Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (EUC Report)

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I cannot say that I think of that every morning as I arrive, but I will bear the noble Lord’s words in mind.

I want to make five minor topical, practical points arising from the report. First, in strict logic, the position that the Government take up—that banking union is nothing to do with us but is a matter for eurozone countries—could mean that the Government do not object to the proposal, much discussed in Brussels at the moment, that the heavily overloaded Commission’s single market directorate-general should be split, with banking and financial legislation moving to the financial directorate-general, the primary concern of which is of course for the health of the euro, leaving the single market directorate-general handling the classic single market agenda. That would be disastrous, from a number of points of view, not least from the point of view of UK interests. The British Bankers’ Association states:

“It is of utmost importance to maintain the structure of the relevant Commission services dealing with financial services so that their work is permeated with the priority of preserving the single market focus. We suggest that the UK Government should proactively defend the unity of DG MARKT and oppose any plan to move financial services out of it. It would be a mistake to move the work e.g. to DG ECFIN which has quite different priorities”.

I strongly agree and I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us that we shall—to the extent that our current influence allows—work to ensure that that does not happen.

In my view, it is highly desirable and important that the current head of the single market directorate-general, the most senior of that very small and dwindling band of British personnel in the Commission, should stay where he is. I strongly agree with what has been said already today about the need to reinforce that. Retaining the unicity of the director-general is much more important than who is the single market commissioner—the issue that dominates the headlines. What matters is that it is the director-general and that he covers all the work that is of interest to the City of London.

My second point is also quite topical. I hope that the Government will, to the extent that their current influence allows, seek to discourage a second suggestion much debated in Brussels now, which is that the next finance commissioner should also be the next president of the Eurogroup, replacing Mr Dijsselbloem, the Dutch Finance Minister, when his term ends next summer. Combining the two jobs would be a prescription for serious schizophrenia, with a real risk that eurozone concerns might override single market integrity. This is not a moot point in the US sense. In our report we use “moot point” in the British sense, which means it is a key issue. In America, a moot point is a point so boring and irrelevant that it is worth discussing only in a moot court—a fine example of the difference between the two languages, as is “tabled”. If we said that our report had been tabled, people in Congress would say, “Oh, bad luck”, because it means shelved in America.

The moot point is that we have seen two recent examples of just what I am worried about—eurozone concerns overriding single market integrity. In the Cyprus crisis, when the eurozone imposed capital controls, that was a fundamental strike—which may have been necessary in the crisis—against a fundamental principle of the single market. It affected non-eurozone citizens. A British citizen with money in Cyprus could not move his money because of capital controls introduced by the eurozone. The result was that the case was quite rightly taken by the British Government to the Court of Justice against the ECB for its attempt to argue that clearing systems trading euro-denominated paper must be within the eurozone. That, too, is a clear breach of the single market and I applaud the Government for contesting it. It would be dangerous to see the two jobs of presidency of the Eurogroup and finance commissioner in the Commission combined. That may be difficult to prevent, given diminished influence, but I urge the Government to have a go.

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

Does the noble Lord agree that in a crisis—this is true whether supervision and regulation are done on a national basis or on the basis of the Union as a whole—the need to prevent the crisis and deal with it must override market rules? That has always been the case in this country and in the United States. It has always been the case in any country run by good governance rules.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I hasten to add that I do not know the detail of what happened over that weekend when the capital controls were introduced. The noble Lord may be quite right. I merely say that there is a risk here: we see it in the case we are bringing in the court and saw it over the Cyprus capital controls.

The third point, about the European Parliament, is very topical. The committee was lucky enough to take evidence from Sharon Bowles, who chaired the relevant committee in the European Parliament. She did so extremely well and has now retired from the Parliament. There were two other senior British Members of the European Parliament on the committee. I do not know who will be on the reformed committee, but it is crucial in relation to financial legislation. The new chairman of the committee is a highly effective, intelligent Italian, but I do not know whether there will be British members. Presumably, we cannot look to UKIP to do any work and, given the sad fact that the Conservatives are not in the EPP family, I do not know whether there will be a Conservative on this committee. There were two Labour members on the outgoing committee—they were both extremely good but have retired. I hope that the parties will get together and, in the national interest and the interest of the City, will ensure that there are some people on that key committee who are aware of the importance of the City and the importance for the City’s health of good European legislation.

The fourth point is not quite so topical. I urge the Government to think very carefully about the implications of the change in Council voting weights which happens in four months’ time. The UK’s voting weight goes up from about 8% to about 12% but comparable increases for other large member states, such as Germany, France and Italy, mean that the eurozone will, for the first time, have a clear qualified majority. That is in the Council but also in the ESMA—the European Securities and Markets Authority—although not in the EBA because of the dual-majority system. That is rather fragile but, for as long as it lasts, this will not apply there.

The voting weight change in the Council reduces the viability of a purely defensive strategy of the kind that the United Kingdom has adopted on the banking union dossier. We have argued, as the Minister has, that our aim is to protect the interests of non-eurozone single market members, in particular the interests of the UK financial community. We have been doing that by objecting to various things and looking for support. We have often been able to obtain that support, but it will be more difficult in future. We will need to change our tone and our posture: we will need to be a little more proactive and a little more constructive. In particular, we should be trying to field City experts to advise our partners, in a non-polemical way, on how they can best, in their interests, keep their transactions capital—London—healthy and ensure that the EU remains in the big league, playing host to one of the big three global markets. The saga of our handling of the ludicrous financial transactions tax proposal shows that we are not very good at that. Recent events show us deliberately distancing ourselves and not being very good at adding up votes. That will prove even more unwise when the eurozone caucus has a qualified majority, as it will have from 1 November.

My last point is a more difficult one to put in the hard-edged way that I have tried to put the previous one. Networks of regulators and supervisors matter: informal contacts and knowing the guy at the other end of the telephone. In some ways, that matters a lot more than the formal. Informal contacts used to develop organically and naturally, but that is harder to do now. The Governor of the Bank of England naturally cannot be on a close terms with his fellow central bankers on the continent as were Gordon Richardson, Robin Leigh-Pemberton or Eddie George, who met them in meetings all the time, with so much of the central bank’s work being done on a eurozone basis. For example, the meeting this coming weekend sounds a very important one—but there will be no Brit in the room.

I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Flight, said about the relationship between the Bank of England and the ECB being very good. I believe that it is, and that it is very important to go on ensuring that it is very good. As we staff new supervisory and regulatory structures in this country and they work out their modus operandi, we and they really should be aware, too, of the cardinal importance of informal co-operation and advice from and to concerned colleagues. Intelligent and well informed advice, privately conveyed but not in a hectoring tone or as if we knew better, will be well received. London’s expertise is still well recognised among the experts and such practical links will become even more important, the more we slide into self-isolation at the political level.

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[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I shall start with three introductory comments. First, like other noble Lords, I pay tribute to our excellent chairman who managed to guide us all, although we came from very different vantage points, to clear and decisive conclusions. There is not much point in having a parliamentary report that does not come to clear and decisive conclusions, but it is a very good thing to achieve. Secondly, I thank Stuart Stoner, our excellent clerk who has already rightly been paid tribute to by many noble Lords. Thirdly, I thank my colleagues on the committee, including the Eurosceptic Tories, with whom I always disagreed. We have had a very stimulating time and have all learnt a lot. It has certainly been great fun working with colleagues from all parties and perspectives in producing this report.

We have had some very interesting speeches from many noble Lords this afternoon. I thought my noble friend Lord Desai’s speech was particularly interesting. He raised a number of issues which I do not have time to go into now, but which need to be engaged with. I shall make one or two points on his comments on the need for stabilisation in the eurozone. I think he may be slightly overpessimistic because although I totally agree with him that it would very desirable if the European budget were increased to 2% of EU GDP—I will come on to that in a second—the European Union has found a way of getting much more stabilisation leverage out of the existing structural funds and cohesion budgets by the practice of front-end loading, which it has just adopted for the first time in this new seven-year framework period. It means that money allocated for seven years overall can be spent very largely and substantially in the next two or three years, when it is quite clear that there is going to be a lack of demand from other sources in the eurozone economy, so that is a very positive thing.

My noble friend Lord Desai might be slightly pessimistic in his comparison with the United States. The position is not entirely unfavourable to the EU. First, there is less scope in the United States for fiscal stabilisation at the level of individual states. All American states—possibly with the exception of one and therefore 49 American states—have a balanced budget law. Although the constraints in the Maastricht treaty for fiscal deficits by member states are considerable, you cannot go to more than 3% even in exceptional circumstances. That at least provides some scope.

Secondly, I think that I am right in saying that federal grants in aid in the United States, if you measure them in terms of the proportion of the percentage of per capita income of the beneficiary state, come out less. If I recall correctly, the greatest beneficiary in the United States of federal grants is Arkansas. The receipts are less on that basis than the receipts of structural funds and cohesion funds in the poorer member states in the EU. An element of automatic stability is already there. There should be more. I totally agree with my noble friend that it would be excellent to go to 2% of GDP.

I was very attracted by a suggestion that the committee came across—not just me—when we went to Berlin. A German economist suggested that an excellent way to increase the budget of the EU would be to transfer to the EU responsibility of unemployment funds. There would be an obvious element of automatic stabilisation which would be quite powerful. That suggestion, which is referred to in our report, needs to be taken further. I look forward to speaking to my noble friend about a number of those issues and I very much encourage him to continue to talk about them because he has set out an agenda which should be pursued very seriously.

I cannot resist responding to my old friends and sparring partners, the noble Lords, Lord Lamont and Lord Hamilton, who are particularly distinguished Eurosceptics. There are several blatant contradictions in what they are saying. They say that there is not enough democracy in the European Union and that the member states are not taking the recent European elections seriously enough. At the same time, almost in the same sentence, they say that it is quite wrong to take the European Parliament so seriously or to take democracy so seriously and that the European Parliament should not have anything to do with the choice of President of the Commission. You really cannot have it both ways. Either you think that the European Parliament is a legitimate, democratic voice, in which case it should be listened to and the changes in membership of that Parliament may be something that everyone should take on board. Alternatively, often you hear in other Eurosceptic rhetoric that it is not a democratic organisation at all and that its proceedings and membership should therefore be discarded from attention. You certainly cannot plead that it should be taken into account when you wish to do so.

I have exactly the same problem with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, about fiscal integration. He complained that fiscal integration was not included with monetary integration at the time of the Maastricht treaty. I remember distinctly that at the time he opposed any suggestion that there should be any degree of fiscal integration. You cannot have it both ways. Either it is necessary or it is not necessary. You cannot logically complain at the absence of something and then complain a few moments later at its presence when it is delivered.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Of course you can. You can be against transferring fiscal authority out of the UK but say that the only way in which you can make a monetary union work is for you to transfer it out of your country to a central organisation. There is no contradiction in that whatever.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am sorry, I take a different view. It seems very contradictory to me. Either you should not have fiscal integration or you should. It is very important that politicians are coherent about these things and I do not think that the Eurosceptics are coherent, not least on the matter of democracy in the EU.

Incidentally, my noble friend Lord Desai made the excellent suggestion that we should have an election for the President of the European Union. I have always been in favour of that, and I quite agree that the EU lacks democratic accountability. You hear all the time from Eurosceptics that the EU lacks democratic accountability, but the moment you suggest any measure at all, whatever it might be—changes at parliamentary level, say, or the direct election of the President—that would supply much greater accountability, they are always against it. Again, there is a blatant contradiction running through their views on the subject. I have to say that if you pursue politics on a contradictory basis like that, you do not do great credit either to your reputation for intellectual clarity or to the good faith of your arguments.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

Surely the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is wrong. The point that my noble friend Lord Lamont is making is that the eurozone requires integration. We did not join it because we were not prepared to take part in that integration. The European countries joined because they were prepared to integrate but then they did not actually do it. That is what all the problems were about.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I repeat that you cannot at the same time complain about something when it is absent and then complain when it is present; that does not make any sense to me at all. Equally, I do not think that I have heard any response to my points about democratic accountability. If there is a desire for more democratic accountability in the EU, which there is, and if it should be addressed, which in my view it should be, then you cannot turn down every possible proposal that is made in order to achieve that, which is what the Eurosceptics tend to do.

I think that our report makes three conclusions. The first is that the general direction of genuine monetary and economic union is probably right. We support it and think that it is a sensible thing for the eurozone to be engaged in. We feel that it should go further and be completed. We think that it is troubling that one or two elements of the agenda have not been implemented and will not be in the immediate future, notably the retail bank deposit insurance system that we have just referred to and which has been referred to several times today; we are broadly in favour of that and think that it is a very good scheme.

The second general conclusion is that this process is not without risks and costs for our country. That point is made very clearly in paragraphs 185 and 186 of our report, to which I draw the Committee’s attention. It is also made in another document, the British Bankers’ Association report, which we have obviously all been sent. I have been sent a copy, and it has already been referred to and quoted from. I shall quote from it in case some people here have not received it:

“EU, government and industry studies have shown that deepening the Single European Market offers a growth potential that is achievable without further increasing public debt … However, the understandable moves towards stronger Eurozone governance may make it more difficult for the UK financial sector to play a full role. For example, development of Eurozone caucusing, outside the EU-28 format, on matters that impact directly the Single Financial Market could, even unwittingly, damage its integrity”.

The document goes on to raise other risks, not just caucusing but the risk of the eurozone having a permanent president, the risk of the new configuration of the European Parliament being less likely to defend British interests—largely because the Conservative Party withdrew from the EPP, so that is entirely its fault—and other risks.

The fact is that the British public have been bamboozled, and this report goes some way towards redressing that and illuminating them, which is very necessary. They had been persuaded to believe that somehow we can have a half-in and half-out approach, with one foot on one side of the fence and one on the other in our relations with the EU at no cost, or that we can gain all the benefits from the EU without actually subscribing to all its programmes and disciplines. The sheer fact is that you can never do that in life, and you cannot do it in this case. Personally, I would prefer any measure of relationship with and access to the European single market and the EU than none. I am the sort of person who would always prefer half a loaf or even a quarter to no bread at all. However, I am very conscious that we are losing some portion of the loaf by the course that we are adopting. That comes out very clearly in the conclusions to the report, and we have fulfilled a useful function in writing it.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, we are not part of the eurozone group, so are we not inevitably half in and half out, whether we want that or not?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, as I shall say myself and, indeed, as the report states, we are not just out of EMU. We could not join EMU if we wanted to because we do not qualify under the fiscal provisions. Our fiscal deficit is excessively high—more than twice the level required the last time I looked at the figures. We cannot join anyway; we just have to face that.

Quite apart from that fact, it is true that the public in this country have been poisoned against the whole notion of EMU by a very effective press campaign, and it would be quite difficult to join EMU in the short term even if we qualified, which we do not. As we do not, it is a theoretical issue. Quite apart from that, we could, if we wished, join a banking union. We appear, for reasons which are unconvincing to me, to have decided not to join a banking union. As a result, we will find that we are not really, truly in the single market.

I put that the other day—this is a matter of public record because it was an open committee session—to the chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, Sir Win Bischoff. He agreed with me unequivocally that, as a result of what is happening, we will have a fragmented single market. We will have our own banking regulation based on our own bank regulation Bill. We have secured a derogation from the bank regulation directive, which I think is very undesirable. That means that, although there will be no fundamental differences in the way that banks are regulated in the eurozone and here, there will be small differences from time to time. There will be different responses because different people will be doing the regulating. There will be greater compliance costs. British banks such as HSBC and Barclays with major operations on the European continent will have to go through parallel procedures in different countries, whereas they could have just reported in one coherent way on a consolidated basis to one regulator, which would have been much more desirable.

More serious than that, there will be regulatory arbitrage, with distortions: people being tempted—no, being driven—to practise certain operations and activities in some markets merely because regulation there is slightly lighter than in other areas within the single market. That is not a single market at all. There will of course be a great lack of clarity and, therefore, investor and depositor confidence as a result of the confusion and complexity, which is, again, quite unnecessary.

It is a perfect example of how you can impose costs on yourself for no useful purpose. We all say that we want a single market. We are all in principle against regulatory arbitrage—all British Governments always have been—but we have deliberately created a fragmented structure which has higher costs and prevents a single market taking place. That really cannot make sense. It is about time that we realised that our policies—I say our policies; I mean the policies of the Government of the day, the coalition Government—contradict the national interest. Because we are not in the eurozone, we face the danger that problems may be created for us by the eurozone itself through its members caucusing for meetings of ECOFIN or other bodies due to the greater weight given to the eurozone organisations—a point made by the British Bankers’ Association. Not only may we be the victims of other people doing things that we do not like very much but we are creating problems for ourselves, which seems particularly irrational.

The report is a very useful piece of work and it deserves wide consideration. I hope that it may be the beginning of a reconsideration of the rationality of our policies in this area, because it is a great shame that for reasons of, I think, essentially party politics or emotion, we are often dysfunctional in our pursuit of the national interest.

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[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the committee for its work on this report and all noble Lords who have spoken in today’s debate. It has been like a high-level seminar on the subject rather than a usual parliamentary debate. Although I would love to think that students around the UK and Europe will read our debate today, I fear that it will not get the attention that it deserves. It is also quite a novelty when replying to a committee report to find that quite a lot of the speakers were not on the committee. Very often, one is faced with just the members of a committee, who have tendency to repeat what is in the report and basically say how clever they were in producing it in the first place, whereas in this case not only were they clever—naturally—but they managed to draw in star outside participants to the debate, which I for one have greatly enjoyed.

The Government have consistently said that they support closer integration in the euro area to make the single currency work. The Government agree that a stable euro area is in the interests of all EU members, not just those in the euro area but those outside it, including, of course, the UK.

The work towards creating a genuine economic and monetary union, which the European Council tasked Herman Van Rompuy to take forward in June 2012 at the height of the euro area crisis, is an important part of this process. As we have seen on banking union, the UK will fully engage in any and all discussions, as and when they are taken forward.

At the same time, the Government have been clear that we will not join the single currency and, as such, we will not be part of this closer integration. Our priority is therefore to ensure that the single market is fully protected and that measures remain voluntary for those outside the euro area. We agree with the report that this will require “continued vigilance” and we have been closely involved in the negotiations, particularly over banking union, to protect UK interests.

We also want to ensure that, as the euro area continues to integrate—

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

The Minister has said that the Government are opposed to our joining EMU or GEMU—we know about that—but will he explain why the Government appear to be against our joining the banking union alone?

[Lord Newby]

Yes, my Lords, I will come to that.

We also want to ensure that as the euro area continues to integrate, the EU continues to operate fairly for those who remain outside the euro area, whether by choice, like the UK, or because they have yet to meet the criteria to join, like some other euro-outs, although I take the point that we do not meet those criteria either at this point.

As the Chancellor and Germany’s Finance Minister Schäuble set out in their joint Financial Times op-ed piece in March, non-euro area countries must not be,

“at a systemic disadvantage in the EU”.

We must ensure that EU institutions continue to work in the interests of all member states and last week’s Council conclusions, agreed by heads of state and government, contain important text about the need to address UK concerns.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord a second time. He said that the Government feel it is important that non-euro area member states not be at any disadvantage in the single market as a result of not being part of the eurozone. Does he not accept that the burden of our report, and indeed of the BBA document which has been quoted extensively this afternoon, is that willy-nilly, whether we like it or not, we will be at some disadvantage—probably increasing disadvantage—by virtue of being outside the EMU or banking union entirely, and we cannot do anything about that if we are determined not to join those systems?

[Lord Newby]

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, explained at the start of his speech the trade-off between influence and being a member of the EMU. I will come to this later but, obviously, in certain respects, we are going to be outside the room by not being members of either the eurozone or the banking union. We have to work very hard to ensure that we maximise our influence in those areas, of which the single market is the most central, in which we have a common view with many, if not most, of our EU partners about the need to reform and the direction that reform should take.

I will attempt to deal with many of the questions that I was asked by individual noble Lords during the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Harrison, asked whether the single resolution mechanism was too complex and therefore would not be effective. By definition, all resolution processes are complicated but the role of the single resolution board is very strong. This may be a vain hope but, from our own experience, we hope that the plethora of legislation and new structures will reduce the likelihood of major crises of which we have been previously largely unaware emerging at great speed.

One of the problems in the UK when RBS had to be effectively nationalised over the weekend was that the storm arose with great speed. If you contrast that with the position of the Co-op Bank last autumn, when it faced major, potentially life-threatening problems, a resolution was undertaken, not formally using the legislative framework but largely using the mechanisms that were envisaged there, and with the Treasury and the Bank playing a major role over a number of months in getting the Co-operative Bank into a position where it was able to resolve its own problems.

The involvement of political bodies other than the single resolution board is inevitable because of the significance of the decisions that are taken and the fact that if major banks are in real difficulty—a weakness we have seen in the UK—there is a political component and you have to take that into account as you are taking decisions. We would hope that the scope of the decisions that have been left to the Council is very circumscribed and that most interventions, even involving the single resolution board, would not require going up to that level.

The second question that the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, raised was whether the resolution fund is too small. On its own, it demonstrably is, if there were a major simultaneous problem with a number of the largest eurozone banks. The key thing here is that it does not have to bear the whole brunt of the resolution process on its own. Arguably, it does not have to bear the main brunt of it. That is the whole point of the resolution recovery directive and the bail-in procedure. The fund is not capable on its own of solving a major crisis, but it is one of a number of tools and not necessarily the largest or most important.

The final question, I think, that the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, asked related to the replacement of senior positions in the EU. As he knows, over the coming weeks, the European Council President will be taking soundings on this and I am no more able to suggest whom we might put forward, than my noble friend was at Question Time today. The UK is fully engrossed in those negotiations with the aim of making sure that we have candidates who will be able to deliver on the priorities agreed by the heads of the European Council last week.

Among other things, the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, has introduced a definition of nirvana that means that I will never think of the concept in the same way again. He ended his speech by saying, I think, that his feet tended to have to accommodate themselves to the shape of the shoe. My experience and expectation is that my shoes will amend themselves slightly to take account of the shape of my foot. I think that that is a rather important distinction in the way that we view our involvement.

This brings me to one of the central points of discussion, which was the importance of political will in terms of the future of the euro. In certain respects, the euro has defied logic because of the strength of the political will supporting it. I strongly agreed with the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Jay, about that. Once the political elites of the major eurozone countries have made up their minds that this thing was going to continue, it was going to continue barring the most unforeseen disaster. Those who predicted its demise simply did not grasp a very straightforward political fact.

The noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Maclennan, asked linked questions about how we could play as full a part as we can in both the banking union and the mechanics of the eurozone. Obviously, we have ruled out membership, so the question is the extent to which we can play a role. I thought that the point of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about the role of informed co-operation and advice was very important here. We have very good relations with the ECB at all technical levels and UK officials are playing, and will continue to play, a big role.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, developed the concept of playing a bigger role in the banking union by saying that there was no logical reason why we should not be in it while remaining out of the eurozone. I am sure that that is logically the case. Why has it not happened? There are a number of reasons. First, the banking union has flowed from the eurozone crisis. I think it is inconceivable that we would have had such a banking union if all had been well with the eurozone, so the two are inextricably linked. I would also be interested, as a newcomer to the theoretical concept, to know whether there has ever been a banking union with banks that had two different basic currencies, or several currencies, because presumably the Swedes and others might also join.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made an important point about having more British people involved—

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[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am sorry to say I am not convinced by the Minister. We do, of course, have a derogation from the directive, as the Minister presumably knows.

[Lord Newby]

I remain of the view that the directive approach applies in financial services in the same way, broadly speaking, as it does in many other areas.

I am just about out of time but, briefly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, made a point about whether the ECB had the ability to supervise. It has a big job on its hands and is taking on new responsibilities. As we have seen, getting the Bank of England fit for purpose has taken a lot of time and effort. Indeed, the only thing that will demonstrate whether it has succeeded is how it performs in a crisis. We hope it does not have to do that for some time but it is clearly taking on the job of supervising a very large number of banks, whether it is 250 or 6,000, or whatever it is. It is very big new job, and I wish it well in it.

I conclude by saying again how much I appreciate the work of the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, this committee and all speakers in today’s debate. It is clear that Europe will be at the centre of our political debate in the period ahead. That debate is often conducted in extremely depressing, ill informed and—to borrow a word from the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton—poisonous terms. During all this, I am sure that your Lordships’ European Union Committee will continue to be a voice of reason and common sense and that Governments of whatever persuasion will continue to value its reports. For my part, I look forward to participating in further debates upon them.