Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Forsyth of Drumlean
Main Page: Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Forsyth of Drumlean's debates with the HM Treasury
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it was, along with other Members, a privilege to be a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. I want to add a few words to what has been said. As a member of the commission whose view on this matter was for full separation, I signed up to the recommendation in order to have unanimity in the committee and because for the rest of us, with due deference to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop, it was an act of faith. That is what the recommendation from the committee was, because ring-fencing is at the moment theoretical. Without naming the person, I well remember someone on the Vickers commission saying to me, “John, we lost our nerve and advocated ring-fencing”. I do not want us to lose our nerve but I want us to be vigilant on this issue.
I well remember the evidence given to us by Paul Volcker who, noble Lords will remember, said, “I cannot really understand what the situation will be if you are the holding company which has authority over the ring-fence. If it comes to making a decision by that holding company’s executives about the future of the company, then the executives of the holding company will win over the decisions at the ring-fence”. At the end of the day, it is the holding company that matters. There is therefore something uneasy and illogical about this issue.
I also well remember another witness, not at the banking standards commission but elsewhere—Willem Buiter, when he was on the Monetary Policy Committee before he went to Citibank to be its chief economist—saying, “Remember that the half-life in the financial services industry is less than three years”. In other words, people will forget what has happened before. Having spent nine or 10 years as chairman of the Treasury Committee, all that I can say is that the banking industry is ever vigilant. If we sit back here for a four or five-year period and then return to the matter to see what has happened, the landscape will have changed completely. All that I would add to noble Lords’ comments is that if this House does not express that it has to be vigilant at all times, we are going to lose out and it could be to the disbenefit of ourselves as a Parliament and of society.
My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading because I could not stay for the wind-ups, but listened to most of that debate. I should like to press my noble friend on his logic. He says that we cannot have some body to police or check up on the regulator. I am very surprised that my noble friend Lord Blackwell, with whom I am normally absolutely on the same square on most issues, says that we must trust the regulator. There was a reason we got into this mess and, by the way, we still ought to have a proper inquiry into what the regulator was doing and how the crisis happened in the first place. The very last thing I feel like doing is trusting the regulator.
We have also seen the regulators going off to work for the banks at, no doubt very appropriately, very high salaries to help them with their compliance and operation of regulation. Let us face it, I am not sure where I stand on the notion that we should trust the regulator on this matter. Like the noble Lord, I was prepared to go along with ring-fencing but could not see how it could work. But it certainly is not going to work if you have very clever people in the banks and at the regulator, but no one is actually breathing down the regulator’s neck. That seems to be the lesson that we can learn with absolute clarity from the previous experience.
I have to say that my noble friend’s logic was, “We can’t possibly have the regulator being subject to second-guessing all the time. How are they going to be able to carry out the agreed policy?”. As has repeatedly been said in a number of speeches, this is an experiment because it is part of a compromise to try to get the banks reasonably on board and to proceed on the basis of consensus.
In my seven years—perhaps it was nine years—working in an investment bank, I learnt that investment bankers are extremely adept at getting between the wallpaper and the wall. If they can find a way to get around something, they will. That is their job and how they make money and resources. The notion that if we have ring-fencing there will not be lots of clever people finding very good schemes to get around the intention of it and that the regulator will stand up to them, especially if we are in a period of prosperity, flies in the face of the experience that we have had.
It is essential to have someone independent of the regulator looking at this relationship and seeing if it is working. They should report to Parliament, with Parliament ready to enforce separation if it is required. It is by putting their feet to the fire in this way that we can be sure that they realise that it is in their interests to make this ring-fence procedure work. Without that, it will not work and we will be back to where we were before you can say “renewed prosperity”.
My noble friend uncharacteristically showed a lack of logic in what he was saying. If he wants the House to commit itself to this policy, he needs to address this basic question of who will guard the guardians.
I have a lot of sympathy with what my noble friend has said. However, on my noble friend’s thesis, there is the problem that if you have a regulator of the regulator, you should have a regulator of the regulator of the regulator. At some point you have to put some trust in someone. As he has said, bankers are adept at getting around any set of regulations. Is there not a point at which you have to have trust?
I agree, but all questions can be reduced in that way—reductio ad absurdum. On that basis, we would get rid of Parliament, which ultimately is the regulator of the regulator. The regulator is accountable to Parliament. We are dealing here with day-to-day very complex circumstances. In this great House we have many experienced people. In my view, the banking commission has done a brilliant job, as has the Treasury Select Committee in many respects. I think all of us would agree that that was appropriate and that that job has been done. However, as I understand it, in the particular instance of deciding whether this ring-fencing experiment will work, here we are talking about the need for some kind of process which will scrutinise that and will report on an informed and an in-depth basis. That is why I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, which seems a sensible course of action.
In the case of the Bank of England, why did it allow interest rates to remain so low when it could see a housing bubble and an asset bubble being formed? Even the former governor, who is now a Member of this House, has acknowledged that and has said publicly that it is very difficult when everyone is making lots of money and the whole consensus is that we have abolished boom and bust. It is very difficult for a regulator to stand up to that, especially if Ministers are egging them on and in their speeches are saying the same thing.
If the purpose of this exercise is to say, as we always say, “What went wrong? What are lessons that we need to learn?”, this amendment points to one of the clear lessons that we need to learn. I am disappointed that my noble friend does not see that.
My Lords, like many in the House I did not manage to speak at Second Reading either, but I have spent a miserable summer concluding that Vickers got it wrong. This is a horrible thing to say to my good friends in the Parliamentary Commission, but they got it wrong too about separation. I come from a long career in merchant banking. I was pulled out of the Civil Service to be a merchant banker and I understand very well how ingenious they are. We had a wonderful concept in my youth called the Chinese wall. All I can say is that ivy grew over that Chinese wall and ear trumpets went through it because we are an ingenious lot.
The very complication of the debate that we are having, the horrible complication of the legislation and the very real difficulty of the amendments all stem from the fact that we are trying to do something impossible. Ring-fencing will not work. It does not matter how many people you place in charge of it, you need institutional separation. As my noble friend Lord Barnett says, we are going to have to come up against this one of these days.
I am also fairly horrified to hear Members of this House describing ring-fencing as an experiment. What are we doing experimenting with the banking system? We have experimented with it before and we should not. We should be sticking to what we actually know will work.
I am in entire sympathy with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. I think that his diagnosis is absolutely accurate, but I differ on the conclusion.
I did not say that I necessarily accepted the Government's conclusion: I was merely testing the Government on the logic of their own position.
My Lords, I came in this afternoon hoping for enlightenment. I received much more and varied judgment expressed from all corners of the House. But the one thing that everything leads to is an assumption that the ring-fence will not work and I am afraid to say that I agree. I do not say that with any satisfaction. A lot of time and effort has been put into this by very well-informed people, but it is against the ethos of the institutions and the markets in which they operate.
To say that we are going forward as an experiment is merely an attempt to sum up where we have got to in this afternoon's debate. We cannot just leave it like that. If there is generally—not just in this House but in a more widespread way—fundamental doubt about whether something as important as this will work, we have to assess whether we are bound to follow that structure. All I have heard so far leads me to think that ring-fencing is not workable. We ought to accept that situation as soon as possible. I leave it to others to follow more logically what I have rather stumblingly set out.
My Lords, I know that noble Lords are looking forward to hearing the Statement, but this is an important point. I certainly would not be able to add anything to what the most reverend Primate has said in a very powerful speech. I am glad that he liked my analogy about wallpaper and walls. I have to say to my noble friend the Minister that the writing is on the wall here, and it is absolutely clear that if we do not have in this Bill a clear provision that gives the Government power to deal with the sector as a whole, most banks will decide to go with the culture and try to make it work. But they are in competition with each other; one will come up with a clever scheme and the others will say, “They’re getting away with this—we ought to do the same, or we will do some variation of the same thing”. You need there to be a threat to the whole sector, if some of them fall by the wayside. That is another argument, in addition to the ones made by my noble friend Lord Lawson and by the most reverend Primate.
I hope that my noble friend the Minister will think about this very carefully and see the writing on the wall. He will find it very difficult to get this Bill through this House without a provision of this kind being incorporated in it.
My Lords, I make a simple observation from experience. I have seen this attempt at ring-fencing in the past. When you have ring-fenced or non-ring-fenced entities—it does not matter which—reporting up to a group head, at the end of the day that group head can manipulate things at an investment level or at all sorts of other levels to influence the outcome in a way that is unexpected. It does not work, the moment that you have a group, because that is outside the ring-fence. I could give noble Lords instances, but it might cause problems if you did. I would rather say that I totally support the most reverend Primate and this amendment, which is very sensible.