Nuclear Weapons (International Relations Committee Report)

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 16th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the register of interests, particularly my vice-chairmanship of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I shall do my best to conclude my remarks within the newly imposed time limit. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, on his excellent introductory speech and an excellent report. I extend my congratulations to his committee, its excellent staff and special adviser. On my recent, varied travels many international colleagues who work in this space have been—deservedly—complimentary about this report.

I will use my time to highlight key priorities for the UK, looking ahead to the 2020 review conference on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which will also mark the 50th anniversary of the treaty itself. As the report highlights, the NPT regime is coming under increasing threat. There are several reasons for this, including: lack of progress on disarmament; increasing risk of nuclear weapons use, proliferation, and terrorism; and deepening divisions among the international community on the role of nuclear deterrence, the vision of nuclear disarmament, and the steps required to prevent nuclear weapons use. Two of the most significant drivers contributing to this negative political context are: the growing divide between the recognised nuclear weapon states under the NPT and the non-nuclear weapon states —as the noble Lord and the evidence heard by the committee made clear, the ban treaty is a direct result of these divisions—and the mounting frustration felt by many countries; and the deteriorated political relationship among the nuclear weapon states.

The fast-approaching 2020 RevCon is an important milestone and an opportunity to sustain, reaffirm and demonstrate the vital contribution of the NPT to reducing global dangers and advancing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. If there is a continuing perceived lack of progress to reach the disarmament goal set out in Article VI of the NPT, we may—not at this RevCon, perhaps—reach the point where that failure damages the future of the treaty itself. With 2020 just over a year away, the UK should be alert to that possibility and should do more—and encourage others to do more—to demonstrate concrete progress in meeting the NPT disarmament commitment and pledges, including, for a start, those set out in the 2010 NPT action plan.

The following are the priorities I would recommend in the short time I have. First, looking to 2020, we should all be aware that if the INF treaty collapses and the US and Russia allow the current political tension to undermine the possibility of extending the new START—which must be agreed before February 2021—and the negotiation of its successor, the US and Russia will return to an unregulated nuclear arms competition that has not been seen since the early days of the Cold War. This will have a serious impact on the NPT. Leaders should recall that, in the past, each time a new US-Soviet or US-Russia nuclear arms control agreement was signed, the parties immediately started negotiations for the next one. Today, nine years after the approval of the new START, there is no agreed process or agenda for next steps on nuclear disarmament and risk reduction between Russia and the United States, which, between them, still possess over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.

At the same time, we are witnessing a collapse of the arms control architecture that we have relied on for the past several decades. The INF treaty is under threat, the CFE is not being implemented, the CTBT has not entered into force, and there is no consensus to even commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is also in danger of collapse. I understand that, during the preparation of an EU statement at the NPT PrepCom, the UK unsuccessfully attempted to block a reference to the importance of agreement on the extension of the new START. I am sure that noble Lords would be horrified if the motivation for this was driven by a desire not to damage a post-Brexit UK-US relationship. Can the Minister reassure the House that that was not the case? If not, can she explain the Government’s reasoning for this resistance and confirm that the Government are encouraging the extension of a new START in all possible diplomatic forums? Without it, we have no strategic arms control at all.

Secondly, and related to the above, is the importance of risk reduction as an issue for discussion and action among the P5. While nuclear arms control is dormant, US-Russian relations are severely strained, raising concerns about nuclear risk. Dangerous military incidents have occurred and official statements emphasising nuclear capabilities have implied the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used, reviving fears of possible military conflict that could potentially lead to nuclear escalation between Russia and the US. Such a collapse would occur in the context of the recent US nuclear posture review, which expands, not restricts, the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy; concerns about Russia’s nuclear doctrine and the new weapons it is developing, as well as its hybrid warfare activity; and worsening tensions between the West and Russia. Risk reduction has, therefore, gained traction among countries in the past year as an important means of demonstrating the responsibilities of nuclear armed states.

The P5, including the UK, should use the remaining time before the RevCon to agree upon actions that will be taken to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use. These could include leaders of the nuclear armed states making a new declaration reconfirming their common view:

“A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.


Ideally, this should be led by the US and Russia and done in conjunction with other nuclear weapon states, but in the absence of such leadership the UK could act alone. Is it willing to do so? The UK should lead an effort to develop a Europe-wide—including Russia—understanding of the risks to stability inherent in the emergence of new technology. Pending improved US-Russia relations, European countries need to prepare and advocate practical proposals about how to include these new technologies and weapons systems into the existing arms control, confidence-building instruments or to develop new ones dedicated to these technologies and systems; they are terrifying. I note that the UK response to this report, which I welcome, admits for the first time that the Government recognise the possibility of cybersecurity threats to nuclear deterrence.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I have very real concerns on the cyber issue. As we construct the Dreadnought class, one needs to look down to the SMEs providing equipment. Proper attention is not being paid at the moment to the possibility of trojans and other things being placed within systems that are fitted in the submarine. More work needs to be done on this. Just as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, went out waving, he asked me to stress that he is worried that more nations than ever are thinking that nuclear weapons can be used for war fighting. This is a terrible thing to be occurring.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

I thank my noble friend for those points. The last time this issue was raised in a debate, he asked the Minister to consider red teaming the Dreadnought programme. The US regularly red teams its resilient military systems and is candid about its vulnerability to this threat. We are investing a significant amount of money—and, most importantly, the security of the next 50 years—in a programme that has vulnerabilities. It needs to be red teamed and we need to admit that protecting that system from this threat will cost significantly more than the Government are currently investing in cybersecurity for the whole country for the next five years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I first apologise for being slightly late into the Chamber; I was caught unawares by the preceding Statement ending a little early. I thank my noble friend Lord Howell for tabling this Motion and all noble Lords for their perceptive and helpful contributions. I particularly pay tribute to him and his committee colleagues for a thorough and comprehensive report. To me, it is a significant contribution to a subject of vital importance. I know my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon is very sorry not to be responding to this Motion. He has important duties this week in Washington at the 2019 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, hosted by the State Department. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that we are all very glad to hear the positive news about his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Judd.

This debate comes at a time when the international security environment is increasingly complex—at times fraught—and arms control frameworks are coming under increasing challenge. In this context, we should not underestimate the positive impact of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and its enduring value as a central pillar of the rules-based international system that the United Kingdom has done so much to build and uphold. I welcome the chance to reflect on the achievements of the treaty, outline some of the challenges we face and set out what we are doing to overcome them.

The NPT was built on consensus and has been at the heart of global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and encourage nuclear disarmament efforts for nearly 50 years. It has overwhelmingly delivered on its objectives and we should celebrate its success. To quote the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, it has made “a massive contribution”. I realise that this is a difficult debate for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb; I may not support her view on unilateral disarmament, but I respect and see the passion with which she holds it. Let me try to reassure her by now turning to the NPT and considering it in a little more detail.

First, the NPT has limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the time of its inception, the world feared a widespread arms race that could have resulted in dozens of nuclear-armed states within decades. The NPT helped to persuade some countries to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons and to ensure that many more did not seek to acquire them. Secondly, it has provided the framework and confidence for a significant reduction in nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War. The UK has provided a good exemplar, significantly reducing its nuclear weapon stockpile since the Cold War peak. Finally, the treaty extended the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy around the globe. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for his recognition of these virtues. His map in the report is encouraging, and I commend him on his imagination in suggesting its inclusion.

The non-proliferation treaty continues to offer a framework that is central to our goal of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. The value of this treaty is widely recognised by nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike, which is why it has received near-universal acceptance. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the treaty next year, noble Lords should be in no doubt that this Government remain committed to its step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised that point. This approach includes the universal application of the NPT, the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the start and successful conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

However, I must be candid: significant further disarmament is difficult to foresee in the current security environment. Some countries are expanding their nuclear arsenals and pursuing a reckless path of breaching arms control and disarmament treaties, as well as developing destabilising new delivery systems for nuclear weapons. We must remain resolute in working to deter such threats and in facing down those who seek to undermine decades of progress. Against this complex security backdrop, the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to both our security and that of our NATO allies, for as long as the global security situation demands.

But even in this challenging context and environment, we are making progress towards verifiable, treaty-based future disarmament. Part of this requires us to understand and overcome the challenges in verifying nuclear disarmament, so that all states can have confidence in the process. The UK continues to play a leading role in developing verification tools and techniques working alongside nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We hosted the first-ever verification exercise for nuclear disarmament in 2017, as part of our quad partnership with Norway, Sweden and the United States. We are active participants in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We also took part in the recent UN Group of Governmental Experts on verification.

Next year’s NPT review conference falls 75 years after nuclear weapons were released on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 50 years after the NPT entered into force, and 25 years after it was indefinitely extended. It is clear to us that the NPT remains as relevant and important now as it has ever been. That is not just the United Kingdom’s view: it is widely shared around the world. However, we also know that even a treaty as important as this requires constant nurturing to ensure that it remains effective.

My noble friend Lord Howell mentioned that trust—I think that is the word that he used—is key and he is absolutely correct. The UK is doing everything we can to encourage trust and confidence, which is also important. That is why we are working with international partners to ensure that the review conference reinforces our shared interests and seeks to advance its goals.

My noble friend Lady Anelay of St Johns asked how we were preparing for this review conference and whether we can resolve differences. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also raised that point. We recognise that achieving consensus at the review conference will be challenging, but we will invest all our energies in striving for a positive outcome. As part of our preparation between now and the conference, we will chair the P5 dialogue, which was established a decade ago by the United Kingdom to build mutual trust and confidence between the nuclear weapon states.

The noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord Hannay and Lord Collins, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and my noble friend Lord King raised some apprehensions about the backdrop to this conference. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, particularly raised the issue of new START. That is a bilateral treaty between the US and Russia. It is a decision for the US and Russia to take forward discussions about extending the treaty and we of course support effective arms control. There is no doubt that new START contributes to international stability. All allies support continued implementation, early and active dialogue and ways to improve strategic stability, and we will use our best efforts to encourage an extension of it. But at the end of the day it is a decision for the United States and Russia.

In an intervention, my noble friend Lord King raised the position of India and Pakistan. Having made his intervention, he now seems to have disappeared, but I will share with the rest of the Chamber that he wondered if they would be parties to the next P5 dialogue. It is correct that that would require the agreement of all P5 members because the P5 process is primarily for NPT issues, but we encourage discussion among all these countries in a variety of fora, so we have noted those important concerns. In addition, we plan to engage in discussions on transparency and risk reduction with all state parties.

Noble Lords raised a number of points that I would like to try to deal with, if I may. The question of cyber capability and cyber risks arose, and that is no surprise. It was raised by my noble friend Lord Howell and the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord Purvis of Tweed, Lord West and Lord Collins, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. It is an important issue to raise in the context of the report and of this debate. The Government take their responsibilities for maintaining a credible independent nuclear deterrent extremely seriously. We have robust measures in place to keep that nuclear deterrent safe and secure. We invest significant resources in ensuring protection against cyber and other threats. However, as noble Lords will understand, it is not government policy to comment on specific security measures relating to the nuclear deterrent, for the purposes of safeguarding national security. I reassure noble Lords that, more broadly, the Government doubled investment in cybersecurity to £1.9 billion in the last strategic defence and security review in 2015. No one is indifferent to or casual about the immensity of that threat. It is the threat of the modern age and the Government are acutely aware of it.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

On the Government’s commitment to cybersecurity, every single time this issue is raised in whatever context in this House the government spokesperson raises this point about £1.9 billion—without explanation. The £1.9 billion announced in 2015 and again in 2016 is to cover five years of all the work that the Government do on cybersecurity in every aspect of public policy. But the National Audit Office reported on that in March this year. My reading of that report suggests that the true figure is £1.3 billion and that, in the first two years, the Treasury transferred 37% of the funding to other matters that were priorities for the Government that were not originally intended to be included. Can we please in future have specific information on the issue that is before the House about how much is being spent by the MoD on the Dreadnought programme and on cybersecurity? That is the question, not what the Government may or may not be spending on cybersecurity writ large.

[Baroness Goldie]

I hear the noble Lord, but he will understand as well as anyone, with his distinguished experience in these matters, that we cannot comment on specific security measures and I do not think he would expect the Government to do that. But I hear his detailed questioning about the funding. I have no specific information available this evening, but I undertake to make further investigation and write to him.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised a couple of issues about policy and strategy—essentially, why the UK maintains a nuclear deterrent and what our commitment to disarmament is. I suggest that actually the two are not mutually exclusive. It is clear from the evidence that the committee received that the Government have a strong record on nuclear disarmament. We have significantly reduced the size of our own nuclear forces since the Cold War peak and we have about 1% of the total global stockpile. But it is absolutely clear that the independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to our security today and will do for as long as the global security situation demands. It has existed for more than 60 years to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life and I submit that it is helping to guarantee our security and that of our allies. But the commitment that we have to the NPT is manifest. Noble Lords will understand my suggestion that the two positions are far from mutually exclusive.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, raised the matter of Russia and the strategic approach. His specific question was about whether at the recent meeting between the Prime Minister and President Putin any discussion had taken place. Apparently, a wide range of issues was discussed, including global security issues, but I have no more specific information than that.

My noble friend Lady Anelay raised paragraph 197 of the report and how the Government proposed to respond in practical terms in their dealings with nuclear possessor states. We have regular and frank exchanges on such issues through the P5 and bilaterally and we encourage all possessor states to recognise their responsibilities and to refrain from destabilising rhetoric and destabilising technology.

A number of noble Lords raised Iran, including my noble friend Lady Anelay and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. The UK expressed deep concern that Iran is pursuing activities inconsistent with its commitments under the JCPOA. We did that in a statement with France and Germany earlier this month. The UK remains committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We think it is important for our security and for neutralising the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. We and remaining parties are working hard to ensure that it is upheld for as long as Iran meets its commitments, including full IAEA access. I say to the noble Baronesses that the Government regret the United States’ decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions, but we continue to work with our European partners and Iran to try to find solutions to support economic relations.

I think my noble friend Lady Anelay also raised the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of Hormuz. We are concerned at tensions in that area and we are doing everything we can to de-escalate them by diplomatic means. However, international maritime law must be respected and upheld. We shall protect British shipping in the region. The recent escort of a British tanker by HMS “Montrose” demonstrated our resolve to offer that protection.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised the issue of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We remain fully committed to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We believe that realistically that is going to be possible only when political solutions are found to the tensions in the region. We believe that the convening of a conference has potential but we think it will be worth while, valid and achievable only if it is on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all states in the region, as set out in the 2010 NPT review conference plan.

It is clear that the NPT has made a substantial contribution to international security and prosperity. It succeeded in all three of its pillars and has earned its place as the central pillar of the arms control architecture. This Government remain committed to multilateral disarmament. We will continue to work tirelessly to uphold the NPT and to explore practical ways to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

This has been an extremely helpful and interesting debate. I once again commend my noble friend Lord Howell and his committee for their hard work in producing this report. It is a very useful report. I realise that this was difficult for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but the report and what we have debated this evening indicate what is possible when people are bonded by the same objective and motivated by the same desire. Perhaps perversely, she and I have the same objective; we just have different ways of arriving at it.

I conclude with the words of my noble friend Lady Anelay still ringing in my mind: a watched pot never boils. I think we all agree that this is a situation and a subject where we do not want the pot ever to boil.