Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Clarke of Nottingham and David Lammy

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

It must be a serious matter causing serious harm to their reputation. Most Members have things printed about them twice a week that cause them annoyance and which they would vehemently start arguing about if they had the opportunity to do so in front of readers. It is serious matters that must be subject to the serious process of defamation law in the pursuit of a remedy—a financial remedy, an apology or whatever—in a court of law.

[Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)]

Will the Secretary of State say a little more about this matter? He will understand that once the law is codified, judges will interpret what he has said. Does he recognise that for ordinary members of the public—for example, someone running a small business to whom harm can be caused if a local paper runs a particular story—what is serious is quite different from what is serious for celebrities and those in public life?

[Mr Clarke]

I agree. I stress that it will be for the courts to determine what amounts to serious harm in an individual case, but I agree that someone whose business is damaged—albeit by a local allegation in a local newspaper—could almost certainly demonstrate serious harm. Any citizen against whom a serious and unfounded allegation of personal misconduct is made will probably be able to demonstrate that it has done serious harm to his reputation. The hurdle is raised a little, but I trust that it will not bar any plaintiff who has had serious problems as a result of a publication.

I was moving on to deal with the defences. Clauses 2 and 3 replace the common law defences of justification and fair comment with new statutory defences of truth and honest opinion. These are areas where the law has become increasingly complicated and technical over the years. In our opinion, the revised approach should simplify the situation, ensuring that the defences are available without so many endless and costly disputes over detail and interpretation. Alongside the new defences of truth and honest opinion, we are introducing, for the first time, a statutory defence of responsible publication in the public interest. This is based on the common law defence that has been developed by the courts in recent years following the case of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers but expressed in clear and flexible terms. It provides a defence where the defendant can show that the allegedly defamatory statement is, or forms part of, a statement on a matter of public interest, and that he or she acted responsibly in publishing it.

The relevant clause identifies specific factors to which the court may have regard in deciding whether the defendant has acted responsibly, based on current case law. However, we do not want those to be interpreted as a checklist or a set of hurdles for defendants to overcome, and the list is intended to set out factors in an illustrative, non-exhaustive way so courts will retain flexibility. It is not our intention to change the Reynolds defence; we have sought to set it out in statutory form in a way that we hope will help.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

I agree strongly with that extremely good point. The more these things can be dealt with by way of a preliminary judgment by a judge, the more settlements we will get, because sometimes the whole thing really turns on one point, which can be dealt with much more quickly if a jury is not involved.

[Mr Lammy]

Will the Secretary of State give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I think I had better conclude, because I have taken—as I usually do—quite long enough.

This Bill is, in our opinion, a sound piece of modernising reform that we have approached in a balanced way. We have sought in particular to defend the interests of free debate. Accordingly, the Bill contains a range of measures which will greatly strengthen the environment for open and robust scientific and academic debate, including measures to apply across the piece, such as the introduction of the serious harm test, the simplification and clarification of defences and a single publication rule, together with specific ones, such as the extension of qualified privilege to peer-reviewed material and to reports of scientific and academic conferences.

I believe that this package of measures rebalances the law in a fair and effective way so that free speech is not unjustifiably impeded and debate about issues of public importance is able to thrive, while still providing appropriate remedies for those who have been defamed. It also updates the law for the first time to address properly the most pressing challenges raised by the internet and social media in relation to defamation. I commend it as a sound, reforming Bill.

I tempted fate earlier, and the Solicitor-General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr Garnier) and I will tempt fate again, because we believe that the process of producing a draft Bill and getting this far has produced a quite extraordinary degree of consensus that I, for one, would not have thought possible to achieve when we first embarked on modernising the law on defamation. So little interest has been attracted abroad that even the media, which one would have thought would be obsessed with the issue, are paying little attention to the debate.

There is still a debate to be had, and this House will demonstrate its usefulness in scrutinising the legislation, just as the Joint Committee on the draft Bill has shown what can be achieved in consultation so far, but I hope that in the end we will continue to command cross-party support in our efforts to address long-standing weaknesses in our defamation regime, and I commend the Bill to the House.

Legal Aid Payments

Debate between Lord Clarke of Nottingham and David Lammy

Thursday 17th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

I am sure that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary and I will be only too happy to meet the Members of Parliament particularly affected by the issue. We will have to take advice on whether we will be subject to any kind of legal review if we do that in the middle of the bidding process but, subject to that, we would welcome advice from Members who have particularly large numbers of such cases to deal with, because we will have to look at the whole provision of legal aid in this and other areas.

[Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has made much of the fact that this is the only voluntary body that has found itself in such difficulties. Does he recognise the volume of immigration and asylum work that has been done and that has to be done? He suggests that other comparable bodies have not found themselves in such a situation; can he name some of those that particularly relate to immigration and asylum?

[Mr Clarke]

The trust that folded had a 7% market share. It was, of course, part of the old advisory service, which was split up some time ago. The other half of the old advisory service is to get a much bigger market share—over 20%. We are talking about a policy of the last Government, and one with which I do not disagree. The graduated fee scheme was introduced in order to get better value for money out of the legal aid scheme, and everybody had to adjust to it. So far as I am aware, the body is the only one that is in great financial difficulties. In a way, it would have been very awkward for us if it folded after we had awarded the contracts. We would have been in a mess if we had discovered that we had awarded a contract to a financially insecure organisation that went down once we were relying on it to do the work. As far as I am aware, everyone else who is bidding is, I hope, in a sound financial state.