Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Garnier Excerpts

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 15th November 2016 Commons Chamber

The Minister said that this set of amendments was inappropriate. He has said that he opposes them because of the doctrine of unripe time. I put it to Members that it is for the House to decide whether these amendments are appropriate and timely. I support the Lords amendments.

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

I rise to support my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General in his resistance to the Lords amendments, which was based on principle rather than over-excitement or hyperbole. It seems to me that the motion put forward in the other place—no doubt well intentioned—does not entirely cover the justice of the case. Before I move on to the main part of my argument, I would like to declare an interest, in that I have some 40 or 45 years’ experience as a member of the media and libel Bar.

The first Lords amendment proposes a new clause to be inserted after clause 8, and I am particularly disturbed by one or two aspects of it. I fully appreciate that as a matter of policy and politics, we in the House, the Government and Parliament generally frequently make use of what I would call the nudge system of trying to encourage people to be of better behaviour. We introduce laws that seek to persuade people not to behave in an antisocial or criminal manner. Broadly, it is the use of incentives to encourage better behaviour, and I have a suspicion that that is what is behind the Leveson report and their lordships’ proposed new clause.

In some respects, the provision is in the wrong place. The Bill is about investigatory powers and although I accept and applaud the ingenuity of those who introduced the new clause in the other place, I believe that introducing it into this important Bill, though understandable, is not the best place for them to have done so. They risk imperilling the policy behind the Investigatory Powers Bill without advancing their own cause in respect of those grievously and adversely affected by phone hacking.

While the proposed new clause is, on the face of it, of course related to phone hacking, it seems to me that it is not limited to phone hacking. If we look at subsection (1)(b), we see that the defendant in question needs to be “a relevant publisher”—that is fair enough—but if we look at subsection (1)(c), we find that it deals with claims

“related to the publication of news-related material.”

It may be that the news-related material has come as a consequence of phone hacking, and as my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) has correctly pointed out, phone hacking is already a crime and the criminal justice system is already able to get a grip on it. When it comes to the consequences of hacking someone’s phone, there could be a public interest defence to the criminal charge of phone hacking. The newspaper might publish material that a claimant says is in breach of his rights of privacy or a misuse of private information or a breach of confidence, or it could amount to a defamation. None of those additional civil claims is covered by this nudge or incentive proposal. I think that we need to be wary lest a legitimate exposure of misconduct on the part of, say, a public authority or a person in the public sphere might be inhibited by this no doubt well-intentioned new clause.

The first point that I would make to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General is that subsection (1) of the new clause does not limit the nudging or the incentives to the misdemeanour of phone hacking. It goes beyond that, and in doing so, it seems to me, could put a defendant newspaper or publisher in danger of being penalised for doing what might turn out to have been the right thing. As I said a moment ago, it might well be that the initial phone hacking was on the face of it criminal, but there might be a defence for it, and, moreover, the product—the fruit—of that phone hacking, legitimised because it was in the public interest, might lead to a further claim in a cause of action under civil law.

The defendant publisher might win the case, because what had been written might be true, and it might not be against the public interest to publish the confidential information because it had exposed iniquity or something of that nature. The defendant newspaper—if it is a newspaper—should therefore be entitled to win the case and defeat the claim. Under the new clause, however, although the claim had been defeated and the publishing defendant had won the case, the defendant would be required to pay the undeserving claimant’s costs as well as its own because the defendant might not be a member of some approved regulator.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am listening with great care to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman is saying. May I suggest to him that the situation that he has just described is covered by the proviso in subsection (3)(b) of the new clause proposed in Lords amendment 15C, which states that the court may take account of whether

“it is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case”

to make a different award of costs? May I suggest that in the circumstances that he has described, the “just and equitable” exception would kick in, and a newspaper that had a valid defence and had revealed iniquity as a result of hacking could pray it in aid?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

It might if both new clauses became law, but it might not if the new clause to which the hon. and learned Lady has referred did not become law, and we were left with only the one with which I am dealing.

My second point is this. Why should a well-intentioned and successful defendant publisher have to risk the expense of successfully defending a claim and then having to pay the costs of the unsuccessful claimant? That strikes me as unjust. The House is famous for passing laws that are laden—replete—with unintended consequences. It seems to me, however, that when an amendment paper contains a proposal that will clearly lead to a problem—although I am not suggesting that it would be an insoluble problem—we would be foolish not to warn the Government against it. I am delighted to see that the Government seem to have mustered their forces and thinking processes in such a way that an unjust law will not be passed.

When I spoke in the House following the publication of the Leveson report, I was sufficiently pompous and self-confident to rebuke Members who thought that the inquiry, and the report that followed it, meant that there would be state regulation of the press. There will be no such thing as a consequence of the Leveson inquiry. However, I feel that I am entitled to warn Members who, like me, thoroughly disapprove of illegal phone hacking not to assume that once the words “phone hacking” have been uttered, that permits the House, the Government and the courts to rain down on successful, innocent and well-intentioned defendant publishers the burden of the costs of successfully defending a claim.

It should be borne in mind that defendants do not choose to be defendants. Of course they choose to publish the material that they have got hold of, but it is the claimant who feels obliged, or makes the choice, to sue the defendant. To be sued as a defendant is tedious enough, but to be sued as a defendant, to win, and then to be required to pay the costs of the unmeritorious claim must surely constitute even more of a punishment.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

Is there not another choice that the media can make? Can they not choose to subscribe to a compliant regulator and thereby avoid the need for all the regulation and legislation that we do not want to see in the Bill?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

Of course I understand what my right hon. Friend has said. He is one of the most sophisticated proponents of the “nudge” or incentive system of lawmaking, and I salute him for that. I sometimes wonder, however, whether it is a good idea to use the force of what are essentially the punitive elements of the legal system to encourage innocent defendants to pay the costs of unmeritorious claims. Yes, in a perfect world we would all settle our disputes, and people would not even provoke disputes in the first place; but to be compelled, on penalty of having to pay out large sums in legal costs, to join an organisation of which one either does not approve for one reason or another, or does not wish to join for one reason or another, strikes me as unjust.

I have been a victim of, shall we say, stupid conduct by the press. It is very annoying. I have seen others, not only my friends and colleagues but people for whom I have acted, having to deal with the misconduct of the media. But I would rather have a system which recognised justice—

[Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)]

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not see a difference between himself—as he has already told us, he is a leading advocate at the criminal Bar dealing with these matters on a day-to-day basis to earn his crust—and someone who does not have those advantages and who is caught in the same snare?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I do not wish to be rude to the hon. Lady, but I did not say any of those things. I am not a leading member of the criminal Bar. I happened for some little while to be a member of the media and defamation Bar, which may be a distinction without a difference as far as she is concerned. [Interruption.] She may disagree with me—she may disagree with me vehemently—but what we are trying to do is to pass good law. If my colleagues on the Front Bench, and those around me, disagree with me, fine: go ahead and disagree with me.

[Bill Wiggin (North Herefordshire) (Con)]

We do.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

My hon. Friend clearly does.

[Bill Wiggin]

I absolutely disagree with my right hon. and learned Friend. I have been sitting here listening to him carefully, but I cannot think of any other industry that does not offer any sort of guarantee. If people make faulty washing machines, they replace them, but if they publish stories about people, they have already made their money by the time they end up being sued, and that is why the papers have to bear some of the cost.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

My hon. Friend’s intervention demonstrates to me that I have not made myself clear. What I am suggesting is that it is wrong for a claimant who has lost his case to demand the costs from the successful defendant. I am not suggesting that if I make a faulty washing machine, I should not be liable, under law or morally, to put the matter right. However, if I have made a good washing machine, the fact that my hon. Friend does not like the colour of it, or the fact that it revolves in any number of ways—[Interruption.] I am in danger, Madam Deputy Speaker, of reducing the level of the debate to something that it should not be. I will stop now, because I think I have made the points that I wish to make with sufficient clarity. Some will agree with me and some will not, but I urge the Government to be very wary about passing unjust laws for very well-motivated purposes.

[Several hon. Members rose—]