Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Blunkett Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 7th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, encores are rarely worth the value of the extra time, but the noble Lords, Lord Grabiner and Lord Willetts, have shown that it can be done. I will be very brief, because they have said so much.

I draw attention to an interesting contribution from Professor Jo Phoenix, who was interviewed recently on Radio 4. She supported this clause on tort, on the grounds that the University of Essex had treated her appallingly—it clearly had; this was acknowledged—but she had not been able to obtain loss. She was not employed by the University of Essex, so the loss was some theoretical appreciation of whether she would be invited somewhere else because of what had happened at Essex.

I commend the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for attempting to meet the debate in Committee, but I think we have opened another can of worms. You go through the Office for Students and the adjudicator and you have the facility of judicial review and, as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, said, employment law—which I used to teach—which could involve constructive dismissal if you are employed. If you are not employed there but have been treated extremely badly—the right of free speech has been denied you and that has been acknowledged —you might believe that the acknowledgement itself may persuade others not to invite you and you would use the law under this tort to go to court to get redress.

What is the redress? Who will make a judgment on the financial value of what you might have done had you been invited to speak elsewhere, when you do not know whether you have not been or would have been invited? It is a bit like Donald Rumsfeld’s known unknowns. If you go to court with known unknowns, you will be in a disaster area. The only people who will benefit—I say this with some humility to my good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner—are the lawyers.

The simple way around this is to do two things: approve the rest of this Bill and encourage civil society to be civil and people to stand up for each other, rather than always running to the courts, to deal with this small minority of intolerant, anti-democratic bigots—they are bigots, in terms of not being able to debate properly the rights of women. That is really what we are talking about in lots of these cases. We should not have a merry-go-round of trying to compensate somebody for something which you could never know and, if you did, probably would not have resulted in a loss of income in the first place. Let us get rid of Clause 4 and get back to common sense.

[Baroness Shafik (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 22, to which I have attached my name. I declare my interest as director of the London School of Economics and Political Science. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, whose remarks I very much agree with. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for the constructive way in which they have engaged with all of us throughout the passage of this Bill.

It was made clear in Committee that Clause 4, as drafted, was not fit for purpose and that statutory tort would provide an avenue for vexatious, costly and damaging cases to be brought against universities by troublemakers far more concerned with self-promotion than free speech. The clause would have the perverse effect of limiting free debate and exchange of ideas on our campuses by creating exactly the kind of chilling effect that it aims to prevent. Student unions in particular would be frightened of inviting anyone at all, given this risk of lawsuits.

LSE hosts literally hundreds of events every year, which are all open to the public, and as its director, I have chaired hundreds of them. We work very hard to foster an environment where free speech and critical thinking are encouraged. I feel strongly that the solutions to the chilling effect, which I acknowledge exists, lie in education, dialogue and codes of practice, not the courts. Peers in the US, a far more litigious country than ours, are now petrified of inviting any speakers at all for fear of the consequences they may face. I fear that this legislation could take us to a similar position.

I was grateful that Ministers acknowledged that changes were needed and that significant revisions have been tabled on Report. Despite those positive moves, which are very welcome, I am still convinced that Clause 4 remains both unnecessary and potentially very harmful. I believe analysis and redress should be overseen by the regulator, as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, has said. The existence of the tort system would call into question the working and judgment of that regulator, as well as universities’ own procedures. It would open up our institutions to potentially long, drawn-out and unnecessary complaints brought by individuals with axes to grind, time on their hands and, potentially, the financial backing of those with an agenda. I do not believe that having to go through existing complaints procedures would deter those kinds of individuals.

The potential costs of time, effort and money in highly constrained circumstances are unduly high. Of course, we would have to ask about loss, as the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, very eloquently noted. Who has sustained this loss? It is still very indeterminate and the legislation as drafted does not require that loss to be material. Is it monetary, reputational or temporal? Is there a minimum threshold for the loss? Could it be the price of hurt feelings or the unquantifiable effects of media attention? All those things are highly intangible. There is still far too much uncertainty and confusion, and too much potential for this tort to be misused or have the perverse effect of stifling freedom of speech, which would be contrary to the other, more meritorious, objectives of this legislation. I concur with the proposal to remove the tort, as I believe it will be counterproductive.