Ukraine

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I greatly welcome my noble friend Lord Spellar, with his huge reputation. He and I agree on almost everything—apart from on this war.

I am not a pacifist; I have supported wars in the Falklands, eastern Europe and intervention in Iraq, but not the war in Ukraine. This is my 23rd contribution in opposition. Too many lives have been lost and too much property has been destroyed. The war has destabilised the world economy and redirected aid from the poorest to fund arms and reconstruction in the developed world. It has moved Russia from west to east, and it has hugely reinforced the position of those in Russia whose corrupt practices were being progressively exposed by courageous dissidents. It has provoked a population movement of 8 million at the heart of Europe as people seek sanctuary in neighbouring states, interrupting the education of millions. It has provoked a debate over NATO’s future, while destroying Ukraine’s GDP, with prospective reconstruction bills topping £400 billion.

We are witnessing a failure of foreign policy perhaps unmatched in history. I think back to a period of hope: the fruitful period of early discussions between Putin, Blair and my noble friend Lord Robertson of Port Ellen in the early 2000s. It was a period of opportunity, only to be undermined as militaristic opinion in America hijacked the debate in favour of NATO expansion. It is that threat of expansion that stands at the heart of this conflict. With Yeltsin’s death, the die was cast. With the removal of Yanukovych, Putin’s paranoid obsession with NATO expansion, built on Russia’s understandable obsession with Second World War losses, turned ugly and defensive.

Events further deteriorated after the Maidan with Zelensky’s election. His demands at the 2019 Paris conference and the rejection of Putin’s counterproposals opened the door to war. I believe Russia’s obsession with NATO expansion could have been defused if the nuclear-free barrier status of a string of states stretching from Estonia in the north to Georgia in the south had been maintained, pending progressive liberalisation of all things in Russia. Yes, it is a slow process, but this process would have accelerated in a post-Putin era of increased international travel and commercial, cultural and student exchange. It was only a matter of time. Russia was on a trajectory now reversed at huge cost to the international community. The question is: how can we revitalise the whole process? My personal view is that we need a new initiative. A war dependent on the endless demands of Zelensky is not one to be won. Trump could do a deal, but he comes with baggage.

So what can we do? We need a new forum for talks, convened by a non-combatant or munitions-contributory power. I would not rule out a representative of the BRICS—perhaps China. Its relationship with Russia is no more than commercially opportunist. We ignore its potential role in world affairs at our peril. The attendees should include Germany and the UK, the drivers behind the 2020 talks, and of course the United States and Russia.

Russia has repeatedly called for talks, admittedly on an escalating agenda of military and territorial demands, but Russia is equally exhausted by the war. It wants security for its people in hostile territory. A talks agenda should concede on the issue of non-NATO membership for Ukraine and no nuclear deployments in the barrier states, all against a background of a review agreeable to all sides, perhaps within a 20-year negotiable timeframe. Donetsk and Luhansk should be subject to a form of international protectorate status, delivered under the international guarantee, which would include Russia. The protectorate would decide on official languages and all forces would withdraw in conditions of a ceasefire.

We need to defuse the conflict. It cannot be left to Zelensky; he is locked into conflict. We, the West, cannot influence events unless we advocate at least some basis for a realistic negotiating position. We need to promote in Russia at least some basis for a debate on war aims. We learn from history that Russia will fight to the last. Ukraine needs to rebuild influence on the public debates in the UK. It has to move from the military to the political. I believe there is a solution; we just need to start talking.

I leave the House with a thought: Russia lost 20 million —some say 25 million—people in the Second World War. We must never underestimate its fear of what it mistakenly believes to be external threat. It drives Russia’s fear of the West.