European Union Bill

Lord Garel-Jones Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Waddington]

I was referring to the opt-out and am describing what happened subsequently. I am not here to defend the Major Government, of which I was a member at that time, although not later when it came to ratifying the treaty. I am just describing the history of the matter.

[Lord Garel-Jones]

For the record, would my noble friend confirm that the phrase we have just heard was not uttered by Prime Minister Major?

[Lord Waddington]

I hear what my noble friend says. I have not the faintest idea whether it was uttered or not. By the time all these great events were occurring, I was reading the Royal Gazette in bed in Bermuda and not the Times or the Telegraph here in Britain. All I am telling noble Lords now is what the history of the matter is. The history that I have related so far is entirely correct. The Conservative Government were obviously not happy about many aspects of Maastricht, which was precisely why they, with considerable perspicacity, negotiated the opt-out. However, having opted out, there were still great dangers ahead. Therefore, when the Danes rejected Maastricht there was an opportunity to block the treaty and work for a fresh start in which energies would be concentrated not on trying to manage the economies of the member states but on extending the borders of the EEC and creating a fully competitive common market within those borders. But that opportunity was all thrown away. If it had not been and there had been a fresh start, the EU would not be in the mess it is in today, bailing out countries which are “broke” as a result of having been put in the straitjacket of the euro.

This amendment cannot affect how we should react if there are further defeats of proposals for treaty changes in other countries, although I hope that we have learnt some lessons in that regard, but it would prevent a British Government going along with EU bullying if the people voted no in a referendum—and that would be a very good thing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, I was not going to speak for very long on the amendment, which is in my name as well, until the intervention of the noble and Europhile Lord, Lord Garel-Jones, who informed us that John Major did not say, after the Maastricht negotiations, that he had achieved game, set and match. That is generally accepted and I must ask the noble Lord: if Mr Major did not say that, who did, or is the whole thing just a figment of Eurosceptic imagination?

[Lord Garel-Jones]

I have some advantage over both the noble Lord and the British press: I happened to be there at the time. First, Prime Minister Major never said any such thing. Secondly, if it was said, it was said by a high-ranking civil servant, whose name, for obvious reasons, I will withhold.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

That would be just typical of the Eurocrats.

However, it is true that the Conservatives forced through the Maastricht treaty, so presumably they were quite pleased with it. Some of us resisted it in this House. In his defence, one has to say that Mr Major had discovered the error of his ways by 12 November 1996, when he wrote a letter to M Jacques Santer, who was then, whatever it was called at the time, the boss of the European Commission. The letter shows how Mr Major, and possibly the Conservative Administration at the time, realised how they had been deceived by the cunning and duplicitous octopus in Brussels. His letter is very brief, and I have read it to your Lordships before—in 1998, I think, so it bears repetition now. It reads:

“Dear Jacques,

My intention in agreeing to the Protocol on Social Policy at Maastricht was to ensure that social legislation which placed unnecessary burdens on businesses and damaged competitiveness could not be imposed on the United Kingdom. The other Heads of State and Government also agreed that arrangement, without which there would have been no agreement at all at Maastricht.

However, in its judgement today, the European Court of Justice has ruled that the scope of Article 118a”—

that is, health and safety at work, and things like that—

“is much broader than the United Kingdom envisaged when the article was originally agreed, as part of the Single European Act. This appears to mean that legislation which the United Kingdom had expected would be dealt with under the Protocol can in fact be adopted under Article 118a”.

The following is a good paragraph:

“This is contrary to the clear and express wishes of the United Kingdom Government, and goes directly counter to the spirit of what we agreed at Maastricht. It is unacceptable and must be remedied”.

He then says that he will table amendments and so on to it. His penultimate paragraph says:

“I attach the utmost importance to these amendments and I shall insist that they form part of the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference. I do not see how new agreements can be reached if earlier agreements are being undermined”.

That was in the run-up to the Amsterdam treaty. The Conservatives then lost the election and the new Labour Government signed up to the Social Chapter anyway, so we have the working week and so on.

That is the full picture behind the noble Lord’s intervention. At least we can see that, by the time he left office, Mr Major had understood the nature of the beast with which he was dealing, although of course when poor Mr Blair came along, he went back to the whole business of being at the heart of Europe—being nice to them and so on. We get everything that we want and that is why we are where we are today.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said that the reason the French voted against the Giscard constitution was that they wanted a more social Europe. My simple question to him is: why did the Dutch then vote in exactly the same way two days later? I support the amendment.