Scotland: Independence Referendum

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 30th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am extremely pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and I join in the thanks and congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, on securing this important debate. In the debates on the Scotland Act last year, I rather unkindly suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that Scotland had given up listening to him a long time ago. With his characteristic quick wit he came back to me immediately and said that he was never aware that Scotland ever listened to him. I can say unequivocally and, I think, uncontradicted by those who have heard him today that we all hope that the people of Scotland—my fellow Scots—listen to what he had to say today.

On that subject, perhaps I may say how pleased I am that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, is in her place today and that she will contribute to this debate. I certainly know that the people of Scotland listen to her, and we all wait with eager anticipation for her contribution.

I intend to concentrate on one subject alone in these few minutes: the profound implications of the forthcoming Scottish independence referendum for the defence and security of the UK.

The United Kingdom presently enjoys a very high level of security. However, although we face no existential threat, in the words of the national security strategy:

“Today, Britain faces a different and more complex range of threats from a myriad of sources. Terrorism, cyber attack, unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, as well as large scale accidents or natural hazards”.

Consequently, the task of our Armed Forces and our wider security machinery extends far beyond conventional defence. They discharge that remit to an extremely high level of competence. But that competence is built on partnerships—between us and international organisations such as NATO and the EU; between us and our allies, the US, Germany and France; and between Scotland and the rest of the UK. We can meet 21st century threats only with collective capabilities and shared approaches, and independence can only divide that capability, leaving us a little more disparate, but certainly leaving the people of Scotland more remote from the collaborative friendships that have served us so well for the past 70 years.

Let us consider intelligence as but one example. Scotland’s Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, accepts that countering the threats facing Scotland would need,

“an independent domestic intelligence machinery”.

However, no part of the existing UK’s intelligence machinery can be disaggregated to an independent Scotland, and no effective intelligence organisation can be domestic. It would have to start from scratch and look outwards to threats that could emanate from anywhere in the world. What Scotland has already, which helps to provide security for its citizens and protect the prosperity of its businesses, could be replicated but not easily, certainly not quickly and not without considerable expense. As we wait for that, Scotland and the rest of the UK may be less effectively secure.

Further, while our relationships across the board with the US may often be misdescribed as “special”, we do have a unique defence and intelligence partnership of trust with the US. It allows us access to intelligence material without which we would be much hampered in containing the 21st century threats that we face. Although obviously secret and perhaps arguably requiring greater parliamentary scrutiny, it is essential to our security. It is improbable that an independent Scotland, particularly one intent on unilateral nuclear disarmament, would enjoy the same relationship. That also has implications, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said, for intelligence sharing with the so-called “Five Eyes” partners—Australia, Canada and New Zealand—NATO allies and, indeed, with the rest of the United Kingdom.

We must also recognise, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said, the very human dimension to this debate. Traditionally, Scotland has provided disproportionate numbers of soldiers and operatives to our defence and security forces. I think that I can say without fear of contradiction that no UK unit is without a Scottish presence—nor for that matter an English, Welsh, Irish or Commonwealth comrade. Thousands of Scots serve in our wider intelligence and security forces. Serving with distinction, they form an unbroken line back through Iraq, Afghanistan, countless peacekeeping missions and other crises, and two world wars, and deep into our history. This shared heritage and tradition is stronger than its individual components. The loss of them will not serve the interest of anyone in these islands, especially not the interests of the Scottish people.

Scots are everywhere in the defence architecture of NATO, where they enjoy considerable influence. They are accorded that influence because of their individual contribution but also because they come from the tradition, training background and experience of service in the UK Armed Forces. The armed forces of most European states of similar size to Scotland are restricted by their scale to home defence and exercises and to limited international involvement. Those few countries that are the exceptions established their military capability over years when defence spending was considerably higher, and that opportunity is gone for decades. Why would serving Scottish men and women choose to leave that tradition and join the armed forces of an independent Scotland when they could stay where they are and also enjoy the opportunity of promotion, advancement and the influence of being part of a UK larger force?

The inevitable loss of human and intelligence capability during the early decades of a separate Scotland, added to the loss of jobs in defence industries, the local impact of the removal of the Faslane naval base, the huge start-up costs for unique armed forces, the loss of access to intelligence and the loss of scale, will create very real risks to the people of Scotland and significant challenges for the rest of the United Kingdom. In the words of General Andrew Mackay, former GOC 2nd Division and commander of British forces in Afghanistan:

“It is easy to argue from within the comfort of a nearly 300-year-old Union that an independent Scotland would only require a small fighting force. It is not likely to be so comfortable after you have jettisoned your allies and you are on your own”.