Armed Forces: Airborne Maritime Patrol Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence

Armed Forces: Airborne Maritime Patrol

Lord Empey Excerpts
Thursday 4th June 2015

(9 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Asked by
Lord Empey Portrait Lord Empey
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To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to improve the United Kingdom’s airborne maritime patrol capability.

Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
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My Lords, we have been clear for some time that the right point to look again at the requirement for a maritime patrol aircraft is in the forthcoming strategic defence and security review, the SDSR. That decision will be informed by the latest threat assessments and the conclusions come to in recent years. We continue to embed around 30 former Nimrod air crew in the maritime patrol communities of allied air forces in order to reduce the time and risks associated with regenerating a capability.

Lord Empey Portrait Lord Empey (UUP)
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Steady on. Does the Minister not agree with me that one does not need a review to know that, as an island nation with a sea-borne nuclear deterrent capability, we are not even in a position to secure our own deterrent, because we do not have the capability to do so? I understand that all things have to be reviewed, but this is such a no-brainer. It is obviously of great concern if we cannot protect our own sea lanes against an increasingly aggressive Russian naval force. Will the Minister go back to his right honourable friend in the other place and say that we should be proceeding now to prepare the necessary facilities to ensure that we have adequate protection for our nuclear deterrent as well as for our shores?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I absolutely do not accept that we cannot protect our own sea lanes. We have acknowledged that we have a capability gap, following the decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service, but at the same time we made it clear that we chose to accept that gap because we knew that we could mitigate it through employment of other assets, as well as through co-operation with allies. Even taking operational activity into account, we remain of the view that the SDSR is the right context in which to take a decision of this significance.