Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Harding of Winscombe
Main Page: Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Harding of Winscombe's debates with the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology
(7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am hugely grateful to my noble friend Lord Faulks, if I can still call him that—in real life, he is my friend, even if he now sits on another Bench—both for tabling his amendments and for the incredibly comprehensive and thoughtful way in which he has introduced this group. To have the noble Lord’s expertise on this topic is incredibly valuable. I have signed his Amendments 16 and 53 but have also tabled my own in this group: Amendments 17 and 54. I am grateful to the noble Lords who have signed mine.
By way of some background to add to what the noble Lord has said, as I mentioned on the first day in Committee, and indeed at Second Reading, the Communications and Digital Select Committee held hearings on the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill during the summer of last year. We took evidence from the large tech firms as well as a range of challenger firms. We focused on Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, which is what we are discussing at this time.
As my noble friend the Minister acknowledged when he spoke at Second Reading, we as a committee found that the Bill as it stood at that time—as introduced to Parliament—struck a careful balance. We felt that, overall, it was proportionate and would deliver on the outcomes that we were seeking to achieve and all felt were necessary for this legislation—namely, a level playing field for the various different businesses that now seek to operate in digital markets. We were careful to acknowledge that striking that balance was hard to achieve; it was not an easy thing. We commended the Government for that. We were also clear, however, that any further changes, particularly to some contentious areas, such as the appeals process, could cause significant problems.
As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, we will come on to the question of appeals in a later group. The insertion of the word “proportionate” in the Bill, in the context of the conduct requirements that the CMA may impose, or the specific pro-competition interventions, has the potential to create a question and introduce a loophole that could be exploited during the appeals process. This is making people nervous—it is certainly making me nervous.
The noble Lord’s amendment would change the Bill back to its original wording. I have signed the amendment based on the way he, as a legal expert, has explained it, which seems to me to be the best way forward. However, my Amendments 17 and 54 try to make it clear to any tribunal hearing down the line that, by including the word “proportionate”, Parliament has not intended to create any new, novel or different opportunity for anybody to interpret what the CMA should always be doing, which is being proportionate in the way in which it goes about its duties. My amendments are, if you like, a safeguard, but I think what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has proposed is clearer and neater. Like him, I look forward to the Minister’s reply. This is an area which is causing quite a lot of concern and on which we need a clear response from the Government.
My Lords, it is an honour to follow such an esteemed legal brain and parliamentary brain. I am neither, but I have put my name to my noble friend Lady Stowell’s two amendments and I want to make two points in support of her arguments.
The common-law concept of proportionality is important in this legislation. I am not supporting these amendments in any spirit other than wanting to make sure that we are proportionate in the way we regulate the technology sector. After our first day in Committee, I was reflecting a little that perhaps all of us got a bit carried away—certainly I did—with some of our oratory about the importance of mitigating the downsides of the technology sector. I want to put it on the record that I recognise the upsides, too. Therefore, a proportionate path is important. I sit on the Communications and Digital Select Committee that my noble friend so ably chairs and, as she said, we felt that the Bill as introduced into the Commons got that proportional balance right.
We have been in this place before, having a very similar argument. A number of us here today are part of the Online Safety Act gang. I had a look at Hansard and on 19 July, during the last group on Report on the Online Safety Bill, I proposed a group of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which sought to clarify how non-content-related harms would be captured in the Bill. The argument made by the Minister, my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, was that, by trying to define it in the Bill, we would create legal uncertainty because that concept was already defined. Now we find ourselves on the opposite sides of the same argument, where I think I am hearing the Government say that there is no intention to bring in any different definition of proportionality than that which already exists—that the CMA is already mandated to give significant consideration to proportionality—yet they want to put the word back in the Bill in the way that they resisted firmly in the Online Safety Bill, when a number of us were seeking a different form of clarification. I do not think that you can have it both ways quite so quickly in related legislation. Either the Government mean something different from the existing requirements of proportionality that the CMA is under, or we should simply take out this additional complexity and reduce the risk of further legal disputes once the Bill is enacted.
My Lords, I support Amendments 39 and 40 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which are about countervailing benefits. I have added my name to them. Before I make my remarks about those amendments, it is worth noting that my noble friend Lord Black gave quite a compelling argument in support of Amendment 48, describing how it would not drive a coach and horses through what the Bill is trying to introduce by virtue of the final offer mechanism but would strengthen it further. I will be interested to hear what my noble friend the Minister has to say in reply to that.
In response to the debate on a previous group of amendments, my noble friend the Minister said that, by virtue of the process of parliamentary scrutiny, or just making laws, we should improve Bills, in the sense that the way in which they are first introduced to Parliament does not mean that they cannot be changed. He is absolutely right: doing our jobs should lead to stronger, better and more effective legislation.
In the few amendments I have tabled I have tried not to unpick what has already been changed in the Commons but to add clarification where I felt that the changes were going in the wrong direction. On the topic of countervailing benefits, I added my name to Amendments 39 and 40, which revert Clause 29 back to its original wording at the point of the Bill’s introduction to Parliament, because I could not think of another way to secure the important purpose of Clause 29.
If I may, I again return to the way in which the Communications and Digital Committee scrutinised the Bill when it was first introduced. Countervailing benefits was one of the topics that we identified as an area of contention. In the course of our hearings, we heard a range of views on this clause. As other noble Lords have voiced in this debate, some wanted to see Clause 29 removed and others wanted it strengthened. The committee found that it should remain as it was; that it did not need to be changed and should remain in the Bill. We noted that the countervailing benefits exemption is
“designed as a backstop rather than an initial enforcement measure: the CMA is expected to take consumer benefit into account throughout its work”.
In conclusion, we said that the exemption
“provides a proportionate backstop as long as the threshold for using it remains high. The Government should resist any changes that would lower the threshold”.
Contrary to those who argued either to take out Clause 29 or to raise its threshold even further, my view is that, as it stood, it was fair and proportionate. Some of the big tech firms did not like it at all, but we thought none the less that it was an appropriate measure. Therefore, it would be fair to all parties for us to revert to the original text.
My Lords, I, too, wish to speak to Amendments 39 and 40, to which I have added my name. First, it is worth dwelling briefly on what the countervailing benefits exemption is: quite a “get out of jail free” card. To be clear: the company in question will have been found to have SMS, conduct requirements will have been imposed and the company will have been found to be breaching them and be on its way to jail. The countervailing benefits exemption is a “get out of jail free” card because the benefits that the new product or functionality brings are so good that it is worth breaching this set of fundamental competition principles.
That exemption is a really powerful tool that gets you completely out of jail. It can also enable you to simply slow down the process by arguing that it should be used, even if you will not succeed in getting out of jail. The process of slowing down being sent to jail is also very powerful for the big tech firms. This is a big weapon in the Bill.
However, I can also make the case, as many of the tech companies did at our Select Committee—as my noble friend Lady Stowell just said—that the exemption is an important tool to have in the Bill because we do not want to live in a world where large monopolists are not encouraged to innovate at all. There is an argument that we need to find the Goldilocks spot, if noble Lords will forgive me mixing my metaphors. I sit on my noble friend’s committee and, as she said, we have heard from the companies that would like this removed and from the companies that would like it strengthened. I share her view that the Bill as introduced to the House of Commons got that spot just about right.
Does my noble friend the Minister think that the new wording, introduced at a late stage in the Commons, of
“could not be realised without the conduct”
is the same as “indispensable”, or does it set a higher or a lower threshold to be able to use the “get out of jail free” card? I do not think he is going to argue that it sets a higher threshold; I think it is either the same as or a lower threshold. If it is a lower threshold, why do we really think that we need to make it easier for people who are on their way to jail to get out? If it is the same then we are right back to where we were two hours ago. Why do we need to define something differently that is already well enshrined in law as “indispensable”?
Before my noble friend answers that, can he shed some light on which stakeholders feel that this is unclear?
I cannot give a full account of the individual stakeholders right now; I am happy to ask the department to clarify further in that area. My contention is that the effect of the two sentences are the same, with the new one being clearer than the old one. I am very happy to continue to look at that and listen to the arguments of noble Lords, but that is the position. Personally, when I look at the two sentences, I find it very difficult to discern any difference in meaning between them. As I say, I am very happy to receive further arguments on that.
With respect to the participative arrangements by which a decision is reached around, for example, a conduct requirement, during the period of conduct requirement design, and during the decision-making period, it is, as my noble friend Lord Lansley has stated, highly to be expected that firms will make representations about the consumer benefits of their product. During a breach investigation, on the other hand, later on in the process, a consumer benefits exemption can be used as a safeguard or defence against a finding of breach.
Sorry, but there were so many questions that I have completely lost track. Perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will restate her question.
My Lords, I will be brief. I strongly support the intentions of this part of the Bill. What the Government are attempting to do must be right. Relative inaction on mergers by leading regulators around the world has contributed to the problems that we are now trying to address with the creation of the DMU. Killer acquisitions are a serious and enduring problem in this market.
My view is that the CMA, among other regulators, probably could and should have acted earlier. It is worth pausing for a moment to consider why it did not. One reason is a lack of boldness; a reluctance to take risks by taking action with its existing powers; a fear of losing. Although we are empowering it a good deal through the DMU, it is important to bear in mind that, unless we secure a change of mindset in the CMA, I am not sure that we will get the benefits that we are hoping for from this Bill—certainly not all of them.
A second reason why a good number of the big regulators did not intervene earlier derives from the intellectual history of the current legislation, which is similar all around the world. Over the last 30 years, in the post-Cold War world, almost all the major jurisdictions, and a lot of minor ones, put on the statute book very similar legislation. About 150 jurisdictions have done so, based on a set of ideas often summarised as the Chicago school, although it is rather a caricature, which believed that there would be no need for such an interventionist approach because it would be difficult for any platform to sustain for long a dominant position, and another technological change would supplant them. That may yet turn out to be the case, with AI and new generations of technology.
However, we now know that it has not been successful with the existing range of platforms; they have been around for a long time, and we have ample evidence of abuse of market position by some of them. That is why we need to qualify the Chicago school approach in our minds. We need the people who run our competition regulators to shed what may be a lifetime of acceptance of some of their reflexes in respect of these big deals. They should start to challenge far more, and be far less accepting of, the tenets of the Chicago school.
Perhaps I could summarise my position overall by saying that I am sympathetic to all the clauses that have been tabled, but Ministers will need to reassure us that their intentions for these clauses really will be delivered by what is in the Bill at the moment. I myself am not sure that it is enough. There may be merit in some or all of the amendments in achieving what the Government themselves say they want to do.
My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks just made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, about recognising how important it is that we embolden the CMA to tackle these merger issues. I do not have anything like the expertise in detailed drafting that my noble friend Lord Lansley has just demonstrated, but I encourage the Government to listen carefully to his advice and review the drafting. We should see if we cannot come together with a solution on Report that achieves what I think we are all trying to achieve here.
I would also like to briefly correct the record. On Monday, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, I said that all the companies had appealed their designation of the DMA. Much to my amusement, Google was very swift to email me on Tuesday morning to tell me no, it was very keen to collaborate, so I would hate that to become a considered fact of this Committee—I owe Google that.
I support the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I point out to the Committee that it is actually a very small amendment. The CMA told us in one of its briefings last week that it could undertake only two SMS investigations at any one time. We should recognise that it is a very minor amendment meaning that, while the CMA is investigating two entities, those two entities will be required to report. We should accept that that is a very small improvement that we should encourage the Government to accept.
My Lords, I am sure the Committee will be relieved to know that we do not have a great deal to say on this, except that we see merit in the amendments from both the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Lansley.
I thought the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made a very good point: this is very simple. It is about providing and encouraging greater transparency in the merger process. It is straightforward in ensuring that all parties are aware of the status of the undertaking involved, and it brings clarity where the SMS is concerned.
It has to be regretted that companies might want to use mergers and acquisitions as a way of delaying SMS designation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, has just said, there are delays enough in the process as it is. If the CMA is going to be able to do only two of these a year, there is hardly much reason to encourage more, greater and longer delays in the process.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, argued that designations could take until 2025 and delays will occur. With the sheer volume of acquisitions taking place, if companies are going to use that as a means of gaming the system then that cannot be right. It cannot be in consumers’ interests either.
I turn to the elegant amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. It seeks to ensure, where a designated undertaking is involved, that there is an assessment of the impact on consumers. The Minister has argued from the Dispatch Box that the legislation is designed by the Government to place the interests of consumers at the very front of this piece of working legislation. So, if a merger is likely to lead to a loss of benefit to consumers, it must therefore be right that market intelligence is shared, and we assume from our perspective on the Labour Benches that that must be a public good to be supported.
My Lords, the hyperactive pen of my noble friend signed up to this amendment as well. It is a great pleasure to support the noble Lords, and particularly to get cover from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—it is not usually like that. I am very happy to support this amendment, or the principle of this amendment: if not these words, some others.
Just to emphasise, when I was speaking to the last group of amendments, I set out a group of the major tech companies and said that in 2022, they had a revenue of nearly £400 billion, which is twice the size of the Ukrainian economy. That is the scale of the opponent that we are asking citizens to take on. To deny them the opportunity to band together, which in itself would still be a formidable challenge, is really to deny them justice. It is unrealistic to expect any individuals bar a few—and they are probably the ones who own the companies in the first place—to have sufficient resources to take on businesses of this scale. I would like the Minister at least to acknowledge that point. Perhaps we can go away and work out the best way to enable the reality of individuals being able to bring cases, because at the moment it is merely an idea; it cannot possibly happen.
I will just add a couple of questions to the ones that my noble friend Lady Stowell just posed, and I am sorry that I have not been organised enough to share these with the Bill team in advance. Both relate to the importance of the collaborative nature of this legislation and how important it is that the tech companies are actually incentivised to work with the CMA as they go through this process. I too have had a couple of questions posed to me, in addition to what I would describe as the Ofcom-model question that my noble friend raised.
First, should the legislation require courts to avoid judgments that conflict with the DMU’s existing decisions? Otherwise, I think there is potentially a risk that you get two jurisdictions coming to contradictory conclusions. Secondly, how can we avoid litigation undermining existing DMU resolutions and therefore just extending and delaying any implementation? In both cases, there is a risk—although I defer to the huge expertise in the Committee on the need for the civil proceedings. We have to make sure that we do not undermine the very principle of trying to incentivise the SMS firms to engage in constructive dialogue through the process.
The CAT’s class action powers have been a success, although probably not an unqualified success—but that is for another day. I just want to pick up on one point.
Nowhere is the asymmetry of power greater than between an ordinary consumer and a platform. We must try to find ways of enabling consumers to have greater self-reliance, to have mechanisms to achieve some redress of that asymmetry. When I was in the CMA, I did quite a lot of work on this subject, not only with respect to platforms but generally with respect to big firms, and that work largely got lost.
I suggest to the Minister that he asks for some work in this field to be done by the CMA, not only with respect to platforms but across the piece, to see whether a much more comprehensive programme—taking into greater consideration the reality of the asymmetries of power that we see have now developed in the marketplace —can be put together and give consumers greater confidence that they are not being ripped off, as so many of them are at the moment, frankly.