Post Office Court of Appeal Judgment

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Alderdice

Wednesday 28th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their comments. I completely share many of their sentiments of shock and outrage. The tragic failings of the Post Office have occurred over many years, over many different Governments. On behalf of the current Government I can only say that we are truly sorry.

We welcome the decision of the Court of Appeal on 23 April to quash the 39 convictions. This is in addition to the six convictions that were quashed in the Crown Court in December. The impact that this ordeal has had on affected postmasters, their lives and livelihoods cannot be overstated. Nobody who saw the television coverage and the news reports the other day can fail to have been affected by the individuals featured. We certainly hope that, with this decision, these postmasters can at least start the process of moving forward to a new chapter in their lives.

I move on to the specific issues raised by the noble Lords. On compensation, the Government hope that the court’s decision is another important step towards bringing resolution to these postmasters. The Court of Appeal’s judgment will require careful consideration by all involved, and the Post Office itself will need to consider the next steps and the best process for fairly compensating these postmasters. We are keen to see that all those whose convictions are overturned are fairly compensated as quickly as possible and we will certainly work with the Post Office towards this goal. I understand the strength of feeling felt by those postmasters in the GLO who I understand only received a portion of the original £57.75 million settlement by the Post Office. However, that was a full and final settlement reached between the claimants in the GLO and the Post Office.

Both noble Lords mentioned the inquiry. Many postmasters and their families have suffered issues and distress since the faults in the Horizon system. We all agree on that. Some had their livelihoods and businesses taken away and were convicted of crimes that we now know they did not commit. Anybody can only imagine the distress that that must have caused to loyal, upstanding and honest members of the community. We are clear that a situation such as this must never, ever be allowed to happen again.

To ensure that the right lessons are learned, and to establish what must change, we launched an independent inquiry, led by Sir Wyn Williams, in September last year. He is a retired High Court judge with a wealth of experience and is fully independent of both the Government and the Post Office. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that the inquiry has made swift progress. It has already heard from a wide group of affected postmasters. The call for evidence has recently closed and I understand that Sir Wyn is planning to have some public hearings on these matters in June. I can confirm that we expect to get his report by the end of the summer.

Given that all parties so far are committed to co-operating, we remain of the view that a non-statutory inquiry is the right approach. However, if Sir Wyn does not get the co-operation he requires, then all options are on the table and we will not hesitate to act. We do expect his report in the summer.

On who is to blame, decisions regarding the litigation strategy at the time were taken by the Post Office based on the legal advice that it had received. The Government at the time relied on the Post Office’s management to investigate issues with the Horizon system. As we have seen from both Mr Justice Fraser’s judgment and now the Court of Appeal judgment, the Post Office consistently maintained that the Horizon system was robust. That obviously turned out to be incorrect. What is also clear, from the Court of Appeal judgment last week and the judgments in the 2019 group litigation, is just how misguided the Post Office was in its approach to the management of issues arising from the operation of the IT system. All of these matters will be investigated in the inquiry, so that we can ensure this never happens again. I commit to keeping the House fully informed.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, raised the issue of private prosecutions. The Post Office no longer undertakes any private prosecutions, and I have been personally assured by the new chief executive that it has no plans to undertake any further prosecutions in these matters. However, the Government understand the wider challenge that the Post Office case poses regarding the responsibilities that companies have in undertaking private prosecutions. The Justice Select Committee considered this last year and concluded that prosecutions brought by victims of crime themselves, whether corporate or individual, still have a valuable part to play. The Select Committee concluded that existing safeguards in place to regulate private prosecutions are effective at filtering out weak claims. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, himself acknowledged, the Post Office’s powers to bring private prosecution fall under Section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, and they are not specific to that company. It has the same right as any other, whether an individual or a company, to bring a private prosecution but, as I said, I have been assured that it has no plans to bring any further prosecutions.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, was kind enough earlier today to mention the issue of the Post Office and its investigatory powers. Since he did, I have asked my officials to investigate this matter. There are, apparently, over 600 public authorities that can use investigatory powers, and these are overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. There have been no changes to the authorities that the IPCO oversees since the introduction of the Investigatory Powers Act. According to the IPCO 2019 annual report, Post Office Ltd is not on that list.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

We now come to the 20 minutes allocated for Back-Bench questions. I ask that questions and answers be brief so that I can call the maximum number of speakers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will certainly pass on the noble Baroness’s comments on the speed of the justice system to the Ministry of Justice. I am sure there are many other areas where we would all like to see speedier justice.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Minister has confirmed that the inquiry—although, technically, I think it was originally called a review—is looking at corporate governance issues, and that is welcome. Could he answer two specific questions? Have the Government submitted any evidence already in the response to the call for evidence? If not, why not? Secondly, does Sir Wyn have the powers to subpoena information from the Government if it turns out that he requires that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The noble Lord will notice that I have avoided commenting on any potential police investigation, for very good reasons that he will understand. However, I hope the investigation will reach speedy conclusions and the police will take the appropriate action.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

We have come to the end of the 20 minutes and I regret that two noble Lords who were actually in the Chamber were unable to ask their questions.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Alderdice

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 9th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I recognise that the hour is late, so I will attempt to be as brief as possible. I begin by setting out why Clause 50 should stand part of the Bill, before moving on to discuss Amendments 169A, 169B and 169C.

Clause 50 reserves for the UK Parliament the exclusive ability to legislate for a UK subsidy control regime in future. The Government have always been clear in their view that the regulation of state aid, which is the EU approach to subsidy control, is a reserved matter. Let me say in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that the devolved Administrations have never previously been able to set their own subsidy control reviews, as this was covered by the EU state aid framework. Now we have left the EU, we have an opportunity to design our own subsidy control regime that works for the UK economy.

It is important, in our view, that there continues to be a uniform position across the United Kingdom. Reserving will ensure we take a coherent and consistent approach to the way public authorities within the UK subsidise businesses, supporting the smooth functioning of the UK’s internal market. A unified approach will reduce uncertainty for UK businesses and prevent additional costs in supply chains and to consumers.

Also in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I say this reservation does not impact the devolved Administrations’ existing spending powers. The devolved Administrations will continue to make decisions about devolved spending on subsidies—how much, to whom and for what—within any future UK-wide subsidy control regime.

The Government announced in September that the UK will follow World Trade Organization rules for subsidy control from 1 January. These are internationally recognised common standards for subsidies. Before the end of the year, the Government will publish guidance for UK public authorities to explain these rules and any related commitments the Government have agreed in fair trade agreements. We will also publish a consultation in the coming months on whether we should go further than those existing commitments, including whether or not legislation is necessary, because we want a modern system for supporting British business in a way that fulfils our interests. We do not want a return to the 1970s approach of Government trying to run the economy or bailing out unsustainable companies. We will take the necessary time to listen closely to all those with an interest in this subject.

UK government officials have been meeting, and will continue to meet, their devolved Administration counterparts on a regular basis. We are keen to ensure that the devolved Administrations are involved in the upcoming consultation process. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this approach is the best, and indeed the only, way to ensure that the whole of the UK can benefit from having a consistent and coherent system of subsidy control, which is necessary to support the smooth running of the UK internal market. I therefore commend that Clause 50 stands part of the Bill. I hope that I have answered at least some of the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Fox. If not, I will write to him to confirm the other points.

I turn to Amendments 169A, 169B and 169C, in the name of my noble friend Lady Rawlings. They seek to amend the definition of a subsidy for the purpose of their reservation. They would add to this definition that a subsidy will also include “research and development grants”. The interpretation provisions contained in Clause 50 set out what is classed as a subsidy for the purpose of this reservation. We define a subsidy as including assistance provided to a person, directly or indirectly, financially or otherwise. The definition includes examples of this assistance as income or price support, grants, loans and guarantees.

For the purpose of the reservation of subsidy control, the definition of a subsidy is deliberately broad to ensure that we have sufficient scope to design a future domestic regime that meets the needs of the United Kingdom. To ensure that we cover a broad range of financial interventions, the definition is not currently limited by reference to any specific policy purpose or sector. Subsidies may be given for a variety of purposes, and it would be anomalous to single out just one of them here. The current wording in the clause already encompasses assistance provided to a person directly or indirectly by way of grants and is therefore sufficient to cover research and development grants as my noble friend intends. Therefore, the Government do not think that the amendments are legally necessary. I hope that, in the light of that information, my noble friend will be able to withdraw her amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

With every answer, there come more questions, I am afraid. The Minister sought to explain that the devolved authorities will still be able to spend the money—I think those were the words that he used—but I am interested to know to which money he is referring. How in future will they get their hands on the money? Will there be a competitive bidding process? Is it part of the formula? Is that the money that he is talking about? Perhaps he could outline what he means by “the money”, because it is not entirely clear to me. He is looking at me as though I am being slightly stupid and I shall be very happy to be educated by him in writing rather than verbally.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Alderdice

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has participated in this group. I will seek to take forward the suggestion of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that letters be copied around—I have another batch on my desk to approve once we have finished this debate, many of which, I am sure, are to my Liberal Democrat colleagues. I will ensure that they are circulated to all the protagonists. They are not particularly secret; they just help to clarify and explain the Government’s role and answer the many questions that we have been asked. I hope that is helpful.

I will start with Amendment 110, which seeks to replace Clause 28 with a new clause on the establishment of the Office for the Internal Market. As noble Lords will know, this Bill will create an Office for the Internal Market within the Competition and Markets Authority to carry out a set of independent advisory, monitoring and reporting functions to support the effective operation of the UK internal market. The proposed new clause seeks to create a new and separate public body that reports to the BEIS Secretary of State. The effect would be not to establish the Office for the Internal Market within the Competition and Markets Authority.

Let me say in response to my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Naseby and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Government did consider a wide range of delivery options for the advisory, monitoring and reporting functions of the UK internal market, as set out in the Bill. We concluded that the Competition and Markets Authority is best suited to house the OIM to perform these functions. The CMA is an independent non-ministerial department that currently operates at arm’s length from the Government. It is sponsored by BEIS and Her Majesty’s Treasury and—to answer the question posed by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe—Ministers will be responsible to Parliament in reporting on the work of the CMA and the Office for the Internal Market, even though they operate at arm’s length.

The Competition and Markets Authority has built up a wealth of expertise and experience that makes it a natural fit to take on these additional functions. It has a global reputation for promoting competition for the benefit of consumers and for ensuring that markets work well for consumers, businesses and the wider economy. It will also build on the CMA’s existing technical and economic expertise, which will now support further development of the UK internal market.

I should also explain that it is government policy that new arm’s-length public bodies should be only set up as a last resort and when consideration of all other delivery options has been exhausted. Other delivery options that should be considered include utilising existing bodies in order to deliver any new functions. New public bodies should be created only if there is a clear need for the state to provide the function or service through a public body and if there is no viable alternative—effectively establishing new public bodies as a very last resort. For the reasons that I have set out, we are not able to agree with this amendment. I hope that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe will feel able to withdraw it.

Regarding Clause 28 stand part, this clause defines regulatory provisions on which the CMA, through the OIM, will monitor and provide reports and advice. The purpose is to set out the areas where the OIM will perform functions under the Bill, in order to ensure certainty and transparency for Administrations, businesses and the general public in connection with the effective operation of the UK internal market. Regulatory provisions are within scope if they set requirements for the purposes of the mutual recognition and non-discrimination principles of the Bill for the sale of goods and the equivalent for services. Moreover, regulatory provisions are within scope if they apply to one or more nations but not the whole of the United Kingdom. Clause 28 as it stands forms an integral part of the provisions for the OIM to carry out its independent, advisory and reporting duties in respect of the UK internal market. For these reasons, therefore, I am unable to accept the proposal that Clause 28 should not stand part of the Bill.

On Clause 29 stand part, removing Clause 29 would remove the Competition and Markets Authority’s objective when exercising its functions as the Office for the Internal Market. This clause designates the CMA, in its capacity as the OIM, as having a specific role in the operation of the UK internal market. It is additionally important to note that this clause establishes the statutory objectives of the CMA in its capacity as the OIM. This clause will ensure that the CMA in its OIM role is able to operate effectively as the monitoring body for the internal market, and will ensure there is no confusion between the pre-existing powers of the CMA and those newly conferred upon it as the OIM. Distinct objectives will prevent any operationally problematic blurring of functions. Clause 29 as it stands forms an integral part of the provisions for the OIM, and therefore we are unable to leave it out of the Bill.

Moving on to Clause 41 stand part, removing this clause would leave out vital definitional provisions. This clause provides key definitions for the purposes of this part of the Bill. This includes a definition of the Competition and Markets Authority itself and sets out how widely the operation of the internal market in the United Kingdom should be understood. This clause also defines “Relevant competence” in Part 4 as meaning both reserved and devolved competence so that executive and legislative competence in each territory is included. Clause 41 as it stands forms an integral part of the provisions for the CMA in its capacity as the Office for the Internal Market: it ensures legal clarity and certainty on technical terms used throughout this part. For all those reasons, therefore, I am unable to accept the removal of this clause.

Amendment 111 would require the CMA to not engage in any form of dispute resolution while fulfilling its responsibilities as outlined in Part 4. This addresses the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. In cases of disagreement between one or more Administrations, the OIM, within the CMA, could be called upon to provide a non-binding report to support intergovernmental discussion. An assessment of economic impacts will ensure a technical underpinning to an otherwise political discussion.

Ultimately, the OIM only supports the resolution of disputes among the Administrations politically, and it does not adjudicate. The Government believe that building upon existing intergovernmental arrangements is the best approach to resolving any potential disputes, and this includes mechanisms such as common frameworks and intergovernmental relations, according to a clear and agreed process. The OIM will have its role in disputes between individuals and businesses, but businesses can request that the OIM consider disputes as part of its regular reporting. It is under no obligation to do so, nor will it have the authority to adjudicate on the specific issues.

Amendment 113 would prevent the necessary flow of information from the Competition and Markets Authority to the Secretary of State as the policy’s sponsor. The clause in question allows the CMA to alert the Government when it thinks adjustments may be needed to the way it fulfils its statutory functions, or it wishes to raise issues of particular concern. This is in line with precedent for similar public bodies and mirrors provisions in the existing legislation underpinning the CMA. Removing this provision would hamper the necessary communication between the Government and the CMA across all the other provisions in Part 4. For that reason, we are unable to accept the amendment.

Amendment 155 would make it an explicit statutory duty of the CMA, under its existing duties within the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, to protect and promote the interests of consumers in respect of the internal market. The clause in question establishes the statutory objective of the Competition and Markets Authority in its capacity as the OIM. It will ensure that the office is able to operate effectively as the monitoring body for the internal market and that there is no confusion between the pre-existing powers of the CMA and those newly conferred upon it. Distinct objectives will prevent any operationally problematic blurring of functions. The OIM will operate for the benefit of all those with an interest in a smoothly functioning internal market, be they regulators, businesses, professionals, the four legislatures or consumers. Explicitly narrowing its focus to consumers would, in our view, be to the detriment of all the other stakeholders I have listed. Therefore, I am unable to accept the amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.

OneWeb

Debate between Lord Callanan and Lord Alderdice

Wednesday 8th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

The Government will invest $500 million, on an equal basis with Bharti Global Ltd. As part of the agreement, a small equity stake will be held by existing OneWeb creditors. This is not specifically designed for global national positioning systems; these satellites operate in a lower orbit for a number of missions, but primarily for earth observations and tele-communications.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, is not with us, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Birt.

[Lord Birt (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a former member of the board of Eutelsat. LEO is potentially a breakthrough technology, but it is also very high risk, as the collapse of OneWeb so vividly demonstrates. What scale of investment will be needed to build out a commercially viable constellation? How will that investment be funded, whether by debt or equity?