Medicines and Medical Devices Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Clement-Jones
Main Page: Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Clement-Jones's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on 4 November in Grand Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lady Jolly introduced amendments designed to limit the ambit of the information-gathering powers under Clause 3, which deals with falsified medicines. I raised the subject at Second Reading but was unable to be present for the debate in Grand Committee.
The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, said in resisting the amendments:
“We also want to explore creative uses of information as long as they are for public interest purposes. Therefore, we do not want to constrain or limit options ahead of engagement with stakeholders.”
It was not at all clear what the Minister meant by “exploring creative uses of information”, and in fact it was quite concerning given that these have not been set out anywhere in any consultation document. However, he went on to say:
“I should make it very clear that the overarching principles of the Bill as set out in Clause 1 also apply to our powers here. The scope of the purposes mentioned is not unfettered. The appropriate authority must be satisfied that regulations dealing with anything under Clause 3—not just around how the information will be used—will promote the health and safety of the public. In making that assessment, the appropriate authority is required to have regard to the three considerations discussed previously in Committee.”—[Official Report, 4/11/20; col. GC 326.]
Of course, as the result of the very welcome government Amendment 4, the safeguarding of public health is the key objective, and by Amendment 6, Clause 1(3) has been tightened up too. However, having carefully considered these amendments and the Minister’s previous response, I must still question his interpretation of Clause 3 and how it interacts with Clause 1. Clause 3(1)(b) currently says that the regulations may make provision about
“the use, retention and disclosure, for any purpose to do with human medicines, of information collected for the purpose of preventing the supply of falsified human medicines.”
At best there is a conflict between the two clauses, and at worst Clause 3 is open-ended and gives the Government far too much discretion in the scope of regulations under Clause 3.
In the discussions we have had with the Minister between Committee and Report—for which I am grateful—it became clearer that we need to ensure that this information regarding falsified medicines is used for limited purposes. The Minister cited a whole range of possible uses for the data, which came as a considerable surprise. As I said earlier, there has been no industry consultation, despite considerable ambition on the department’s behalf. That is why in this amendment we have tied the purpose to “ensuring patient safety”. What possible objection could there be to this limitation? Why would the Government want any wider scope, especially if the Minister believes that Clause 1 already provides a limitation?
I have now seen the brief announcement issued by the department on the consultation on the regulations to be carried out on a new national scheme. It says:
“We are committed to public consultation around the need and details of any national scheme, as well as a specific consultation on the use of data collected as part of any scheme.”
That lacks detail, to say the least.
Many noble Lords have been briefed by the Company Chemists’ Association about the commercial sensitivity of this data. As my noble friend Lady Jolly said in Grand Committee:
“The Department of Health and Social Care already has access to a very wide range of data on the sales of medicines, and their use in the UK, under the Health Service Products (Provision and Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018. These require manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies to provide summaries of products sold and prices paid. Ministers can request more detailed information if required.”—[Official Report, 4/11/20; col. GC 324.]
Given this access and the known sensitivities about falsified medicines directive data, it is unclear why the department has included this sweeping provision in Clause 3(1)(b). I described this as “legislative creep” at Second Reading. It goes well beyond the EU falsified medicines directive of 2011 and the associated delegated regulation of 2016. Of course, this was not acknowledged in the Commons by the Minister, Jo Churchill. As a result of the efforts of several noble Lords, the changes proposed to the FMD provisions are now out in the open—but that does not make it any more acceptable.
This might seem rather a specialised part of the Bill, but clarity about the scope of Clause 3 is vital if we are to have confidence that a suitable scheme for falsified medicines data will be put in place that does not go well beyond the current scheme in terms of the sensitive data that is collected and used. I hope the Minister can do better than last time in giving greater assurance about the ambit of Clause 3 so that I do not need to divide the House. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to support the noble Lord, Lord Clement -Jones, and my noble friend Lady Thornton. I urge the Minister to respond, as the noble Lord asked, on how Clause 3 will actually be used. It did not help that the Explanatory Notes made no mention of what the noble Lord described tonight and at Second Reading as “legislative creep”.
We have had submissions from a number of organisations that make the point that the wording goes beyond the current EU legislation, which was carefully implemented after extensive consultation with the relevant bodies. That is from the Company Chemists’ Association. The ABPI said that the falsified medicines directive was introduced as a barrier to counterfeit and falsified medicines entering the supply chain, thus reducing the potential risk of harm to patients, that the ABPI and its members have worked to fund and implement the falsified medicines directive, and that any future considerations under this clause must include full consultation with industry.
So there is general concern in the industry about how the clause will be used. We know that the department already has access to a wide range of data on medicines sales and use in the UK under the Health Service Products (Provision and Disclosure of Information) Regulations. Given this and the known sensitivities around falsified medicines data, I am still unclear why the department wants to extend the purposes for which data is collected under a future UK system. I know that we were very privileged—
My Lords, I am enormously grateful for that helpful debate. Let me try to provide some of the clarity and reassurances noble Lords have sought. Amendment 14 to Clause 3 would add constraints to the use of data collected as part of the operation of any national falsified medicines scheme. I understand that the intention of Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is to prevent the use of data collected for any additional use other than for the purpose of ensuring patient safety. We discussed this at length in Committee and afterwards, and I am grateful to the noble Lord and to other noble Lords who have given up their time to discuss this important issue. I know that the noble Lord has returned to this because he thinks it is worth continued debate, so I would like to reassure him that we have thought very carefully indeed about the power in Clause 3(1)(b).
I will start with the context of the power to use information collected as part of any potential future national falsified medicines scheme. First, it is important to note that the overarching principles of the Bill set out in Clause 1 also apply to, and are constrained by, the powers in Clause 3.
Amendment 4 in my name would ensure that in making regulatory changes under Clause 3—not just around how information will be used—the appropriate authority’s overarching objective must be safeguarding public health. In making that assessment, one of the things the appropriate authority must have regard to is the safety of medicines. Further, we have provided for a clear and unambiguous lock on patient safety; that is, as part of the decision-making process behind regulatory changes, if proposed changes have an impact on the safety of human medicines, the appropriate authority may make those changes only if the benefits outweigh the risks.
Secondly, of course, any regulations providing a framework for the use of the information will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the draft affirmative procedure. So, the scope of Clause 3(1)(b), which is the focus of our discussion, is not unfettered. I have discussed previously the statutory requirement to consult before making regulatory changes. Powers at Clause 3(1)(a), (2) and (3) will provide us with the means to make the regulatory changes to establish a verification system, if appropriate. As part of the effective operation of any such system, information will need to be collected. It is only once we have established the need for a verification system, and how it could work, that we can fully consider how the information it collects could be used to deliver additional benefits for the UK and for patients. Clause 3(1)(b) and (3) enable us to make appropriate best use of the data collected as part of a national focused scheme and ensure that the appropriate authority must have regard to the importance of ensuring that information is retained securely.
I want to reassure noble Lords by being as clear as I can that the data in question is that which would be collected for the prevention of the supply of falsified medicines—that is, as part of the operation of any verification scheme. I reassure noble Lords that we could not expand the data being collected using Clause 3(1)(b) as part of a verification scheme. However, we want to maximise the use of data collected as part of any verification scheme where it is in the public interest. In this, we would be learning from the EU scheme, which, for example, allows data to be used beyond patient safety for reimbursement purposes and in delivering a solution that works at a national level. I reassure the Chamber by being as clear as I can be that the powers in Clause 3 do not include the collection of patient data. As with the current European scheme, there are no plans for any future national falsified medicines system to collect patient data.
My concern is that putting such a limit on the use of information at this time could constrain or limit options ahead of our engagement with stakeholders. Critically, it may not allow for the data to be used for all potential research purposes. We are not in a position at this moment, ahead of our engagement with stakeholders, to list all the potential ways in which data sources might be combined for research and wider public health purposes, which can go beyond patient safety. We want to be guided by our stakeholder engagement and not to restrict that process unnecessarily before we have had a chance to hear how this data could be used for public interest purposes.
We are also proposing a staged approach to engagement and consultation. We are committing to a clear and separate consultation and engagement: first, a consultation around the need for and details of any system concerned with the prevention of falsified medicines; and secondly, a specific consultation around other uses of the data collected under Clause 3(1)(b). As I have said, any regulatory changes that will provide a framework for the use of the information would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny under the draft affirmative procedure.
I believe that by developing these proposals through consultation and engagement, we are improving our policy-making and its subsequent implementation. I remind the House that we have no scope for changing these provisions at Third Reading, so if the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, wants to press the matter, he will need to do that today, but I hope instead that he will have had enough clarity and reassurances from the Dispatch Box to be able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank my noble friend Lady Jolly, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for their helpful contributions and support today. I also thank the Minister for his reply; I regard it as something of a curate’s egg, but I recognise the thought that has gone into it, particularly his statement on the overarching principles in Clause 1 governing Clause 3 and the fact that the benefits must outweigh the risks in any scheme. He talked about the affirmative procedure; I very much hope that we will retain the super-affirmative procedure, which encourages me that there will be greater scrutiny of any new framework.
The Minister also spoke about the statutory duty to consult on proposals and the duty to secure data. He said that no patient data was being used and that, at the end of the day, the essence of this is to maximise the use of data where it is in the public interest. He gave research as an example that might be outside patient safety—I doubt it, but he thought it might be interpreted as going beyond patient safety. I was very struck by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, saying that there was an element in this of having a power that might come in useful; indeed, the Minister almost repeated that in saying, “We’ll see what data we have collected.”
I take some comfort from what the Minister has said. We have had some very productive debates and some important amendments secured, so I will not press this amendment today. However, the noble Lord probably has to suffer the potential of being immortalised on a Pepper v Hart basis if there is any subsequent dispute about the width of regulations made under this clause and whether Clause 1 limits the scope of Clause 3. I am sure he looks forward to that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.