Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Fox Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 5th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be working on this Bill—a Bill that we on these Benches broadly welcome. I hope we will be able to work constructively to improve it as it moves through your Lordships’ House. It is about time, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, noted. The Furman report was set up five or six years ago; we have been impatient for competition law in the digital space to be reformed and for the Digital Markets Unit to be empowered—so, at last.

As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, also noted, this is a big Bill, and it acts in a number of different ways. I fear that many of the things I say will be similar to what was said by the noble Lord; in order to maintain novelty, I will probably say them in a different order.

I will start with consumer issues. Clearly, these issues have excited correspondence from a lot of people in the outside world. We should note and thank them for the work that they have done in sending through a load of briefings. There are some important issues here, and areas that should be tightened up and improved. These include: tackling online scams, dealing with product safety issues and strengthening trading standards; taking action on primary and secondary ticketing; impeding price drip and mid-contract price rises; addressing the pernicious nature of fake reviews, as we heard from the Minister; devising a sensible way of redesigning automatic subscription rollover—there is a danger of us taking a number of other areas down with the law we have, so we must be careful of unintended consequences of that move—and delivering a range of other consumer rights, such as the possibility of collective action for consumer claims. I am sure there will be plenty of grist to this mill as we work through that part of the Bill.

Moving on from consumers, the second big challenge is the need to tip the balance of power toward content providers—and here I should declare that I have several creators in my family. As a basic principle, all content creators should be properly paid for the work they do. UK law requires payment for the commercial use of another’s copyrighted work, yet commercial use is currently being made of content by global platforms without any permission being obtained or payment being made. The dominant platforms profit from the efforts of content creators, from songwriters and artists to publishers and broadcasters, and they do not get rewarded.

The News Media Association estimates that over 50% of searches are news-related, but Google keeps the value of repeated visits and the value of online footfall that is generated. As such, copyright law looks foolish, as the system is being gamed. Smaller players must try to sue their distributors to enforce their rights, but they cannot risk such a move or indeed afford to take them on. Indeed, the evidence suggests that it is difficult even for Governments to challenge these platforms. After almighty tussles, the Australian and Canadian Governments have won concessions. It remains to be fully appreciated how those will pan out but, as well as highlighting the global dominance of the big two, those fights highlighted an essential difference between Meta and Google when it comes to news content, which is of great interest.

The Bill must make it clear that platforms need to pay properly and fairly, on benchmarked terms and with reference to value for end users. Additional clarification is needed on how a final offer mechanism would work in practice, and we will be seeking that, but really a bigger change is needed. That change should require those using and distributing content to obtain the owners’ permission before they use it, and we will be pushing for that.

I remind noble Lords that that we are discussing the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill—so competition is a central part of it and we have already heard elements of that. But, in the market that we are looking at, competition is weak—if not frail, to perhaps overstate it. In our view, the pro-competition interventions are one of the Bill’s most powerful features and a big step forward. We must use the Bill process to ensure that the powers are sufficient and Ministers must articulate government support for the ambition that the CMA and its DMU will need in order to start to take on the competition challenge, because that will require a big shift in emphasis from the CMA.

At present the CMA deals with a lot of mergers— 50 to 70 detailed investigations a year—while enforcement typically attracts fewer than 10 cases per annum and there are hundreds of complaints for it to deal with. When looking at competition matters, including acquisitions and mergers, the world’s competition authorities have focused on efficiency and short-term consumer benefit, but, as we have been reminded recently by the Court of Appeal when it found against Apple, the overriding objective of the CMA, as set out in the 2013 Act, is to promote competition in the interests of consumers.

“Promoting competition” does not mean just assessing the efficiency of a monopolist; in digital markets, this approach has delivered global oligopoly. So, while Web 1.0 was an open access—albeit read-only—platform, Web 2.0 has been captured, intermediated and monetised by a very small number of profitable concerns. That has been achieved largely through acquisitions that have been waved through by the authorities. Looking at the publicly disclosed acquisitions between 2008 and 2018, we see that Google has acquired 168 companies, Facebook 71 and Amazon 60. Now, thanks to this and other things, they control the core software in web browsers and device operating systems, and through that control they determine what we see, what we find, what we search on the web and how we pay for stuff.

The Bill is, in many respects, seeking to close the gaping doors of empty stables that this approach has delivered and, to do so, short-term consumer welfare cannot be the sole—or sometimes even the primary—consideration. Promoting competition means taking into account market structure and the ability of players to innovate. When looking at mergers, regard has to be taken of the effect of allowing large companies to buy innovative ones so that they can assimilate or retire their ideas and technology. In that context, we very much welcome the CMA’s approach to the Microsoft acquisition of Activision Blizzard and Ofcom’s decision to refer the hyperscalers in cloud services for an investigation by the CMA. This demonstrates that the CMA is up for a global challenge in this strategic way and that it can play a leadership role.

Looking forward, as well as mitigating the competitive and consumer issues thrown up by the centralised Web 2.0, the Bill should empower the CMA to help usher in a genuinely decentralised Web 3.0. As Professor Furman reminded us in evidence in Committee in the Commons, intervention interoperability is a vital remedy—and we say that interfering with interoperability in all its forms should be policed by the DMU. That means embarking on investigations and actions with the aim of distributing the power and control over Web 3.0, creating a network that spans a large base of independent actors. This speaks to the technology on which the network is based and the standards that are set to deliver that network.

It seems clear that the DMU should be proactive with respect to promoting international standards and aiming to create that interoperability: for a start, by focusing on open access and operational transparency, working for standards that allow unrestricted participation and favouring the technologies and protocols that prevent a single person or group amending or reversing transactions executed and recorded. It would be good to hear from the Minister, when he sums up, on the role that the Government feel the DMU and the CMA should be playing on the standards authorities—the IETF and the W3C. How do we see engaging further and more thoroughly with those standards bodies, because that is where the first fight starts in these technology issues?

So there is a lot resting on this Bill. The architecture of the web is currently threatened by those who would create and preserve their own walled gardens of content that is provided by others, privatise a public resource for their own ends and monopolise all content offered to the public via the internet for their own profit. This is not an abstract need; additional danger is already with us. Big tech is busy wrapping its tentacles around AI, including by co-opting start-ups for investments and partnerships. It is critical that the CMA uses these new powers to keep that technology open before it, too, is intermediated.

To deliver on this, however, there are many issues to be addressed. Your Lordships will no doubt come up with many others; we have already heard a list from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who will be pleased to know that there are many coincident issues. I will give a short list before I end of the issues that we will be keeping an eye on: ensuring that the Bill no longer gifts to strategic market status players the opportunity to challenge DMU decisions on the basis of lack of evidence, which means looking at the five-year view that is required; securing the role of judicial review and making sure it is not eroded; strengthening the leveraging principle that denies third-party developers revenue; understanding the Government’s position on data and information-sharing; clarifying how the final-offer mechanism would work in practice; probing the proportionality tests brought in via the latest amendments; challenging the changes to the definition of “counter- vailing benefit”, which also came through the amendments; enabling those with content to be paid properly; and allowing smaller businesses a voice and an ability to bring claims and, where possible, be awarded exemplary damages.

This Bill is a weighty tome, but it has a vital role in shaping the architecture and landscape in which the future digital economy will be built. It will help establish how the value of this economy is created and distributed. It will influence how easy or hard it is for challengers and disrupters to enter the market. Our job, therefore, will be to ensure that the CMA and DMU have the powers they need, but, more than that, our job is to articulate the cross-party ambition we have for this direction of travel and to launch the DMU with our overwhelming support to maximise its success.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all today’s speakers for their eloquent, clear and powerful contributions to what has been a fascinating debate of the very highest quality. In particular, a number of speakers referred back to the Online Safety Act debates and variants of the warm glow. I am delighted to participate in any such approach to the Bill, as is my noble friend Lord Offord. I welcome very much the support shown across the House for this legislation, with the caveats gone into by many speakers. As my noble friend said in his opening speech, this is an important Bill which will drive innovation, grow the economy and deliver better outcomes for consumers. The debate we have engaged in is demonstrative of noble Lords’ desire to ensure that digital markets are competitive and work well, and that consumers are protected from the potential harms posed by anti-competitive and unscrupulous practices.

I will respond to the questions raised, cutting across a number of issues and speakers as I go. First, my noble friend Lady Stowell and the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Clement-Jones, asked, quite rightly, whether we are watering down the Bill. Let me categorically say that that is absolutely not the intention. The amendments at Commons Report brought further clarity, and they will ensure that the DMU’s interventions are proportionate and drive the best possible outcome for consumers. I look forward to discussing this further during the Bill’s passage.

I turn to the appeals standard in the digital markets regime, which was raised by noble Lords across the House, including my noble friends Lord Vaizey, Lord Kamall, Lady Stowell, Lady Harding, Lord Black and Lord Lansley, the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Ritchie and Lady Jones. We have considered strong and differing views about appeals from a range of stakeholders. Judicial review remains the appropriate standard for the majority of decisions in the regime, and we have maintained that for appeals of regulatory decisions, with additional clarification on the need for the Digital Markets Unit to act proportionately. Firms would already have been able to challenge decisions to impose interventions on the basis that there were disproportionate interferences with their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This amendment allows that challenge to happen under usual JR principles. Moving appeals on penalties to full merits brings the regime into line with the Enterprise Act 2002. It will mean that, once a breach has been found, a firm could argue that the imposition of a penalty was not appropriate, the level of it was not suitable, or the date by which it should be paid needs to be changed.

I turn to the countervailing benefits exemption, which was raised by a number of noble Lords, including my noble friends Lady Harding, Lord Vaizey, Lord Lansley, Lord Kamall, Lord Black, Lady Stowell, the noble Lords, Lord Bassam, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie and Lady Kidron—I see the point about themes. I reassure all noble Lords that this is a further safeguard in the legislation to ensure that consumer benefits which might have been unknown when conduct requirements were first introduced can be recognised. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for an example of how this could work in practice. If an SMS firm bans an application on its platform, it might breach a conduct requirement not to apply discriminatory terms. The firm could claim that the ban was to protect user security and privacy. Thanks to the exemption’s high bar, the DMU would close its investigation only if the SMS firm provided sufficient evidence, such as an independent report from security experts. Firms will not be able to use the exemption to delay enforcement. Assessment of whether the exemption applies will take place during the enforcement investigation, which has a deadline of six months.

The noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Bassam, and my noble friends Lord Vaizey, Lady Harding and Lord Kamall asked about the change to the indispensability wording. The change of the language is to clarify the exemption; it maintains the same high threshold and makes sure that consumers get the best outcomes possible, whether through the benefits provided or through more competitive markets.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, for his detailed analysis of the work of the CMA and his continued support for the legislation. He raised the matter of proper scrutiny of the CMA. I very much agree with him on the importance of this and look forward to continuing that conversation.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friends Lady Stowell and Lord Kamall sought reassurance that requiring the Secretary of State to approve guidance would not cause delays. The Government are committed to ensuring that approval is given in good time, in order for the regime to be in place as soon as possible. Introducing a statutory timeline for this process would limit the Government’s ability to work collaboratively with the CMA.

My noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised the importance of the independence of the regulator, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, spoke about the risk of regulatory capture. I agree that this is an absolutely vital issue. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and my noble friend Lord Holmes asked about the resourcing and tools of the DMU. I reassure them that the Government have full confidence in the DMU’s resourcing. There are currently around 70 people working in DMU roles, and we expect the DMU to be around 200 people in steady state.

A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Black, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron, Lady Bennett, Lady Jones and Lady Ritchie, raised the importance of support for the press sector, with which I agree. The digital markets regime aims to address the far-reaching power of the biggest tech firms and help rebalance the relationship between those platforms and other businesses, including publishers. This will make an important contribution to the sustainability of the press, which is so important in all aspects of our lives.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, my noble friend Lord Black and the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, asked about the final offer mechanism and how this will work. The final offer mechanism is a backstop measure to help resolve sustained breaches of conduct requirements relating exclusively to fair and reasonable payment terms, where other DMU tools are unlikely to resolve the breach in a reasonable timeframe. Unlike the Australian and Canadian models, the final offer mechanism is not a standalone tool to force negotiations. It forms just one part of the DMU’s holistic toolkit for promoting competition in digital markets. The DMU will be able to impose conduct requirements on the firm from day one of its designation, including requirements to ensure fair and reasonable terms. However, we recognise that some stakeholders may be concerned about SMS firms frustrating the process. Here, the CMA can seek to accelerate the stages before the final offer mechanism, making use of urgent deadlines on enforcement orders and significant financial penalties, where appropriate.

The noble Lord, Lord Knight, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett, Lady Jones and Lady Uddin, asked if the regulator will have sufficient power to deal with imbalances in access to data. The answer is yes. These are exactly the kinds of issues that the DMU will be able to address.

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, asked how the digital markets regime will address the rise of artificial intelligence. The regime has been designed to be tech-neutral, future-proof and flexible enough to adapt to changing digital markets.

I now turn to questions raised today on the competition part of the Bill. I note the interest from my noble friend Lord Sandhurst in the recent Supreme Court judgment on the status of litigation funding agreements—LFAs—and its potential impact on the ability to bring collective actions on behalf of consumers across the legal system. The Government have urgently addressed the potential implications of the judgment on claims under competition law, and we feel this has provided some much-needed certainty to funders and claimants. I also note the interest from my noble friend and others across the House in extending this to all parts of the civil legal system. While I am advised that this Bill is not the appropriate vehicle to deliver this aim, I can assure noble Lords that the Ministry of Justice is actively considering options for a wider response.

I now turn to the consumer part of the Bill. Several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Black, the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, posed questions about the approach taken in the Bill on subscription traps. The measures being taken forward are the ones which are necessary and proportionate to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and understand what they are signing up to, while balancing further costs and regulatory burdens on businesses.

A number of noble Lords—I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not read out the full list, because there are far too many of them and it might test everyone’s patience—raised concerns about potential unintended consequences for charities in relation to the new subscription rules, in particular their ability to claim gift aid. Donations to charities where nothing is received in return are not subject to the subscription rules. Generally, charities will only be in scope if they provide auto-renewing contracts to consumers for products and services in return for payment. This is consistent with other consumer protection laws. I reassure the House that it is not the Bill’s intention to undermine access to gift aid; we are examining this issue closely and will provide a further update in Committee.

Many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Fox, raised other consumer harms such as drip pricing and fake reviews. The Government have recently consulted on proposals to address these and other practices, and our upcoming consultation response will set out next steps. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, also mentioned misleading green claims. This is indeed an important issue, which we hope is already covered by existing regulations.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and my noble friend Lord Holmes that the right to repair is important. The right-to-repair regulations which came into force on 1 July 2021 address some of the issues she raised. My noble friend Lord Offord, as the responsible Minister, would be happy to meet her to discuss this further.

My noble friend Lord Holmes raised concerns about Henry VIII powers. Where the powers to amend primary legislation would permit major changes to the legislation concerned, they are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

I hope that in wrapping up I have responded to at least most of the points raised by noble Lords today. I note that there were other issues raised which I have not addressed, such as alternative dispute resolution and secondary ticketing. I look forward to discussing those items and others during the Bill’s passage. Let me once again thank all noble Lords for their contributions and engagement, not just today but in the lead-up to it. My noble friend Lord Offord and I look forward to further and more detailed debates on these matters and many more besides in Committee.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I should say that I mentioned the central role that standards and the setting of future standards have. The Minister need not answer the question now, but could he write to me about the strategy, in a sense, and the involvement that the DMU might have, or should have, in future standards-setting for the technology?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lord for not addressing that. Absolutely I will write.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Fox Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 48 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and I support dropping Clause 29 from the Bill.

These amendments are also about speeding up the process of stopping anti-competitive behaviour by the tech companies. It is essential that no hostages to fortune are given for tech company lawyers to drag out the process, as many noble Lords said, particularly in the first group.

I want noble Lords to bear in mind that, for every big tech company, every week they succeed in delaying a decision against their anti-competitive practices is one in which they earn millions of pounds, while their competitors are left struggling in so many areas. Speed is of the essence.

As a former newspaper journalist, my most immediate field of concern is local and regional media, which are suffering from the anti-competitive behaviour of the tech companies. There has been a collapse in local newspapers over the past decade and in the next three years this will turn in to a major exodus, with huge areas of the country becoming local news deserts with nobody reporting on local councils, courts and other important civic activities.

The Digital Markets Taskforce study on digital advertising found that the tech companies had used network effects and economies of scale to dominate the market. It concluded that the “more vibrant competition” in the market would improve

“the bargaining power of online news publishers”,

which would

“improve the health and sustainability of journalism in the UK”.

In turn, this would

“contribute positively to the effectiveness and integrity of our democracy”.

On top of this, much of the news content generated by these media companies is used by tech platforms either for free or for little remuneration.

I have long campaigned for the final offer mechanism to be available to the CMA as a powerful deterrent against anti-competitive behaviour by the tech companies, but surely all deterrents are more effective if there is a realistic chance that they will be deployed, and in a short time. Once the CR requirements on an SMS have been imposed, breached and reported, the CMA should be in a good position to know whether the designated SMS company will take the long or short road to a solution. Amendment 48 would allow the CMA to issue an enforcement order, decide whether that has been breached and investigate the breach, if it feels that it will lead to a satisfactory resolution to the company’s behaviour. However, if, earlier in the process, the solution is not going to be possible, the regulator needs the power to bring forward its ultimate deterrent. No SMS will want to have the final offer mechanism imposed on it, and I understand that the CMA is equally reluctant to deploy it, but the more pressing the threat the more likely it is that the DMU investigation will be brought to a quick and effective resolution.

I know that these companies will fight tooth and nail to preserve their massive profits resulting from the anti-competitive behaviours. It might be useful for the Committee if I give just one really shocking example of how effective these delaying actions can be. The salutary lesson is the story of a nascent shopping comparison site, Foundem, based in London and founded in 2005, which was doing very well until 2008, when it was massively deprioritised on Google Search, at about the same time that Google Shopping, the search engine’s own shopping comparison site, was set up. Foundem issued a complaint to the EU Commission in 2009 about anti-competitive behaviour by Google. The Commission set up an investigation and, three years later, after many legal arguments, Google was given a preliminary assessment—similar, I imagine, to an SMS designation. Rules were then laid down for the company to follow, but within six months market tests revealed that it was not tackling the anti-competitive behaviour. The response was dragged out by Google until 2016, when it was given a supplementary statement of objectives, which were also heavily fought by the search engine.

Finally, on 27 June 2017, the EU imposed a record €2.4 billion fine on Google for violating EU competition law. However, the company appealed, first to the EU General Court and then to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Final judgment on the case has yet to be issued. Meanwhile, Foundem exists in order to fight the case, but it suspended all its services eight years ago. This is a 15-year David-versus-Goliath battle with a company, some of whose activities CMA might have to designate. This legislation must be drafted to ensure that the process brings results, and fast, if small digital competitors are to have a chance of surviving.

Already the CMA estimates that the designation process will not become operational until June 2025. I know that the hope is to set up a designation process at the same time as negotiating the conduct requirements, but that could still take up to nine months to implement on the SMSs. Meanwhile, many of the smaller media outlets I talked about earlier will have gone under.

The same arguments for legal delay by tech companies must apply to Clause 29, which introduces the concept of countervailing benefits. I do not understand the need for Clause 29. Clearly, the balance between consumer benefit and anti-competitive behaviour will have been looked at as part of the SMS designation process, which is clearly set out in the Bill. Does the Minister think that our world-class regulator will ignore these considerations in the initial process? If they will be considered then, why introduce this clause for consideration all over again? I have already explained the need for speed in the CMA’s process. This exemption can only play into the hands of the tech companies to draw out the processes and hold up the prospect of many more companies like the start-up shopping search website Foundem being littered by the digital wayside. I ask the Government to seriously consider taking Clause 29 out of the Bill.

However, I support the fallback in Amendment 40, to have the word “indispensable” inserted into the clause. Your Lordships’ Committee has heard that “indispensable” was taken out on Report in the other place. The Minister has said that the simple threshold of “benefit” is already established in Section 9 of the Competition Act 1998 and Section 134(7) of the Enterprise Act. However, the former talks of an “indispensable benefit” and the latter just of a “benefit”. The Minister says that the two thresholds are the same; clearly, they are not.

The new definition of the grounds on which anti-competitive conduct can be permitted states that

“those benefits could not be realised without the conduct”.

It requires only that anti-competitive conduct be necessary, rather than indispensable, which means that anti-competitive behaviour is the only way to achieve the benefit. Surely, if that is the case, it would be better for the consumer, in whose name the Bill is being enacted, to have the highest possible threshold of benefit.

The Explanatory Notes open up avenues for further legal wrangling by lawyers, as they say the definition of benefit will be similar to that in the Competition Act and the Enterprise Act. As the two Acts use “benefit” in different ways, that will surely lead to confusion. Is the use of the word “similar” because it is not possible to say “same”, in the light of the divergent terms that appear in these two Acts? Without it, there seems to be room for legal ambiguity. At the very least, there should be an explanation in the Bill that establishes “benefits” as having the same definition as in the Competition Act.

I know that all noble Lords want the Bill to be implemented and effective with all possible speed, to make this country a world leader in digital start-ups. However, it needs to be amended to avoid legal confusion and unnecessary delay by world players that have everything to gain from protecting their dominant position in markets.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, on the pretext that he would not be here, my noble friend passed responsibility for this group on to me. As noble Lords can see, he is “not” here. This is a long group and my noble friend managed to attach his name to every amendment in it, with the exception of the two proposed by the Minister, so I apologise if I give a slightly long speech on his behalf.

I spoke at Second Reading, but I was not here for the first day in Committee, as I was in the Chamber speaking to the main business there. My noble friend has tabled Amendments 38 and 41, on countervailing benefits; Amendment 43, on goods and services; Amendments 49, 50 and 51, on final offers; and Amendment 107, on injunctions. He also supports Amendments 36, 39 and 40 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which seek to restore the status quo of Clause 29.

In Clause 29, as we know, there is an overarching provision that enables SMS designated firms to push back on regulatory decisions through a countervailing benefits exemption. This is, in our opinion, a potential legal loophole for big tech to challenge conduct requirements through lengthy, tactical legal challenges. We just heard an example of how similar measures can be employed. This is a significant loophole, not a small one, and it would require the CMA to close a conduct investigation into a breach of conduct requirement when an SMS firm is able to prove that the anti-competitive conduct in question produces benefits which supposedly outweigh the harms, and that the conduct is “proportionate”—that word again—to the realisation of those benefits. It has the potential to tie up CMA resources and frustrate the intent of the legislation. It is critical that these provisions do not inadvertently give designated firms immunity from CMA decisions. We heard from other speakers that the scale of resources at the command of these companies far outweighs the resources that the CMA would be capable of summoning. That inevitably leads to the ability to clog things up.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, explained, the Government added amendments to the Bill on Report in the Commons that could further weaken the ability of the DMU to push back against spurious claims of consumer benefit. The removal of the term “indispensable” may weaken the regulator’s ability to rebuff these claims as, by analogy with competition law, the use of the term “indispensable” is likely to require a high standard for firms to meet; therefore, the standard is now lower.

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It is the Government’s opinion that this creates the same standard—neither higher nor lower—but with greater clarity. We agree with the importance of ensuring that this exemption does not act as a loophole to the regime. However, some stakeholders found the previous wording of the exemption confusing. The current wording clarifies the countervailing benefits exemption by setting out in the simplest possible language how it is intended to operate while, crucially, as I say, maintaining the same high threshold as in the previous wording. SMS firms must still prove that there is no other reasonable, practicable way to achieve the same benefits for consumers with less anti-competitive effect.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

The Minister has already introduced a difference between the two. There is a difference between “there is no other reasonable or practicable way” and “indispensable”. They are not the same—they are not synonymous. If I have to prove that something is not practicable, that is not the same as indispensable. The Minister has absolutely proved the point.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Again, in my opinion, the two sentences are indistinguishable in their meaning.

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[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As many noble Lords in the debate have alluded to, we have to be clear that this is a fast-moving field, and we have to at least allow for the possibility that new technologies can provide new consumer benefits and that it is okay to argue that a new and emerging technology that was not part of the original consideration can be considered as part of the defence against a finding of breach. The fact that the intended meaning is intended to be clearer in the current drafting is aiming to provide greater certainty to all businesses while ensuring that consumers continue to get the best outcomes.

Amendment 41, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would change the current drafting of the countervailing benefits exemption in several ways that together are intended to ensure that the CMA is provided as soon as possible with information relating to an SMS firm’s intention to rely on the exemption. We agree with noble Lords who have spoken today that it is important that the exemption cannot be used to avoid or delay enforcement action. The conduct investigation will operate in parallel to the assessment of whether the exemption applies, meaning that the investigation deadline of six months is not affected by the exemption process. The regime has been designed to encourage an open dialogue between the CMA and SMS firms, helping to avoid delays, unintended consequences and surprises on all sides. Therefore, in many cases, if a firm intends to rely on the exemption, we anticipate that this will be clear to all parties from early on in the process.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I appreciate what the Minister said. By “early on in the process” does he mean after the process has been instigated, or before? A lot of this information is needed in order to understand whether there needs to be a process in the first place. There is a chicken and an egg here, in that some of this information is up front before we get to actions and enforcement.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed. It is an important point. Right from the beginning of potential conduct requirement design or PCI design, it would be consulting very widely with all stakeholders, including SMS firms and tech challengers. As part of that consultation, consumer benefits would be expected to be stated, in what is designed to be a participative process on all sides. As I was saying, the CMA is required to consider consumer benefits early on, when setting conduct requirements. The SMS firms will therefore outline the consumer benefits associated with their conduct at that stage, long before a conduct investigation.

Finally, adding further evidential requirements risks overburdening the regulator with more documentation than necessary, and therefore potentially delaying any enforcement action. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the amendment will not be pressed.

I come now to the discussion on the powers of the CMA to enforce obligations where they have been breached by SMS firms. Amendment 43, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would provide the CMA with a power to impose an enforcement order requiring an SMS firm to offer fair and reasonable payment and non-payment terms to third parties for goods or services. I can confirm that, under Clause 19, the CMA already has the power to require a firm to offer fair and reasonable terms through conduct requirements, and, where these are breached, the CMA has power under Clause 31 to make an enforcement order obliging the firm to stop the breach. As such, this amendment would not give the CMA any additional powers and could risk a narrower reading of its powers by raising the question of why other types of orders are not mentioned.

Amendment 107, also from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would allow the CMA to apply to the High Court where a firm was breaching, or attempting to breach, an obligation or one of the conduct requirement objectives set out in Clause 19(5). The objectives in Clause 19(5) are not intended to be binding on SMS firms. Their purpose is to guide the design of conduct requirements by the CMA. It would therefore not be appropriate for the CMA to find a firm in breach of these objectives.

However, I agree with the noble Lord, and others who have spoken today, that it is important that the regulator can respond quickly before irreversible harm results from SMS-firm conduct. Where urgent action is needed in relation to a suspected breach of conduct requirements, the CMA will have the power under Clause 32 to make an interim enforcement order before irreversible harm occurs. For PCIs, the CMA will be able to issue directions setting out specific steps that a firm must take to become compliant with a pro-competition order. Failures to comply with orders under either conduct requirements or PCIs can be enforced through robust penalties. There is also the possibility of affected persons applying to court to enforce relevant requirements, and to apply for injunctions under Clause 101.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I appreciate the Minister giving way again and his answers. I am slightly confused; I either misheard or misunderstood, but did the Minister say that Clause 19(5) is, in essence, unenforceable by the CMA and is merely an advisory action?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, clearly the noble Lord’s days on the standing committee were not wasted; we thank him for his incredibly cogent set of arguments. He has said some of what I was going to say, which is good, so I will not repeat it.

It is worth remembering that there is a point of scale here, and it is scale that creates the issue. Alphabet, Amazon, Microsoft, Meta and Apple, in 2022, together had revenues of nearly £400 billion. How did they get there? Of course, they had their initial offering and their services and were able to attract customers, but then there is the law of networks and then predatory acquisition. The two feed off each other; one boosts the other and gives the finances and so on. Predatory acquisitions add to the network scale, and the network scale then makes the offer.

As we have heard, there has been a huge number of such acquisitions—not mergers—across those platforms, and they have very much been part of the strategy for those businesses. Few, if any, were questioned in time because, in classic competition terms, the scale of one outweighed the significance of the other in the short term.

The noble Lord pulled out the question of the acquisition of Activision. That was a departure—it did not go to court, but it did lead to a different way of looking at an acquisition by Microsoft. It was interesting that the authorities in the EU and the US did not take the same view. It was notable that the CMA stood apart and made that decision. It is a small step, and one that will clearly need much more support in order for the aims of this Bill to be properly supported.

The Bill introduces a requirement for SMS firms to report mergers, which is a start. They have to meet criteria relating to share ownership, voting rights, relevance to the UK and transaction value. This will help ensure that problematic acquisitions by dominant tech firms do not fly under the radar, but the Bill does not give the regulator additional powers, as such, to intervene in those deals.

Existing merger control practice in the UK and elsewhere has struggled to grapple with tech acquisitions, which can appear relatively harmless in the present, as we have said, while resulting in serious competition, as was elegantly illustrated by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. In the UK, the CMA can intervene in a merger only if it proves that the deal is “more likely than not” to result in a “substantial lessening of competition”. Of course, that was not tested with the Microsoft acquisition. To address this, the Bill should be amended to give the CMA greater scope to block or impose remedies on SMS acquisitions. The Bill should introduce a tougher merger control regime for acquisitions by SMS firms, in the sectors where they have been designated as SMS firms.

On that basis, we support both Amendment 59, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, relating to where an investigation is ongoing, and Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, to Clause 57. As we have heard, it would amend the merger regime in the Enterprise Act. We think that may be a way of reaching in and giving the powers that the CMA will obviously need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

I wanted to intervene briefly. I do not have an amendment in the group, I have not signed my name to any, but I wanted to piggyback on the introduction of the issue of private litigation to ask a question that has been put to me by one of the big tech firms. I thought it was a reasonable question, even though it was not one I felt moved to table an amendment on. I suggest to my noble friend the Minister that he might find it easier to reply by means of a letter to me that he can put in the Library of the House, rather than taking up time.

The question is why, in this Bill, if somebody wants to bring a private litigation, there is no provision for the CMA to be required to give consent before an action can be taken by way of private litigation. In contrast, in the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom’s consent is required before private litigation is taken on a matter that refers to conditions imposed on the various companies that come under its auspices. The relevant part of the Communications Act is Section 104, where claimants must obtain permission from Ofcom to bring private enforcement claims alleging a breach of the conditions that have been set by Ofcom: they cannot simply file a claim whenever they wish. The Act says:

“The consent of OFCOM is required for the bringing of proceedings by virtue of subsection (1)(a)”.


The purpose of this is to give Ofcom a sort of gatekeeping role and prevent overlapping, or private litigation happening while something is being carried out by the regulator.

I thought it was a worthwhile question and I am happy to ask it. The other issue that has been raised with me is that in these private litigations, the contentious countervailing exemption that we discussed in an earlier group is not available to the big tech firms in the same way that it is available to them in the procedure that is set out in the Bill.

I have given the Bill team notice of these questions. I know that they have some very good answers, and I suggest to my noble friend that he asks his officials to convert that into a letter that he can put into the public domain.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the hyperactive pen of my noble friend signed up to this amendment as well. It is a great pleasure to support the noble Lords, and particularly to get cover from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—it is not usually like that. I am very happy to support this amendment, or the principle of this amendment: if not these words, some others.

Just to emphasise, when I was speaking to the last group of amendments, I set out a group of the major tech companies and said that in 2022, they had a revenue of nearly £400 billion, which is twice the size of the Ukrainian economy. That is the scale of the opponent that we are asking citizens to take on. To deny them the opportunity to band together, which in itself would still be a formidable challenge, is really to deny them justice. It is unrealistic to expect any individuals bar a few—and they are probably the ones who own the companies in the first place—to have sufficient resources to take on businesses of this scale. I would like the Minister at least to acknowledge that point. Perhaps we can go away and work out the best way to enable the reality of individuals being able to bring cases, because at the moment it is merely an idea; it cannot possibly happen.

[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

I will just add a couple of questions to the ones that my noble friend Lady Stowell just posed, and I am sorry that I have not been organised enough to share these with the Bill team in advance. Both relate to the importance of the collaborative nature of this legislation and how important it is that the tech companies are actually incentivised to work with the CMA as they go through this process. I too have had a couple of questions posed to me, in addition to what I would describe as the Ofcom-model question that my noble friend raised.

First, should the legislation require courts to avoid judgments that conflict with the DMU’s existing decisions? Otherwise, I think there is potentially a risk that you get two jurisdictions coming to contradictory conclusions. Secondly, how can we avoid litigation undermining existing DMU resolutions and therefore just extending and delaying any implementation? In both cases, there is a risk—although I defer to the huge expertise in the Committee on the need for the civil proceedings. We have to make sure that we do not undermine the very principle of trying to incentivise the SMS firms to engage in constructive dialogue through the process.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Fox Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th January 2024 Grand Committee

If this amendment were passed, it would ensure that resources are made available to make happen the kind of committee that we need in Parliament for us to perform the kind of parliamentary oversight that is becoming increasingly needed and urgent. I urge my noble friend the Minister not just to support what is proposed—it is in the Government’s interest to support this—but, as I said on the last group when I did not seem to have much luck, to adopt the amendment as the Government’s own, as they did when the Financial Services and Markets Bill was going through the House. Parliament would then see that this kind of extra responsibility and resource has the full support of the Government. We have to be better equipped to discharge our responsibilities and I hope that this attracts widespread support from the Committee today.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 82 in my name. Through the medium of parliamentary reports, it seeks to probe the Government’s position on standards—as was previewed by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. Why am I interested in standards? My experience of other sectors is that the UK’s approach to engagement in international standards is often—in my case, always—a technical approach. Technical people are sent to the relevant bodies to do the work. This flies in the face of what I have witnessed when other countries, on their own account and that of their national champions, used the process of negotiating new standards to further the strategic aims of their country and its national standards. I want to have this discussion so that I can hear how the Government view this and where the responsibility lies. Without a real handle on standards, competitivity and competition will be playing catch-up.

During the first day in Committee, when I was in the Chamber, your Lordships discussed the importance of interoperability. By my definition, interoperability has to enable both vertical interconnection between systems and horizontal interconnection with the web. The internet is a web of interconnected sites, so interoperability has to be both one to one, for example between servers and systems, and among servers and systems.

During that debate, the Minister, the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, said that there was no need to define interoperability and that doing so might unhelpfully narrow the definition. That would be true if, when he was speaking, he had covered all types of interoperability, including web interoperability. Separately, he referred to interoperability and data access. This might be helpful if he meant interoperability generically, covering different subsets. Can the Minister clarify whether his department’s definition covers many-to-many, one-to-many and one-to-one interoperability?

To be more technically clear, this would cover interoperability among and between websites, using JavaScript and web data such as URLs, as well as one-to-many interoperability, such as browser interactions with websites, and one-to-one interoperability, such as covering apps and operating systems. At present, the language of Clause 20(3) is limited only to interoperability with a platform, so it would not address abuse by interfering with web interoperability.

This may sound too detailed, but it is deliberately detailed, because the detail of standards establishes who wins commercially. Somebody has to be inside all this to make sure that we can avoid businesses locking out their competitors, because what has happened over the past 20 years is increasing amounts of locking in.

Microsoft tried to use its operating system to lock in its media player app and its browser. Google is locking in online advertisers to its systems. Apple locks in apps through the payments and App Store terms and conditions. Amazon sought to lock people into its buy box. Facebook does not allow people to cross post, and each company runs messaging platforms that work better when plugged together than when plugged in with one of their rivals. Lock-in reinforces the network effect in communications and increases each platform’s separate monopoly. Standards define which software components work with other components, while definitions help to decide which software can work with which. Definitions of what is in the browser and what is elsewhere right across the internet are critical.

As the Committee knows, there are three principal players setting these definitions. What the browser does is overseen by the World Wide Web Consortium—W3C. Other internet standards are defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force—IETF. Telecoms standards are defined by the International Telecommunication Union—ITU, which is part of the UN in Geneva. All are relevant to interoperability and it is critical that the CMA has a role in policing interoperability, not least to ensure that standards are not rigged for the benefit of the bigger players, as I have just illustrated.

The ITU is a public body, but W3C and IETF are run by private entities for their own benefit. There is a serious risk and current concern that the definitions that are vital to avoid the intermediation of the future web are being rigged for the benefit of the big tech players. Promoting interoperability between browsers and websites means that browsers are not websites and do not operate in a way that prefers the website of the browser owners. They should render websites whoever owns the website. Different functions have to be standardised and policed for this to happen. To promote online competition, businesses need to be able to compete with the dominant browser owners. To be clear, Google and Apple own or control browser engines for all Apple, Google and Microsoft devices sold worldwide—essentially, almost everything apart from Chinese systems.

It is central to digital competition that the CMA promotes open and fair interoperability, thereby ensuring that browser owners do not give themselves discriminatory preferences or otherwise use their control over one part of the system to benefit themselves at the expense of their rivals. As we go forward and technology changes, we have an opportunity to nip this in the bud rather than trying to reclaim it in the opposite direction.

I am in danger of labouring this point, but I am going to: wallets offer storage for online payment cards. Someone running a wallet business would expect that the wallet’s operation would be discrete from the browsers. You would expect a browser to operate in a non-discriminatory way, enabling all types of wallets and cards to be used. Well, in 2022, W3C passed a standard that clearly benefits the two dominant browsers by allowing them to prefer their own wallets, casting a shadow across the whole online wallets and payments business world. This happened because Google and Apple play a considerable role in the development of standards for their own benefit. If we actually want an open market, this all needs to be actively policed; I suggest that the CMA has to be central to that policing process. Without this effort, much of the other work of the DMU will be closing empty stables’ doors while chasing bolting horses.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, had some interesting things to say about interoperability and data in the previous debate, so I will be interested in his response and those of other noble Lords to this amendment. I of course will not be moving it, but I want a full reply from the Minister and possibly some further dialogue before Report, just to see the department’s view of how the engagement on this highly technical and important issue is to be done at international level. If it is not the CMA, who and how?

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Fox Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 31st January 2024 Grand Committee

I hope very much that my noble friend will be able to respond positively to this idea. If not, I hope that he will agree to meet me and others who would like to encourage him to think positively about this as a way to open up a discussion on an area about which there are many concerns.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I know the Minister is a big fan of innovation, so the introduction of some innovative procedure by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, will no doubt have filled him with delight. We all look forward to seeing how that wheels out.

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who seemed, if he does not mind me saying so, to list second-order problems. How much split of the award you get depends on whether you can bring the case in the first place. If there is no case, there is no 50:50 or 75:25. Earlier, as memory serves, we talked about individual litigants and their ability to form groups, and the Government were set against that process. Here, we are again talking about a system that avoids or stops people getting together to fight the fight. We should remember clearly the power balance that we are talking about here. In the digital field, I used the example of the top five platforms. Their revenue is on the level of that of nation states. In order to fight battles with people, companies and organisations such as that, there needs to be some ability to come together and find the funding.

I am not a lawyer, but I am persuaded by the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. When it comes to what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, there are of course code of conduct issues; generally speaking, when I have been involved in legislation, things such as codes of conduct arrive in secondary legislation, not as part of the primary legislation. I hope that he can join in debating the principle. He is right that the details of the principle are important, but I suggest that they are a second-order issue. With that in mind, what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, combined with his amendment, looks a little like long grass—

“Make me pure, Lord, but not yet”.


We need to have the debate that will be initiated by the noble and learned Lord, and others, before we start worrying about the industry code of conduct that comes behind it.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, the Committee should be enormously grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst, Lord Arbuthnot and Lord Carlile, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for bringing forward this group of amendments dealing with litigation costs in group actions. There is real and practical importance for those who will potentially benefit from this when seeking redress. The noble Lords have persuasively argued the case for the amendments in their names. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, gave notice that he would bring forward such an amendment with others at Second Reading. He has been good to his word.

At the time, the Minister, the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, argued that the Government had,

“urgently addressed the potential implications of the judgment”,—[Official Report, 5/12/23; col. GC 1452.]

in the PACCAR case, which had then recently been decided by the Supreme Court. However, the Government’s solution to the problem is, as we have heard from noble Lords this evening, limited to addressing the issue for some claims in the Competition Appeal Tribunal, leaving a big problem for litigation funding agreements—LFAs—used in other proceedings. We note the Government’s view that the Bill is not the right place to deal with the wider issues, but, as currently drafted, this will create a two-tier system in the UK, whereby claimants would have different rights and different access to financial backing, and therefore different legal support, depending on the court in which they pursued their claims. Having listened to noble Lords, that cannot be right if we are to ensure equal access to justice. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, argued, the proposed amendment to Clause 126 goes some way to addressing the issue, by widening the scope of agreements that will be placed in the pre-PACCAR position, but it does not solve the problem for cases outside the CAT.

Of course, back in early December, few of us understood the true import of LFAs, but that was before the TV drama, “Mr Bates vs The Post Office”. Now, of course, we are far more conversant with them, and so are the public. Without such arrangements, the sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses would not have been able to challenge the Post Office in the courts, and that cannot be right.

Currently, for an LFA to be enforceable by the funder for opt-in and opt-out cases, it must comply with the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013. Those regulations were introduced to deal with contingent fee agreements between claimants and lawyers, not funding arrangements with third-party funders. As I have already said, Clause 126 deals with only CAT opt- out cases. I am persuaded that we need a comprehensive solution to the problem.

We understand, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, explained, that the noble Lords who have tabled these amendments were unable to bring forward a more comprehensive solution to the PACCAR ruling at this stage of the Bill. I was very interested in what he said because he referenced the Standing Orders of the House and the ability of your Lordships’ House to determine a Bill’s scope. It is, as he said, done rarely but we certainly did it once or possibly twice in my time as Opposition Chief Whip, to the benefit of the House. On those occasions, we sought counsel’s legal opinion, which we posted in the Library of the House. I do not think that we need counsel’s opinion on this case, having a former Lord Chief Justice and other eminent lawyers making the argument.

Assuming that the Minister is unable to offer a solution today, I assure the noble Lords behind this amendment that we will willingly support amendments brought forward to resolve the issue. Since the “Mr Bates vs The Post Office” drama, government Ministers have suddenly woken up to the salience of the issue. There is surely enough goodwill in the political system for colleagues to agree a way forward on this. Legislative time is at a premium, as the Minister will no doubt tell us, and we see this as an opportunity not to be missed and to be used.

I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, on which he gave a very brilliant exposition. I tried to follow most of it, but I can see the force of his argument. His amendment is eminently supportable. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, points out, it has the upside for the Government of kicking the issue into the long grass, but there is clearly a need for some review at some stage. However, I hope that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, becomes otiose if we can see a way forward with the route that has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, this afternoon. We should be very grateful for those noble Lords, and it is nice to know that, in the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, we have a star of the silver screen in our midst. I am sorry that he is not here to hear the arguments put to his benefit. With that, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Fox]

108: Clause 147, page 93, leave out lines 3 and 4 and insert—
““consumer” means—(a) a person (“P”) acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside P’s business, or(b) a person acting in the name of, or on behalf of, P in relation to P’s purposes;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the definition of a consumer to make it explicit that it includes third parties working on behalf of a consumer, as is the case for traders.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Deputy Chairman of Committees, who once again did a magnificent job. I speak on behalf of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones to move Amendment 108 and speak to all the other amendments in this group that are in his name—seven in total. Talk has rightly centred on the CMA’s role in standing up for consumers. This whole group focuses on an important area where consumers are in danger of not getting the best possible treatment as a result of the flexing of market power. The amendments are designed to probe the competitive relationship between providers of a service and legitimate third-party agents who sell those services on.

Online intermediaries in marketplaces can serve a valuable role, helping consumers exercise choice and explore a wider range of options for their needs, ultimately supporting competition and innovation, as long as this is done in a transparent manner. Perhaps the most obvious arena for this sort of activity is the travel industry: flights and hotel bookings. There is of course a natural struggle between the provider of services—the airline, for example—online travel agencies or OTAs, and the third player, which is the platform. This is usually Google.

The question that this group poses is: what is the CMA’s role in the competition between these parts of the industry? It also asks: how is consumer choice maintained or enhanced in that activity? My noble friend’s amendments are designed either to explore the need to protect consumers who make bookings through a third-party agent, or to ban activity that could mislead consumers about the merits of booking through a third-party agent. There are of course other elements to these relationships, and I hope this debate can flesh those out as well.

There is certainly evidence that some low-cost airlines are extensively using their market power to advance their own commercial gain while potentially eroding protection and choice and inflating prices for millions of UK holidaymakers. For example, since December 2023, most OTAs have been prevented by Ryanair from booking flights on behalf of consumers. This rendered the OTAs unable to fulfil holidays that include a Ryanair flight. I understand that a consequence of this is that it is almost impossible for consumers to book an ATOL-protected package holiday that includes a Ryanair flight. I do not have full confirmation of that, but that is my belief. It is difficult not to conclude that this blocking was designed to push customers towards booking hotels as well as flights through Ryanair, rather than as part of a package holiday through an OTA. It is easy to conclude that Ryanair was able to do this because of the market power it holds over its routes.

For its part, in a regulatory announcement Ryanair welcomed the removal of its flights from OTA websites, promising lower fares “where necessary” to encourage all passengers to book directly on ryanair.com. The fact that it did not reference the fact that it had caused the removal of the OTAs in the first place, and its use of the phrase “where necessary” regarding pricing, are clear indications of its instinct in this move. I use this example to demonstrate how serious and real things are for this sector and the consumers it serves.

The question for debate here is: how could and should the CMA act to balance the relationships that surround service providers and third-party agents? The relevant provisions here are in Clause 223, on the prohibition of unfair commercial practices, and Schedule 19, on

“Commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair”.


Together, these provisions set out a list of conduct to which the consumer protections in Part 4 will apply automatically in all cases.

The list in Schedule 19 is relatively granular, so it can be extended in scope easily to deal with these issues. For example, as set out in Amendment 136, Schedule 19 could include:

“Refusing to enter into (or otherwise blocking) a transaction with a consumer on the basis that the consumer is acquiring the trader’s product through a third party acting on its behalf”.


Secondly, it could include:

“Refusing (or otherwise blocking) third party agents, acting on a consumer’s behalf, the necessary means to make or manage the consumer’s purchase”,


thereby degrading the consumer experience. Thirdly, it could include:

“Making a materially inaccurate or disparaging claim about third party alternatives through which a consumer could otherwise acquire the trader’s product”.


Fourthly, it could include:

“Imposing higher prices for a consumer who chooses to acquire a trader’s product through a third party acting on its behalf than for a consumer who acquires that product directly, in particular without providing such consumer with a clear, accurate and complete explanation as to the reason for such a price increase”.


Fifthly, it could include:

“Any act or omission which deprives a consumer of sufficient freedom to make an informed choice as to whether to purchase a product directly from a trader or to engage a third party to make such purchase on their behalf”.


We then need to ensure that the protections afforded by Part 3, on enforcement of consumer protection law, and Part 4, on consumer rights and disputes, apply equally to consumers irrespective of whether, for example, they have made flight bookings through OTAs acting as consumers’ agents or they have booked directly with the airline. The relevant provisions of the Bill relating to the definition of a “consumer” are in Clause 147, on relevant infringements, and Clause 223, on the prohibition of unfair commercial practices.

In both cases, the definition of “trader” is already explicitly extended to circumstances in which a person is acting personally or through another third party on their behalf. This concept of indirect consumer-trader relationships should be extended to the definition of “consumer”. A new paragraph should be introduced in Clauses 147 and 223 to make it explicit that it is immaterial for the purposes of that definition whether a consumer chooses to engage with a trader directly or through a third party acting on the individual’s behalf as an agent. These proposed changes are set out in Amendments 108 and 129.

Other references to indirect booking need to be provided for—again, to include the provision that it is immaterial whether a consumer engages with a trader directly or through a third-party agent. The relevant clauses here are Clause 230, on rights of redress, and Clause 243, on the meaning of “transactional decision”. Amendments 145 and 146 would make it explicit that the protections in Part 4 apply to contracts entered into by the consumer with traders, both directly and indirectly.

Given the sort of behaviour already in the market, we also need to introduce the concept of misleading or aggressive commercial practices by a trader, which are designed either to deter consumers from booking through third parties—including OTAs, which book flights on consumers’ behalf as their agents—and/or to prevent such third parties from making such bookings. In other words, we need to outlaw those practices.

This time, the relevant provisions of the Bill are in Clause 224, “Misleading actions”, and Clause 226, “Aggressive practices”. These clauses deem commercial practices to be unfair if they involve misleading actions or aggressive practices that cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision they would not have taken otherwise. A new subsection should be introduced in each of Clauses 224 and 226 to make explicit that, for the purposes of Clause 224(1)(a), “misleading information” includes

“an action where the overall effect is to deter the average consumer from using third party agents to conclude transactions on their behalf, including disparagement relating to such third parties”.

For the purposes of Clause 226, in the context of determining whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion or undue influence, account should be taken of

“whether the practice significantly impedes the average consumer’s freedom of choice in respect of whether they choose to make a booking directly with a trader or to use a third-party agent to conclude transactions on their behalf”.

This is the effect of Amendments 139 and 141. The Minister will understand that this is an important example of the potential misuse of market power, to the detriment of consumers. We await his response.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for that introduction. He made an excellent argument about why we should include third parties working on behalf of consumers in the remit of the Bill. As he described, this particularly relates to package travel firms.

Whether using a legacy airline or a low-cost carrier, all of us will have booked flights online. These days we have unprecedented freedom to fit our travel arrangements to our specific requirements and then pay for them at home, at the office or on our phones. But how many of us have had the far less welcome experience of discovering, a few minutes later, that our deal was not as good as we thought and that there were cheaper fares for the same flight? This is frustrating and unfair, and, unfortunately, it is due to deliberate anti-competitive practices, many of which the noble Lord described.

Low-cost airlines—LCAs—have transformed the aviation landscape. They have disrupted the market, offering travellers unprecedented choice and competition. Their rise in the UK has empowered consumers, democratising air travel and making it affordable for a much broader demographic than used to be the case. The greater availability and lower cost of flights to and from the United Kingdom has, in turn, led to the rise of online travel agencies and tour operators, known as OTAs. These offer travellers a wide array of pre-packaged holiday options, which include flights, accommodation and add-on activities. The convenience of being able to plan and book an entire trip from the comfort of one’s home has fuelled the popularity of online package travel. OTAs are becoming extremely popular and convenient ways for families to plan, book and pay for their holidays.

However, in recent years the low-cost airlines, themselves once the industry disruptors, have felt threatened by the newer online travel agencies. The industry is witnessing a growing trend of complex anti-competitive actions aimed at stifling competition. One such tactic is curtailing seat availability to specific destinations, which renders them inaccessible through OTAs or individual bookings unless bundled as airline packages. Another anti-competitive tactic is to introduce cumbersome verification procedures for passengers who book through OTAs rather than directly with the airlines, adversely affecting the consumer experience. Unfortunately, in this battle for market share between the LCAs and the OTAs, the consumers are often the casualties.

The situation is made still more opaque for consumers by the existence of 13 different types of airfare. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Leong, who has looked into this. He tells me—I will mention only the most common six—that there are normal fares, point-to-point fares, excursion fares, APEX fares, PEX and super-PEX fares, and branded fares. Additionally, some come with specific restrictions, some are non-refundable, others cannot be exchanged or transferred, and none of these restrictions is immediately obvious or consistent with ticket types.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments concerns package travel. I will address Amendment 108, along with Amendments 129, 136, 139, 141, 145 and 146. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling them and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for speaking to them so eloquently. These amendments cover the same theme: the use of third parties in contracts between consumers and traders.

I reassure the noble Lord that the protections sought in these amendments are mostly provided for in other parts of consumer law, which I will detail. For example, Clauses 224 and 226 prohibit traders using misleading information or aggressive practices. This prohibition would already cover situations involving a consumer’s decision on whether to use a third-party agent. Similarly, Amendments 145 and 146 seek to make clear in the legislation that a consumer enjoys consumer rights, whether they purchase from a trader directly or via a third-party agent. However, in either situation the contract is between the trader and the consumer, and therefore the consumer benefits from the relevant consumer rights. Amendment 146 focuses on the transactional decisions related to purchases from a trader. Whether the decision is carried out by the consumer themselves or a third party is not relevant. The consumer that the contract is with will receive the relevant consumer rights. The practical effect of Amendments 145 and 146 is already achieved through consumer law.

I shall record two instances in which these amendments would have an adverse and unintended effect and thus why the existing wording of consumer law is set out the way it is. Consumer protection requires a consumer-to-trader relationship for consumer rights to apply. If, as suggested in Amendments 108 and 129, the definition of a consumer were changed to include third-party agents, they would in effect also become consumers in the eyes of the law. That means that the consumer’s relationship with the agent would be classed as a consumer-to-consumer relationship instead. Should there be an issue between the consumer and the third-party agent, the consumer would then no longer benefit from the same consumer rights as ordinarily apply. The amendment suggested by the noble Lord would broaden a very established principle of consumer law with this unintended effect.

I shall conclude my response—including the matters raised by Amendment 136—with reference to travel agents and the sale of package travel holidays, as I believe that may have inspired some of the noble Lord’s amendments. This is a sector in which it is common for consumers to use agents on their behalf. I am aware that issues have arisen between online agents and flight operators. Ministers in my department were pleased to meet representatives from an online travel agent and an airline recently to understand the issues from all perspectives.

Through our markets regime, the Government have ensured that the CMA has significant powers to investigate and act if it finds that businesses are behaving anti- competitively in a market. It is right that those matters are for the CMA to determine itself.

Separately, the Department for Business and Trade carried out a call for evidence on the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 during September-December 2023. Those rules set the consumer protection framework for package holidays. It is vital that consumer protections for package holidays, as a key consumer leisure activity and expense, provide strong protections and that regulations support consumers to access choice and a competitive market. I am pleased to confirm that we are now analysing a substantial volume of responses, including from consumer groups, package organisers and suppliers, such as airlines. The operation of airlines and travel agents is governed by PTRs and ATOL. Those are being reviewed. That is the appropriate way to consider these issues.

Given the noble Lord’s interest, once further analysis has been undertaken, I will be eager to share with him the Government’s response to that consultation. I hope that, in light of what I have set out, he will be comfortable to withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response and for his offer to look through the data, which we will be happy to pick up. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her support and for enlightening me on the intricacies of airline ticketing. I suggest that there may well be a new class Z, which she and I will get, where our luggage gets lost as a result of what we have been saying here today.

Central to the Minister’s response is that all this exists already in some form or other, or the words have not been quite crafted correctly. Saying that the existing protections are there belies the fact that there are problems today. If those existing protections were 100% where they should be, doing what they should, the noble Baroness and I would not be able to stand up and list the problems that exist. It behoves us and the Minister to talk between Committee and Report, including my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, to set out where there are clear issues at the moment and where there could be changes, even if we did not use the words contained in these amendments.

There are problems, and it would help if the Minister acknowledged that. The existing wording and the use and interpretation of those laws is not solving those problems, so there is something to sort out here, one way or another. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 108 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

My Lords, on this group of amendments on net zero and the collective interests of consumers, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bennett, for their Amendment 109, which would explicitly provide that consumers’ collective interests include avoiding any detrimental effects that they may incur by not reaching net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for raising the important issue of protecting consumers during the transition to net zero. At present, where environmental issues arise, the court or enforcers already have the requisite powers to take action, including by tackling misleading green claims which affect consumers’ purchasing decisions. In addition, in its annual plan, the CMA listed

“helping to accelerate the UK’s transition to a net zero economy”

as one of its priorities.

We are already making strong progress towards net zero by 2050. The UK has reduced its emissions further and faster than any other major economy. To that end, we feel that there are sufficient measures already in place to protect consumers during the transition to net zero. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will feel sufficiently reassured to withdraw her amendment.

On the right to repair, I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for their Amendments 128A, 145A and 201 and, in the latter case, for our recent discussion on the issue, where we had much of a meeting of minds.

The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 are being restated in the Bill and prohibit unfair commercial practices. These include misleading actions which are likely to affect a consumer’s decision-making, so consumers are already protected from misleading statements made by traders on the availability of spare parts. Furthermore, there is a range of activity across government presently which support the aims of the proposed amendments, which in summary focus on sustainability and ensuring that products are repaired, where feasible.

The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero’s eco-design initiative aims to encourage the uptake of products which use less energy, resources and materials through product-specific regulations. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is responsible for waste and resources policies, including preventing waste occurring in the first place. Both departments work with the DBT to ensure that, over their lifetime, products use less energy. This ultimately saves carbon, reduces waste and helps households and businesses to reduce their energy bills.

New and updated eco-design measures introduced in summer 2021 have, for the first time, included requirements for manufacturers to make spare parts available and replaceable with commonly available tools, as well as to provide information to professional repairers to assist with repairs. These new requirements cover dishwashers, washing machines and washer-dryers, refrigeration appliances, televisions and other electronic displays. The measures will help to establish a “right to repair” for consumers, as part of a more resource-efficient economy. Defra has recently set out aims in its new waste prevention programme to move to a circular economy by keeping goods in circulation for as long as possible and at their highest value. This includes increasing the reuse, repair and remanufacture of goods. We are consulting now on reforms to the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Regulations and will consult later this year on reforms to the batteries regulations. We have also launched a separate call for evidence on reforms to the WEEE regulations to seek views on how they can further support the circular economy by incentivising more sustainable product design and higher levels of reuse of electrical products.

Further, from 29 April 2024, the new product security regulatory regime will require manufacturers to publish information on the minimum length of time that security updates will be provided for consumer connectable products. However, mandating a minimum security update period before the impact of these measures is known could run the risk of imposing obligations on businesses disproportionate to a product’s lifespan and any associated security benefits. The Government have committed to a post-implementation review of these new measures to understand their impact before any further action is considered.

Similarly, adding rights to repairability to consumer law now will oblige retailers to pre-emptively seek information from the manufacturers of products that they sell. More work is required before this is suitable for the Government to ask. In the meantime, it would mean greater costs and a reduction in choice for consumers. It may also have implications for our WTO and international treaty compliance, as it would constitute a new technical barrier to trade about which we would need first to notify and consult partners.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I welcome what the Minister says, in some respects. Will the issue of updating electrical and electronic products be part of that review, too? In other Bills, we have discussed who has the obligation to maintain software updates for equipment from the perspective of safety as well as longevity. I hope that the review takes that into consideration, too.

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for that. There is a lot of information, and it is reasonable that I write to the noble Lord about the gamut of the consultation that is going on. As I said in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, a lot of consultation work is going on in the two main departments—business and Defra. It is therefore only fair that we spell that out, and we are happy to do so.

To finish what I was saying, I hope, on the basis of what I have said and those assurances, that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

I turn now to Amendment 134, on greenwashing, for which I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, Lady Kidron and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. The amendment would add specific greenwashing claims to the list of banned practices in Schedule 19. Misleading consumers about the environmental qualities or impact of goods and services so that it leads them to take a different purchasing decision is already against the law. Further, initiatives are under way, including the CMA’s draft guidance on sustainability agreements between businesses, which are aimed at helping to achieve environmental goals. The CMA has also published guidance on environmental claims on goods and services to help businesses understand how to communicate their green credentials without misleading consumers.

Part 3 of the Bill will strengthen consumer protection enforcement by allowing public enforcers to make applications to the court, which will not only stop the infringing conduct but allow the imposition of financial penalties. In addition, the Bill introduces new powers for the CMA to take action more quickly against bad business practices, without needing lengthy court action, and to give penalties of up to 10% of turnover for those breaking consumer law.

In summary, given that greenwashing is already prevented in law, our priority is to keep these existing interventions under review to observe their impact before rushing into further legislative action. For these reasons, I hope that noble Lords will feel comfortable not to press this amendment.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Fox Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

I hope that the noble Lord did not misunderstand me. I think we said that this is already covered in legislation. The definition is capable of including a vehicle that is or may be being used to store goods that may disclose a breach of legislation. We are being clear that the definition of “goods” is sufficiently broad to include goods or vehicles. I was coming on to say that an enforcer may inspect products under paragraph 25 of Schedule 5 for the purposes of checking the compliance of those products with relevant legislation, so we are tying this back to the relevant legislation. We believe that the definitions are already sufficiently wide and therefore there is no need to further legislate.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

That is beginning to be helpful, but the Minister will be aware that different local authorities are receiving different legal advice. Some are comfortable with the definition that he has given and others are uncomfortable with it. At some point, possibly during Report, a Pepper v Hart definition that solidly allows legal officers in local authorities to make the decision that a car is a container in particular circumstances would, at the very least, be helpful. Perhaps adopting the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, would be even more so.

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

I was not aware that there are different definitions in different local authorities. That seems a valid point to address, so we will look at it before Report.

Amendment 124C is on fines for obstructing enforcement officers, for which I again thank my noble friend Lord Lucas. This addresses the question of the appropriate level of fines for the offence of obstructing an enforcement officer, under paragraph 36 of Schedule 5. Currently, the fine must not exceed level 3 on the standard scale, which is £1,000. Amendment 124C would increase that to level 5—an unlimited amount. I fully agree with my noble friend that any sort of obstruction, whether intentionally failing to comply with instructions or knowingly giving misleading information, is a serious matter that must be subject to criminal enforcement.

The current level of the fines was subject to previous government consultation ahead of the introduction of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It was set to reflect the deterrent purpose of the offence, proportionately and consistently with comparable criminal offences. For example, the penalty for obstructing a police officer or an officer of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is set at a maximum of £1,000, which is level 3. We consider that the current level of these fines continues to be proportionate to the offence, consistent with comparable regimes. I once again thank my noble friend for his consideration of this issue and hope that my explanation persuades him not to press his amendment.

I thank my noble friend Lord Lindsay and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bakewell and Lady Crawley, for tabling Amendment 125, which was presented by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. It would end the prohibition on enforcers to use information provided by a person in response to a written information notice in criminal proceedings against that person. Prohibitions of this sort apply throughout the UK legal system and serve to help protect a person from self-incrimination when enforcement authorities are given broad powers to send information notices to compel the production of information.

The Government have listened carefully to trading standards departments, which consider that removing this prohibition would enable them to gather evidence needed for consumer prosecutions more easily. We have been told that using other information-gathering powers comes with operational challenges, such as having to resource travel outside the local area to carry out investigations. We are keen to work with enforcers to address these challenges. However, this prohibition is an important protection. It safeguards a right that is recognised under English common law and the Human Rights Act.

In summary, Amendment 125 stems from an operational issue that does not justify rolling back well-established legal protections. I therefore hope the noble Lord will feel able not to move this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

The noble Lord is such a strong unionist that I would be surprised if that were not the case.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

When the Minister writes that letter, perhaps he could extend it to include the United Kingdom Internal Market Act because that seems not to have been taken into consideration. Some of us here today—at least two of us—participated in the lengthy discussions about differing standards across borders and how they might be enforced, and this seems to fall well into that territory. What consideration has been made of that Act in drawing up the terms of the Bill? It would be helpful if the letter set out the various positions within the internal market Act and how they have been represented in the Bill.

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. I share his interest in this matter, and that was exactly what I was intending to examine. The United Kingdom Internal Market Act is a fundamental new piece of architecture that, on us exiting the EU, allows us to trade as one single nation, and I will always be promoting that.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Fox Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 11th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 60 is in my name. I was expecting to be ploughing a rather lonely furrow on this amendment, so I welcome the enthusiasm of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, particularly as it is based on such relevant experience and came with such authority. I thank her for that.

The Minister has been very open in our discussions on these issues, which focus on two areas: interoperability and standards, which are, of course, inextricably linked. One critical area to be clarified is the importance of vertical and horizontal interoperability and the fact that each requires different responses. Clause 20 covers vertical interoperability; for example, the promotion of the use of platforms as neutral distribution channels to market for all kinds of apps. The Bill does not explicitly include interoperability between an app and a platform that operates as a distributor and, in a network sense, among websites that compete with each other and with the platforms. This is horizontal interoperability.

The department’s view is that Clause 12 is wide enough to catch all of this. The Minister said in Committee that it is the department’s contention that defining interoperability is unnecessary because it considers it to be a “commonly understood technical term”. That is welcome, but it relies on a level of interpretation and inference by the DMU because the department’s interpretation is not clear by the letter of the Bill. As such, it would be helpful if the Minister could confirm the explicit inclusion of horizontal interoperability between websites in promoting competition. Will he please confirm that Clause 20(3)(e) will not limit conduct requirements to promote interoperability with a platform only, and set out how the Bill permits the DMU to consider requirements relating to interoperability in a range of contexts, including web browsers, apps, operating systems and websites?

As far as standards are concerned, I think we agree that there is a need for open and non-discriminatory international standards to support interoperability and promote the competition at which the Bill is so firmly targeted. That this is important is illustrated by the fact that Apple recently publicly threatened to block access to the open web from its devices. For there to be competition, the open web needs to interoperate with Apple and Google browsers. This is quite a serious point. This activity is controlled via W3C standards.

The amendment I have tabled is designed to be helpful. It ensures simply that the DMU understands its role in seeking to ensure that international standards bodies are promoting interoperability, both vertically and horizontally, and hence promoting competition. Given the central importance of standards to competition, my aim is to emphasise that this is not an add-on for the DMU but a core activity. I thought the Minister might be able to accept this amendment, but if he feels unwilling to do so, I feel sure that if he could put on record this important role for the DMU, it will be an important step forward, and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been illuminating to listen to the varied and valuable contributions from all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I thank all those who have risen to speak. As may be expected, a broad range of knowledge, differing views and important concerns has been shared and expressed. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to Apple’s dominance and it not being prepared to comply with any digital legislation. This should make us mindful of what big tech is getting up to. One thing is very clear: there is a strong consensus in the House that legislation is needed to catch up with, and indeed anticipate, the rapidly changing digital landscape which even the most technophobic among us can no longer afford to ignore.

I shall speak specifically to Amendments 14, 15, 23 and 24 in the name of my noble friend Lady Jones of Whitchurch. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Harding and Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding their names. The principle behind Amendments 14 and 15 is to ensure that the Competition and Markets Authority can tackle anti-competitive conduct in a non-designated activity, provided that the anti-competitive conduct is related to a designated activity. These amendments do not seek to hamper digital innovation but rather to create a pro-competition market in which consumer interests are safeguarded.