Lord Garnier
Main Page: Lord Garnier (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Garnier's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Finances Bill
Lord Garnier ExcerptsTuesday 25th October 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Criminal Finances Act 2017 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)
I take the point that my neighbour, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), makes, but often when a criminal is sentenced, along with a compensation order or a proceeds of crime order, he is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment in the event that he does not pay back the money. Sometimes those extended sentences can be very long—indeed, as long as or even longer than the original sentence.
Ms Abbott
Far be it from me to bandy words with the many lawyers in the Chamber. I repeat that as the Bill goes through Committee we will seek to examine the question of people flouting compensation orders. Overall, in relation to bearing down on money laundering, we welcome the relevant provisions, including the unexplained wealth orders, the reform to the suspicious activity reports regime, information sharing and the new disclosure orders.
The Bill also deals with tax evasion. In recent years there has been a great deal of public interest and a raft of Government measures on tax avoidance. Arguably, less attention has been paid to tax evasion. There is some blurring between the two terms, but broadly, tax evasion occurs when an individual or corporate entity acts in breach of the law, and tax avoidance occurs when an individual or corporate entity complies with the letter but not the spirit of the law. In recent years Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has produced estimates of the tax gap—that is, the difference between the tax that is collected and that which is theoretically due. Clearly, any such estimate must be speculative, but I draw the attention of the House to the fact that HMRC’s most recent estimate of the gap is £36 billion, which is the equivalent of 6.5% of total tax liabilities. Of that £36 billion that is lost, £5.2 billion is lost to evasion and only £2.2 billion is lost to avoidance.
We welcome the measures to bear down on tax evasion, and we welcome the provision that makes it a criminal offence for corporations to fail to stop their associated persons facilitating tax evasion. We particularly welcome the fact that this will have extra-territorial jurisdiction. However, we regret that in the tax evasion measures in part 3 there is no reference to the British overseas territories and Crown dependencies. That is a startling oversight. There are 14 British overseas territories. Just one of them, the British Virgin Islands, is mentioned no fewer than 113,000 times in the Panama papers. BVI, with a population of just 29,000—fewer than my own constituents in Hackney—is home to 452,000 international businesses. Maybe the 29,000 population is particularly skilled at accountancy and banking, but maybe some of those business entities are shells for tax evasion.
There are three Crown dependencies, Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and it is frequently argued that the British overseas territories and the Crown dependencies are the largest tax evasion network in the world, so the failure to mention them in a Bill which purports to deal with issues surrounding tax evasion is a major omission. We will be seeking amendments as the Bill goes through Committee. It is frequently asserted that it is not possible to legislate for the British overseas territories and the Crown dependencies, but the Ministry of Justice seems to think differently. This is an issue that we will explore.
The Minister referred to the beneficial ownership register that we are encouraging the overseas territories and the Crown dependencies to introduce, but he must be aware that at least some of the overseas territories are boasting that they are in practice evading the Government’s efforts to get them to set up beneficial ownership registers, and many of them are saying that these registers will not be publicly available. The Opposition insist that if this Government are serious about dealing with tax evasion, they must ensure that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies not only set up beneficial ownership registers, but make them publicly available.
We note that there is little distinction in the Bill between corporate or partnership bodies which facilitate tax evasion, and those that do it routinely and as a central part of their business model. We believe that we should look into a new provision specifically criminalising entities and individuals for whom tax evasion is at the heart of their business model, and punishing them more harshly.
I shall not conclude my remarks on tax evasion without mentioning the Labour party’s tax transparency enforcement programme. We want a public inquiry to examine the loss of tax revenue, and increased powers for HMRC, including a specialised tax enforcement unit. We want to force foreign firms to list their owners and beneficiaries, and we want the introduction of a general anti-avoidance principle and the extension of current rules to cover offshore abuses.
The Bill deals with the important issue of terrorist finance. Those of us who have watched with horror terrorist atrocities all over the world, and here in London, know that terrorism is an existential threat to us and our society. We share the Government’s aims in reducing the terrorist threat, not just to us in the UK but to our allies and interests overseas, and agree that one way of doing this is to deprive terrorists of the financial resources required for terrorism-related activity. Globalisation means that we must constantly update our legal instruments. We note the changes that the Bill will make to the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in relation to investigations of offences under the Terrorism Act 2000, but we will examine these proposals because we are anxious that they do not have too harsh a bearing on genuine charities.
Labour Members support the Bill in principle. We will scrutinise its detail with care. We insist that it is vital that agencies such as the National Crime Agency get the money they need for implementation, because otherwise the Bill will be a dead letter. For too long, London has been accused of being a hub for money laundering, with all its terrible effects not only on the take of our Treasury but on the lives and countries of many of the poorest people in the world. We hope that this Bill is the beginning of a process that brings the curtain down on the era when London could be described as a money-laundering hub, instead ensuring that London and the UK set an example internationally about what can be done to bear down on money laundering and tax evasion.
Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)
I begin by declaring an interest. I have been instructed in the past, and I am currently instructed, by the Serious Fraud Office in a number of matters that touch on this Bill and some of its predecessor legislation.
I apologise to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench, and to the shadow Home Secretary, the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), for the fact that I might not be able to be here for the wind-ups. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service will forgive me. All being well, however, the debate may run short—if I do not talk too much—in which case I shall be here.
Like the shadow Home Secretary, I broadly support the principle behind the Bill, which I assume is entirely uncontroversial. We all want the criminals whom we hope will be touched by it to be caught and to be prevented from committing such financial crimes. The days when people went into banks with sawn-off shotguns are long over. Criminals are now much more sophisticated: they go round the back with a set of wires, metaphorically, and extract money out of banks and other financial institutions through computer crime, rather than by using violence. We need to keep up with them. As my hon. Friend the Minister for Security said, we have to be craftier than the crafty hoods.
In our enthusiasm to pass the Bill, however, there are one or two matters about which we need to be a little cautious, although I am sure that, during its passage, the Government will think about how to get the detail right. It could be said that many of the points I am going to set out would be better made on Report than on Second Reading, but I might as well make them while I am on my feet.
Unexplained wealth orders, as a matter of principle, are in line with provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and similar measures, in that they reverse the burden of proof by making the respondent to the order explain himself, rather than requiring the prosecution or the state to make the case against him. That principle is now accepted in our criminal law, and that will continue as long as there are sufficient protections for the respondent. Under the Bill, the High Court may, on an application made by one of the prosecution authorities or enforcement agencies, make an unexplained wealth order in respect of any property if it is satisfied that each of the requirements for making the order is fulfilled. The order will be made in the High Court and the application will be made to the High Court in relation to a respondent who has a criminal connection, but also to politically exposed persons. We need to be careful that politically exposed persons, who will, as I understand it, be foreigners, are sufficiently protected from the making of an application that could trash their reputation and that, even when that is not acceded to by the High Court judge, none the less still leaves him or her exposed to the allegations made against them. I suppose that, to a lesser extent, the same could be said of a respondent with some form of criminal connection.
It seems to me that the way around that is to do what has been done with deferred prosecution agreements in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of schedule 17 to that Act provide a way of dealing with those issues so that reputations cannot be damaged until the necessary time when a particular state of affairs has been proved. In deferred prosecution agreements, the parties—the Serious Fraud Office in this case—apply to the court for a declaration that entering into a deferred prosecution agreement with the respondent is likely to be in the interests of justice and that
“the proposed terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate.”
That hearing takes place in private. Once the court is satisfied, and the parties are agreed, that the terms of the order are correct, the judge makes an order that is made public, and also makes public the judgment that he made in the private hearing some days or weeks earlier.
That is a perfectly sensible way of maintaining the interests of doing justice in public, while holding in private the initial hearing in the event of an order not being made, or of it being altered in a way that makes the respondent look a lot less guilty than he might otherwise have looked. That allows a hearing to be heard without damaging an innocent man’s reputation. That is simply a matter of mechanics, and if the Government can spare the time between now and when the Bill leaves the House of Commons, we could achieve the end that we all want, without causing collateral or unintended damage.
I am also a little concerned—perhaps this can be dealt with at a later stage—that clause 1 deals with income as though that were all that needs to be considered. Proposed new section 362B(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 states:
“The High Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient for the purposes of enabling the respondent to obtain the property.”
Proposed new subsection (6)(d) notes that
“‘known’ sources of the respondent’s income are the sources of income (whether arising from employment, assets or otherwise) that are reasonably ascertainable from available information at the time of the making of the application for the order.”
If “income” simply means money received, I understand that; but if it means income as opposed to capital, we need to make clear that by income we mean not just the interest from capital or a salary, but all that the respondent owns, so that we can capture the distinction between income and capital. A respondent could be capital-rich, but income-poor. We need to avoid a situation where he can get away from the order by saying that his income does not amount to much when we all know, or can anticipate, that his capital is larger. I am sure that plenty of the houses that the shadow Home Secretary spoke about are bought with cash—essentially, they are bought for great lumps of capital—rather than from borrowing.
I am concerned about the Bill’s use of the words “purports to comply”. I appreciate that that expression is to be found in earlier, similar Acts but, to me, purporting to do something means either doing or attempting to do one’s best, or doing something speciously—appearing, falsely, to do something. Albeit that we accept that that expression is used in earlier legislation, we need to be clear that to pretend to do something should not be a defence or an answer to an accusation of failure to comply with an unexplained wealth order.
I turn to the question of enforcement, which has been brought up on several occasions. Let us assume that an unexplained wealth order is made, and let us assume that there is a hearing, initially perhaps ex parte—singlehanded—by the authority. The matter then either comes back for a hearing between both parties, or moves on in some other way. It is all very well making these orders, but that will do no good if we do not have the necessary police officers or investigators to ensure that they are enforced.
I have noticed that in the past with confiscation orders. Very often, the courts make an order, and either the order is never put into action or very little of the amount required from the offender is ever recovered. We need to make sure that this legislation is not simply written in air; it must have real teeth to deter those who think they can get away with this sort of misbehaviour, and to enable the Treasury to recover the ill-gotten gains. I dare say that the same could be said in relation to suspicious activity reports.
Finally on unexplained wealth orders, is there to be any form of appeal system? It strikes me that under proposed new section 362H, an application for an unexplained wealth order may be made without notice, and I have dealt with points about that. Will the procedure be susceptible to any sort of appeal, and if not, why not?
I turn to the “failure to prevent” provisions, which my hon. Friend the Minister mentioned in his opening speech. I heartily approve of this new system for dealing with corporate misconduct. We saw it first in our jurisdiction under section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010. Although there have been only a few cases involving section 7, it strikes me as being a sensible way of dealing with the difficulty that we face, under English law at least, in pinning criminal liability on corporations. In the United States, a corporate body can be held to be criminally liable because it employed the criminal. It is vicariously liable for employing the criminal and his activities are pinned on the company. In this country—certainly in this jurisdiction—we rely on the Victorian principle of the directing mind. Nowadays, in huge international companies that have hundreds of thousands of employees posted right across the world, albeit that the headquarters of the company may be in this jurisdiction, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that the directing mind of the company knew what the criminal employee was up to. Section 7 of the Bribery Act gets around that.
Richard Arkless (Dumfries and Galloway) (SNP)
Although I accept the directing mind principle, does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that when employees engage in less than ethical practices—such practices have caused a lot of the problems that we have seen in the UK over the past six or seven years—unless the liability goes to the top of an organisation, the organisation will never develop the protocols and processes required to make sure that those employees are responsible for their actions? Does he accept that point?
Sir Edward Garnier
What the hon. Gentleman says is perfectly true, but I am not sure whether that constitutes accepting what he says. The point I am trying to get across is that companies can avoid liability in the absence of the “failure to prevent” system under section 7 of the Bribery Act. Individuals can be prosecuted and imprisoned, but the company gets away free. The advantage of section 7 is that it brings the company within the ambit of responsibility.
Yes, the compliance system in banks and financial institutions is nowadays much more sophisticated and vigorously engineered, so that everybody from top to bottom should know what they are supposed to do and not do, and so that such a culture goes right the way through the company. It seems to me that there is no excuse for failing to behave properly, since we should all now know what to do. The compliance world is certainly keen to ensure that employees in banks and so forth know what they are supposed to do.
I want the Government not to limit the “failure to prevent” provisions to section 7 of the Bribery Act and those clauses in this Bill that deal with tax evasion, but to expand the regime to all offences that can sensibly be brought under it, as set out in part 2 of schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The schedule covers 40 or 50 economic or financial crimes that corporations should be required to prevent. That would put a blanket across a range of criminal financial offences that are not dealt with at the moment, such as fraud, theft, false accounting, the suppression of documents, dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit, the exportation of prohibited or restricted goods and so on. There is a list for the Government to look at. I hope that thought will be given not just to expanding the regime to the evasion of taxation both in this country and abroad, but to some of, if not all, the offences listed in the schedule.
Finally, I want to make a small point, which I suppose comes back to resources. In an online article in “The Brief” from The Times this morning, a senior lawyer at a City firm of solicitors complained that tax officials were failing to use existing tools against tax avoidance schemes while seeking to expand their powers. He said:
“The huge range of swingeing powers HMRC has been given in recent years may have helped its image…but to date they have been little used as an enforcement tool, and some may question whether public time and resources could have been better spent.”
He also said:
“Before granting HMRC yet further powers…parliament should consider very carefully whether such powers are actually needed and ask HMRC to explain why some of the powers it has been granted in recent years have been under-utilised.”
I do not know whether that is pinpoint accurate, but it seems to me that we can do both: we can make better use of the powers provided to HMRC and ensure that it uses them; and we can also widen the ambit of our ability to catch those involved in financial crime and our ability to prevent it by introducing the “failure to prevent” provisions in this Bill in, I hope, an expanded form.
Richard Arkless (Dumfries and Galloway) (SNP)
Before I go through my speech, I think I can sum up our position on the Bill very succinctly. The crux is that we support in principle the aims of the Bill. To be truthful, there is not much within the four corners of the Bill that we would dispute. Our problem is not with what is in the Bill but with what is not in the Bill, as I will make clear in my speech.
When I studied the financial system at university in the 1990s, the focus of financial crime and of the Government with regard to it was on anti-money laundering regulations and proceeds of crime legislation, which were specifically geared towards getting at the proceeds of drug traffickers and, quite frankly, bank robbers. For the most part, that has worked. Long gone are the days when criminals could easily legitimise buckets of cash from ill-gotten gains. Thankfully, long gone are the days when the only concern involved in robbing a bank was being caught red-handed. The perception of criminals was that if they could evade capture and did not flash the cash, they could eventually spend the money. In many cases, criminals could be incarcerated for crimes and still look forward to spending loot they had stashed when they were eventually released. Money now needs to be accounted for; banks must consider the sources of funds and be satisfied that they are indeed legitimate. Police now have powers to recoup proceeds of crime even if they have been spent by the criminals, and pass them back to the victims.
In my view, we simply could not believe in the rule of law unless we supported such an evolution in rules and regulation. Fairness and the rule of law should be at the heart of everything we do as a society. It is not fair to anyone to live in a world where criminals are free to generate cash and spend it without fear of repercussion. There simply must be a level playing field for the vast majority of society who play by the rules. The past changes did not merely disincentivise criminals; they drove a police coach and horses right through their plans. There are many famous bank robbers and drug traffickers. We know them; we have watched all the films. I suggest that they simply would not have committed those crimes had we had tougher money laundering regulations then.
The challenges today are very different. We live in an era of evolving financial crime and now face a very different threat from that which we faced a generation ago, when I was at university. It is the threat of grand corruption, particularly in relation to politically exposed people, facilitated for the most part—perhaps unwittingly —by the City of London.
Earlier this year The Guardian revealed through the Panama papers how a powerful member of Gaddafi’s inner circle had built a multimillion-pound portfolio of boutique hotels in Scotland and luxury homes in Mayfair, Marylebone and Hampstead in London. He was head of Libya’s infrastructure fund for a decade and has been accused by Government prosecutors in Tripoli of plundering money meant for schools, hospitals and archaeology. Scottish police have confirmed that they are investigating. Libya has made a request for an asset freeze, but that has not yet been implemented.
These challenges are such that new and tougher legislation is required to give law enforcement the tools to really do something about this problem. We in the Scottish National party support that principle. Although I do not wish to undermine your Office’s consideration of the Bill, Madam Deputy Speaker, I respectfully suggest that the Bill applies to Scotland. There are specific clauses on how the provisions will apply to Scotland.
As far as devolved competencies go, the SNP Scottish Government have demonstrated their commitment to tackling criminal finances and tax avoidance, and boast a successful track record in doing so. In Scotland we have introduced robust anti-avoidance rules on devolved taxes, described by commentators as among the toughest in the world. The SNP Government’s approach to devolved taxes demonstrates that we are deadly serious about tackling tax avoidance in Scotland. For example, the Revenue Scotland and Tax Powers Act 2014 established the Scottish general anti-avoidance rule, which will allow Revenue Scotland to take counter-action against artificial tax avoidance schemes, making it more difficult for people to circumvent the requirement to pay tax.
That said, although we support the broad principle at stake here, we note with interest the clear terms of the most recent Tory manifesto:
“We will continue to lead the world on tax and transparency…We are also making it a crime if companies fail to put in place measures to stop economic crime”
and
“We will…crack down on tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance”.
Admirable principles, and ones we support, but we have real doubts that the Bill goes far enough to achieve those goals, as I and my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin) will make clear as we move through the debate.
Many mechanisms and vehicles are provided for in the Bill. One of the most important, and perhaps the easiest for the public to understand, is the unexplained wealth order. The Bill will enable a court—in Scotland, the Court of Session, upon application by Scottish Ministers—to make an unexplained wealth order. The order will require an individual or organisation to explain the origin of assets if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that that individual or organisation may be involved in criminality or intend to use that wealth for criminal purposes, and the value of the assets exceeds £100,000.
The order will be available to the court where assets appear disproportionate to known legitimate income—for example, as recently reported, when a taxi driver owns a £1 million fish tank. Failure to provide a response to the order and explain the legitimate source of funds would give rise to a presumption that the property was recoverable, making any subsequent civil recovery action much easier.
As a lawyer, the notion of reversing the burden of proof is not one that sits comfortably with me, but, as in other areas, I consider it to be proportional to the issue at stake. Sound legal principles, such as the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof being on the Crown, should not inadvertently protect criminals, which I suspect may have happened thus far.
Unexplained wealth orders will also help to expose the owners of property. Land Registry figures show UK real estate worth more than £170 billion is held by more than 30,000 tax haven companies. The key to this provision is that a criminal conviction will no longer be necessary before law enforcement can pierce the criminals’ veil that camouflages their wealth. Getting away with the crime itself will no longer protect a criminal’s wealth. The Bill will allow for this power to be applied to foreign politicians and officials, or those associated with them, known as politically exposed persons, helping to tackle the issue of proceeds of grand corruption overseas being laundered in the UK.
I have a couple of specific questions for the Minister relating to unexplained wealth orders. There is a provision relating to interim freezing orders. If an unexplained wealth order is made, one could presume that the respondent would be keen to hotfoot it out of the country with a stash of cash. Freezing orders are available if the court is satisfied that they are necessary. Will the Government consider strengthening this position to ensure that the hotfoot temptation is not available to these criminals? I could imagine the rush to flee—I think we all could. Perhaps an automatic freezing order on the granting of the application for the unexplained wealth order can be considered. Will the £100,000 threshold create a new “out” for grand corruption? Will politically exposed people collaborate with many people to do numerous transactions under £100,000? That should also be considered and we should ensure that the provisions catch those types of activities.
Current legislation does not make it easy to seize criminals’ assets in the form of bank accounts and other value assets, such as precious metals and jewels, or indeed casino chips and high value betting slips. There is evidence, however, that these moveable items are being used increasingly, both domestically and across international borders. The Bill will create new civil powers similar to existing cash seizure and forfeiture schemes in current legislation, which would close that gap. The powers will be exercisable where there is reasonable suspicion that the property is the proceeds of crime or will be used in unlawful conduct.
The SNP’s 2016 manifesto stated:
“We will argue for changes in the law at Westminster to enable the police to seize items of monetary value from criminals, such as high value betting slips and casino chips.”
I was pleased to hear the Minister state that the changes will be included in a forthcoming amendment. I was struggling to conceive how criminals could be caught by the face value vouchers provisions currently in the Bill, so I was grateful for that statement and I thank the Minister for making it.
On corporate failure to prevent tax evasion, the Bill attempts to legislate on what we understand as corporate economic crime. As we heard from the Minister, the Bill will create two new offences. We support the measures as far as they go, but we see this as a huge missed opportunity. For example, nothing in the Bill would criminalise the banks themselves for their employees rigging the LIBOR market. I suspect that when the public begin to understand which corporate crimes are dealt with in the Bill and which ones are not, they may see this as a slight cop-out and a continuation of the status quo that has got us into so much difficulty. It is uncontroversial to hold companies to account for the tax evasion of their employees. It is tax evasion, for goodness’ sake. The public would expect it to be criminally sanctionable as is. What the public want are stronger measures to hold companies, in particular banks, liable for the crimes of their resident rogue bankers. It seems strange that the Government have ducked this issue.
Speaking as someone who has worked for a well-known retail bank—something that I do not advertise as much these days as I used to—I can testify with absolute certainty that until the banks themselves are in the frame they will never, as I claimed in my intervention, develop the risk management and other protocols necessary to make sure that their agents or employees do not commit these crimes. Only when liability goes to the top will we ever begin to solve these issues.
Will the Government consider reacting to what the public understand as corporate crime, and make banks liable for practices that have caused so much economic heartache to so many ordinary people since 2008? Why should the innocent ordinary punter pay for the mistakes of rogue bankers? If we make these bosses liable, we will see a tightening up almost instantly.
Sir Edward Garnier
As a first step, would the hon. Gentleman encourage the Government to look at the schedule to the 2013 Act, where the economic and financial crimes are set out, to see whether we could get “failure to prevent” provisions added to this Bill on a wider basis? Perhaps the hon. Gentleman and I could then get together to try to persuade the Government to introduce the American vicarious liability system of corporate criminal liability.
Richard Arkless
I have a great deal of sympathy with both of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. I suggest, however, that the first one is rather a half-house measure that does not go far enough. It will not pin criminal liability on the banks. On the second point about vicarious liability, it is interesting to note that the United States is often considered as the free market monster of the entire world, yet the US feels comfortable with criminalising banks for the actions of their rogue employees. I suggest that we should do the same in the UK.
Lord Garnier
Main Page: Lord Garnier (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Garnier's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Finances Bill
Lord Garnier ExcerptsTuesday 21st February 2017
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Criminal Finances Act 2017 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 21 February 2017 - (21 Feb 2017)
Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 3—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 2)—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—
(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;
(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;
(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of documents);
(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading);
(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false statements to auditors, misleading statements, and misleading the FCA);
(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property, facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal property).
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” has the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(4) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.
(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
(7) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to certain offences listed in subsection (2).
New clause 4—Failure to prevent criminal financial offences in the UK—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a criminal financial offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with B.
(2) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the criminal financial offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(3) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing criminal financial offences.
(4) For the purposes of this clause—
“criminal financial offence” means an offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 [that could not be prosecuted under the offences created by sections 7 and 38 of this Act],
or, one of the offences listed below—
(a) an offence under section 1, 6 or 7 of the Fraud Act 2006;
(b) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968;
(c) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006;
(d) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
(e) the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;
“relevant body” has the same meaning as in section 36.
(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”
This New Clause would create an offence of failing to prevent any financial offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
New clause 6—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in the Overseas Territories—
“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—
“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Overseas Territories
(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—
(a) this Act; and
(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017
to take the steps set out in this section.
(2) The first step is, no later than 31 December 2018, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of the UK’s Overseas Territories to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.
(3) The second step is, no later than 31 December 2019, to prepare an Order in Council and take all reasonable steps to ensure its implementation, in respect of any Overseas Territory that has not yet introduced a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies within their jurisdiction. This Order would require the Overseas Territory to adopt such a register.
(4) In this section “a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.””
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take steps to provide that Overseas Territories establish publicly accessible registers of the beneficial ownership of companies, for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Part 3 of the Bill (corporate offences of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion).
New clause 10—Duty to prevent use of new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity—
“(1) The Treasury may not lay regulations before Parliament on new Limited Partnerships before the Secretary of State has completed and published a review of the proposed regulations.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to review draft regulations which would allow the creations of new Limited Partnerships, in order to prevent the use of new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity.
(3) In performing that duty the Secretary of State must, in particular, have regard to the contribution transparency may make in tackling tax evasion, money laundering, national and cross border criminality, and terrorist financing.
(4) Following any review under subsection (2) the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament on what steps the Government will take to prevent new Limited Partnerships being used for criminal purposes.
(5) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Scottish Government,
(b) the National Crime Agency,
(c) the Serious Fraud Office,
(d) the Financial Conduct Authority,
(e) HMRC,
(f) interested third sector organisations, and
(g) any other persons the Secretary of State deems relevant.”
This new clause sets a duty on the Secretary of State to review Treasury proposals for new Limited Partnerships to prevent their use for financial criminal activity, including tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing. In carrying out the review the Secretary of State will be required to consult those groups listed in subsection (5) and lay a report before Parliament.
New clause 11—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences: consultation on other jurisdictions—
“(1) Within 12 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must conduct a public consultation on the issues listed in subsection (2).
(2) The issues are—
(a) the desirability of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories introducing equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act; and
(b) the steps that would need to be taken for the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to introduce equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act.
(3) As part of this consultation the Secretary of State must seek views from—
(a) the governments of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories,
(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or the governments specified in subsection (3)(a) consider appropriate,
(c) any other person or body who the Secretary of State deems relevant, with particular regard to non-governmental bodies and private sector entities.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report setting out the outcome of this consultation within 24 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”
New clause 12—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion offences: publication of convictions—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report listing all bodies and organisations that have been found guilty of a failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign tax evasion offence within the previous five years.”
New clause 13—Failure to prevent tax evasion offences: sentencing guideline—
“(1) The Secretary of State must produce sentencing guidelines for the level of fine to be imposed on bodies found guilty of failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign tax evasion offence.
(2) Such guidance must stipulate that the maximum level of the fine cannot be greater than the total value of the tax whose evasion was facilitated.”
New clause 14—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 3)—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means any of the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a person associated with B commits an economic criminal offence intending—
(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.
(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.
(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
New clause 15—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence (No. 4)—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—
(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;
(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;
(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act 1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of documents);
(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (fraudulent trading);
(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false statements to auditors, misleading statements, and misleading the FCA);
(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property, facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal property).
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a person associated with B commits an economic criminal offence intending—
(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.
(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing an economic criminal offence.
(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal financial offence takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.
(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons acting in the capacity of an associated person from committing an economic criminal offence.”
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
New clause 16—Conversion of platforms to centralised registers: review—
“(1) Within one year of this Act receiving Royal Assent the Secretary of State must establish a review of the operational efficacy of closed beneficial ownership platforms created by Crown Dependencies or British Overseas Territories that are subject to the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information with Her Majesty’s Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial activity.
(2) The aim of the review will be to gather information to equip Her Majesty’s Government to take all steps necessary to provide financial, administrative or any other support to assist Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in converting all such beneficial ownership platforms into closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.
(3) In the course of the review the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the governments of any Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories which have created closed beneficial ownership platforms and which are subject to the automatic exchange of information with Her Majesty’s Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial activity; and
(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or governments under subsection (3)(a) deem appropriate.
(4) The review shall be completed and laid before Parliament within one year of its establishment.
(5) No later than one year after the review has been laid before Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government must have taken all steps necessary to assist relevant Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in the establishment of closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.
(6) Her Majesty’s Government shall supply quarterly reports to Parliament of the progress of steps taken under subsection (5), and such reports shall set out—
(a) concerns expressed by relevant Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories about conversion of beneficial ownership platforms to centralised registers, and
(b) an assessment by Her Majesty’s Government of the extent to which objections to the creation of centralised registers can be justified on a constitutional, economic, administrative or any other operational basis.”
New clause 17—Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies—
“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—
“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies
(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—
(a) this Act; and
(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017
to take the actions set out in this section.
(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.
(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019, to publish legislative proposals to require the Government of any Crown dependency that has not already established a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to do so.
(4) In this section—
“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.
“legislative proposals” means either—
(a) a draft Order in Council; or
(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.”
New clause 18—Whistleblowing in relation to failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector in relation to the disclosure of suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering.
(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to—
(a) arrangements to protect the anonymity of persons disclosing suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering;
(b) the efficacy of current penalties for institutions that treat whistleblowers unfairly, and proposals for future criminal penalties.
(3) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) whistleblowers in the banking and financial services sector,
(b) devolved administrations,
(c) interested charities,
(d) the relevant regulators, and
(e) any other persons the Secretary of State deems relevant.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay the report to Parliament within six months of the passing of this Act.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking and financial services sector, in consultation with those groups listed in subsection (3), and then lay a report before Parliament on steps the Government will take to bring forward penalties for institutions that fail to protect whistleblowers.
New clause 19—The culture of the banking industry and failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion—
“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a review into the extent to which banking culture contributed to the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the banking sector.
(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to, the following issues—
(a) the impact of culture change on decision making senior executive and board level;
(b) the pressure on staff to meet performance targets;
(c) how allegations of tax evasion are reported and acted on.
(3) The review must set out what steps the UK Government intends to take to ensure that banking culture is not facilitating tax evasion.
(4) In carrying out this review, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) devolved administrations;
(b) HMRC;
(c) the Serious Fraud Office;
(d) the Financial Conduct Authority;
(e) interested charities, and
(f) anyone else the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(5) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of the review before the House of Commons within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”
New clause 20—Report on the impact of the criminal offences relating to offshore income, assets and activities—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year of the coming into force of the provisions in Tax Management Act 1970 relating to criminal offences relating to offshore income, assets and activities introduced by section 165 of the Finance Act 2016 publish a report on the impact of the introduction of these offences.
(2) The report must include, but need not be limited to, information about—
(a) the number of persons who have been charged with offences under each of sections 106B, 106C and 106D of the Tax Management Act 1970;
(b) the number of persons who have been convicted of any such offence;
(c) the average fine imposed; and
(d) the number of people upon whom a custodial sentence has been imposed for any such offence.”
New clause 21—Report on income lost to tax evasion—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year of the passing of this Act, prepare and publish a report, in consultation with stakeholders, on the value of income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.
(2) The report must include the following—
(a) the value of the income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences in the financial years—
(i) 2015-16;
(ii) 2014-15;
(iii) 2013-14;
(iv) 2012-13; and
(v) 2011-12;
(b) a detailed summary of the model used by HMRC for estimating income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.
(c) an assessment of the efficacy of HMRC’s performance in relation to dealing with tax evasion, including—
(i) a breakdown of specific HMRC departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement of tax evasion matters;
(ii) details of the numbers of staff in each of the years listed in paragraph (a) who are located within departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in relation to tax evasion;
(iii) details of the budgets allocated to departments or units dealing with investigation above; and
(iv) details of the numbers of prosecutions or the amount of tax recovered in each financial year listed in paragraph (a) as a result of the work of HMRC departments or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in relation to tax evasion in those financial years.”
Sir Edward Garnier
I shall be relatively brief in introducing this group of new clauses. In moving new clause 2, which stands in my name and those of a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House and which mirrors new clauses 3, 4, 14 and 15, I want to introduce a debate about the future of corporate criminal liability in this jurisdiction. I must declare an interest, as over the past few years I have been instructed by the Serious Fraud Office in a number of cases involving the prosecution of large international companies. One of the problems that prosecutors and, no doubt, investigators have found in this jurisdiction when dealing with the modern corporate landscape—to use that hideous jargon—involves trying to fix liability on a company suspected of criminal activity, as a matter of criminal law. It is not difficult to fix criminal liability on an individual if the evidence is there: the person either did or did not do it, and they either did or did not have the necessary criminal intent.
Under current English law, however, fixing criminal liability on a corporation involves resorting to what is called the identification principle. This involves finding someone of sufficient seniority within a corporation who can act as or be described as the directing mind of the company. Through that identified person, we can then move on to fix criminal liability on the corporation. That was fine in the Victorian era, when most companies had one or two directors. An example would be a small business in a market town in the 1860s or 1870s, which would have been owned and directed by two or three men—it was always men in those days. If a fraud was committed on behalf of the company, it would have been perfectly easy to find the directing mind of that company among the small group of directors.
As the industrial revolution and corporate legal development proceeded during the late 19th century and early 20th century, however, it became clear that companies were getting bigger. An increase in international trade meant that companies based in this country had offices, and directing minds, in other parts of the world. In 1912, the United States dealt with this by doing away with the identification principle involving the directing mind and, through case law, by developing a principle in criminal law that a company could be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its employees on the basis that they were conducting criminal activities for the benefit and on behalf of the company.
We in this country reached the stage long ago at which we needed to reform the way in which we look at corporate criminal liability. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless), with his Scottish legal experience, will no doubt inform us whether the situation is the same in Scotland as it is in England, but I believe that it is uncontroversial to say that the Victorian identification principle is no longer apt to deal with international corporations. I am not picking on the company that I am about to mention because I think it has committed a criminal offence; quite the contrary—I just want to use it as an example of a large international company. British Telecommunications is a huge company that employs hundreds of thousands of people all around the globe doing various things in the telecoms world, all of them entirely legitimate and beneficial to the company, its shareholders and our national economy. Surely, however, it is a matter of common sense to say that it would be extremely difficult nowadays to fix upon an individual or small group of individuals as representing the directing mind of that company if it was suspected that an offence had been committed many miles away from the main board and the headquarters of the company in London. I repeat that I have used British Telecommunications simply as an example of a large international company with operations right around the world.
Of course it would be perfectly possible to fix upon an individual, a human being, who had committed an offence. It might well be that that individual had committed an offence for the benefit of the international corporation, but unless that person was of sufficient seniority within the hierarchy of that great big international company, it would be very difficult to fix criminal liability for that person’s offence on the corporation as well. As I have said, the United States has been getting round that problem for more than 100 years by using the principle of vicarious liability, which we are used to dealing with in this country in civil law but not in criminal law.
I believe that there are two ways in which we can approach this question, and this is the whole point of the new clauses that I and others have tabled. First, we could use the American system of vicarious liability, and there are plenty of good arguments for doing so. Secondly, we could approach the problem—as we have done in the new clauses—by using the failure to prevent regime, in which, when a company fails to prevent someone or another body associated with it from committing a specified offence, it thereby becomes liable for the criminal offence itself. We already have that provision on the statute book in section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, and it is about to be added to the statute book through the existing provisions in this Bill relating to tax offences. That follows David Cameron’s speech to the corruption summit at Lancaster House last summer.
In pushing forward these new clauses, I want to invite Parliament, in this House and the other place, and the Government—by which I mean not only the political Government but the non-political Government: the officials who run the Government day by day and advise on matters of policy—to consider whether extending the failure to prevent regime would be an easier and better way to deal with this than turning the whole thing on its head by adopting the vicarious liability principle wholesale.
There are plenty of arguments for and against the extension of the section 7 failure to prevent bribery model. I have attended a number of meetings with criminal lawyers who are far more experienced than I am. Indeed, I see one sitting just two Benches in front of me, behind the Minister. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) will know, as I have come to learn over the past few years since I have taken an interest in corporate crime, that a number of difficulties are created by the failure to prevent model. I will not rehearse them all now, but some of those difficulties were set out on Friday 13 January 2017 in the Ministry of Justice’s “Call for evidence” paper, which sets out five options for a failure to prevent regime.
I favour the failure to prevent model over the vicarious liability model because it is already set within our system. The new clauses would not extend the principle but merely extend the ambit of the criminal offences that could come within a failure to prevent system. The provisions will not be brought into this Bill because it is highly unlikely that the Government would accept any of them—albeit they may nod politely at them—when the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence process is still open. However, I hope that the Government will look carefully at the shape and design of the new clauses with a view to considering vigorously whether what we have proposed as a matter of principle is worthy of greater thought.
The intention of new clause 2 is to create a corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, as defined by reference to the offences listed in part 2 of schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Again, I will do my best to be brief. That schedule brought in the deferred prosecution agreement system for dealing with errant companies. I declare an interest, with both capital and small letters, in that not only have I been instructed by the SFO in two of the three deferred prosecution agreements that have so far taken place, but I brought the system into law when I was Solicitor General—at least I began it before I got the sack. There is a cloud in every silver lining, is there not?
Sir Edward Garnier
Very few. I am diverting myself, because I deliberately said “a cloud in every silver lining” not “a silver lining in every cloud.”
The short point is that schedule 17 to the 2013 Act contains about 50 economic and financial criminal offences that can be dealt with through deferred prosecution agreements between either the Crown Prosecution Service or the SFO on the one hand and corporations—that is to say respondents and defendants that are not human beings—on the other. Those offences are perfectly capable of being moved across into the failure to prevent regime. As I said, section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 makes it an offence to fail to prevent bribery, and we are about to have an offence of failing to prevent a tax offence, so why not—I ask rhetorically on this occasion—extend the failure to prevent regime across to these other offences? New clause 3 does exactly the same, save that it limits the offences to those set out in its subsection (2).
New clauses 4, 14 and 15 contain provisions suggested by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) that broadly address the same issue that I am discussing. I will not press new clause 2 to a Division, because these are probing amendments designed to create a public discussion, and I hope that they will inform the Ministry of Justice’s discussion paper. I also hope that they will encourage the Home Office and the Minister, with whom I have had some useful discussions about this and other matters to do with the Bill, to consider carefully and positively the extension of the failure to prevent regime.
Caroline Flint
I will not press new clause 6 to a vote. I do not believe that the Minister has really answered the points that have been made by hon. Members across the House. I am sure that this matter will be picked up in the other place, and I reserve the right to pick it up once again with my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) when it returns to this place.
Sir Edward Garnier
My new clause 2 was drafted and tabled before Christmas. Since then, I have had a number of meetings with my hon. Friend the Minister and we have also seen the Ministry of Justice’s call for evidence in relation to corporate criminal liability. In the light of what he has said this afternoon, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Public Registers of Beneficial Ownership of Companies registered in Crown Dependencies
‘(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (introductory), after section 2A, insert—
“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown dependencies
(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in furtherance of the purposes of—
(a) this Act; and
(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017
to take the actions set out in this section.
(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction.
(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019, to publish legislative proposals to require the Government of any Crown dependency that has not already established a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to do so.
(4) In this section—
“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies Act 2006.
“legislative proposals” means either—
(a) a draft Order in Council; or
(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.” —(Dr Huq.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.