, the important point is that it depends on the motivation for the decision. The Bill would prohibit only investment and procurement decisions that would appear to a reasonable observer to be influenced by moral or political disapproval of foreign state conduct, and have a territorial element. It would not prevent public authorities making any other kind of territorial or practical business considerations. I have been trying to clarify this.

As I am conscious of time, perhaps we could turn finally to—

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th May 2024 Lords Chamber

Clause 3(7) is deeply damaging, because it suggests to Israel that its conduct in the Occupied Palestinian Territories does not matter and that it is immune from any criticism from its friends, whatever it does and however it acts. That is not a demonstration of friendship; it is the encouragement of a dangerous delusion that will lead the region to ever greater disaster. We should cease encouraging that delusion. A good place to start would be to delete Clause 3(7) or, better still, to dispense with the Bill altogether.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment introduced by my noble friend Lord Warner. It is conceivable that the Government’s objective of exempting the State of Israel—I say that carefully, the State of Israel—from the imposition of BDS, which I do not support, could be achieved with different drafting. However, to have introduced it in the way that it is introduced in Clause 3(7) is a mistake, and the mistake is compounded by mixing up completely different things: the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories, which certainly include the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. They should not be treated in the same way. They are not part of the State of Israel in the view of the British Government, though they are in the view of the present Israeli Government. I repeat, they are not in the view of the British Government part of the State of Israel. Within those Occupied Territories—Golan, east Jerusalem and the West Bank—there are internationally illegal settlements. Illegality is another category on which the British Government’s policy is quite clear—just read the Security Council resolution, which has been quoted. Mixing these things up together is, frankly, a solution of disaster. It will just doom this legislation by including it.

I am not trying to suggest that it would not be possible to do something, though I doubt very much whether specifically mentioning Israel is a wise thing in the first place. I agree with the Government that public bodies should not be making foreign policy, but I am not sure that specifying one country out of 194 where they particularly should not be making foreign policy is a very clever way of setting about that. If you took that away and tried to sort out these unhelpfully mixed-up elements, there might be a better chance of this Bill making progress. So long as they are all mixed up together, we will have a cat’s cradle of contradictions.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said that this Bill will increase anti-Semitism. That is one view. I prefer to observe what is actually happening. We only have to look at what is happening in universities at the moment; we will come on to universities in a later group.

If we look at what has been happening with the encampments that have been springing up in the UK following what has been happening in the US, they are vocally calling for boycott and divestment in relation to Israel—and, indeed, quite a lot worse. This is a very live issue. It is causing much harm on campuses for Jewish students, who are clear that there has been a significant increase in anti-Semitism since this has started. This is not theory; it is actually happening.

Israel is always the focal point for BDS campaigns. The BDS movement itself came into being to attack Israel. I am glad that we are aligned with the noble Lord, Lord Collins, on the need to protect Israel from those activities. From my perspective, if the Bill does nothing else, it should try to protect Israel from boycott and divestment activities. That is why we need Clause 3(7): it underlines the importance of Israel and the particular attacks on Israel.

I accept that the Occupied Territories raise much more difficult issues. In line with the international community, the UK recognises the settlements as illegal, but the practicalities are that this will not be settled conclusively until there is a two-state solution. This is something that cannot be imposed; it will have to be agreed, but that is unlikely to happen very soon. Anyone who has been to Israel or has been in touch with people in Israel will know that the attacks by Hamas on 7 October have left a traumatised Israeli people, for whom the possibility of discussing a two-state solution seems almost unthinkable at this point in time. That is not to deny that that is the right solution in the long term but simply to say that it does not appear to be an immediate, practical problem.

The reality on the ground is that, in the meantime, the unsatisfactory nature of the Occupied Territories is likely to continue. Even if we thought that boycotts and divestments in relation to the Occupied Territories would punish Israel, this ignores the simple fact that there is economic activity in those settlements. Anything that harms that will almost certainly harm Palestinians as much as it harms the people of Israel. We only have to look at what happened when SodaStream, an Israeli company, was forced to withdraw from its activities in the occupied West Bank. The people who really lost out were the Palestinians who lost good, well-paid jobs when that facility had to close.

On our last day in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, pointed me to the FCDO guidance, which I duly went and read; he has read much of it into the record today. The important thing about that guidance is that, although it highlights the risks involved, it does not prohibit anyone in the UK from investing or dealing with those who are active in the Occupied Territories. I believe that this Bill reflects that pragmatic position—that the Occupied Territories are a fact of life—and that, until there is a two-state solution, trying to eliminate it from the Bill does not reflect the practical politics we are facing.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow that speech, although I respectfully point out that groups such as Diaspora Alliance hold the same sway and weight in the Jewish community as, for example, Gays for Trump would in the homosexual community in America. You can always find a Jew or Jewish group who will say whatever you want; going back to the Talmud, we are a disputatious people. I would gently warn noble Lords against picking people in the Jewish community who happen to agree with what they say. The two main communal bodies, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council have been forthright in support of the Bill.

Let me turn to Clause 3(7), which is what this amendment focuses on. As we know, the way in which the Bill works is that unless a country is added to the Schedule by the Secretary of State, a public body cannot discriminate against it on essentially political grounds—I paraphrase. Clause 3(7) provides more procedural protection to Israel and to the territories listed in it because its effect is that a future Secretary of State cannot add Israel or those territories to the Schedule—that can be done only by way of primary legislation, as the noble Baroness just pointed out.

The purpose of this amendment is obvious although I note that, perhaps wisely, its proposers were neither able nor willing to say so in terms in a Member’s explanatory statement. Its purpose is to strip Israel of that procedural protection to make it easier procedurally, and therefore also politically, for a future Secretary of State to give a green light to a boycott of Israel. That, in terms, is what this amendment is designed to do and what, if it became part of the Bill, it would do.

Two main arguments have been made in support of removing Clause 3(7) from the Bill—let me say a word or two about each. The first is that Clause 3(7) does not distinguish between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as it is said the UK is required to do. There are two points in relation to that: first, what is the source of this supposed obligation?

I referred in an earlier group to the opinion from Richard Hermer KC. I declare an interest: he is a friend, but the fact that he is will not stop me saying that I think he has got it hopelessly wrong on this point. His opinion says that there is a

“wider international law obligation on all states to ensure that impediments to Palestinian self-determination are brought to an end”.

To support that proposition, he cites the 2004 ICJ advisory opinion on the separation wall. That, of course, is an advisory opinion and, in terms, is limited to the separation wall itself, which the ICJ refers to as an “impediment” to Palestinian self-determination

“resulting from the construction of the wall”.

We could mount a very good argument, and I would, that it is the construction of that wall which advances Palestinian self-determination because without it, there would still be suicide bombings and people blown up on buses and in cafes, but let us put that to one side.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I just want to correct the noble Lord. The judgment did not say that the wall was illegal; it said that it was placed illegally because it was placed in the Occupied Territories, not on the boundary between the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

That is not the point I was making, but the noble Lord is absolutely right. My point was whether there is in that judgment some sort of obligation on us not to impede the construction of a Palestinian state. However, the noble Lord is absolutely right in his characterisation of that part of the advisory opinion.

The only obligation the judgment refers to, therefore, is an obligation not to recognise the Occupied Palestinian Territories as part of Israel. That is in the advisory opinion as an obligation. UK government policy does not do so, and this Bill does not do so either.

Then we look at the other supposed source of this obligation: UN Security Council Resolution 2334, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in moving the amendment. That goes no further. That, in paragraph 5, “calls on states”. Let us just be clear: that is not an international law obligation. With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who characterised that as a UK commitment, it is not. As other noble Lords will know much better than I do, the use of words such as “requires,” “obliges” and “calls on” are important distinctions—we will come later to what distinctions are—in UN Security Council resolutions. In any event, that only “calls on states” to distinguish between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and not to lump them together.

Secondly, in so far as there is any legal obligation, which there is not, it would only be one to distinguish between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Clause 3(7) does that. It does distinguish: you distinguish between things by treating them distinctly. You do not need to treat them differently. Those are two distinct, or different, things. This Bill is therefore entirely consistent with UK government policy and with UN Security Council Resolution 2334. That is a complete answer to the first point.

Let me go to the second point, which is the question about why Israel is treated differently. That is the main question underlying much of the debate on this clause. I have already explained that the differential treatment is procedural and not substantive; so why, asked the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in moving his amendment, is Israel treated differently in this Bill? I answered that question in my speech at Second Reading. The short answer—and I will not repeat it—is that Israel is constantly subjected to differential and discriminatory treatment, both by international bodies such as the UN and its rather unhappily named Human Rights Council, on which sit some of the world’s biggest abusers of human rights, and by some public authorities in this country. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has asked the question about why Israel is treated differently, let me answer it by reference to his oral contributions in your Lordships’ House.

Over the past 10 years, the noble Lord has—and I have benefited from them—contributed to many debates on many topics in your Lordships’ House. I thought I would have a look at some of his contributions relating to some of the countries set out in the list from the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in his Amendment 49. I know he is now no longer going to move that amendment, but it is a useful list because it sets out those countries that have poor, or worse, human rights records.

On the basis of my researches in Hansard, the current position is as follows. I am not going to go through them all, but here are some. The number of times in the last 10 years that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has referred to Saudi Arabia is zero; Yemen, zero; Myanmar, zero; Sudan, zero; the Uighurs, zero; North Korea, zero; Congo, zero; Venezuela, zero; Iran, zero; China, one, in the context of a speech on the West Bank; Syria, one, in the context of a speech on Gaza; Ukraine, one, to ask why we do not treat Israel the same way we treat Russia; Israel and Palestine—nine.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that there is a bit of confusion going on. Amendment 7, which takes out the words in Clause 1(7), relates only to who is carrying out the disapproval. It is just amplifying those people whose disapproval is taken into account, to see whether or not the clause is engaged. It is not trying to add different categories of decision-maker, because the reference to decision-maker is clear in Clause 2, which we will come on to in another group. It is that definition that then drives enforcement, et cetera.

I was interested in Amendment 55 of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman—although I think it is actually the wrong amendment asking for regulations—because it highlights that decision-makers might be individuals under the Bill, which they can be. As I understand it, the definition of “decision-maker” in Clause 2 encompasses some individuals being the decision-maker from whom all these consequences might flow. That was a complete surprise to me because the Bill is titled the Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill—a manifesto commitment related to public bodies. I was completely amazed to find that individuals might be public authorities within the terms of Clause 2, and therefore decision-makers.

I was interested in the noble Baroness’s probing amendment, because I hoped that she would be using that to ask the Minister what kinds of individuals could be decision-makers under the definition that we are using—the Human Rights Act definition. The limited research I have done produced the example of a doctor. When a doctor is carrying out his NHS work, he could be a public authority for that purpose, but when carrying out his private work, he could not be. I did not find much more than that, and I am rather hoping that the Minister will be able to explain to us in rather more detail precisely which individuals are decision-makers within Clause 2.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, will speak to this amendment and do so, like the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Johnson, in relation to universities and higher education. I had some experience of that: I was on two university councils—those of Birmingham and Kent—and I chaired the Birmingham council for five or six years in the early part of this century.

I have to say to the Minister that, as a result of a lot of extremely desirable reforms, the decision-making at universities was concentrated quite heavily on the council. The council did not micromanage every decision, but it was responsible for every decision taken at the university. That responsibility was clearly focused on a much-reduced size of council, down from the 30s or 40s to the 20s, and it meant that a quite a lot of responsibility came on to its members, who were a combination of academics and lay persons—with a majority, on the whole, of lay persons. The lay persons on the council were volunteers and were not paid a penny. Now, if the vagueness in this bit of the legislation is retained, I would not like to be out there trying to recruit new members to university councils, if they thought they were going to be liable for any of the sorts of problems that could arise under this legislation.

I suspect that this is just one of many pieces of this legislation that reinforce the case for simply taking higher education and universities completely out of it. I think that is what we will come to when we get to Report. This is just the first illustration that it will have a remarkably chilling effect on the conduct of councils and the way in which people are prepared to serve—for nothing and as volunteers—on university councils, giving up many hundreds of hours of their lives to making sure that the university is properly administered and decisions properly taken.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I preface my remarks by declaring an interest as chancellor of Cardiff University. I apologise that my duties at Cardiff University prevented me attending the whole of Second Reading—so I could not speak, although I attended a significant part of it.

Before I was chancellor of Cardiff University, I was a member of the council of Cardiff Metropolitan University, so I have a background in both executive and non-executive roles at universities. What I have to say very much follows neatly from the noble Lord. My experience is that university councils—and other bodies doing the same job but sometimes with different names—are very highly regulated already. They involve a great deal of training and responsibility and absolutely no financial reward—but there is great satisfaction for those who participate.

In both universities I have mentioned, our problem is always trying to get the suitable range of highly skilled, highly experienced people to participate. If you add another unnecessary layer of responsibility on to those people, you will deter very worthwhile recruits and you will make life more difficult again for our higher education sector. So can the Minister give us examples of universities—and individuals within universities—that have made these inappropriate decisions, so that we can see why universities are included? Otherwise, if there are no examples at the Minister’s fingertips, could the Government give further thought to whether they should be included at all?

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the Bill to which this House is being asked to give a Second Reading today is, in my view, both ill-timed and ill-conceived. It singles out Israel for special protection over any other country in the world in a remarkably discriminatory way—positive for Israel, negative for everywhere else—which, important though the preservation of Israel’s security and democracy undoubtedly is, can hardly be justified. Is it really that much more important to us than the countries of the Commonwealth?

The Bill is ill-timed in the sense that, while many will assert and defend Israel’s right to act militarily in self-defence in response to the onslaught unleashed against it by Hamas on 7 October, as does the present speaker, this is hardly the appropriate moment to bring forward a piece of legislation which appears to give Israel a blank cheque for whatever it does in Gaza and the other Occupied Territories.

It is ill-conceived because it would appear also to override some of the formal international positions taken by successive British Governments with respect to the West Bank and the settlements established there, to the Golan Heights and to east Jerusalem. Can the Minister confirm whether it remains the Government’s position, as set out in paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 2334, for which the UK voted, that the status of these territories can be determined only by international negotiations and agreement between the parties to the dispute between Israel and Palestine—and not, as is the view of the present Israeli Government, by the unilateral action of Israel—and that those settlements are illegal and that the assertion of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and east Jerusalem has no basis in international law? If so, and given that that view is shared by the vast majority of the members of the UN, why is that distinction not recognised in the present Bill? Why, indeed, is it not recognised as being an obligation on public bodies in this country, just as they are not permitted—rightly, in the view of the present speaker—to try to impose their own trade sanctions on Israel?

Let us reflect for a moment on where we would have stood in the early 1990s with respect to investments in apartheid South Africa, had a Bill of the sort proposed been on the statute book. I listened with great interest to the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, to that issue. Do we really wish to tie the hands of public bodies in matters of investment, should such breaches of customary international law occur in the future?

The objections I have referred to relate to the international dimensions of this Bill, which seem far-reaching and undeniable. How do they respect the Government’s championing of the rules-based international order, of which the provisions relating to the status of the territories concerned are surely an integral part?

Other considerations, referred to by other noble Lords, such as whether it makes any sense to deprive public bodies of powers they would appear to possess, are matters for others with more expertise than me on such aspects of the legislation. The negative implications for the autonomy and freedom of speech of universities has been referred to by noble Lords and must be a matter of real concern.

The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, did us a favour by reading out the relevant passage from his party’s 2019 manifesto. The Salisbury/Addison convention is highly relevant to the Bill. There is no mention in the manifesto of Israel, and no mention of universities, which are not public bodies. This will be relevant as we look, as I believe we should, to produce some fairly radical amendments to the Bill in order to avoid setting off in quite the wrong direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

We will move on. Obviously, I agree that the history of—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

On that point, if can help the Minister, I represented this country at the United Nations at the time and what the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, says is totally accurate.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

We will move on. I was just going to say that it was amazing that the change happened in South Africa. I remember visiting it in the 1990s, after the change.

UK-EU Relationship (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 20th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the report we are debating, so admirably introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who contributed to great effect to its production, is quite simply the first overall analysis of the future development of the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU by either House of Parliament since we left the EU in early 2020, more than three years ago, so it deserves to be taken seriously. It will not be the last word on a subject which, whatever side you voted on in the 2016 referendum, will be prominent in our politics for the foreseeable future, but its long list of suggestions for developing that relationship deserves careful scrutiny and response.

First, it is a great pity that the Government have yet again rejected the idea of negotiating an SPS agreement with the EU, when it has the wholehearted support of the agri-food industries in all four nations and of most parties in Parliament. That industry, which has benefited to an increasing degree from its access to continental markets, is being sacrificed on the altar of sovereignty—that imprecise and poorly understood concept which is trotted out whenever needed to reject a well-argued proposition.

Secondly, the report’s proposal that the UK should establish a structured framework for co-operating with the EU on foreign and security policy issues has been supported strongly by all previous speakers in this debate. It was a concept endorsed by both parties in their joint political declaration, negotiated and ratified in 2019 and 2020, and then dropped by Prime Minister Johnson. Whatever the rights and wrongs of that decision at that time, the case for such a framework has been greatly strengthened since then by the need to respond effectively to two major challenges: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the rising assertiveness of China worldwide. The Government say that we are getting along just fine by co-operating with the EU on an ad hoc basis on those and other issues, but that demonstrates a not-unprecedented misunderstanding of the way the EU best responds, which is through frameworks for co-operation laid down in advance, while leaving each party autonomy in its own decision-making. Surely this is a moment for a rethink on that issue.

Thirdly, there was the Government’s response to the report’s proposal that the UK and EU should develop the closest possible co-operation on their climate change policies, in particular linking their emissions trading schemes and ensuring that any cross-border adjustment mechanism did not get at cross purposes and give rise to further friction in their mutual trade. To say, as the Government do, that they agree with the report’s views in part, without saying which parts, is just a curate’s egg reply. Every single professional witness who gave us evidence urged the need for the closest possible co-operation on those issues, but in the real world the UK’s emissions trading scheme is now drifting away from the EU’s and the Government have not yet decided even whether to have a CBAM scheme, let alone what relationship it should have with the EU scheme that is already taking shape. What will the Government do if the EU imposes a CBAM on Chinese steel and cement? Will they just sit back and allow the trade to be diverted here?

The section in the Government’s response on the report’s conclusions on school visits and many other forms of cultural and educational co-operation is, frankly, shameful. The Prime Minister and the French President agreed last March to remedy the free fall in UK-France school visits since Brexit. What has happened since then? Precisely nothing is the answer; something might happen by the end of the year, we are told. Meanwhile, successive generations of schoolchildren are missing out on those formative experiences, and what could be more self-defeating than refusing to make the Turing student exchange system one which operates mutually and opens up possible co-operation with the EU’s Erasmus scheme? There is narrow-mindedness here which is quite shocking.

There is much wrong with the Government’s response so far to our report. How best could that be remedied? First, we should open discussions with the EU on how to strengthen the framework for our co-operation on foreign policy and security issues, as we foresaw doing in the 2019 political declaration. At the same time, we should begin exploratory talks with the EU about how to put to most effective use the 2025-26 review of the trade and co-operation agreement, which is provided for in its terms. None of this will be easy or straight- forward, so the sooner we begin the better. It will be important for both parties to work for ways to strengthen our co-operation to their mutual benefit, as we emphasised and underlined in our report. That should help to answer silly criticisms of cherry-picking, which are bound to surface from some quarters in Brussels.

The first few years following Brexit have hardly been a happy experience. Now we have a real opportunity to get on to the front foot and treat the existing skimpy system as a floor and not a ceiling. The Windsor Framework and the deal on Horizon are a promising beginning, but we need to be more systematic and determined about the next stages. That is the challenge this report makes to Parliament and to all parties represented here. Let us hope they will rise to it.

EU–UK Partnership Council

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 16th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, would the Minister not agree that a slightly more proactive approach to holding meetings with the TCA might be better than simply standing at the Dispatch Box and saying that we have fulfilled the minimum requirement under law? Would he perhaps answer the part of the Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that related to matters which might be discussed at such a future meeting? Has he given consideration, for example, to raising the issue of performing artists so that the work that the Government are doing bilaterally is supplemented by work with the EU where the EU has competence in these matters—for example, with cabotage?

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, the Partnership Council is, of course, the highest body of the governance structure created by the TCA, and as such it does not need to meet very frequently. That is why the treaty commitment is to once a year. However, the specialised committees are important and look through the detail, and those have been running since June. As I said, all of those will shortly have met. So the governance structures are working well. We obviously have been giving thought to the agenda of the Partnership Council; it will no doubt take the issues that are of highest priority at that point. We touched on the question of touring artists at the 9 June meeting, and I imagine that we will do so again at the next meeting.