Lord Eatwell
Main Page: Lord Eatwell (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Eatwell's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for repeating the Statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in another place. However, I regret that effective scrutiny by this House has been limited by the Government providing the 80-page response only half an hour before the noble Lord got to his feet.
As the Statement makes clear, banking policy in this country has two potentially conflicting goals: first, to ensure that a stable domestic financial system supports the real economy with a steady and reliable flow of appropriately priced credit, together with other domestic and international banking services; and secondly, there is the goal to sustain the City of London and other UK centres as the world’s premier offshore financial centre, providing a wide range of financial services that transform and repackage saving flows from all around the world. This was the core conflict highlighted by the Independent Commission on Banking—the trading activities of the offshore centre can inflict instability and contagion on the domestic economy. The proposal of the ring-fence that the Government are endorsing today is a response to that core conflict. It is an inadequate response, but perhaps something is better than nothing.
Why is it an inadequate response? Noble Lords may be surprised to learn that more than three years on and contrary to the assertions of the ICB in its final report, nothing in these policy proposals would have prevented the collapse of Northern Rock. The reason is that there are two serious flaws in the ICB approach. First, there is the belief, echoed by the noble Lord, that moving to a 10 per cent capital to risk-weighted assets ratio will provide the resilience to the banking sector required to head off a serious crisis. This belief is a fantasy without empirical foundation. For example, Allied Irish Bank had capital in excess of the maximum now being proposed by the Government prior to its collapse. It was not enough. In a real financial crisis, no feasible capital ratio will be enough. While on the subject of risk-weighted assets, do the Government intend to maintain the Basel II approach that leaves the calculation of these risk-weights to the banks themselves? With respect to other primary loss-absorbing capacity, what is the Government’s view of the buoyancy of the market for these instruments on which they put so much weight and which do not at present exist?
Secondly, the report maintains the outdated and indeed discredited approach of focusing on the asset position of the banks and has very little to say about the liabilities side of the balance sheet. Hence, the ring-fencing proposals are all about what is done with depositors’ assets and the capital needs are related to that dubious measure of risk-weighted assets. But in the case of Northern Rock, the collapse was entirely attributable to what was happening on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. It was the inability to turn over short-term funding that resulted in the taxpayer needing to provide a £30 billion rescue. The ICB’s claim that current liquidity proposals could have prevented this is, I believe, wishful thinking. By the way, in the glance that I have been able to give the Government’s response, I would suggest that the illustrative diagrams of balance sheets on page 28 are profoundly misleading as the boxes do not represent the proportions of liabilities and assets as they are presumed to do. I shall return to the issue of the liabilities side of the balance sheet later. For the moment, I give one cheer to the Government’s endorsement of the ICB’s approach. At least it is better than nothing. Ring-fencing is the right thing to do even if they put the fence in the wrong place.
Crucial to the entire approach will of course be the construction and policing of the ring-fence. Can the noble Lord tell the House whether the Government have accepted all—I stress, all—of the ICB’s proposals on the construction of the ring-fence? In particular, the Government seem to suggest that ring-fenced banks will be permitted to hedge risks to which they are exposed in derivative markets. If they are allowed to hedge, how is the line to be drawn between hedging and speculation, and who is to draw that line? A major hole in the ring-fence as it now stands—or perhaps it is a flexible thing as it now waves in the wind—is that banking activity for large companies can take place either within or without the ring-fence. This means that organisations that produce well over half the UK’s GDP will have banking services outside the ring-fence. In that case, will not banking operations outside the ring-fence be too big to fail, because they could bring down major British companies, and will not the exposure of the taxpayer that the ring-fence is supposed to eliminate be almost as great as it ever was?
More generally, it is a well known outcome of regulatory activities that they stimulate a creative response from the banks, creative in the sense that they work out ways to circumvent and/or evade the regulations. Hence there will be a need to keep the operations of the ring-fence under continuous review. How do the Government intend to do that? The response states:
“The Government believes that the location of the ring-fence should be flexible”.
What does this mean—it sounds like a fine opportunity for lobbying to me—and who will determine the location of this “flexible” fence? Would it not be appropriate to keep the ICB in being and charge it with the task of reviewing regularly the performance of the ring-fence?
One of the declared objectives of the ring-fence, which the noble Lord repeated, is to protect the assets of depositors from the casino operations of the investment banking divisions of the banks. Where a ring-fenced bank is the wholly owned subsidiary of a bank holding company and that holding company fails, perhaps due to casino-style activities, will its creditors have access to the assets of the ring-fenced bank? If not, why not? If so, what is the value of the ring-fence?
I turn to the liabilities side of the balance sheet. Am I right in saying that the Government have no intention of limiting the wholesale funding of the balance sheet other than through the imposition of a leverage collar that fails to discriminate between deposits and wholesale funding? Why are the Government therefore intent on penalising banks that have a strong deposit base—banks that proved to be the most resilient during the financial crisis? Of course, the FSA’s proposals on liquidity and a leverage collar will improve the situation, but surely they are not enough. Why do the Government not take note of the research that demonstrates that deposits by families and firms are “sticky”, while wholesale deposits embody greater risk? On the other hand, what is to be the role of the interbank market within the ring-fence?
On competition, the noble Lord made it clear that the higher levels of capital and loss absorbency will apply just to UK banks. What of the branches of non-UK banks operating in the UK, such as Deutsche Bank? What is the Government’s assessment of the competitive impact on UK banks of branches of European or other banks operating in the UK not being required, as the response states, to have the same levels of loss absorbency?
On timing, the ICB said that the ring-fence should be in place as soon as possible and well before the Basel III deadline. The Statement refers to compliance with the legislation on ring-fencing being as soon as “practically possible”. Who is to determine what is practically possible and what are the criteria for that determination?
What do the Government expect to be the impact of these recommendations on the supply of credit? Given the abject failure of the Government’s Project Merlin and the desperate need to increase lending at reasonable rates to UK SMEs, the Bank of England’s executive director for financial stability has suggested that the ratio of capital requirements to risk-weighted assets should be lowered, not raised as the ICB and the Government recommend. Do the Government agree with the ICB or with the executive director of the Bank of England?
I welcome the Government’s announcement on the Royal Bank of Scotland. These are changes that we on this side have urged for some time. This is a taxpayer-owned bank and it should pursue the taxpayer interest.
I therefore give one cheer for a faltering step in the right direction. We will seek significantly to improve the approach when the Government bring forward their legislative proposals.