Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

81: Clause 180, page 164, line 33, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) constitutes the offences of fraud, false accounting, money laundering or offences under any binding sanctions regime, whether at common law or in primary or secondary legislation,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for a shorter and more focused definition of “economic crime” than is presently to be found in Clause 180(1)(a) and Schedule 9.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I preface my remarks by emphasising that what I say about this amendment and the other amendments in this group is not intended in any way to qualify or undermine the broad objectives of the legislation. They are intended to make the legislation better.

I will focus for the moment on Amendment 81, which addresses the definition of economic crime to be found in Clause 180. The amendment has the support of the Law Society and the Bar Council. In the current wording of the Bill, the definition relates to only three matters. The first is the disclosure obligations under Clauses 175 to 178; the second is that by virtue of Clause 181(2C) it applies to the Law Society’s powers to impose a fine in cases relating to economic crime; the third circumstance is that it applies to the new legal services regulatory objective in Clause 183 of promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime.

Under the current definition in Clause 180, economic crime is defined by reference to a long list of offences, common law and statutory, extending over two and a half pages in Schedule 9. The definition of economic crime would be further extended under the Government’s proposal to add a new Schedule 10, which is directed to the failure to prevent fraud. As we heard in the last debate, although I think it is right to say that none of the amendments relating to SLAPPs is tied to any definition of economic crime in the existing Bill, SLAPPs would have to be in some way connected to some definition, and that may be wider than one would otherwise contemplate economic crime to comprise.

The definition of economic crime in Clause 180, by reference to Schedule 9, and its extended meaning by reference to the proposed Schedule 10, raises the fundamental question of what this Bill is actually about. Under Schedule 9, for example, it includes theft, and under the proposed Schedule 10 it includes false statements by company directors.

The Government’s intention, however, as I understood it, is that the Bill is directed to a specific type of criminal activity—fraud, false accounting, money laundering and the breaches of sanctions. Those are the activities which Amendment 81 sets out. Those elements were identified in a meeting which I had with Dame Margaret Hodge, who has played a significant role in the promotion of this type of legislation. Those activities—fraud, false accounting, money laundering and the breach of sanctions—chime with the Bill’s three key objectives, mentioned at the very beginning of the Explanatory Notes, which are focused on the abuse of corporate structures. That is what the Bill is about: the abuse of corporate structures to launder money, hide assets obtained unlawfully and prevent restitution of such assets by making them irrecoverable. To include theft under Schedule 9 goes far outside that type of activity, as it would embrace, for example, a straightforward theft of any object in any circumstances, which has no economic significance other than the loss of value to the owner of the object.

Further, Section 19 of the Theft Act 1968, mentioned in Schedule 10, as I have said, makes it an offence for any officer of a company or unincorporated association knowingly to make a false or deceptive written account with intent to deceive members or creditors. This is a very broad offence, and again not necessarily related to the objectives of the Bill, as they are explained in the Explanatory Notes, and as I understand them to be. I suggest, therefore, that the Government should focus on the real objective of the Bill and define economic crime accordingly and consistently, rather than by reference to a long list of common-law and statutory offences, which are diffuse and wide-ranging.

That brings me to my next point, which concerns good legislation and proper drafting. To define economic crime by reference to a wide range of offences over two and a half pages is not good drafting.

It complicates rather than simplifies the law. It also gives rise to potential difficulties if any legislation mentioned is repealed and re-enacted in the same or a different way. Of course, in these circumstances there is provision by way of regulation for the Secretary of State to add to or detract from Schedule 9, but there has to be an alteration. By defining the constituent elements of economic crime, as is done in Amendment 81, there is a clear steer as to the objectives of the Bill, and any change in legislative offences will not require an alteration to the Bill. Schedule 9 and proposed Schedule 10 would cease to be relevant. Amendments 82, 83 and 84 are all consequential on Amendment 81.

I now move to the next substantive amendment to Clause 183, which introduces a new regulatory objective into the Legal Services Act. Amendment 90 is signed by my noble friends Lord Verdirame and Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. Unfortunately, none of them is able to be here today. I am very grateful to them for their support. This amendment also has the support of the Law Society and the Bar Council. Currently, the provisions in Clause 183 relating to the new regulatory objective are far too wide in the following respects. First, it is not confined to the conduct of the lawyer but is expressed as general enforcement of the law relating to economic crime. It turns the regulator of legal services into a general enforcer of the law. Secondly, Clause 183 is not confined to legal activity as defined by Section 10 of the Legal Services Act 2007. In broad terms, legal activity is defined in the 2007 Act to mean the conduct of litigation, advocacy and legal advice and assistance.

Thirdly, the clause does not focus on what is critical, namely the misconduct of the lawyer in this context, which is facilitation or collusion by that lawyer in economic crime. Facilitation or collusion by lawyers in economic crime are the principal areas of misconduct in relation to lawyers mentioned to me in my meeting with Dame Margaret Hodge. Fourthly, it does not make clear that the proposed legislation on economic crime does not trump legal professional privilege where that applies or to the “professional principles”, which will remain one of the regulatory objectives under Section 1 of the 2007 Act.

Just addressing this last point, in any legal proceedings legal professional privilege precludes the usual obligation to disclose and permit the inspection of all relevant documents. The privilege, which is the privilege of the client, not their lawyer, is a fundamental common-law constitutional right on which the proper administration of justice rests. There are two aspects to the right—first, legal advice privilege, which applies to communications made confidentially for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice, whether or not litigation is contemplated or pending and, secondly, litigation privilege, which applies to communications which come into existence for the purpose of litigation.

--- Later in debate ---

For those reasons, while completely understanding why the amendments have been proposed, I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press Amendment 90 or his other amendments, and to withdraw Amendment 81.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Perhaps I should first take the opportunity to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I think the answer is that if somebody goes to a solicitor for advice on a potential course of action, it may be clear that it is unlawful, in which case legal professional principles would require the solicitor not to act for that client in relation to that. But there may be gradations of arguability about whether it is lawful or not; I gave the example of things going up and down, and he would be perfectly entitled to advise on those degrees of legality and prospects of success in litigation. My point was simply that that should not render the solicitor in any way concerned about committing any breach of a regulatory duty. That is the way it would work, and it would be the same for a barrister.

Turning to the Minister’s comments, I am afraid he has not really addressed the point that I made, which is that, in paragraph 2, the Explanatory Notes say that the Bill has three key objectives. That is the Government’s definition of what it is about:

“a. Prevent organised criminals, fraudsters, kleptocrats and terrorists from using companies and other corporate entities to abuse the UK’s open economy. This Bill will reform the powers of the Registrar of Companies and the legal framework for limited partnerships in order to safeguard businesses”.


Then it deals with strengthening

“the UK’s broader response to economic crime”

by seizure of crypto assets and so on. The extension of the definition of economic crime to matters such as I mentioned, for example representations of directors or theft, is way outside that. It is nothing to do with London as the place where people launder money, for example, and I do not accept that there may be some difficulty in distinguishing fraud and theft. A fraud may involve a theft, but fraud is quite clear as to what it is.

Amendment 81 is not an attempt to narrow the definition, except in relation to what I understand to be the essential elements: fraud, false accounting, money laundering and offences under any binding sanctions regime. If it is something more than that, then that ought to appear in the Explanatory Notes or be clearly stated by the Minister at the Dispatch Box. It should be made clear. You could combine a statement such as that—the broad objectives—together with various bits of legislation, but actually the advantage of expressing it in these generic ways is that it would make it far simpler and easier to understand, and would not require changes to the Act when there are legislative changes, with regard to the various offences currently listed in Schedule 9.

Having said that, I have made perfectly clear what the primary objections are to the new regulatory offence, which does not concentrate on the actual personal collusion or facilitation by the solicitor but could cover, for example, information that the solicitor receives in the course of advice from the client about some third party—because it is that wide, I say it would be an abuse of the legal regulation to leave it in that way rather than confine it to a personal involvement.

But I have made those points. I have listened to the Minister and certainly, so far as today is concerned, I beg leave to withdraw the amendments.

Amendment 81 withdrawn.