Financial Services Bill

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing this important Bill. Its importance can hardly be in doubt, given the core dilemma presented by the place of financial services in the British economy. On the one hand, Britain is a world leader in financial services and a considerable measure of our future prosperity depends on that industry. On the other hand, as we have seen, it is the industry that has greater potential than any other to inflict severe damage on Britain’s economy. The goal of regulation is to secure the benefits while minimising the costs and to achieve that in a manner that passes the tests of accountability, clarity, efficiency and transparency. Regrettably, the Bill fails all those four tests.

It certainly fails the test of clarity, being both complex and incomplete. The Bill is unnecessarily complicated because, instead of drafting a new template for the financial services industry, superseding all past relevant Acts and incorporating the new banking Bill that is yet to be published enacting the Vickers proposals, the Government have constructed a dog’s breakfast of amendments to earlier legislation.

Last week, noble Lords were no doubt surprised to receive a passionate entreaty from the Treasury Committee of the other place insisting that the Bill had been cobbled together with undue haste and had not received adequate consideration—in the case of some clauses, no consideration at all—and providing a checklist of serious failings in the legislation as currently drafted. From these Benches, I can assure the Treasury Committee that its despairing plea will not go unanswered. We intend to devote just as long as it takes to sort out this flawed Bill and thank goodness that the procedures of this House will allow us to do so. I am sure that all sides of the House will support this commitment, since this is essentially a non-partisan Bill. We all have a strong vested interest in getting it right. I hope that the Government will approach our deliberations in that spirit, although their negative performance in the other place was not encouraging.

The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, referred to the regulatory failures that have been all too evident in the financial crisis. That there were serious failures is beyond doubt—most notably in the operation of the tripartite memorandum of understanding. But these were less failures of structure and more failures of the then conventional wisdom with respect to regulatory theory and practice. As the Joint Committee on the Bill noted:

“Successful regulation depends more on the regulatory culture, focus and philosophy than on structure”.

That point was made even more forcefully by Mr. Alan Greenspan in his evidence to the US House of Representatives in October 2008. Referring to the intellectual framework that guided the regulatory stance of the Federal Reserve System, Mr. Greenspan said:

“This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year”.

That was as true of the thinking of British institutions as it was of the United States.

In this context it is worth remembering why the tripartite system was created in the first place. One of the key reasons was that the Bank of England had proved to be such a fallible regulator. The cases of Johnson Matthey, BCCI and Barings come to mind. In the latter instance, the Bank’s performance was so bad that the Board of Banking Supervision was moved to comment that it would be a good idea if the Bank of England understood the products that it was supposed to be regulating.

Nonetheless, on the basis of what we have all learnt over the past four years, the fundamental thinking behind the reforms set out in this Bill is clearly well-founded, even if the execution falls a little short. The key thing that we learnt was that focusing on the stability of individual institutions, however large—so-called microprudential regulation—is not enough. The whole is bigger than the sum of the parts; systemic risk is all pervasive and by its very nature cannot be managed by individual firms. Hence the need for macroprudential regulation, spelt out so clearly in the FSA’s Turner review. But macroprudential regulation poses major new challenges to economic and financial policy-making. It will necessarily involve measures that cross what has previously been deemed to be the boundary between actions that might reasonably be left to unelected officials and actions that are necessarily the province of politically accountable decision-makers.

The essence of the macroprudential structures as set out in this Bill is that the Treasury cannot be trusted. Just as it was feared that the Treasury might approach the setting of interest rates with an inappropriate eye to political advantage, and hence the Bank of England was given control over interest rates, so now it is feared that the Treasury will fail to take away the punch bowl of loose credit in order to reap the short-term political benefits of a debt-fuelled boom. Accordingly, the Bank of England is given, via the new Financial Policy Committee, virtually autonomous control over a variety of instruments to manage the supply of, and perhaps later the demand for, credit. In addition, microprudential regulation is also taken into the Bank, in the form of the Prudential Regulation Authority.

This agglomeration of powers in the Bank of England poses two vital questions. Is the governance of the Bank of England such as to result in accountable, clear, efficient and transparent utilisation of these extraordinary powers? Equally, does the relationship between the Bank of England and the Treasury, as set out in the Bill, meet the test of these four principles? The answer given by the Treasury Committee to both of these questions is a resounding no. We on this side broadly agree with the Treasury Committee, though we differ in some details. We certainly agree that the governance of the Bank should not be a matter for the Bank itself. Our major disagreement with the Treasury Committee’s proposals is that they do not go far enough.

First, with respect to the governance of the Bank, the Government have responded to the evident lack of co-ordination in the crisis by designing a model of perfect co-ordination; namely, that one person should be responsible for everything. The Governor of the Bank of England will chair the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Authority, as well as being in overall charge of the Bank of England’s special resolution unit and its payment and clearing and settlement systems oversight department. When he or she has some spare time, this individual will also chair a number of important international committees. Even if it is possible to find the exceptional individual who can effectively take on all these tasks simultaneously, that person will be driven mad, for many of these activities will demand contradictory policies. Moreover, if ever there were a structure likely to result in the dangers of group think, this is it, since the group is a group of one.

Side by side with the inefficient, unaccountable and untransparent role of the governor is the now anomalous position of the court of the Bank. The Financial Policy Committee is to be a committee of the court. It is envisaged that primary responsibility for determining and keeping under review the strategy for achieving the financial stability objective will sit with the court, although the court will be required to consult the FPC and Treasury, and the FPC may at any time make recommendations to the court. On a moment’s reflection, it is clear that the court’s composition and powers are simply not up to the job.

In Grand Committee we will propose wide-ranging reform to the governance of the Bank of England to ensure that it has a structure of decision-making appropriate to the first half of the 21st century, rather than to 1694. In particular, we will require a more collegiate form of decision-making and propose measures to improve the accountability of what is, after all, a public institution. I was delighted to hear from the Minister that the Government are searching for good ideas in that area. I think that we have some.

Given that the governance of the Bank, as the Treasury Committee puts it, falls,

“well short of what would be expected in a modern institution, whether public or commercial”,

and that this is,

“especially important given that vitally important decisions made by the Bank’s executives, especially during times of financial instability, may not reasonably be made public and therefore be immediately available for scrutiny”,

the next question obviously arises. Are the powers of autonomous action endowed on the Financial Policy Committee and, accordingly, the Bank, appropriately balanced with the need for political oversight by the Treasury of the overall conduct of economic and financial policy? Does the Bill provide for sufficient parliamentary scrutiny to endow the FPC and the Bank with an appropriate level of legitimacy? Again, we believe that the Treasury Committee does not go far enough. The FPC is described by the Government as,

“a powerful new authority sitting at the apex of the regulatory architecture”.

The mechanisms to ensure democratic accountability of the FPC need to be commensurate with the strength of its powers.

The most important aspect of the relationship between the Bank and the Treasury is what should be done in a crisis. After all, it was in a crisis that the system failed. This is spelt out in Part 4 of the Bill and in the draft memorandum of understanding on crisis management. The draft memorandum of understanding, which, by the way, is in general far less clear than the old tripartite memorandum, at least makes clear that the Bank is the gatekeeper, defining when the Treasury may play a crisis management role. It is worth quoting the MoU. It states:

“The Bank has primary operational responsibility for financial crisis management. The Chancellor and the Treasury have sole responsibility for any decision involving public funds. When the Bank has formally notified the Treasury of a material risk to public funds, and either there is a serious threat to financial stability, or public funds are already committed by the Treasury to resolve or reduce such a serious threat and it would be in the public interest to do so, the Chancellor may use powers to direct the Bank. … Where the Bank is able to manage a financial crisis without public funds being put at risk, it will have autonomy in exercising its responsibilities”.

This is the most extraordinary nonsense, a fetishisation of the use of public funds. First, whatever is happening, the Treasury must wait for notification by the Bank of England before it can act. Given the Bank’s record on Northern Rock, that notification will come far too late. But secondly, and more seriously, households may be losing their savings, businesses may be collapsing, and economic activity may be in precipitate decline as the result of financial instability, but if there is no threat to public funds the Treasury is shut out of any active financial stability role until the governor invites it in.

This betrays a lack of understanding of the mutually reinforcing co-operative role that the Bank and the Treasury need to adopt to tackle macro-risk. This was put very clearly by Jacques De Larosière to the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House three years ago. He said:

“Let us not hide ourselves from reality. Often ... fiscal policies can be part of systemic risk”.

The only sensible solution seems to be for a fundamental rewriting of Part 4 of the Bill to allow the Treasury to act when severe financial problems arise without the Bank acting as a gatekeeper. In 2008, the problem was not that the Treasury was too strong but that it was too weak. To ensure that the roles of the Bank and the Treasury are clear beyond all reasonable doubt and given that the MoU will evolve in the light of operational experience, the MoU itself must be the subject of enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. By the way, the definition in the Bill of the objectives of the Financial Policy Committee, with its peculiar emphasis on leverage, debt and credit growth in the UK, also betrays a worrying lack of understanding of the nature of systemic risk in a global financial system.

Many other aspects of the Bill require substantial revision by your Lordships’ House, ranging from procedures for consultation at all levels, the role of the tribunal in disciplinary cases, to the duty of care that retail financial institutions should exercise towards their customers, and the range of access to financial services and to the procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of the avalanche of secondary legislation that the Bill will stimulate. My noble friends and I are committed to playing a constructive part in that revision. However, at the core of the Bill—the core that we must get right—are the new procedures for macroprudential regulation. If an open and successful financial services industry is to be sustained, it is imperative that an accountable, clear, efficient and transparent mechanism for the management of systemic risk is established. Moreover, that mechanism must have as its ultimate objective the promotion of employment and growth in this country.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

The noble Lord has made a passionate and powerful speech about the importance of the Bill. Why have the Opposition agreed that it be referred to Grand Committee for its Committee stage?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, I shall speak about two aspects of the Bill regarding two areas that it needs to cover but does not. I think that it is commonly accepted on all sides that a significant problem facing the economy is the question of lending to small and medium-sized businesses. It is generally accepted that we have been unsuccessful in getting sufficient lending to take place. The Bank of England confirms that the UK’s biggest banks failed to meet last year’s lending targets. The five banks that signed up to Project Merlin lent £1 billion less to SMEs than their 2011 target—and the Merlin deal has of course not been renewed. The Bank’s trends and lending report for April this year reports that in the three months to February 2012 the stock of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises continued to contract, and had in fact been negative since late 2009. In January this year, BIS published a report on SME access to external finance. Among its findings, the report states that 21% of SME employers that sought finance from any source did not achieve success, which was a significant increase on the 8% seen in 2007-08.

These figures are bad enough, but they conceal areas where there are more significant problems. The effects of the financial crisis are being most keenly felt in those areas of the country that have long been the most deprived. Workless households are concentrated in the old industrial areas of the north of England, the Midlands, Scotland and Wales, as well as in a number of seaside towns and inner-city urban areas. We urgently need to stimulate demand for SMEs in our deprived areas and to make finance available to help them develop. At the moment, according to a 2012 report by the Centre for Responsible Credit, just 4% of all lending to SMEs goes to businesses in the most deprived areas.

The only data provided by the six largest banks concerning their lending to SMEs are produced on an aggregate basis. This means that there is no information available to allow local economic development agencies, including local enterprise partnerships and community development finance initiatives, to enter into effective dialogue with the banks with a view to assessing and improving performance, nor any way of knowing which banks are performing better than others. Similarly, the current dataset provided by the banks tells us nothing about the terms on which credit is being made available to SMEs. There are other indications that the shift by banks from term lending to overdraft lending will probably lead to a significant increase in financing costs, but we do not know how much or where. We also do not know to what extent, if at all, the banks are supporting the third sector to take advantage of the new rights under the Localism Act. The Act provides for local communities to take over the running of local authority services to build new homes, businesses, shops, playgrounds and meeting halls.

All this requires planning and funding. That means the active involvement of the banks. We need access to information to show us what the banks are doing, area by area, bank by bank, to support this agenda. All this can be achieved by making a couple of simple amendments to the Bill. I believe that we should consider adding a fourth operational objective to the three set out for the FCA. This new objective could be called something like “the sustainable economic growth objective” and could be defined as ensuring an appropriate level of financial services provision in disadvantaged areas by having regard to the needs of SMEs and third-sector organisations in deprived communities for affordable loans, savings and insurance products.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

How are the banks expected to provided more lending at the same time that they are being required to make greater provision for capital and liquidity purposes? Surely that is asking them to do two contradictory things.

[Lord Sharkey]

I had a more minimalist objective: to make it plain that that is the case with the banks at the moment. We need to make sure that we know that they have an obligation to support SMEs and third-sector organisations in deprived communities. I add in passing that the need for some growth objective is evident not only in this part of the Bill, but in the objective set out for the FPC itself. Stability is a necessary objective, but stability without growth is, at best, a recipe for stagnation.

The existing objectives for the FCA include a competition objective. This competition objective includes the statement that the FCA may have regard to,

“how far competition is encouraging innovation”.

Apart from noting that the word “may” should read “must” if the paragraph is to have any real meaning, I also want to note that this is the only time that the word “innovation” appears in the 330 pages of the Bill.

That brings me to the second area that I want to address. Innovation in the provision of traditional retail financial services is obviously important. The Breedon report, commissioned by BIS and delivered in March this year, estimates that by 2016 there will be a shortfall of between £26 billion and £59 billion in finance needed by SMEs for working capital and growth. In their response, the Government acknowledged the problem and said,

“The Government welcomes the development of new and innovative forms of finance such as peer-to-peer lending and recognises the potential of these models to have a positive impact on the SME lending market”.

Currently, the total amount of peer-to-peer lending in the UK is small, but growing rapidly, and even more rapid growth is projected. The Government are encouraging growth in this area with a £100 million investment. Earlier this year, Andy Haldane, head of policy at the Bank of England, even suggested that these non-traditional lenders could eventually replace banks, but if these new models are to succeed in providing real and substantial competition for the banks, they need more help from the Government than £100 million in pump priming. At the moment, the non-traditional peer-to-peer lending sector is unregulated. As the Daily Telegraph said two weeks ago,

“if it is serious about encouraging the growth of a genuine long-term alternative to bank lending for SMEs, the Government also needs to address the thorny question of regulation. At present, alternative funding providers are not regulated by existing financial services legislation, leaving both borrowers and lenders vulnerable to rogue players entering the market”.

Alternative funders are in favour of regulation. They recognise the dangers to their business model of a scandal generated by some rogue entrant to their market. This is not a theoretical danger or a distant prospect and is certainly not a trivial problem. There is nothing to stop such an event occurring and permanently destroying confidence in the peer-to-peer model. As the Daily Telegraph also said:

“SMEs desperately need a genuine alternative to borrowing from banks and those using alternative funders must be protected so that both they and the market can flourish”.

The Government need to take action now, and this Bill provides the perfect opportunity.