Ukraine

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, a remarkable aspect of the bitter fight between the Russian aggressor and Ukraine is that the latter has not been overwhelmed by now, as it was in Crimea. The Ukrainians are admired for their national commitment to this fight. Western nations have greatly aided their ability to withstand the Russian assaults.

But it is surprising that the Russians, so much stronger on paper than the Ukrainians, have still not emerged victorious—far from it. The Ukrainians’ Kursk push into Russia earlier this summer is still not repelled. Why has Russia not proved to be the overwhelming master of the battlefield? Why has it not used all its air power to establish air superiority over Ukraine? Ukraine started with very few fighters. Its ground-based air defences and drones have proved a challenge for the Russian air forces, but that alone should not have been the deciding factor. Why have the Russians come up so short against Ukraine?

One reason, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, is that Russia itself is fearful of what it sees as the advances of NATO, now closer than ever to the very borders of Mother Russia. NATO is a defensive, not an offensive, alliance. That was true at its formation in 1949 and is just as true today. But Moscow may believe that its truth about NATO is a very different one. Far from remaining a treaty of the original transatlantic and west European nations—at first 12—it has expanded, grown and advanced east. There are now 32 member countries. Old Warsaw Pact countries have been signed up into its grasp. Most recently, Sweden and Finland have become members.

Now, from Norway in the far north and all the way down to Turkey, NATO borders Russia itself. It is said that Ukraine will be welcomed into NATO when the time is right, and it has pushed into Russian territory, now less than 350 miles from Moscow. Russia has also seen NATO operating for two decades from 2001 in Afghanistan. Its perception of NATO must be as an offensive threat of great concern.

Add to that its military doctrine of maskirovka, the concept of masking one’s intentions by disguise and deception, which is well practised in many fields by Russia. It was exploited by assurances before Russia’s special operation in Ukraine in February 2022 that it had no intention of attacking. Lying to conceal the truth is sound doctrine for the Russians. They must assume it to be good doctrine too for NATO and the West. After all, surprise is one of our key principles of war. Perhaps they might even fear a real nightmare, a secret Article 5A—not, as in Article 5, that an attack on one is an attack on all, but that an attack by one is an attack by all.

Does the Kremlin believe that NATO tells lies too and acts to deceive and surprise it? If that is its assessment, surely it will be fearful of committing all its forces against Ukraine and being too weak against what it fears from NATO. Is that an explanation for why it relies so much on North Korea and Iran for war-fighting support, and is seen to be using old Soviet-generation tanks and bombs and dated weapons in its fight with Ukraine? It must face the threat of NATO, as it sees it, with adequate capability and war stocks.

I postulate these thoughts not in any way to defend Russia’s recent actions against Ukraine, or earlier in Crimea. These actions are against international law. They must be called out on that basis and the right of any country to live in peace behind its borders. But if one is to have one’s own successful strategic thinking, how the opposition may think is important too. NATO is right to stress its defensive posture and its key reliance on Article 5 of the treaty. The importance of that as a deterrent to any Russian desire to push back against so successful a NATO cannot be overstated. Putin’s position is not as strong or as lasting as he once may have hoped.