Gambling (Licensing and Advertising) Bill

Lord Browne of Belmont Excerpts

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Browne of Belmont]

3: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Consultation on and implementation of self-exclusion for remote gambling
The Secretary of State shall—(a) review and report to Parliament on the significance of the remote gambling market in relation to potential problem gambling;(b) within one year of this Act coming into force, consult on a system of standardised self-exclusion for remote gamblers; and(c) within two years of this Act coming into force and after the conclusion of consultation under this section, introduce a system of standardised self-exclusion for remote gamblers.”

[Lord Browne of Belmont (DUP)]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak to Amendment 3, which is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Morrow and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. By way of introduction, I apologise to noble Lords for my absence from Second Reading, which was unavoidably caused by illness and meant that I was unable to travel to London during that week. This was a matter of some frustration as I intended to speak and had a speech lined up which was given in my absence by my noble friend Lord Morrow. However, I have read the debate with interest, particularly the Minister’s response.

The reality of problem gambling is that it is a terrible blight on our society. The 2010 UK problem prevalence figure demonstrates a problem gambling figure of 0.9%, which may not sound very much on one level but equates to 461,000 people. However, to really understand the challenge, we need to remember that the actual figure is much larger if one includes the families who are associated with this problem. Indeed, in 2012, the Gordon Moody Association, which treats the most serious addicts, estimated that each addict,

“will have severely affected the lives of at least 15 others in order to support their gambling”.

Of course, we have to understand that gambling online has a significantly higher problem prevalence figure than gambling generally. Far from being 0.9%, the problem prevalence figure for online slot machines was actually over 9%, rising to over 17% on a monthly basis.

I am of course aware that a perceived drop in problem prevalence figures associated with the Health Survey for England is currently being used by some to mitigate the sense of urgency for implementing stronger social responsibility mechanisms. Lest anyone here should be attracted by such arguments, I will make three brief points. First, the Health Survey for England itself acknowledges that health surveys tend to report lower gambling problem prevalence figures than dedicated problem gambling research. Indeed, I understand that there was a relatively low response to the gambling section of the survey.

Secondly, notwithstanding the perceived lower overall gambling prevalence figure, that number does not tell us much at all in relation to this Bill. The Bill is about online gambling rather than gambling in general. What the Health Survey for England results do tell us is that problem gambling is particularly associated with young men aged between 16 and 24, an age group noble Lords will no doubt associate with mobile phone apps and the use of the internet. The health survey says:

“Among men aged 16-24, 11.7% were classified as low risk gamblers and a further 3.2% as moderate risk gamblers … When combined with problem gambling rates, 16.6% of men aged 16-24 experienced some type of difficulty with their gambling behaviour in the last year”.

That means that there is the potential for at least 16% of men in that age group to develop a very serious problem indeed.

Thirdly, the point should be made that you cannot compare the UK problem prevalence figures with the results of Health Survey for England questions on gambling, not least because they do not include the results from the equivalent Scottish Health Survey or figures for Wales and my very own Northern Ireland. Moreover, even if there was a drop in problem gambling of a few per cent from 461,000, it would still leave hundreds of thousands in need of help. This would be no cause to relax.

In making this point, I think particularly of the two cases that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, mentioned at Second Reading: Lisa Carville, the accountant from Northern Ireland who stole £50,000 to feed her online gambling habit between March 2010 and September 2012; and Michael Garner, the financial adviser who stole almost £1 million from friends, a charity and investors to feed his online gambling habit between December 2011 and May 2012.

Having made these important introductory remarks about the sad reality of problem gambling, I now turn to self-exclusion. The principle of self-exclusion is not one that I have dreamt up. It is standard that is widely recognised, not least by the Gambling Commission codes for the purpose of helping problem gamblers and those who feel they are at risk of becoming problem gamblers. Put very simply, on a strong day someone who recognises that they have a problem, or are in danger of developing a problem, can visit each of the betting shops in their town—perhaps up to four or five—and self-exclude for a fixed period of time, such as six months. During that period the betting shops in question are not permitted to serve them.

By acting in this way, the problem gambler will effectively cut themselves off from the opportunity of terrestrial gambling in their home town for six months, during which time they can get help and try to put their lives back together. The problem with this protection from the perspective of today’s debate is that although online problem gamblers can self-exclude from an online provider, self-exclusion does not provide them with comparable assistance because it cannot cut them off from online gambling opportunities. They can self-exclude from four gambling websites, but there will still be hundreds if not thousands of online gambling providers that they can access without even having to leave the comfort of their own home. The reality of this failure is particularly problematic as online problem gambling has a higher problem prevalence figure than gambling generally. It is extremely ironic that in this context, where it is needed most badly, self-exclusion is most ineffective.

The good news is that a remedy is available. I suggest that in future, rather than trying to self-exclude from the hundreds if not thousands of online gambling websites that are out there, online problem gamblers should simply have to register their self-exclusion with the Gambling Commission. Any holder of a UK Gambling Commission licence should then be required to respect the terms of their self-exclusion.

When this was proposed in another place, the Minister did not appear to have any real arguments against implementation apart from the fact that it was complicated and she wanted to give the industry more time—although more time for what was not entirely clear. At Second Reading in your Lordships’ House the Minister also mentioned that implementing such a solution would be complicated. In my experience, most worthwhile endeavours require hard work. I am not suggesting that setting up such a system would be a walk in the park, but I am suggesting that it would be possible.

Indeed, Dr Sally Gainsbury, author of Internet Gambling: Current Research Findings and Implications, published in 2012 by Springer in the SpringerBriefs in Behavioral Medicine series, states that a significant limitation of self-exclusion is,

“the lack of collaboration between different online gambling sites and venues, so that excluded individuals may find it easy to gamble at another site or venue”.

She argues that the technology is available and points to its feasibility, particularly in the UK due to the current existing licence conditions and code of conduct upheld by the UK Gambling Commission. In demonstrating that a one-stop-shop facility is technologically entirely possible, Gainsbury highlights a programme called VeriPlay.com, developed by Bet Buddy, which allows the secure exchange of anonymous data. It enables operators to check whether a player is on a centralised list of players who have self-excluded. Gainsbury also argues that collaborative efforts would help to strengthen self-exclusion. Moreover, research presented to the Canadian-based Responsible Gambling Council in 2011 by the British-based GamCare and the University of Salford, along with Bet Buddy, endorses the proposal.

Within the past week I have been informed that both the industry and officials see no reason in principle why we should not embark upon such a project, nor why it should not work. Some might seek to argue that the difference of treatment meted out to online problem gamblers compared with that afforded to terrestrial gamblers is justified, because it is not possible to provide online problem gamblers with as robust a form of self-exclusion as that enjoyed by online terrestrial gamblers. That would constitute a legitimate defence if it was true but, as we have seen, it is not. In a context where we have the capacity to deliver online problem gamblers an equally credible form of self-exclusion to that afforded to terrestrial problem gamblers but choose not to, we practice discrimination. In this context, the basic question that we have to ask ourselves is: can we bothered, and do we have the will to do this?

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[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his amendment.

As your Lordships have reflected, problem gambling does serious harm, not only to an individual, but also to their friends and family, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, highlighted so strongly. As I said at Second Reading, GamCare has calculated that every problem gambler costs the state £8,000 every year, and we must never forget the distress and upset this causes to wider family members. That is why the Gambling Commission’s licensing conditions require operators to make a commitment to the identification and treatment of problem gamblers, and set out how operators will contribute to this. The Gambling Commission’s licence conditions and codes of practice already include the requirement for each remote licensee to have, and to put into effect, procedures for self-exclusion, which must include a register of those excluded with appropriate records, and the removal of access from those self-excluded persons found to have gambled or to have attempted to gamble on the facilities. This recognises that self-exclusion is an important tool for those individuals who have already recognised that they have an issue with their gambling and wish to address it.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, noted at Second Reading, in principle the software exists to set up a central self-exclusion scheme, but there are wide ranges of practical and legal issues to be resolved. Those complexities include issues such as the compatibility of different operator systems for registering players; the range of self-exclusion options offered by different operators, which may vary in the length of time and range of activities covered; and how to ensure the wrong people are not prevented from gambling or “self-excluded” by third parties, not by themselves. Any comprehensive centralised system would require a trusted third party to run the central list and oversee the scheme.

The first step to resolving these complexities and achieving a system for self-exclusion is the enactment of this Bill, which will bring operators within the remit of the Gambling Commission. It will give the Gambling Commission direct access to information from operators to assess the most effective way of achieving a system for self-exclusion.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, rightly wanted to know the Government’s view. Work is under way on reviewing the effectiveness of self-exclusion as a tool for managing problem gambling. The Gambling Commission asked its expert advisory body, the Responsible Gambling Strategy Board, to look at the effectiveness of self-exclusion as a tool and how it could be improved. Self-exclusion also forms part of the Responsible Gambling Trust’s work programme, and they are due to report their findings in March. Further steps will be developed once these findings have been considered and the remote operators are brought within the regulatory oversight of the Gambling Commission. The Remote Gambling Association also convened an industry meeting in November 2013, and this will be contributing to the process. What is more—and this is crucial to the amendment—under the Gambling Act 2005 a centralised self-exclusion system can be achieved in licensing conditions and does not require further primary legislation. For that reason, although I entirely understand the force of arguments about problem gambling and our mutual desire to assist as much as possible, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Browne of Belmont]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have participated in this debate, and for the Minister’s response. I am glad that he now seems to be engaging with this issue rather more than the Minister in the other place, and that he understands that the Gambling Commission and the industry are considering addressing this problem in various ways.

However, it is the state, through legislation, that proposes that the scope for British people, and therein all problem gamblers—I will not cite any statistics at this stage—should be widened, that they should be made more aware of types of gambling with a higher prevalence of problems than gambling as a whole. It is therefore only right that the state should, as a minimum, provide problem gamblers, through the same legislation, with equal and opposite protection in the form of a credible model of self-exclusion. To simply leave this to the industry is not acceptable. I should say that I would welcome self-exclusion from restaurants—it might help to improve my figure. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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[Lord Browne of Belmont]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of the proposed new clause in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. The new clause is important because since 2005 a significant number of online gambling providers have moved outside the UK to European Economic Area and so-called whitelisted jurisdictions, from which they can continue to access the UK market and advertise but, crucially, avoid paying tax. The Bill, in tandem with the Treasury initiative, will plug that loophole, resulting in British consumers having to depend once more on British regulation.

In that context, the proposed new clause is vital for two reasons. First, we need to be sure that no British consumer will experience an erosion of the protections that they have come to rely on as a result of coming under UK regulation, at least so far as UK consumers are concerned. Secondly, we should always be working to ensure that the protections that we afford consumers, especially in relation to problem gambling, are the very best.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, has explained, Alderney is particularly important because it is a jurisdiction to which a number of UK operators have relocated. The better protections provided for problem gamblers in Alderney, in terms of the setting of limits, are certainly something that we should look at and maybe amend our codes and technical standards to emulate.

I would like to look at two EEA jurisdictions, Finland and Denmark, which in some important respects provide better regulation and consumer protection than we do here in the UK. Finland’s regulator has implemented a mandatory daily loss limit and a monthly loss limit, as well as setting a maximum amount of euros that can be in a gambling account of €5,000. The maximum daily loss is set at €500. Innovatively, they have also produced an actual boundary, something that is so often lacking in online gambling. Transfers from bank accounts to a gambling account cannot be made between midnight and 6 am. This creates a natural boundary that is similar to betting shop opening and closing times. Implementing such a provision would create a level playing field across the industry in general, and would help to protect people from unhelpful and impulsive all-night gambling sessions.

The responsibility codes go further in Finland. On marketing, there can be no registration bonuses, deposit bonuses or activation bonuses, and no rewards can be given based on gaming volume. Indeed, payment using credit cards is forbidden. It is possible in every game to activate a short 12-hour gaming ban that covers all games. This short self-imposed gambling ban can be activated by pressing a panic button that is located in the bottom half of the screen. Given that problem gambling is often associated with impulse, the provision of a button like that would help many people tremendously.

The Danish model of regulation, meanwhile, requires gambling companies to obtain information about the customer’s intended gambling volume at the same time as the customer provides identification information by opening an account. Players are allowed to set daily, weekly and monthly limits, and all three options must be given to the player. If a player chooses to self-exclude permanently, they must be given the option to be added to what in Denmark is referred to as the register of self-excluded players. This is a central list, much like the proposed one-stop shop for self-exclusion. If a player chooses to be added to that list they will not be able to gamble on any website that has a Danish licence, since every company, before allowing a player to gamble or open an account, must check the list to see if that person has entered their name to the register. To this end, as I have already explained, Amendment 3 is vital.

I very much support the proposed new clause. I hope that the Government will warmly endorse it, and I particularly look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about the protection that is afforded in Alderney, Sweden—as we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Howe—Finland and Denmark, compared with those provided in the UK.

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her amendment. The Government are confident that the British regulatory system is a model of international best practice and that the Gambling Commission’s requirements are robust and of the highest standard. It is the commission’s job to ensure that the British regulatory system is the best that it can be, and to that extent always has its licensing conditions and technical standards under review. As the noble Baroness will be aware, the commission has just concluded its consultation into its licensing conditions and codes of practice, and we await its response. It is fair to say that the commission is internationally respected and continues to disseminate best practice, extensively engaging with overseas regulators. I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, for illustrating what is happening in Finland and Denmark.

In preparation for the new licensing regime, the commission has had a series of meetings with regulators in Gibraltar, the Isle of Man and the States of Alderney to establish ways to minimise duplication. It will be using the recently developed multijurisdictional business form for those applying for remote operating licences, which enables operators to provide and update information, once in a form, that can be provided to multiple jurisdictions without duplication.

The commission continues to explore the scope for expanded collaboration. It also has memorandums of understanding in place with several regulators, including Alderney, for the sharing of information between regulators. This will enable the commission to use any licensing, compliance and enforcement information to determine the suitability of an operator to hold, and continue to hold, a British licence. Neither the Government nor the Gambling Commission is complacent about these matters, and should either feel that such a review would be appropriate, sufficient power already exists under the 2005 Act to enable that to take place. For that reason I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.