Afghanistan (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Monday 24th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, 6 January was the first anniversary of the publication of our report. Several other noble Lords have mentioned the problems associated with getting it debated—better late than never, I suppose. I was proud to a member of the committee. If I can say so as 1/12th of the committee, I think it is an excellent report and it stands the test of time. Although it was long ago, I must give special thanks to the secretariat—Eva George and her team—and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, for her chairmanship. She managed to do it all on Zoom, which to me is beyond human understanding.

On rereading the report, I particularly regret that we did not have a chance to debate it before the establishment of the Taliban regime. I am not going to exaggerate the significance of a single parliamentary report, but I think that many of the issues we raised were relevant prior to the Taliban takeover and remain relevant today. One year ago, no one reading our analysis could have been in any doubt whatever that the situation in the country was exceedingly grave. Although we did not predict the imminent collapse of the Government, we certainly identified their nearly insurmountable challenges. As we said in paragraph 1 of our summary:

“The Afghan state remains very fragile, with limited control of territory. The Taliban’s insurgency continues, and terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State Khorasan Province, operate in the country.”


We also pointed out that:

“The Afghan state is highly aid-dependent, and there are few prospects for domestic revenues to increase.”


Perhaps most tellingly of all, we said:

“The Afghan government’s accountability to its citizens is limited by its reliance on international military spending and aid. Government appointments are regarded as a source of spoils, and warlords and militia leaders retain roles inside the state.”


It was also obvious to our committee that, whatever resulted from the peace talks then taking place in Doha, our Government would have to address the fact that the Taliban would be involved in any settlement and we would have to decide at what level, and under what conditions, we should engage with them. We said:

“We conclude that the Government should be giving careful consideration to how, in the event of the Doha talks resulting in an agreement, it will handle its future relationship with the Taliban, which will necessarily be part of any power-sharing arrangement.”


We knew before it happened that the Taliban would be playing a crucial role in the future and that our Government would need to know how to engage with that.

While, as I say, we did not anticipate the imminent total Taliban takeover, it was obvious that the Taliban would be a major if not dominant force in any future Afghan Government. Indeed, anyone reading our report today would see there was a palpable sense of the overwhelming challenges of instability in the country and, despite the peace talks then ongoing, a strong sense of foreboding. That was implicit in our comments on the policy of the Trump Administration in reaching their one-sided agreement with the Taliban. It guaranteed US withdrawal without any reciprocal undertakings from the Taliban or any involvement in the talks by the then Afghan Government. It is impossible to resist the temptation to say of US policy at the time, in the light of subsequent events, “We told you so.”

Now we know that our foreboding was justified—the Taliban takeover is complete and took place in a stunningly short time—yet, for all the huge significance of the takeover, just a glimpse of the chapter headings of our report shows that the challenges facing Afghanistan today were there prior to the takeover, although of course hugely exacerbated by it. Our report listed the problems of poverty, hunger, Covid, human rights, corruption, refugees, drugs and terrorist groups.

On poverty in the country, we pointed out a year ago that Afghanistan was ranked 170th out of 189 countries in the 2019 Human Development Index. We also reported that Afghanistan depended on international aid for about 60% of its budget, that it was the most aid-dependent country in the world and that there were few prospects for domestic revenues to increase. In paragraph 237 we said, and this was prior to the takeover:

“The country faces a humanitarian crisis, with alarmingly high levels of food insecurity.”


So the basic problems of poverty were known well before the events in August.

It has to be said, in fairness, that in subsequent Statements and Answers to Questions the Minister has recognised the absolute priority of aid to those most in need in the country. He said in the House last week that the aid was getting through and there was good co-operation on the ground. However, since the Statements last week millions of people who will not necessarily be following these things will have seen the heart-rending, almost unwatchable reports by John Ray on ITN—this led the news on one day—about the desperation of so many people in Afghanistan, particularly the children, who as we speak are simply not getting enough to eat to keep them alive. So I really must ask the Minister: what are the obstacles to aid getting through to where it is needed most? How far short of the aid needed is actually being provided? What is being done to co-ordinate and accelerate the international effort?

We then have the allied problems of disease and hospital supplies, which were also highlighted by ITN, with children dying for lack of medicines. This issue is massively exacerbated by Covid. Last January, our report said that further humanitarian aid would be necessary specifically as a result of Covid. Again, I ask the Minister: where is the international commitment, and the UK’s in particular, on the supply of vaccines and essential drugs to hospitals that are so desperately in need?

So many of these issues have, inevitably, been mentioned before; the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, moaned about four of his foxes being shot but I feel as though all my foxes have been shot by speaking late. But on human rights, especially those of women and girls, our committee noted the improvements that had been made since the beginning of the UK’s involvement in 2001. For this, as with so much else, we salute the heroism and dedication of the military and all those British citizens who worked in Afghanistan with the aim of making life better for the Afghan people.

However, our report expressed concern about the extent to which these hard-won rights were being jeopardised in those parts of the country already under Taliban control. We found that there were substantial local variations, depending on individual Taliban commanders. I ask the Minister this: since the takeover in August, can he give any kind of overview of the human rights situation now that the Taliban has overall central control? Is it at all possible to say—this is perhaps a crude question to ask, but I would be interested to have an assessment—whether the Taliban today differs in any substantial way from the horrors of the Taliban of 20 years ago or is a reprise of that?

That brings me to the question which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned and I merely repeat, about the engagement of the UK and our allies with those in control in Kabul. In December the Brookings Institution published a paper titled “It’s time for the West to engage with the Taliban”. The paper says:

“If we refuse to engage with the Taliban at any meaningful level … economic collapse and isolation risk provoking deeper instability, insecurity, and repression”.


On 15 December, the Minister for the Middle East, James Cleverly, said in a ministerial Statement:

“We have used our engagement with Taliban to press them to ensure a suitable environment for aid delivery, as well as to respond to international concerns on terrorism, the protection of human rights, especially the rights of women, girls and members of minorities”.


We have heard about the talks in Norway, but can the Minister update us on the level and frequency of that engagement? Can he also report on the success or otherwise of those contacts with the Taliban, especially on the catastrophic humanitarian issues?

I would also be interested in his reaction to a letter which some may have seen in the Guardian today—it was reported quite heavily. A number of our distinguished colleagues were signatories, including the noble Baroness, Lady Amos, the noble Lords, Lord Ricketts and Lord Sedwill, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Richards. They basically argued, among other things, for proper engagement with the Taliban. I would like the Minister’s reaction to this and, in particular, to the quote from the Norwegian foreign Minister, who said

“we must talk to the de facto authorities in the country. We cannot allow the political situation to lead to an even worse humanitarian disaster”.

I agree with every word in that letter and report. It would have saved me a lot of trouble if they had written it a couple of weeks ago, because it would have given me a lovely structure for my remarks. I would like to hear the Minister’s response.

I almost find myself summarising at this stage because it has been a very sombre, quite sad and regretful debate, with much more—this is true of my remarks as well as so many others—about the huge problems facing the country than practical ways of addressing and solving them in our much-reduced situation, but we must make the effort. In our report, we identified so many challenges facing Afghanistan. The same challenges remain but the situation is now far worse. The need is so great on so many fronts that it is sometimes difficult to focus and prioritise, but there surely can be no higher priority than the millions of children in Afghanistan whose lives are threatened because they simply do not have enough to eat. We need to address these problems, with that clearly as the first priority.