Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Lord Garnier and Earl Howe

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for speaking to his amendments with his customary clarity. I hope I can be helpful to him and the Committee in my response.

I have heard unmistakeably the reservations expressed across the Committee about these proposals. Before saying anything else, I undertake to represent to my noble and learned friend the Minister the strength of those reservations. I do so without commitment at this stage but in good faith. It may be helpful to the Committee if I explain where the Government are currently coming from in making these proposals so that noble Lords can understand the issues as we perceive them.

Amendment 169 seeks to remove lines 35 and 36 of Clause 53, which would have the same effect as removing the clause in its entirety. Clause 53 amends Section 239(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allows the Secretary of State to make rules with respect to the proceedings of the Parole Board. At the moment, the provision permits rules to be made about how many members deal with particular cases, or that specified cases be dealt with at specified times. This clause adds that the Secretary of State may also require cases to be dealt with by

“members of a prescribed description”.

Amendment 169 seeks to remove that addition.

I will explain briefly why we want to ensure that the Secretary of State can make rules about who sits on parole cases. In the Root and Branch Review of the Parole System, the Government committed to increasing

“the number of Parole Board members from a law enforcement background”

and ensuring that every parole panel considering a case involving the most serious offenders has a law enforcement member on it. We are talking here about murder, rape, terrorist offences and the like.

The Government of course recognise that each and every type of Parole Board member brings with them different experience and skills. That range and diversity contributes to generally effective risk assessments and sound decision-making. However, members with law enforcement experience, such as former police officers, have particular first-hand knowledge of the impact and seriousness of offending. Many will also have direct experience of the probation system, including, for example, licence conditions and the likelihood of an offender’s compliance with such conditions.

Clause 53 enables the Secretary of State to make the secondary legislation needed to prescribe that certain Parole Board panels include members with a law enforcement background. We will, naturally, continue to consider operational readiness before we lay any secondary legislation. I hope that explanation is of help.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Am I to draw the inference from what my noble friend has just said that, under the current arrangements, inappropriate members of the board have been inappropriately appointed to particular cases?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

No, not at all, but we think that certain Parole Boards can be strengthened usefully by having additional members with the experience that I have described. I have not implied or, I hope, made any criticisms of Parole Boards that have sat in the past or their decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I am sorry that it is very late and I am being tiresome. My noble friend the Minister said that there may come a time or there may be circumstances in which it would be necessary to remove the chairman or chairwoman of the Parole Board. I wonder whether my noble friend could perhaps give me one or two examples of the sets of circumstances in which that might apply.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

A mechanism already exists for the Secretary of State to ask an independent panel to consider dismissing the chair if there are concerns about the postholder’s performance or ability to do the job effectively. That route remains our preferred approach in the unlikely event that a dismissal is required. However, as the board is a high-profile public body, making important decisions on public protection every day, it is right, in the Government’s submission, that the Justice Secretary should have the levers to change the leadership if a situation arose where it was necessary to do so in order to maintain public confidence in the work of the board. It is not a power that any Secretary of State would ever use lightly, and ideally there will never be a cause to use it at all. We are talking here about situations where, for example, there might be conflicts of interest, security issues or confidentiality issues. At the moment, my understanding is that there is no mechanism to dismiss a chair should any issue of that kind arise. The grounds at the moment are quite restrictive.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Just to be clear, the Government are proposing that they will need to sack somebody who could be responsible for a breach of confidence, a breach of security, or some other grievous breach; but they will already have appointed this person to that job. Surely the vetting procedure leading up to the appointment would weed out the sort of eccentric people who would leak, or breach confidence, or misconduct themselves.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

That is exactly why I said that it is not a power that it is likely any Secretary of State would use often, if at all.