Civil Nuclear Road Map

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Monday 15th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I agree with a lot of what the noble Lord said. I absolutely accept the strong support of the communities in west Cumbria. I am not sure I agree that they are the most enthusiastic—I am sure our colleagues from Wales would disagree about that—but we can probably agree that they are as enthusiastic as many other communities. His party-political point about dither and delay was slightly unfair; much of it was started under a Government whom he was close supporter of. But perhaps we should put those matters aside and welcome the fact that both Front Benches now agree that we should take forward the new nuclear renaissance we have announced.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my registered interest as co-chair of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group, and to the fact that I have family members living on Anglesey. I say to my noble friend that they, too, share the view that the further development of nuclear power generation at Wylfa would be very welcome on Anglesey. Since Hitachi withdrew from the project at Wylfa, we have legislated for the regulated asset base model. With the example of Sizewell C, is there scope, and indeed action, to bring Hitachi back for a project at Wylfa again?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Wylfa is one of a number of excellently co-ordinated and positioned sites. I am not sure I want to give it any prominence beyond what it already has; there are a number of other potential sites. I am sure we will be very interested in having further discussions with Hitachi if it wants to progress those proposals.

Domestic Heat Pumps: Budget Underspend

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Tuesday 28th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

It is certainly a good start. I was talking to officials about it earlier today. It started only in the middle of January and has already driven about a 62% increase in traffic to the GOV.UK website that provides information about heat pump offers. As the scheme moves into its second year, we will move into what further marketing activity we can do.

I will go back to the question from my noble friend, who I believe was going to ask me about the Swaffham Prior scheme. For those in the House who are not aware, Swaffham Prior is a village in Cambridgeshire. I suspect that it was in his constituency—

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

No.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Anyway, I have visited it, and it is a great example of a community coming together to install heat pumps and a domestic heat network, supported by government funding. It is an excellent project and is going extremely well. I give my congratulations to Cambridgeshire County Council and Swaffham Prior on implementing it.

Advanced Research and Invention Agency Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill as introduced to the House added ARIA to the lists of reserved bodies within the three devolution Acts. That approach would have conferred on ARIA the same constitutional status as UKRI, which is the UK’s primary public R&D funder. More importantly, it would also have ensured ARIA’s independence by placing it outside the competence of the devolved legislatures.

Since then, my ministerial colleagues and officials have been in close discussions with all three devolved Administrations throughout the passage of the Bill, on the need for legislative consent Motions to be passed in the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd and the Northern Ireland Assembly. During those discussions, principled objections were raised to the creation of ARIA as a reserved body. As a result, we have worked—as I am sure the Committee would expect us to do—to develop an alternative way of guaranteeing ARIA’s independence, through something called the “agreement on the independence of ARIA”, which all four Administrations of the UK have said that they will abide by, and which will sit beneath the overarching memorandum of understanding on devolution.

I am delighted that the text of this document has now been agreed by all four Administrations of the UK and that we have been able to share it with noble Lords in advance of this discussion. I apologise for the fact that we were not able to provide the opportunity for noble Lords to consider this document at greater length before the Committee. However, I wanted to share it as soon as possible, albeit fairly shortly in advance, rather than not sharing it at all. I am confident that this agreement will allow ARIA’s important characteristics to be protected. On that basis, I am content to remove, through Amendments 37 and 40, the reservations that we originally placed in the Bill.

ARIA will remain a single UK-wide organisation able to find and fund the most exciting projects in all regions and nations of the UK. Through the agreement, all four Administrations of the UK have committed to upholding the important principles of ARIA’s strategic autonomy, operational autonomy and minimal bureaucracy.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My noble friend referred to the agreement having been shared with us, but I am not aware of having seen it or where it was shared with me.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My noble friend also sent a letter to me following last week’s Committee; that was shared only with the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. My noble friend’s department has form on not sharing widely with those in Committee when things are circulated. Can he go back to his department to ensure that all active members of the Committee get access to all the information circulated in response to its deliberations?

Advanced Research and Invention Agency Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

This group of amendments relates to the balance that we need to strike between ARIA’s independence from and accountability to government, which is a difficult balance to draw. I shall begin with the amendments relating to the composition of ARIA’s board.

Amendment 2 from my noble friend Lady Noakes would limit the executives on ARIA’s board to just the CEO and the CFO. I appreciate the spirit of her amendments, trying to ensure that ARIA is an agile body with a streamlined board, but we have decided that the number of executives should be at least four. We have said that in the interests of representing the different executive functions within the organisations. Similarly, we have imposed a maximum number to try to keep it as efficient as possible.

As the majority of the board members need to be non-executives, in our view, that means that the minimum total number of board members will be nine, to ensure a majority of non-executives, and our expected maximum is 15. We believe that this is very much in line with standard practice. It is not usual for legislation to specify quoracy arrangements, and the Bill’s current provisions mirror some of the procedural arrangements that are in the Higher Education and Research Act. I am also happy to confirm that it is not our intention to offer non-executive members pensions or gratuities—I do not want to get into a definition of gratuities—but it is commonplace to ensure that the provision is available.

The drafting that we have used is also found in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 for UKRI non-executives under paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 9, and indeed in the Energy Act 2013 for the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s non-executives under paragraph 11(3) of Schedule 7. I therefore do not see that Amendment 8 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes is necessary.

I turn to Amendment 3. In our view, the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser will bring a somewhat unique perspective to the ARIA board in their independent advisory capacity, with awareness of science and technology across government. It is important to emphasise that he or she will be on the board in their capacity as an independent adviser, not in their science and technology strategy capacity. Indeed, it is perfectly possible for there to be two different people in those roles. It is also important to emphasise that they will not do so on a privileged basis. Other non-executives will have been appointed for their expertise, their wide experience and their special knowledge of different facets of the research and development system, and they will equally provide ARIA with independent advice in the best interests of the organisation and its objectives, as the Chief Scientific Adviser will.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Before my noble friend moves off this particular point, he will know, and the Committee will have observed, that in paragraph 18 of Schedule 1 the Government are proposing to take a power to substitute somebody else or some other office for the Chief Scientific Adviser. What my noble friend was just saying gave me the impression that this is something that might be contemplated in circumstances where the two roles that he refers to are held separately.

Covid-19: Vaccine Production

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Thursday 17th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am not sure that the noble Lord’s figures are correct. I will certainly write to him if that is not the case, but my understanding is that the vaccines are being distributed at cost. AstraZeneca already has supply agreements—with the Serum Institute of India, for example, to produce 1 billion doses. We will donate 100 million surplus coronavirus vaccine doses within the next year. We are committed to helping the third world to access the vaccines it needs.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, as the Minister said, the process of manufacturing vaccines is complex and difficult, as we saw with Johnson & Johnson in America, for example. The fastest and best way to set up large-scale vaccine manufacturing in developing countries is for the rights holders to invest. Will our Government work with IP holders such as AstraZeneca to set up across the world? We do not need to deprive them of their rights. The Oxford/AstraZeneca group intends its vaccine to be for the world; will our Government help it to deliver that?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My noble friend is correct and speaks with great authority on this subject, but the best way forward is voluntary licensing and technology transfer partnerships. They are making a real and positive impact on vaccine delivery, and the UK Government will of course do all we can to facilitate this process.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Report stage
Thursday 15th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will just say that, as always, I agree with my noble friend.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it has been a helpful debate, not least from the point of view of helping those—I imagine that over time, there will be more of them than we imagine—who will look back and ask what the intentions were behind the Bill as it was brought forward. If I perhaps can say by way of comfort to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, the point that we have discovered going through the Bill is that there are two tracks here—I confess that my Amendment 2 was tabled originally not quite getting that point. First, there is mandatory notification, which is required in respect of a notifiable acquisition, so the definition of notifiable acquisition needs to be specified very clearly. Then there is voluntary notification but also the power of Ministers to call in any transaction. That is precisely the point that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, made very clearly and which my noble friend on the Front Bench reiterated.

The common theme here is that taking out the 15% threshold and, indeed, not including the material influence test in notifiable acquisitions, means that it is not subject to a mandatory notification requirement. As my noble friend said, we should not ignore the fact that under Clause 13(1):

“A notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void.”


The risk associated with an unclear boundary between what is notifiable and what is not is that potentially large numbers of acquisitions that should be notified are not and therefore those transactions are void. We do not want to arrive at that position. We want people who run the risk of their transaction being a notifiable acquisition either being captured by the mandatory requirement or voluntarily notifying. Frankly, for many people voluntary notification will probably be the better and simpler resort.

Taking out the 15% threshold does not mean, in any sense, that those transactions are taken out of the scope of the regime but simply means that they are dealt with within the regime in a more flexible manner than would be the case through the mandatory notification requirement. Some of the press reports I have seen about this slightly miss the point. This is not a hard-and-fast threshold. It is a threshold for mandatory notification, not voluntary notification. The regime still applies.

My noble friend very helpfully responded to my Amendment 2 in precisely the way that I anticipated and quite correctly and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

First, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for these two amendments, which seek to ensure seamless integration between the new regime provided for by the Bill and the existing export control regime. I shall take his amendments sequentially.

Amendment 39 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State can, through regulations, exempt from the regime certain acquisitions of control over qualifying assets that are subject to export control orders. Clause 11 provides for exceptions relating to control of assets. Subsection (1) sets out that acquisitions made by individuals for purposes wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business or craft are not to be regarded as gaining control of a qualifying asset and are therefore excluded from the scope of the call-in power. This does not apply in relation to an asset that is either land or subject to certain export controls set out in subsection (2)(b).

Subsection (3) also provides a power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of assets that are outside the scope of this exemption or to prescribe other circumstances in which a person is not to be regarded as gaining control over a qualifying asset. That includes being able to prescribe circumstances in which the acquisition of an asset subject to export control legislation is not to be regarded as gaining control over a qualifying asset. Any use of this power in subsection (3) would, of course, be guided by the operation of the regime in practice and any patterns of activity that are observed. As such, I can therefore assure my noble friend that the Bill already provides for what his amendment intends to achieve.

Amendment 87 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that any interim orders or final orders made in relation to acquisitions of control over assets take into account controls imposed under the Export Control Act 2002 and related provisions. I thank my noble friend for his proposal and commend the intent behind it. It is, of course, very important that the Secretary of State’s use of the powers provided for by the Bill is in keeping with the Government’s measures under other legislation. The Secretary of State must take into account all relevant factors when making decisions about the use of interim orders and final orders.

The legal tests in the Bill require the Secretary of State, before making an order, to reasonably consider that the provisions of the order are necessary and proportionate for the purpose. In the case of final orders, that purpose is to address a risk to national security, and in the case of interim orders, it is to prevent or reverse an action that might undermine the national security assessment process. Whether controls have been imposed under export control legislation will be relevant to whether the envisaged provisions of an order are necessary and proportionate. For example, where export controls in relation to an asset are already in place, it may not be necessary or proportionate to make an order under this Bill prohibiting the transfer of the asset overseas, but this will depend on the facts of each case.

Addressing the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, about why we need the Bill when we already have the export control regime, I say that the export control regime is a licencing regime for certain controlled goods. It is an important part of the safe- guarding of our national security and it sits well alongside the proposed national security and investment regime. The two regimes are distinct though, and do not perform the same role. For example, the export control regime does not provide the Government with the ability to scrutinise acquisitions of UK companies or direct the use of sensitive assets used in the UK, whereas of course the NSI regime would.

On the noble Lord’s points about standard individual export licences if they have been granted for an export, I tell him that a standard individual export licence is granted to one person to export specified items to a named recipient. If the parties involved precisely follow the terms of a standard individual export licence that has already been granted following an assessment of national security risks, it is unlikely that the Secretary of State would reasonably suspect that the export might give rise to national security risks. In this situation, it is unlikely that he would be able to call that export in under the NSI regime. However, it is important to say that any decisions would need to be made on a case-by-case basis. It is important that the Secretary of State retains the ability to call in and scrutinise trigger events involving the export of assets in the event that national security risks are present.

The noble Lord asked about Northern Ireland. Qualifying entities as assets in Northern Ireland sit within the scope of the Bill, and that ensures that there are no loopholes. A trigger event under the Bill is not based on the application of EU law. For completeness, I should also say that the Secretary of State will, in any event, be subject to public law duties requiring him to consider all relevant factors when deciding whether to make an order under the Bill. Therefore, where export controls are relevant, the Secretary of State will need to take them into account when making that order.

I hope that that has explained, for the benefit of the House, the interaction between the two pieces of legislation. With the explanations that I have provided, I hope that my noble friend will feel sufficiently reassured that his concerns have been taken into account, and that he will not press his amendments.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for each of the contributions to the short debate. They were helpful and, indeed, added to the questions. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, referred appropriately to the Export Control Act provisions. I remember that I was on quadrilateral committee in the other place, about 15 or 16 years ago, so I remember how these issues were considered at that time. Indeed, there was a level of parliamentary oversight of the export control regime, which may be something we refer to at a later stage. He raised some good points: I thought the point about the EU export control regime was a very good one. The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, made an interesting point about the interaction with the Department for International Trade in this context.

If I understand my noble friend correctly, he is more or less saying that the power under Clause 11(3)(b) would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe, by regulation, such circumstances as necessary, so in that sense my Amendment 39 is not necessary. I agree; it is not necessary but certainly the explanation of the interaction between the two regimes is desirable. However, Amendment 87, proposing a new clause, perhaps drafted differently to make it clearer about the interaction between the two regimes—both at the point where a call-in notice has to be considered, as well as the point at which interim and final orders are made—would be very useful. What I have heard from my noble friend suggests that, by administrative means, using the powers in the Bill and under public law requirements, the Secretary of State will have regard to the export control regime when using his powers under this regime. That is undeniably true. I think we all knew that, but there is much more that we put into legislation, particularly with a new system, that helps people who are to be affected by it to look at it and understand how it works.

What I found deeply surprising was that such an important part of the Government’s policy intentions—that the export of goods should still be primarily controlled by an export control regime—was not even referred to in the Bill or in the Government’s response to the consultation. It is as if it did not exist, but it does exist and it is important, as the Minister’s reply suggested. I shall reflect on what he said, but it may well be that there continues to be a “desirable interaction” clause in the Bill that makes it very clear to all those affected that the export control regime plays a significant part in the control of qualifying assets where they are to be exported. However, based on what my noble friend said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this stage.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Committee stage & Lords Hansard
Tuesday 2nd March 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I spoke at Second Reading and referred to this question. Together with the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, I took the view that there were inherent problems in attempting a definition of national security and that the best definition is rendered through the Bill as it stands. Once one defines the nature of an entity, the nature of the assets covered, the nature of the acquirer concerned and the extent of control—or the definition of control for these purposes—I think one arrives at what a trigger event is. By definition, a trigger event gives rise to the question: does this trigger event cause a problem for national security?

I do not dispute that large numbers of consultees to the White Paper and speakers in our debates have said that it would be very helpful to define national security and—I would expect nothing less from her—the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has done as well as one is likely to do. However, I fear that Amendment 13 in particular demonstrates all the flaws with providing such a definition. I will not seek to delay our debate too long, but I will go through a number of them.

The noble Baroness asked whether critical national infrastructure was included. In Amendment 13, critical national infrastructure is included but not defined. We do not know which bits of national infrastructure are in the regime and which are outside it. We know, broadly, the sectors in the scope of the mandatory regime even if we have further detail and amendments to them today. However, if I look at what the Government have published, I find the nuclear industry, the communications industry, data infrastructure, energy infrastructure and transport infrastructure, including ports, harbours and airports. I do not find water infrastructure and food security infrastructure. That is the question and, with the greatest respect, Amendment 13 does not answer whether they are in or out.

We will come on to debate these things but it slightly introduces the concept of whether we are using the EU regulation. My noble friend Lady McIntosh referred to it. The EU regulation includes food security and water. Even if we do not follow the EU lead, which of course now we will not be doing, it at least gives us an interesting list to work from and to question why there are differences.

This brings me to Amendment 2. One of the other differences between our proposed legislation here and the EU regulation is that the EU regulation says that it proposes to safeguard against threats to security and public order. Amendment 2 proposes including public order. However, the European investment screening regime includes freedom and pluralism in the media as one of its investment screening criteria. We are not including that in the Bill. Why are we not including it? It is already in the media public interest regime inserted into the Enterprise Act by the Communications Act 2003, on which I served. I also served on the Enterprise Act Standing Committee in 2002. In that sense, we are not pursuing a public order regime here; we are pursuing a security regime.

I now come to some of the other issues with Amendment 13. Proposed new paragraph (c) talks about the characteristics of the acquirer. If you were to say to me that in my little definition of what constitutes a security risk, we have definitions of the natures of the entities and assets concerned and quite exhaustive definitions of what constitutes control, I would say that what we do not have are definitions of the nature of the acquirer, other than that, presumably, it is hostile in intent.

Amendment 13 effectively tries to give us a list of the trigger events that might give rise to an intervention. In some senses, the amendment is far too narrow. There may be all sorts of unanticipated trigger events that would not be included in primary legislation through this amendment. In other respects, it might be far too wide. Proposed new paragraph (c) talks about

“the characteristics of the acquirer, including whether it is effectively under the control, or subject to the direction, of another state”.

There are virtually no Chinese entities for which that is not true. There are many American corporations for which one could say that that was true. One could certainly say the same of a number of state-owned European companies, including EDF and those engaged in our national infrastructure. What does proposed new paragraph (c) tell us? Does it tell us whether those characteristics are a threat to national security or not? It does not tell us either of those things; all it tells us is that we must have regard to them. We know that Ministers will have regard to them because they are having regard to that kind of issue. It does not get us very far.

The same is true on three occasions, in proposed new paragraphs (a), (e) and (f), which refers to

“the likely impact of the trigger event on”.

It does not say whether the impact is adverse, beneficial or on security. Therefore, almost by definition, all that Amendment 13 tells us is that Ministers should have regard to trigger events in relation to these activities, whether they relate to data or defence capabilities. That is what Ministers are setting out to do.

In a couple of respects, Amendment 13 takes us further than we were intending to go in the Bill. The idea that non-compliance with our international obligations is, by definition, a security risk to the United Kingdom seems to be misplaced. It may be a matter on which we have obligations or be of great policy importance but one cannot construe that compliance with our international obligations in every respect is a security risk to this country.

I am afraid that one also has to look at proposed new paragraph (h), which asks

“whether the trigger event may adversely affect the safety and security of British citizens or the United Kingdom”.

It does not say “British citizens in the United Kingdom”. For example, there are hundreds of thousands of British citizens in South Africa. I was in Natal a few years ago, where there are 500,000 British passport holders, many of whom are British citizens. Are they, by definition, therefore included in this security investment regime?

All that I seek to demonstrate is that although Amendment 13 is a helpful effort, trying to define all the trigger events is bound to fail. Therefore, we should focus on making sure that the listing of entities and assets—as, for example, those published today by the Government—is as good as we can make it, and we will have some debates on that. We should define control properly—not too broadly or narrowly—and we should understand what kind of acquirers we are talking about. We will talk about whether something is foreign or domestic, state or non-state, or hostile and in what circumstances. That is where the lack of definition in the Bill is as yet more important. I refer to the question of what kind of acquirers. I hope that we will talk about that matter in later debates but, for the present, I cannot see the merit of adding Amendment 13 to the Bill.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Let me first say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that I anticipated that she might be a little critical—in her normal, super-polite way—about the letter coming out late. There were some delays in the internal approval process and, faced with a choice of whether to send it out now or wait until after Committee, I thought that, on balance, it was best to get it out to noble Lords. I was fully aware that when I arrived today, some noble Lords might have criticisms for me, but I thought they would like to see the letter rather than not see it before we started Committee. I hope that during a lull in proceedings, Members might have a chance to read the letter—all 100-odd pages of it.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, as well for her amendments to Clause 1 and after Clause 5, which are Amendments 2 and 13 respectively on the Marshalled List, and I give my combined thanks to her and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the proposed new clause relating to the integrated review.

I will begin with Amendment 2, which would expand the scope of the Bill to include public order and public safety, in addition to national security. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is of course right that public order and public safety are exceptionally important and some of the highest priorities for any Government. However, the Bill is about national security—nothing more, nothing less. Including public order and public safety as grounds for calling in an acquisition would be a substantial expansion in the scope of the Bill, as has been pointed out. We do not wish to see any additions to national security, to ensure that we maintain the careful balance struck in this regime between the appropriateness of government powers for intervention and ensuring that the UK remains one of the best places in the world for investment.

In addition, I note that the regime has been carefully designed with the protection of national security in mind and not public safety or public order, as important as they of course are. For example, the trigger event thresholds in Clause 8 are calibrated to protect against activity that could harm national security due to an acquisition of control over a qualifying entity. It is far from guaranteed that these would also protect against risks to public order or public safety, or that they would be the most effective or proportionate way in which to do so.

For example, a certain type of investment may give rise to a risk to public safety or public order only if an entity were bought in its entirety or if, conversely, any investment could harm public order or public safety. Of course, there may be situations in which a risk to public safety or public order is considered to give rise to a risk to national security as well. I assure Members of the Committee that, in such cases, the Secretary of State will be able to call in the acquisition in question if it meets the tests in the Bill, and will be able to take action if appropriate.

I will pick up on a specific issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. The Bill would apply where a qualified acquisition could undermine democracy in a way that amounts to a national security risk.

Amendment 13 seeks to create a non-exhaustive list of factors which the Secretary of State must take into account when assessing a risk to national security for the purposes of the Bill. It will not come as a great surprise to the Committee to hear that the Government’s position on this issue remains consistent with their position when amendments related to this one were discussed on Second Reading and in the other place.

As drafted, the Bill does not set out the circumstances in which national security is, or may be, considered at risk. That reflects long-standing government policy to ensure that national security powers are sufficiently flexible to protect the nation. It also does not include factors which the Secretary of State must or may take into account under the Bill in assessing national security risks. Instead, factors which the Secretary of State expects to take into account in exercising the call-in power are proposed to be set out in the statement provided for by Clause 3. A draft of that statement was published on introduction of the Bill, to aid noble Lords in their parliamentary scrutiny. The draft statement includes details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. That includes certain sectors of the economy, and the types of acquisitions that may raise concern.

While it is crucial for investor confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is obviously a limit to how much the Government can and should disclose in that regard, given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. Nevertheless, the draft statement goes into some detail about the factors which the Secretary of State expects to take into account when deciding whether to call in a trigger event. The proposed new clause would instead create, alongside this statement, a non-exhaustive list of factors which the Secretary of State must have regard to when assessing a risk to national security.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

First, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendment 11. With the permission of the Committee, I will speak first to the three minor technical amendments that the Government wish to make to the Bill: Amendments 12, 37 and 75. Briefly, before I begin, I reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State must lay and publish a statement before using the call-in power.

Amendment 12 is to Clause 4, which concerns consultation and parliamentary procedure for the statement pursuant to Clause 3, in which the Secretary of State sets out how he expects to use the call-in power. At present, Clause 4 enables the Secretary of State to meet the requirement to carry out such consultation as he considers appropriate, in relation to a draft of the statement under subsection (1)(a), before Clause 4 is commenced.

However, it does not make it clear that the Secretary of State is able to make any changes that he considers necessary in view of the responses to that consultation under subsection (1)(b) before the clause is commenced. Amendment 12 clarifies this point, ensuring that stakeholders will be able to see a revised draft statement before it is laid before Parliament.

Amendment 37 is to Clause 11, which provides an exemption for certain asset acquisitions which would otherwise be trigger events. Subsection (2), however, provides that assets that are either land or are subject to certain export controls should not fall within the exemption, and subsection (2)(b) sets out the relevant export control provisions. One of these provisions, Article 9 of the Export Control Order 2008, was revoked on implementation period completion day as a result of EU exit by Regulation 4 of the Export Control (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, with which I am sure all Members are very familiar. The amendment would remove the reference to this revoked provision from Clause 11.

Amendment 75 is to Clause 53, which enables the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to the negative resolution procedure, prescribing the procedure for giving notices and serving orders under the Bill. At present this clause enables the Secretary of State to specify how a notice or order must be given or served, but does not make it clear that these powers are intended to extend to all documents given under the Bill. The amendment would clarify that point, ensuring that the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations in Clause 53(1) in relation to the procedure for service of documents for all the different types of notices, orders and other documents under the Bill. These are relatively small tweaks to the Bill, and I hope that the Committee will see fit to agree to them.

Amendment 11 was tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, and I will begin by briefly setting out its context. Clause 4 sets out a consultation requirement and parliamentary procedure for a statement about the exercise of the call-in power which must be published before the Secretary of State may issue a call-in notice. It requires the Secretary of State, before publishing the statement, to carry out such consultation as he thinks appropriate in relation to a draft of the statement, to make any changes to the draft that appear to him to be necessary in view of the responses, and to lay the final statement before Parliament.

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to clarify the process by which the Secretary of State may publish a new statement if either House resolves not to approve the previous version that he lays before Parliament. The apparent stumbling block that the amendment seeks to remove is that the Secretary of State is under a duty to carry out such consultation as he thinks appropriate in relation to a draft of the new statement, and make any changes to the draft that appear to him to be necessary in view of the responses to such consultation. However, I point out that the Secretary of State must carry out such consultations as he “thinks appropriate”, according to Clause 4(1)(a).

The Bill therefore provides the Secretary of State with some measure of flexibility in deciding whether, for how long and how widely the draft statement should be consulted on. Therefore, the Bill as drafted does not in appropriate circumstances prevent the Secretary of State from publishing a new updated statement, reflecting the debate in Parliament, almost immediately without first undertaking a consultation if he does not think that a consultation is appropriate.

In short, while my noble friend’s amendment seeks to ensure that a new statement may be laid speedily if either House resolves not to approve the previous version, the Bill as drafted already allows for this. I am grateful that he has afforded me the opportunity to make the functioning of this clause clear. Therefore, in the light of the explanation that I have been able to provide, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this short debate. It is quite helpful just to focus on the question of making a statement because, if one looks back at Clause 1(6), it clearly states:

“The Secretary of State may not give a call-in notice unless a statement has been published (and not withdrawn) for the purposes of section 3.”


Although the word “may” is used in Clause 3, all it means in practice is that, if the Secretary of State chooses not to bring any of this into force, he would not publish a statement—but if he wants to issue call-in notices, he has to publish a statement. My noble friend the Minister is right in the sense that he must do this for the system to operate. The words I want to focus on, however, are “and not withdrawn”. If either House of Parliament resolves not to approve a statement, he must withdraw it. At that moment, the Secretary of State can issue no further call-in notices. My noble friend says the amendment is unnecessary because the Secretary of State has the power to consult only as he thinks appropriate.

Energy White Paper

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Lansley

Wednesday 16th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I know the noble Baroness has strong feelings on this because she has asked me this question before. She should bear in mind that hundreds of thousands of jobs are dependent on the North Sea. We are delivering the North Sea transition deal, providing support for the people and communities most affected by the eventual move away from oil and gas production. We are supporting the transition of skills and supply chains for a clean energy transition and focusing export finance on low-carbon opportunities internationally. Many companies producing in the North Sea are committed to the net-zero challenge, so, rather than just say that they cannot produce any more, we need to work to help them in the transition away from fossil fuel production.

[Lord Lansley (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the White Paper refers to the creation of a net-zero hydrogen fund. As my noble friend knows, achieving production of clean hydrogen at a commercially viable scale is challenging but necessary if we are to achieve the switch to hydrogen fuel in our heavy goods vehicle fleet. Can my noble friend say whether the fund will enable us to achieve that objective of switching HGVs to hydrogen?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My noble friend is right to point out the scale of the challenge. We are investing £240 million of capital co-investment in low-carbon hydrogen production, which was committed to in the spending review. That is just one of the measures that will support our ambition for five gigawatts by 2030. The hydrogen strategy package, planned for next year—I am sure my noble friend will follow it with great interest —will set out more details in this space, including how we intend to leverage private sector investment through business models to satisfy the demand he suggests.