Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Fuller Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will not detain the House too long on this amendment. It is a small amendment, but it is very important for members of pension schemes in auto-enrolment, particularly women.

The proposal in the Bill is to move small pots, under £1,000, which are considered dormant—in other words, they have had no contributions paid in and no contact from the member with the provider for 12 months—to a consolidator scheme without member consent. My argument is simple: 12 months is simply not long enough to consider that a scheme that has not had contributions paid into it is dormant and that that member has no interest in the scheme. Imagine a woman, for example, who stops work for a period to care for loved ones or elderly parents, partners or children. They may stop contributions for quite a while longer than a year, but their pension could be moved if the provider had not been able to contact them, and their money would be put into a consolidator scheme approved by the regulator over which they had no control.

Amendment 49 would extend the period before which somebody’s pot could just be taken away from one year to three years; and Amendment 50 would extend it to two years. This would give time for the Government’s correct aim of improving data accuracy to take place. We know that most pension schemes have huge errors in their data and do not always know even how to contact a member. It would also allow time for providers and trustees to trace members and for the pensions dashboard to start and members to be able to find their pots themselves.

I understand that pension providers do not want these small pots and they may make a loss on them, but they should not just be able to get rid of them with such unseemly haste. I hope the Government may accept the spirit in which this amendment is meant, which is to protect members while obviously still allowing the pots to be moved once it is beyond doubt that they are indeed dormant. I beg to move.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, once again, we have another policy designed by civil servants sipping lattés in that rather agreeable ground-floor coffee shop at 1 Horse Guards Road, safe in the knowledge that that regular monthly salary, their generous taxpayer-funded pension and their ability to work from home a couple of days a week provide that comfortable lens through which they view the world outside.

But outside, in the real world, there are whole armies of people who do not do the nine to five; they live by their wits, self-employ and undertake seasonal work or term-time employment—the men or women for whom the Labour Party was established and who salt money away for their retirement when they can.

Many of them work hard and ask their accountant to do the books at the end of the year. It might take some time. Neither the worker nor the accountant work to strict 12-month timescales. It might take three months to finalise the numbers in one year, nine months in the next. That is the untidy way in which the real world works.

To legislate to confiscate someone’s pension after 12 months, as if it was fly-tipped by the side of the road to be swept into the dumpster of some poorly performing default scheme, amounts to theft and an abuse of trust that undermines confidence in the pension system.

I totally endorse Amendment 49 in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann for another reason as well: throughout the canon of pensions legislation, we have a three-year carryback, where people can make up their pension deficit over three years. This amendment is entirely consistent with that. Consistency, simplicity and understandability are the watchwords with which we should proceed.

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[Lord Wolfson of Aspley Guise (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by declaring an interest as chief executive of NEXT plc, a company that has over 20,000 colleagues enrolled in an auto-enrolment pension.

I want to convey to the Government just how worried people are at the idea that the Government are planning to mandate how their pensions—their life savings—should be invested. To be told that a percentage, as yet to be determined, should be invested in certain classes of assets, as yet to be defined, by Ministers who can give no indication as to what they want to do with these powers is deeply worrying.

Good investments do not need to be mandatory. In fact, there is the inherent suspicion that investments which are compelled are unlikely to be very good investments. It is worse than that, because if the demand for certain asset classes is artificially increased then the returns are likely to fall further. Why pay a healthy return to an investor who has no choice but to invest in your class of asset?

It might be argued that while mandated investments are not so good for pensioners, they will be good for the nation as a whole. This is a dangerous precedent, and it is not credible, because the Government are not well placed to allocate capital in this way. They are subject to political pressures, the competing priorities of their Back Benches, the media and the polls.

I join other noble Lords in saying that the Government are not wrong to worry. The British pension funds show an alarming tendency to avoid investing in UK businesses, but there are better answers than this—reform the regulatory regime, make the UK a more attractive place to invest in. Compulsion is the worst possible solution, and it is that compulsion that goes to the heart of my concerns, and those of many others, about this power.

The greatest risk of this power is that the Government abuse it—that in the thick of some political storm, under pressure to boost the economy and to serve some interest group, they mandate large-scale misguided investment in some part of the economy as a last roll of the dice. I stress that I completely accept that this Government would not abuse the power. However, can the Minister be so sure that all future governments, perhaps led by their political opponents, will not abuse it?

Other noble Lords have rightly spoken about the breadth of these skeleton powers. They are not quite Henry VIII powers but, to me, they look very much like Robert Maxwell powers—the power to control and direct the investment of other people’s hard-earned savings for purposes other than their benefit. Back then, we said that never again would we put the savings of so many people in the hands of so few powerful people, or risk people’s life savings being invested for anything other than their benefit. This power takes us back in the wrong direction. It should not stand. I support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, those people who have done the right thing and saved for retirement have made a bargain with the state: in exchange for a little help on the way in, the state will be relied on a little less on the way out—that is the deal. The responsibility for finding people to look after your money lies with the individual and the trustee or investment managers they appoint. On that simple truth, London has developed global leadership in asset and investment management, and the entire City ecosystem has created a tax gusher that pays for defence, schools and hospitals. We should not place it or its reputation under threat.

We have heard a lot from the Dispatch Box over the last 12 months or so about the sort of investments that the Government think we should invest in. We need to learn some lessons from history. One such investment is green schemes, forgetting that when they tried this under political direction in Sweden it created the $5.8 billion Northvolt disaster and all the public sector pensioners lost their shirts. The Minister from the Dispatch Box lionised the large Canadian public sector schemes as the model that should be followed. Last year, their investment returns went down by 5%, at the same time as our own LGPS went up by 9%.

Ministers want schemes to backfill UK infrastructure, and perhaps steel, which we now learn could cost us over £1 billion in a little over a year—money that will never be seen again—or carbon storage and passive funds, which, by arithmetic, lead you into bubbles or into high-risk private assets. At 5 am this morning, the Financial Times published an excoriating demolition of the claims that private equity funds do as well as the Chancellor claims, especially as the J-curve gets stretched out beyond 10 years. I could go on, but I will not.

The point is that, while Ministers want to pick winners, they have been selling lemons. The pound shop pundits are trying to force-feed the riskiest parts of the market—the bits the other professionals turn their noses up at or consider are not right for the man in the street—down the throats of those for whom taking excessive risk is not necessarily the right thing. The Government’s job is to create the environment for the best and most attractive investment ideas to come forward, not to beat pensioners with a stick and strong-arm them into financing their high-risk pet projects, with high fees and uncertain returns.

But, worst of all, if mandation does come, it will create the sort of value-sapping moral hazards and conflicts of interest that will allow the most poorly performing managers to have a “get out of jail free” card—“It was that Torsten Bell chap what told me to do it, guv”—while trashing the global reputation of the UK asset management business and imperilling that tax gusher we all rely on. But, ultimately, it will be the little guy who pays the price, poorer long after Rachel Reeves and Torsten Bell have become a footnote in history. It is our duty to stop this, and we must.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, whose sister company Mercer is a pension consultancy, master trust provider and signature to the Mansion House Accord. I speak in strong support of this group, beginning with Amendment 52, which would remove the power to mandate asset allocation while preserving the requirement on scale. This is a targeted, proportionate change. It keeps the legitimate objective of ensuring sufficient scale in the market without stripping trustees of the fundamental responsibility to make investment decisions.

I have never supported—and it has become abundantly clear in recent weeks that the bulk of industry does not support—the Government’s proposed power to mandate asset allocation. I have listened carefully over the past weeks to Ministers in both Houses, who say that these clauses are simply a reserve power intended to ensure that the Mansion House Accord operates. Even accepting that characterisation, the House should not lose sight of two important points. First, the schemes that signed up to the accord did so in good faith and with trustee agreement. Secondly, those signatories did so on the basis of explicit caveats—caveats that recognised trustees’ fiduciary duties, the necessity of a reliable pipeline of assets and the imperative that the market shifts from a narrow focus on cost to a broader assessment of value across the whole investment chain, including by clients.

It is therefore deeply disappointing to see the Government invoke the Mansion House Accord agreement as though it represents blanket industry support for intervention in private finance and trustee decision-making. It does not. Conflating a voluntary conditional industry commitment with a license to centralise investment allocation decisions risks doing grave damage to good governance and to member outcomes. For these reasons, I urge noble Lords to support these amendments, remove the dangerous power to mandate asset allocation, keep the focus on scale and let trustees, acting with their fiduciary and statutory duties, continue to determine the investment strategies that best serve their members. These amendments achieve that balance.

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My noble friends on the Front Bench have tabled Amendment 77, which is a much more sophisticated approach to the issue of scale than my amendments in this group, because it includes a wider range of factors than investment returns and is a more complete route to expressing what is really meant by scale. I have added my name to that amendment, and if my noble friends wish to move it, I will withdraw mine at the end of this debate. I beg to move.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are obsessed with size, but everyone knows that it is not about size but what you do with it. That point was made forcefully in the Financial Times this morning, which discussed the fact that the larger funds are not necessarily better performers, with the sub-headline:

“Seeking size for its own sake can distract fund managers from focusing on clients and shareholders”.


There is so much I can say, but I will restrict myself to one substantive point. When schemes get large, their normal market investment size gets bigger too. They do not have the time, capacity or need to go away from the big global stocks, most of which are, by their nature, overseas. It limits the constellation of investment ideas, so they chase the same MSCI stocks, creating a value-destroying bubble and systemic risks by all chasing the same thing. It becomes all about speculation.

That is not necessarily what capital markets are for. Capital markets exist to provide capital so that smaller companies can become big ones. Right now in the UK, there are lots of smaller companies with bright ideas and great prospects that could become bigger if only they were relevant to the funds—a few million pounds here, perhaps a few tens of millions there. But they are all but invisible to the superfunds, for which anything less than half a bar is a rounding error.

The problem for the UK is that, while Ministers are worshipping the false icons of scale, they will actually make it harder for the stock market to invest in small British businesses at home. If the schemes are forced to bulk up, they simply will not have the time to look for or after the small fry. British companies that are crying out for long-term patient capital will go hungry, which directly contradicts the Mansion House objectives. Once again, the Government have been suckered into a position by the big boys, understandably keen to cut out the competition, visiting harm on the UK economy and especially on small British firms we all want to see do well. As the Financial Times says today:

“A substantial body of evidence in academic research suggests that mergers in financial services frequently lead to prolonged periods of underperformance. Revenue synergies often fail to materialise and cost synergies tend to be overstated”


—quite.

[The Lord Bishop of Hereford]

My Lords, I speak in favour of Amendment 55, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. There is a questionable theory of change in the Bill—that bigger pension schemes are necessarily better, suggesting the minimum scale of £25 billion. While scale certainly creates advantages, Australian experience suggests that funds can be run at less than this size and still provide value and good outcomes for members. However, concentrating the market into a few megafunds introduces a new system of risk, of schemes that become too big to fail and so are effectively the state’s problem.

Also, megafunds are unlikely to allow for nuance and specialism, such as faith-based funds. Unfortunately, the understanding of faith-based funds in the commentary on the Bill seems to be limited to Sharia-compliant funds and exclusions. The understanding of and engagement with the nuances of faith-based investing in the Bill commentary are superficial at best. There may be perfectly good arrangements with faith-based or ethical distinctiveness; such arrangements may perform well for members in financial and non-financial terms and be significantly smaller than the threshold envisaged. The distinctiveness that they offer might easily be lost in generic megafunds. This amendment makes the important point that absolute size and performance for members need not be correlated.