Armed Forces Bill

Lord Davies of Stamford Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I too greatly welcome this Bill. As has already been pointed out several times by my noble friends Lady Crawley and Lady Taylor, and indeed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, there is a very large element of continuity between this Bill and the Command Paper introduced by the previous Government in 2008, when I had the honour to be serving in the Ministry of Defence, though I had nothing directly to do with that particular Command Paper except as one of the ministerial team. That continuity is very desirable, and it is moving in the right direction. I do not think that we have necessarily got to the end of the road.

The two points where there may well need to be some strengthening or further progress are again ones that have already been mentioned. First, the provision that the Secretary of State can use his own discretion to report on anything other than the three very important items of housing, education and health, is slightly loose. A number of very important issues have been raised in the debate this afternoon, notably military inquests and pensions; they are not included in that list. There may be scope for increasing the number and the range of items which the Secretary of State has to report on, because with the best will in the world, it is all too easy, if one is a Minister, to avoid making any statement on something that is not politically convenient, or perhaps not politically convenient for colleagues to comment on, if one is not absolutely obliged to do so.

My second concern was elegantly set out by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. It is very important to make sure that there is some progress, that results actually ensue, and that this is monitored. If we do not succeed with this Bill, particularly in the important areas of housing, health and education, the next stage would be to place statutory obligations on local authorities for housing lists, local education authorities for education, and the NHS for dentistry and waiting lists, to ensure that military personnel do not suffer in any of these respects from the need sometimes to relocate at very little notice as part of their military obligations.

As this is a Bill which gives the statutory power to the Executive branch to have Armed Services at all, it is a good moment to review the Government’s stewardship of our Armed Forces and the Government’s use of our Armed Forces. I will touch very briefly on these two vast subjects.

The Government’s stewardship of the Armed Forces over the past 14 months since the election has been lamentable—absolutely appalling and really scandalous. The Armed Forces remain pretty stretched, they have been stretched even more by the Libya campaign, and yet we are about to make redundant several thousand experienced military personnel. The degradation of the equipment programme is an even more serious long-term matter. The House will be familiar with a lot of it—it is extraordinary; we have abandoned all long-range maritime surveillance capability. We abandoned those Nimrods, which were going to deliver that, after every penny of their capital cost had already been incurred. Nothing but the operating costs remained. The Government have not come forward with any proposals on how to replace that enormous capability gap. We have abandoned—at least for 10 years, we are told—our carrier strike capability, which is an extremely serious matter.

Another matter came up in this afternoon’s statement on Afghanistan—Chinooks. I was able—at great effort, I must say—to make tremendous and very radical changes in our whole medium helicopter strategy, which enabled me to put together a pot of money with the intention of spending it on Chinooks. As a result we were able to order 22 Chinooks, bringing the total prospective number up to 70, and the Government, I am told, want to cancel 10 of them. This is the same Government, by the way, who, when they were in opposition, had the nerve to tell us that we did not have enough helicopters in Afghanistan. I am afraid to say that the Government are condemned by their own words, but I do not mean to say any more on that particular subject.

It gets worse. In addition to these cancellations of capability which we had acquired, were acquiring, or were planning to acquire, the Government have had a complete hiatus in their procurement programme over the past 14 months.

[Lord Selsdon]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Of course, but I am conscious of time and I will take maybe another minute or two of the House’s time if I have to give way.

[Lord Selsdon]

I was only going to say that I think we are debating the Armed Forces Bill.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am very well aware of that. The Armed Forces Bill is designed to give the Executive branch the right to have our Armed Forces. We therefore need, before we give them that right, to discuss how they are treating our Armed Forces at the present time, and what they propose to do with them in the future. It is absolutely elemental. I cannot imagine why there should be a constitutional requirement for Parliament to give this power to the Executive branch unless we discuss those two very important matters, so I do not in any way regard myself as being offside in the matters that I have decided to raise in this debate. I can well understand the Conservative Party feeling embarrassed by some of the things that I am saying. That is not my fault; that is the fault of the Government that they support.

As I said, the situation is worse because of the hiatus in procurement at the present time. All of us who have been defence procurement Ministers—there are several in this House, and at least one who I can see in the Chamber, the noble Lord, Lord Lee—have always taken great pride in delivering what is required today for our Armed Forces. However, we know that during our time in office we will be procuring some long-term things, and that although we will not be around in the MoD when they are required, they are vital for the nation’s future. None of these decisions has been taken at all over the past 14 months. I cannot remember how many major projects I was responsible for—I suppose I could if I thought about it—but my successor has not had any at all. It is not his fault. Indeed, I can all too well understand the frustration and pain he must feel about the situation. This means that we are simply not providing for the future in this way. The Prime Minister has recognised that in order to deliver the capability that the strategic defence and security review promises in 2020—even the limited capability, greatly reduced from our own White Paper of 1998—it will be necessary to increase defence expenditure in real terms from 2015. But the Treasury has not been told that is the case and is not allowing the MoD to make any of the long-term procurements which would be necessary to achieve that capability goal and would assume an increase in availability of resources from 2015. The Government have to make up their mind; the Prime Minister has to play straight. Are we going to have more for resources after 2015 and are we going to take seriously the capability projected in the defence and security White Paper, or are we not? Let us be honest. At the moment, the Government are not being entirely straight with the public about this very important matter.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I apologise for interrupting but I would simply like to point out, although I know this is rather off the subject of the Bill, that after 2015 we may have another Government, and committing ourselves to long-term defence commitments beyond 2015 is something that we have to consider in rather a different way. Perhaps the noble Lord is assuming that it will not be a Labour Government after 2015, or he is committing a Labour Government to increasing expenditure substantially after 2015. I was not aware that that was yet Labour policy.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

The noble Lord will know, I am sure, that defence procurement requires spending money now for capability that will come forward in 10, 15 or 20 years’ time. If you do not spend money now, you do not get that capability coming forward. We spent a lot of money exactly on that basis, as the noble Lord should know, in a naval building programme, in projects for which I was responsible—the A400M and the Typhoon tranche 3, and so forth. That continuum has now stopped. It is exactly like a business that needs to invest every year, which suddenly stops investing. It will pay the price for that five, 10 or 15 years down the road.

Finally, I want to say a word or two about operations and about the use by the Government of the Armed Forces that Parliament allows them to have. I am not going to say anything about Afghanistan, as we have had a Statement on that very important subject this afternoon and I have expressed myself on one aspect of that. But I shall say a couple of words about Libya. First, it appears that the cost of keeping our Tornados in the south of Italy some hour or two away from their targets, with a requirement to provide in-flight refuelling is at least as great or maybe greater—perhaps the Minister will answer the question and tell us which it is—than the cost of continuing with the Harriers and “Ark Royal”. We all knew that the decision would be disastrous over the long term, but it looks as if it may not have been a very clever decision in the short term. The French are using the “Charles de Gaulle” air carrier and they are only half an hour away from their targets. As a result, they do not need any in-flight refuelling capability. The Harriers did incredibly well, as the Minister knows—he knows a lot about these things—in Afghanistan, in ground support and ground attack roles, and could have done extremely well in Libya. That is my first point; I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to it.

Secondly, I am very much afraid that in Libya our Armed Forces are being asked to undertake an operation in which they are being denied all the traditional military means for success. They are operating under two resolutions, 1970 and 1973, which we of course promoted and which mean that we cannot provide arms to the rebels or opposition—our side, apparently the good guys, whom we are trying to support. They cannot put troops on the ground and they cannot provide any support to the operations of the rebels or the opposition—fire support of anything of that kind. It is a strange and worrying situation when we find ourselves asking our military to perform operations in difficult circumstances, although circumstances are almost always difficult when Armed Forces are deployed, but when the obvious military means are not available to them. I simply point that out. I am a great believer that once our forces are engaged, we should support them, and I am not querying this operation. But I would like the Government to think very carefully about undertaking operations under the aegis of resolutions from the Security Council of this kind, which so inhibit our own flexibility and our ability to deliver the desired result.