United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Callanan Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th December 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 1, 19 and 34 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 1A.

1A: Because they will create legal uncertainty, which would be disruptive to business.

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Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 56 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 8A, 10A and 15A, but do propose the following amendments in lieu—

Commons Reasons

8A: Because the omission of Schedule 1 by Lords Amendment No. 56 in consequence of replacing clause 10 with the new clause proposed by Lords Amendment No. 12 and the omission of powers to amend provisions of Parts 1 and 2 (including Schedules 1 and 2) by Lords Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 12, 17 and 30, would result in the Secretary of State being unable to respond quickly to the changing needs of the UK internal market.

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8K: After Clause 20, Insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to review the use of Part 2 amendment powers
(1) In this section “the Part 2 amendment powers” are the powers conferred by sections 17(2) and 20(7) (powers to amend certain provisions of Part 2).
(2) The Secretary of State must, during the permitted period—
(a) carry out a review of any use that has been made of the Part 2 amendment powers,
(b) prepare a report of the review, and
(c) lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(3) In carrying out the review the Secretary of State must—
(a) consult the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland,
(b) consider any relevant reports made, or advice given, by the Competition and Markets Authority under Part 4, and
(c) assess the impact and effectiveness of any changes made under the Part 2 amendment powers.
(4) The permitted period is the period beginning with the third anniversary of the passing of this Act and ending with the fifth anniversary.
(5) If either of the Part 2 amendment powers has not been used by the time the review is carried out, this section has effect—
(a) as if the report required by subsection (2), so far as relating to that power, is a report containing—
(i) a statement to the effect that the power has not been used since it came into force, and
(ii) such other information relating to that statement as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to give, and
(b) as if the requirements of subsection (3) did not apply in relation to that power.”

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, this group covers the exclusions to the market access principles and delegated powers-.

I turn first to Amendment 8L and other consequential amendments relating to the exclusions from the market access principles. These amendments, to which the other place have already disagreed, would replace the current Clause 10 with an expansive list of aims, which could be used to justify creating trade barriers for goods in the United Kingdom. The exclusions approach, as originally drafted, achieves a careful balance. It sits within the fundamental framework of the market access principles which protect the UK’s highly integrated internal market, but allows the Government to remove very targeted and specific policy areas from scope so that they continue to operate for the particular conditions where they are needed under the bespoke constraints relevant to those circumstances. This targeted approach provides certainty to businesses while ensuring that important or high-risk policy areas, such as chemicals, pesticides or sanitary and phytosanitary measures, can operate effectively.

However, the protections and benefits of the internal market proposals would quickly begin to fade with an expansive list of exclusions for part 1. This would allow unnecessary trade barriers and unjustifiable costs to businesses and consumers. The Government’s view is that a targeted list of exclusions in the Bill, combined with how the principles of mutual recognition and non-discrimination interact, is the best way in which to allow each part of the United Kingdom to meet its respective goals while avoiding unnecessary damage to the UK’s internal market.

The noble Lord’s amendment would not achieve that balance. Although the new list of exclusions that he has presented is slightly changed from his earlier amendment, the list remains very wide. It captures almost all kinds of public policy objectives, and only requires a new regulation “to make a contribution” to any of the aims in the list. This means that almost any regulation proposed by the UK Government or the devolved Administrations in future could be excluded from the scope of the market access principles. The Government reject the idea that a large list of exclusions is needed to preserve standards. The UK Government share with the devolved Administrations commitments to maintaining our existing high standards, whether environmental protection, animal welfare or consumer standards. We will continue to work together on these as a united kingdom as we leave the transition period. We should not forget that the Bill’s design will continue to allow all Governments to innovate, so that new ideas can emerge—as they did with plastic bag charges, for instance—to build better and higher standards for us all, including in the many social policy areas that the noble Lord clearly is concerned about.

I turn to the amendments relating to delegated powers, which underpin the realisation of these market access principles and make sure that they continue to function as effectively as possible. Noble Lords will be aware that the Government’s view remains that these key delegated powers are necessary. My colleague, Minister Scully, successfully argued in the other place that the amendments to remove these powers should be rejected. These powers will ensure that the system continues to evolve, facilitating frictionless trade across the United Kingdom. This will be necessary to react to developments in technology and regulation that cannot be foreseen at present. They also allow the Government to respond rapidly to business and wider stakeholder feedback—for example, to amend the list of exclusions, if implementation shows the need for adjustment.

It is important to note that any of these powers would require an affirmative procedure statutory instrument to be made in Parliament. This will ensure that there is full transparency on any changes and that MPs from all parts of the UK can scrutinise and vote on any changes. Furthermore, these powers are now supplemented by the comprehensive and reasonable package of amendments that we have proposed. This includes new amendments tabled ahead of this debate, giving more certainty on the role of the devolved Administrations in developing changes. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for their constructive engagement on this matter.

We have listened to your Lordships’ House carefully. Indeed, at Report, we removed the power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of statutory requirements which are in scope of the mutual recognition principle for goods. In this case, having looked again after hearing from your Lordships, we changed our position, having assessed that the removal of the power will not substantially undermine the operation and flexibility of the internal market system.

We have also retabled the Government’s amendment from Report, removing the main affirmative power in relation to the exclusions to part 2. When the other place disagreed with this House’s amendment, removing the main affirmative power and the draft affirmative power, both parts of that power were restored to the Bill. I am happy to make the change that I proposed in my amendment at Report once again. We have also proposed new amendments that give an enhanced role to devolved Administrations in relation to these powers, building on the model proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, at Report and ensuring that agreement across all Administrations to the use of the power is achieved whenever possible. The Secretary of State will be required to seek the consent of the devolved Administrations prior to any use of this power. If consent is not provided within one month, the Secretary of State will be able to proceed without that consent but must publish a statement setting out the reasons for proceeding in this way. As this adapts the model that your Lordships previously supported, I hardly need to stress the merits of this approach, which ensures that the devolved Administrations have a say but not a veto. I am hopeful that this time noble Lords will support it. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is nodding; we are in a good place on this one.

Thanks to government amendments introduced at Report that are retabled today, the impact and effectiveness of any use of these powers will be subject to review within five years. A report setting out the conclusions of that review must then be laid before Parliament. I hope this offers comfort to this House that we are taking seriously the concerns that have been raised, and we are working to address them constructively. The uses of the powers to make delegated legislation contained in parts 1 and 2 of the Bill will be scrutinised, not only when they are being laid before Parliament, but also in a more holistic way, after a suitable period has elapsed. This review will again give an opportunity for the devolved Administrations to provide their views.

I briefly address the power to issue guidance, to which we have deliberately taken a more distinct approach. Clause 12 explains that the Secretary of State may issue explanatory guidance on the practical operation of the market access principles for goods. It is not a power to make or amend legislation and, therefore, it differs from other delegated powers in part 1 of the Bill. As part of this process, we will, of course, engage with all the relevant stakeholders, because we are committed to helping regulators and traders to understand the principles and make the best possible use of them. This includes the devolved Administrations, and we are including a legislative commitment to consult them before issuing, amending or withdrawing that guidance. Guidance will not change the rules themselves, so a requirement to seek the consent of devolved Administrations, as proposed for other powers, is not needed.

I urge your Lordships to support all the amendments to these powers, which I hope noble Lords will agree represent a reasonable approach. Crucially, they also enable the internal market system to remain up to date while ensuring the highest degree of scrutiny and accountability. I beg to move.

Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)

Moved by

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I will take the amendments in the opposite order to the Minister, if the House is happy with that.

The delegated powers issue has almost become a ritual in your Lordships’ House. A Bill is published and in it are many very draconian powers, which seek to change almost everything the Bill can do at the will of the Minister. There is then a report from the DPRRC which condemns it, and then there is a debate and we start to move towards a more reasonable situation. I hope, perhaps, that we can learn from this and maybe cut out a few of the steps, so that we can get to the reasonable situation. The Government have given considerable ground on this, and for that we should all be accepting and reasonable and, I suppose, grateful, although perhaps gratitude is the wrong word.

With respect to Clause 12, I think we will all be watching quite closely to see how those powers are exercised, because advice can come in many forms and we will be seeking to observe that.

The characterisation that these delegated powers are required in order for the Government to react and act with speed has been absolutely confounded by the way in which the Covid crisis has been addressed by the Government. There has been very rapid legislation and very rapid reaction. Looking forward, we have got to a better place than we were in when we started. I still do not think that we would call it perfect, but we have taken a long time to get there.

My reading of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is that it is the return of Amendment 21, or at least most of it. Listening to his very reasonable presentation of the amendment and having listened to the debates on Report, I am somewhat surprised that the Government continue to dig their heels in. I can understand that the list in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause might have raised some concerns, and it can of course be subject to negotiation, but as the list now stands—with environmental standards and protection; animal welfare; consumer standards, including digital; employment rights and protections; the health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of public health; or equality entitlements—it seems that the Government could not possibly object to it, so I am surprised. The Minister has set out his concerns about an ordered market, but it is very clear that any market that did not observe these things would not be one that we wanted anyway.

With that response, I suggest that we will be supporting the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, when this Motion is put to a vote. We hope that the Government will be able to have discussions with the noble Lord and others, so that next time they can come back with something much closer to what we have seen today.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for a good, albeit brief, debate. To summarise, earlier I expressed my concerns about Amendment 8L and the expansive list of exclusions from the market access principles that it introduces. The list that we have included has been carefully drafted to strike what is, in our view, a measured balance. It protects the ability of the devolved Administrations and the UK Government to deliver policy, while avoiding harmful or costly barriers to trade within the UK internal market. The Bill does nothing to stop all nations working together to achieve mutual goals and build on our shared high standards.

On the delegated powers in the Bill, it is not proportionate to remove the Government’s ability to ensure that the list of exclusions and legitimate aims remains appropriate. The Government have already set out a comprehensive package of changes to the delegated powers in the Bill, including for the removal of certain powers and for reviews and reporting to Parliament, and new amendments on the role of the devolved Administrations. This provides for effective transparency and scrutiny of the remaining powers.

We believe that there is a reasonable middle ground here. Many noble Lords tabled and supported amendments to alter, but not remove, the powers in the Bill. We agree with those colleagues. These powers are necessary, and we believe that the changes we have proposed should address their concerns. I therefore hope that noble Lords will be able to support the Government’s approach to reinstating these powers in the Bill.

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 14 and 52 to 55 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 14A.

14A: Because they were consequential upon Lords Amendments Nos. 42 to 47 and so the changes they made are no longer needed as a result of the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendments Nos. 42 to 47.

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 42 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 42A.

42A: Because clause 42 protects Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom’s customs territory, as provided for under the Northern Ireland Protocol.

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 43 to which the Commons have disagreed and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 43A and 43B.

43A: Clause 43, page 34, line 42, at end insert “, or
(i) is necessary for the purpose of dealing with a threat to food or feed safety in Great Britain.”

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do insist on its Amendment 44 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 44A.

44A: Because the regulation-making power conferred by clause 44 provides a necessary safety net to ensure Ministers can secure that qualifying Northern Ireland goods have full, unfettered access to the whole of the UK internal market.

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do insist on its Amendment 45 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 45A.

45A: Because it is necessary for the Secretary of State to have the power to ensure there is no confusion or ambiguity in UK law about the interpretation of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol.

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 46 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 46A.

46A: Because it is necessary to codify in legislation the existing practice, whereby aid is notified to the European Commission by the Foreign Secretary through the United Kingdom Mission in Brussels.

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Moved by

[Lord True]

That this House do insist on its Amendment 47 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 47A.

47A: Because the Commons consider it necessary, in order to avoid confusion in domestic law about clauses 44 and 45 and regulations made under them and provide clarity for courts, businesses, and public bodies, for those clauses and regulations to have effect notwithstanding possible inconsistency or incompatibility with any relevant national or international law.

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Moved by

[Lord Callanan]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 50, 57 and 61 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 50A and 57A, but do propose Amendment 50B in lieu—

Commons Reasons

50A: Because it would involve a charge on the public funds and the Commons do not offer any further Reason, trusting that this Reason may be deemed sufficient.

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50B: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“40A Duty to review arrangements for carrying out Part 4 functions
(1) The Secretary of State must, within the permitted period—
(a) carry out a review of the appropriateness, for the purpose of securing the most effective and efficient performance of the Part 4 functions, of—
(i) the provision made by section 30(1) and the amendments made by Schedule 3, and
(ii) any arrangements made under or in connection with that provision and those amendments;
(b) prepare a report of the review (see subsection (4) for specific requirements relating to the report), and
(c) lay a copy of the report before Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly.
(2) The review must, among other things, assess—
(a) the way in which Part 4 functions have been carried out by the CMA through Office for the Internal Market task groups authorised under section 30(1), and
(b) any advantages or disadvantages of continuing with—
(i) the provision made by section 30 and the amendments made by Schedule 3, and
(ii) the arrangements made under or in connection with that provision or those amendments,
as compared with other possible ways of providing for the Part 4 functions to be carried out (including possible arrangements not involving the CMA).
(3) In carrying out the review the Secretary of State must consult the other relevant national authorities.
(4) Before finalising the report required by subsection (1)(b) the Secretary of State must—
(a) send a draft of the proposed report to each of the other relevant national authorities, inviting the authority to make representations as to the content of the proposed report within a period specified by the Secretary of State, and
(b) consider any representations duly made in response to that invitation and determine whether to alter the report in the light of that consideration.
(5) The Secretary of State need not consult the devolved authorities further if the draft is altered as mentioned in subsection (4)(b) (but is free to do so if the Secretary of State thinks fit).
(6) The permitted period for the review is the period beginning with the third anniversary of the day on which section 30 comes into force (or first comes into force to any extent) and ending with the fifth anniversary.
(7) In this section “Part 4 functions” means functions of the CMA under this Part.”

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I now turn to the amendments on the office for the internal market and the subsidy control grouping.

First, I want to emphasise that Part 4 establishes the office for the internal market within the Competition and Markets Authority, which is, in our view, a natural home for the OIM, given its existing technical expertise that is highly relevant to the operation of the UK internal market. But, as I have set out, the office for the internal market will be independently governed within the CMA, and Schedule 3 sets out a carefully balanced set of governance arrangements which guarantee that independence and ensure a meaningful role for the devolved Administrations through the appointments process to the OIM panel. This gives the devolved Administrations a proper voice, while guaranteeing that the OIM can operate without delay or obstruction if four-nation consensus cannot be reached on appointments.

The Government have listened carefully to the discussions in this House and have acted, tabling a number of pragmatic and constructive amendments throughout Part 4. These make it clear that the OIM will work in the interests of consumers and ensure that it will operate in the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom and on an equal basis towards the four UK Administrations. This is further to the significant change put forward previously, requiring the Secretary of State to seek consent from all Administrations within a one-month timeframe, based on proposals developed originally by the Welsh Government. This change provides yet another enhancement for the devolved Administrations in the appointment process, which, as I have explained, fully reflects the even-handed approach to governance that runs throughout Schedule 3.

I hope your Lordships can appreciate that the Government have listened and moved accordingly. However, I cannot support your Lordships’ Amendments 57 and 61, which go further than this, requiring direct devolved Administration appointments to the CMA board. As already set out here and in the other place, it is the OIM panel that will undertake the work of the OIM. The CMA board is responsible for the operations of the organisation as a whole, which otherwise fall wholly within reserved competence. It is therefore not appropriate for the devolved Administrations to make appointments to the CMA board, as those board members would, in consequence, be involved in a range of reserved matters with no relation to the OIM functions set out in Part 4.

With regard to Amendment 50, your Lordships will be aware that this has invoked a financial privilege claim and has not been agreed to by the other place. Although this of course is sufficient in itself, I will remind your Lordships’ House that there is a consultation forthcoming on this matter of subsidy control. It would be premature and unjustified to agree to confer specific regulatory functions on the OIM in respect of subsidies before the wider details of any legislative UK domestic subsidy control regime—including the appropriate mechanism for oversight and enforcement—have even been developed and brought before Parliament, let alone agreed.

However, I have listened to concerns regarding the decision to have the CMA perform these duties, and I am pleased to announce that the Government have tabled Amendment 50B, which will require the Secretary of State to review, after between three and five years and in close consultation with the devolved Administrations, the appropriateness of, effectiveness of and potential alternatives to the CMA carrying out its Part 4 functions. This will allow Ministers from all Administrations to closely consider the CMA’s performance and the pros and cons of continuing with the CMA as the delivery vehicle for the Part 4 functions. This proposal makes it clear that the Government are committed to ensuring due diligence on the CMA’s new functions and facilitating further scrutiny by all Administrations.

This amendment requires the devolved Administrations to be consulted as the review is carried out—but it goes further, giving the Administrations the right to consider and make representations on the draft report itself, and requiring the Government to fully consider those views. Subsection (5) rules out an unlimited obligation to consider repeated rounds of representations that could block the review, but I want to be clear that the Government will consider all views offered in good faith. I note for the benefit of noble Lords that this final point applies equally to Clause 50—to which I will now turn—which reserves to the UK Parliament the exclusive ability to legislate for a UK-wide subsidy control regime in future.

I was pleased to note in the debate on Report that many noble Lords did in fact recognise the importance of maintaining a consistent approach in what is a nationally significant area of economic policy. In addition, I welcome the devolved Administrations’ support for the principle of a unified approach to subsidy control throughout the United Kingdom. For these reasons, the Government believe it is right that we retain the provisions for the reservation of subsidy control in the Bill.

Now we have left the EU, it is important that we continue to take a coherent approach to the system that governs how public authorities subsidise business across the UK. I reiterate that this reservation is not about sources of funding or who makes decisions on individual subsidies across the UK. This reservation will ensure that any future system we put in place to regulate against the distortive or harmful effects of spending on subsidies then applies to the whole of the UK.

A unified approach to that overall framework will reduce uncertainty for UK businesses and prevent additional costs to supply chains and consumers. As such, continuing our UK-wide approach to subsidy control and confirming it in law remains the best way to ensure that we continue to take a consistent approach to regulating the harmful effects of subsidies across the United Kingdom.

To be clear, all UK public authorities are and will remain responsible for their own spending decisions on subsidies—how much, to whom and for what—within any overall subsidy control regime. This reservation is not seeking to change public authorities’ responsibilities for spending decisions. However, the wider rules which they operate should continue to be consistent across the United Kingdom.

I acknowledge the concerns that some of your Lordships have raised in previous debates regarding the principle of reserving a policy area in advance of the forthcoming consultation the Government have committed to publish. However, this reservation is a necessary step to ensure that, if a legislative regime were introduced, it would apply then to the whole of the UK. Given that this is a national issue, the future subsidy control mechanism should be the responsibility of the UK Parliament to determine.

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A very good way of showing the Government’s commitment would be, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, to accept his amendment on asking the common frameworks group to come forward with a proposal for state aid. As he pointed out, there is time. It is not a pressing issue, because we know now that we are operating on the basis of the WTO rules in the interim. If that works, why should we not take the time to go forward with this? Let us test the commitment, resolve and enthusiasm for the common frameworks through this good process of operating a common framework for state aid in short time, and to completion. If that can be done, and if the offer made by both the Scottish and Welsh Governments to hold back on any measures that might interfere with it in the intervening period is attractive, the Government have a win-win situation and I recommend it.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what was another short but powerful debate. I have listened carefully to the points that have been made. I will set out in my closing remarks why I cannot support Amendments 51, 57 and 61 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Turning first to the OIM, I emphasise that the Government have listened and responded directly to points made in this House. This is reflected in the meaningful changes made throughout Part 4. They include putting beyond doubt that the OIM will work in the interests of consumers, and making it clear that its functions will be available to the benefit of all parts of the UK, and for all Administrations, on an equal basis.

The Government have recognised the need for the devolved Administrations to be closely involved in OIM panel appointments. That is why the proposal for a one-month consent requirement on OIM panel appointments with the devolved Administrations is being introduced, providing them with an enhanced role in the process. This amendment originated with the Welsh Government.

Finally, the Government have tabled an amendment that will require a review and a report between three and five years after the CMA takes on the Part 4 functions. This will examine the way in which the CMA has carried out these functions, and the devolved Administrations will be closely involved throughout. The review and the report will provide the necessary assurances that the operation of the OIM within the CMA will be closely scrutinised, providing enhanced transparency and accountability to all four UK Administrations.

I will reply to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay: in seeking to go further than a normal requirement to consult the devolved Administrations on the review of the OIM, the Government have included an additional and explicit requirement to share and allow for representations on the resulting draft report. As I have said, providing that the Government are not required to follow this operation an unlimited number of times is simply intended to prevent a procedural impossibility if no consensus is reached. I am happy to say again that all views offered in good faith will be considered by the Government in preparing their report, as required in the proposed clause. The amendment makes clear that the Government have the option of sharing as many drafts and considering as many rounds of representations as are appropriate and feasible in the circumstances.

I am happy to assure my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that these proposed reviews would assess the pros and cons of the CMA as the delivery vehicle of the OIM, including whether possible arrangements not involving the CMA could carry out the Part 4 functions in the future.

I turn to the knotty issue of subsidy control. The purpose of this reservation is to provide stability and continuity as we move forward in forging a new UK-wide subsidy control regime. This Bill continues the UK-wide approach to subsidy control and confirms this in law. State aid has never been a devolved issue, as I have said on a number of occasions, and this reservation will ensure that we can continue to take a uniform approach to subsidy control across the UK. I reiterate that, in practice, nothing will change for the devolved Administrations. All UK public bodies, including the devolved Administrations and in the areas that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, highlighted, will still have responsibility for spending decisions on subsidies and should make these in a way that is consistent with the overall approach taken across the United Kingdom.

In the coming months, we intend to publish a consultation on whether we should go further than our World Trade Organization and international commitments, including whether further legislation is necessary. We will take the necessary time to listen closely to the devolved Administrations and design a system that promotes a competitive and dynamic economy throughout the whole of the United Kingdom.

The proposed amendment makes clear that the UK Government are committed to involving the devolved Administrations in the forthcoming development of proposals for a UK-wide subsidy control regime. We recognise the importance of working constructively and co-operatively in this policy area, and it is in all our interests that a new regime works to the benefit of the whole country. That is why the Government cannot agree with Amendments 50C, 51, 57 and 61, so I urge noble Lords to accept Amendments 50B and 51B put forward in my name and reject the others.

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Motion M

[Lord Callanan]

Moved by

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 51 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 51A, but do propose the following amendment in lieu—

Commons Reason

51A: Because it is necessary to reserve to the United Kingdom Parliament the right to legislate for a system to regulate the provision by public bodies of subsidies which are or may be distortive or harmful and to avoid the risk of inconsistent regulation of such subsidies in the different parts of the United Kingdom.