Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Bates and Lord Tunnicliffe(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I am, albeit temporarily, on the same side as the Minister, and I am now confused. I think he said—some minutes ago, I grant you—that the Government had not ruled out the use of the word “synthetic”, but then he went on to rule it out. Can he be clear: are the Government thinking about adopting the word “synthetic”, and if so, in what timescale? If I misheard him, he now has the opportunity to be absolutely clear.
Lord Bates
I ask the noble Lord please not to go to the other side just yet but to stay with me a little longer. I was referring to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and was talking about the use of the term “novel” in this context. That was the ACMD point, as opposed to the point about the use of “synthetic”, which I shall come to later and have already touched upon. Now the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks puzzled; perhaps I have lost him in gaining the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. Perhaps I may continue with what I was saying and then I will come to the specific point raised by the noble Lord.
I accept that while our target in this Bill is substances that are harmful when misused, or which have the potential to cause harm, the Bill seeks to define the effect of these substances rather than to make any explicit reference to their harms. Of course, the advisory council has a considerable and impressive track record in making these harm assessments. It is a scientific body of experts which for the last 40 years has been advising successive Governments. These amendments would require assessments of individual substances, or even groups of substances, for the purpose of bringing them within the scope of the Bill and its offences.
Our fundamental issue with that is that it would perpetuate the inadequacies and frustrations of our current approach under the 1971 Act. As the expert panel found, a substance-by-substance approach would not meet our core objective to get fully ahead of the market and scientific developments. It would allow the suppliers to adapt their range of substances on sale in response to new controls. That is exactly what has happened in the past and is behind the purpose of this legislation. Indeed, by driving innovation in the market, the current approach adds to the harms caused by these substances, as each new generation of psychoactive substances is more potent than the last. We need a change in gear—that is what the blanket ban will deliver.
Finally, Amendment 9 adopts a different approach again to how we define a psychoactive substance for the purposes of the Bill. Clause 3 enables the Home Secretary to make regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure, which add to or vary the list of exempted substances in Schedule 1. As we have previously debated, the regulation-making power in Clause 3 has been designed to future-proof the list of exempted substances and ensure that, for example, medicinal products are not inadvertently caught by the blanket ban provided for in the Bill. Schedule 1 contains broad categories of established substances and products that we want to exclude from this regime, mostly because they are already regulated by other legislation.
I turn to the specific point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. He pointed to the advisory council’s concerns about proving psychoactivity as a point of law. I wrote to the noble Lord on this very issue, and he quoted my letter, in which I said:
“The Government is committed to supporting the law enforcement community in the exercise of their powers under the Bill. We will work with the national policing lead and College of Policing on the development of policing guidance”.
It is important to recognise that different powers in the Bill apply to different standards of proof. For example, the powers of seizure in Clause 42 operate to a “reasonable belief” test. An officer’s reasonable belief that a substance is psychoactive could be based on a number of factors, including the substance’s packaging, its markings or even whether the individual from whom it was seized appeared intoxicated and the officer could infer that the substance found might be responsible. The same “reasonable belief” test applies to the issuing of a prohibition notice or a premises notice. Applications for prohibition orders and premises orders are determined on the basis of the balance of probabilities.
In the case of a prosecution for an offence under Clauses 4 to 8—I think that this comes to the point that the noble Lord invited us to look at—we have the criminal test of “beyond reasonable doubt”. Clause 25, which is referred to in my letter, deals with the offence of failing to comply with a prohibition order or premises order. That clearly involves the civil test of the balance of probabilities. However, failure to comply with the order can involve a criminal sanction. Therefore, quite rightly the noble Lord came back and asked whether it was possible that we could end up with someone being caught between the two tests—the civil and the criminal—and facing a criminal sanction on the balance of probabilities test. As I understand it, that is at the heart of his concern. I can certainly give him the assurance that before any criminal sanction could be made under Clause 25, there would need to be proof to the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” that the substance involved was indeed psychoactive.
I hope that that clarification will help the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, with his concerns. I also hope that the point that I made right at the beginning to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that we are continuing in a genuine dialogue with the Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs, will allow her to—
Lord Tunnicliffe
Listening to the Minister, one might almost interpret him as saying that this is a balanced issue on which he needs more time to think and on which he wants to involve noble Lords. However, the only time when noble Lords will get another chance to debate this will be at Third Reading. Is the Minister saying that he may be able to take this away and shed more light on his conclusions at Third Reading?
Lord Bates
Look at the pace of events over the past week and the exchanges of correspondence that there have been. This is moving because we are genuinely exploring what the definition should be. Of course we will keep it under review for Third Reading and, should the Bill go to the other place, it is likely that, as a result of deliberations in your Lordships’ House, government amendments will be tabled in other areas dealing with other clauses. Therefore, through the normal process, we will get an opportunity to consider those Commons amendments should they be made. There will be opportunities for this discussion to continue with the ACMD in the proper way. However, I come back to the basic principle on which the noble Lord and I agree absolutely: we cannot have any more loopholes popping up so that people can exploit the gaps in the legislation. That is the whole point. We might as well not have the Bill if it will simply open up a number of new areas—be it botanicals or some other derivative—that can be used for the purposes that the Bill is intended to clamp down on.
Lord Tunnicliffe
Is the Minister saying—I think he is about to get an answer from the Box—that he may well further consider this issue before Third Reading and that we should debate further at that point? That is very important to the noble Baroness in deciding whether to press her amendment.
Lord Bates
In responding on the Bill, I gave a number of examples of particular botanical substances that would fail the test of “synthetic”. Therefore, it is very much as my noble and learned friend has said. Those substances do not meet the harm threshold of the 1971 Act, but some natural substances are controlled under it. This is part of the confusion and discussion that is still to be resolved, but we believe that what we have at the moment is clear in terms of the intent of the Bill and that to insert “synthetic” at this stage would unnecessarily limit the scope of the Bill and potentially open up new loopholes, which would need to be closed down legislatively on another occasion.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Bates and Lord Tunnicliffe(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, as many noble Lords have pointed out, we had a wide debate on this issue in Committee. We were unconvinced by the argument at that time. We are unconvinced that an amendment to this Bill is an appropriate vehicle but, as ever, we await the government response with interest.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
First, I thank the noble Baroness for moving this amendment and giving us the opportunity to return to this issue. I feel we will be returning to it often, as we have considered it often in the past. During the dinner break, I reread the Committee debate and used the time to look at the video that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, pointed me to when we met yesterday. It is a very moving story featuring testimony from a young boy in the United States with epilepsy who was taking medicinal cannabis to very helpful effect. No parent or grandparent would ever want to decry such examples, but of course they are individual stories or cases, and the duty in considering this is to look at the totality of the evidence. That is the duty of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, which we have talked about a great deal, and of the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, which needs to license and approve products for sale and use in the UK.
This amendment brings us back to some familiar territory. In responding to this amendment, I remind noble Lords that cannabis is a controlled drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and listed in Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001. The 1971 Act will continue to regulate the availability of controlled drugs, and Schedule 1 to this Bill specifically excludes drugs controlled under the 1971 Act. The Government are already under a statutory duty under provisions set out in the 1971 Act to consult the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs prior to implementing any changes to the classification of controlled drugs. Provisions in the 1971 Act also enable the advisory council, acting on its own initiative, to keep under review the situation with respect to controlled or dangerous drugs in the UK and to provide advice to the Government. To place a further statutory requirement on the Home Secretary to consult the advisory council in respect of the rescheduling of cannabis, as proposed in this amendment, will in the Government’s view amount to an unnecessary duplication. Moreover, by setting an arbitrary timetable, it would entail an unjustified diversion of the advisory council’s resources from more pressing tasks, particularly as the issue has relatively recently been examined by the council. Indeed, the advisory council has reviewed the evidence on the misuse and harms of cannabis twice in recent years. Its most recent report, published in 2008, confirmed its previous view that,
“the use of cannabis is a significant public health issue. Cannabis can unquestionably cause harm to individuals and society”.
As I highlighted in Committee, no compelling body of evidence has since been put forward to the Government to challenge the advisory council’s view or the Government’s position on cannabis. However, we have listened to the experiences of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Meacher, and continue to listen very carefully to that evidence, as I am sure that the advisory council continues to do as well. Of course, we continue to monitor the evidence, but it is the Government’s view that the available evidence does not warrant a specific commission of the advisory council at this time. This position does not prevent the advisory council from reviewing the available evidence and providing further advice to Government on its own volition, if it considers that there is enough scientific evidence to warrant the legislative change proposed in the amendment.
In Committee, concerns were raised around the impact of the legislative framework on cannabis research, which was also raised in the meeting that I had with officials, along with my noble friend Lady Chisholm, on the issue of medical research. We were talking particularly about the difficulties involved in research. I said at that point, and I hold by it, that we remain very much open to receiving further evidence of the difficulties that might be there in conducting medical research. Certainly, if Professor Curran or other groups want to provide evidence—we have received a report prepared by the all-party parliamentary group—that will be considered very carefully. The Government attach the highest priority to bona fide scientific research, especially that which will lead to improvements to the future health and well-being of the people of this country. They are committed to removing unnecessary regulatory barriers that impede research.
The Government’s view is that the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the regulations made under the Act already facilitate research in this area. It is therefore not necessary to move cannabis from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2 prior to its use in research or medicinal trials. Schedule 1 drugs are already used in research or medicinal trials. Where wider human trials are necessary, the Home Office can issue a general licence under the 1971 Act to enable prescribers to prescribe on a named-patient basis, pharmacists to dispense and patients to possess, as happened during the development of the cannabis-based medicine Sativex, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred.
The Home Office licensing regime is aimed at enabling access to drugs under a framework that prevents diversion and misuse. The regime is not intended to create unnecessary barriers to research, nor do we believe that that is how it operates in practice. Where there is clear evidence that such barriers exist and that removing them will not increase the risk of diversion to the illicit market, we are open to reviewing them.
Indeed, the formalities for obtaining a Schedule 1 licence and the requirements that would normally apply to prevent diversion and misuse, such as safe custody, are in fact similar to those applicable to Schedule 2 drugs and most Schedule 3 drugs. A decision to grant a Schedule 1 licence will be based on an assessment of risk, which is specific to each individual application. This principle is no different from drugs in the other schedules under the 2001 regulations. It is also worth noting that controlled drug licences are not drug-specific and a Schedule 1 research licence enables an organisation to undertake research with all drugs listed in that schedule, subject to any ethical approvals where human trials are proposed.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I wonder if it would be helpful to the House if I were to move the rest of this large group of largely minor and technical government amendments, Amendments 27 to 50, formally. I flagged up these amendments in Committee and have written explaining the basis of them. There is one significant change in Amendment 50, which provides a new clause to ensure that Border Force officers can access relevant provisions in the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 when they intercept psychoactive substances being imported into or exported from the UK, particularly by post. Unless noble Lords want clarification—
Lord Tunnicliffe
I am sorry. I was going to interrupt the Minister to indicate that we would be content if the amendments were moved formally. We are indeed content.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Bates and Lord Tunnicliffe(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, the Opposition are not minded to support Amendment 23. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for setting out so clearly the intention behind it, which is to decriminalise the simple possession of all drugs listed under the 1971 Act and partially replace that with a drug awareness programme. I emphasise that we believe that education and treatment have to be an essential part of the whole programme that the Government must responsibly pursue to tackle the enormous problems that drug addiction produces, but we do not believe that this is the vehicle to make such a substantial change to the 1971 Act. If the Government were minded to go down this road, surely they would first have to conduct a major programme of research and a major consultation. They may choose to do that, and I await the Minister’s response with some interest, but we are not in favour of the delay that such a research and consultation programme would lead to. The Bill mends a hole in the 1971 Act with respect to psychoactive drugs, and it should be enacted as soon as reasonably practicable in order to attack this difficult problem.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for introducing the debate on this amendment and giving us an opportunity to contemplate in broad terms these two groups of issues: one around the experience of dealing with people with drug problems and the other looking at international comparisons and alternatives, and health and education. This is something that your Lordships’ House does incredibly well: drawing on people who have had practical experience, not just in the police, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has, but in adjudicating, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern has done in difficult areas. Then there were the contributions from the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, and my noble friend Lord Cavendish about their own experiences in trying to assist and work with people coming to terms with addiction. It has been a very thoughtful debate.
I am conscious that I will not be able to cover all the points, but we have a meeting with all interested Peers on 7 July in Committee Room 10A between 4 pm and 5 pm. We will announce it on the all-party Whip—or the business managers will, lest I overegg my powers. It has been set up particularly so that we can hear from Public Health England and about what is happening in education and treatment. I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that that goes very much to the heart of the wider issue we are seeking to address. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about updating where the Government and Public Health England are with the wider drug strategy and building recovery programmes might be usefully discussed at that meeting, along with many other issues.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, it is not the policy of the Labour Party to ban alcohol. I leave it to the Minister to enjoy the privilege of office and explain the intellectual case.
Lord Bates
Oh, that I could get away with that, although I can say that it is not the policy of Her Majesty’s Government to criminalise the consumption of alcohol. On that, we might be clear.
I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. He has spotted a certain lack of consistency in approach and wishes to draw the Committee’s attention to it. As a distinguished academic, he then invited me to put forward an intellectual case that would satisfy him. Of course, he knows that that will not necessarily be forthcoming.
As I listened to the debate, the thought occurred to me that the nearest you could get to an intellectual case would be to say that you would not necessarily be starting from here with alcohol. It has been enjoyed and endured, probably in equal measure, for about as long as people have been walking around in this great land of ours. Therefore, alcohol has been part of our culture and our society for millennia.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Bates and Lord Tunnicliffe(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, just to revert to my original path, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the burden of proof. We think that for the orders a balance of probabilities is appropriate. The only question I seek assurance on is that if any individual were to be either imprisoned or fined, it would be under the provisions in Clause 23—and my understanding is that under that clause the criminal standard of proof would be necessary. Providing that one has that assurance, we do not object to the burden of proof in the relevant parts of the Bill with respect to the order.
Lord Bates
I shall respond, first, to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. Clause 23 would require the higher criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”, so that is how the matter would be dealt with.
Turning to the point about appeals, I believe that, as proposed, Amendment 64A would be disproportionate, given the nature of prohibition and premises notices. These notices are the first stage of our graded response to tackling the supply of new psychoactive substances. They are intended as a final warning and can be issued by a senior police officer or local authority requiring that the subject of the notice desist from any prohibited activities.
A prohibition notice can be issued only if the relevant officer reasonably believes that the respondent is carrying out, or is likely to carry out, prohibited activity. Therefore, it cannot be issued without good reason, and the issuing officer must also reasonably believe that it is a necessary and proportionate response, given the circumstances. As I have indicated, a notice acts as a final warning. Breach of a notice is not a criminal offence and there are no other direct sanctions flowing from a failure to comply.
The noble Baroness drew a parallel with community protection notices and pointed to the fact that the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides for a right of appeal against such notices. Indeed, this amendment largely mirrors Section 46 of the 2014 Act, but there is an important difference between a community protection notice and the notices provided for in the Bill, in that breach of the former is a criminal offence—hence the right of appeal.
I am not persuaded that, in the absence of a direct sanction for breach, a right of appeal is called for. If the respondent takes issue with a prohibition or premises notice, they can make representations to the issuing agency, which could then, if appropriate, withdraw the notice in accordance with the provisions in Clause 14.
Where the relevant enforcement agency concludes that a prohibition or premises notice had been breached, it could decide to pursue a prosecution for one of the main offences or make an application for a prohibition order or premises order, as the case may be. If the respondent is charged with an offence, they will be able to defend themselves in court in the normal way. If an application is made for a prohibition or premises order, again, the respondent will have his or her day in court and will also be able to appeal against the making of the order. We therefore have judicial oversight where it is appropriate.
I have tried to set out the nature of our graded response to the trade in new psychoactive substances and to state why I believe that an appeal process is unnecessary in the case of a prohibition or premises notice.
The other amendments in this group seek to provide for the criminal standard of proof, rather than the civil standard, to apply when a court is considering making either a prohibition or a premises order—a point on which the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, sought clarification.
Clauses 17 and 19, which Amendments 65, 65A, 68 and 68A seek to modify, make provisions for the application process for prohibition orders and premises orders, outlining a number of conditions that need to be met for an order to be made. Proceedings under Clauses 17 and 19 are civil proceedings. Accordingly, it follows that the civil standard of proof should apply. The noble Lord suggested that, as the proceedings are part of the criminal process, the criminal standard should apply, but this is based on a false premise. The whole point of the civil sanctions in the Bill is to enable law enforcement agencies to adopt a proportionate response to any offending behaviour and, in appropriate cases, to seek to tackle the behaviour by action short of a prosecution.
The application of the civil standard to such proceedings is not without precedent. Under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, the civil standard applies to proceedings in respect of anti-social behaviour injunctions. The civil standard also applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 in respect of gang injunctions. Of course, if a prohibition order or premises order is breached, the criminal standard of proof would apply to any proceedings for an offence under Clause 23, as I stated.
One of the key purposes of these civil orders is to enable the police, local authorities and other law enforcement agencies to act promptly to nip problems in the bud before they escalate. If the criminal standard of proof were to apply, it would necessarily dictate that more time was required for evidence gathering and there might be little to be gained by applying for a prohibition order as opposed to pursuing criminal prosecution for an offence under Clauses 4 to 8. These amendments would circumscribe the current flexibility built into the enforcement powers in the Bill, to the detriment of communities and defendants alike.
Much the same arguments apply to Amendments 85A to 85C to Clause 28. The clause provides that proceedings before the court under Clause 18 or Clause 25 are civil proceedings—those clauses relate to the making or variation of orders on conviction. It is the case that such proceedings take place in a criminal court, but it is important to remember that a prohibition order or premises order, as with similar civil orders, is not a punishment. As such, they do not form part of the sentence of the court. These orders are preventive in nature and in these circumstances it is again appropriate that the civil standard of proof and the civil standard of evidence should apply. Given that these are quite properly civil proceedings, I hope that the noble Baroness and other noble Lords with amendments tabled in this group will, on reflection, consider that the civil standard should operate and, in the light of this explanation, that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Bates and Lord Tunnicliffe(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Bates
Let me try to avoid the ambiguity in it. The expert panel recommended that there should be a blanket ban. A blanket ban in the Republic of Ireland had been operating for three years, so it had had an opportunity to look at that. It looked at New Zealand and what had been happening there as another example. I can also point to the report in March from the Health and Social Care Committee of the National Assembly for Wales, in which recommendation 13 of its inquiry said:
“The Committee welcomes the Home Office’s expert panel’s recommendation of a ban on the supply of NPS in the UK, similar to the approach introduced in Ireland”.
I also have a quote from paragraph 4.23 of the report from the similar expert group set up by the Scottish Government:
“The Group agreed that there are a number of benefits to the Irish model, which could strengthen the tools that are currently available and being used by agencies to tackle NPS supply in Scotland”.
What I am doing here is piecing together the information to show that we did not whistle this out of thin air. Some serious people—whether you agree or disagree with them—looked at what was happening in Ireland, and this was their conclusion on which they based their recommendation.
To the next point, I am very much with the noble Baroness. I happen to think that one of the things with which we got close to this, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was the Modern Slavery Act. It is without doubt the piece of legislation in either place with which I am most proud to be associated. One reason why was because of the process in which it actually engaged. It listened to the people who were on the ground, it talked to people, it talked to the experts, it framed legislation, it had pre-legislative scrutiny and there was an ongoing system of monitoring. Also, the Government committed themselves to proper post-legislative scrutiny; we will need to look at that. Should your Lordships and Parliament determine that the Bill gets on to the statute book, in our plans, although there is no set time for it, in a period of three to five years and certainly within the lifetime of this Parliament there will be some post-legislative scrutiny.
The other point which I make in passing here is that, if our friends in the Republic of Ireland were to undertake an impact assessment of our politicking to tackle this, it might not look so sharp. They would say, “Well, what has the UK been doing popping around with temporary banning orders, and every time they tweak one molecule the perpetrators and the traffickers simply change the packaging and change the molecule? What a ridiculous system that is”. In a sense it can go both ways and we must be conscious of that critique of us.
Lord Tunnicliffe
Can the Minister go back to his point on post-legislative scrutiny? I think the House at a subsequent stage may feel much more comfortable with this Bill if he were able to make some time commitment about when that would take place. Clearly he cannot now but I would be grateful if he would consult colleagues and see if he can be a little more specific at a future stage.
Lord Bates
I am very happy to do that. We are in Committee and this is where the Government listen to the arguments—
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I shall comment briefly on this group. I hear the debate on Amendments 7 and 8 and will be interested in the Minister’s response. On Amendment 10, similarly, we will be interested in the Minister’s response.
On Amendment 9, I see this Bill—and I will be grateful if the Minister can flesh out whether he sees it in the same way—as a very narrow Bill. Broadly speaking, everything is illegal except the things that are defined as legal. Bringing in the word “significant” seems to me to be getting into significant bad and not significant good, and therefore we are into the area of legal challenges et cetera. The idea of the Bill, I think, is to be free from legal challenge and that is why it is formed in that way. The Minister will no doubt enlighten me.
The point of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the process—of how the judgment will be made that a substance is psychoactive—is a good one. I would be grateful if either now, or perhaps in writing, the Minister could spell out how the Government envisage determining whether a substance is indeed a psychoactive substance.
Lord Bates
My Lords, these amendments seek to reframe the definition of a psychoactive substance for the purposes of the Bill. This Bill is designed to capture substances supplied for human consumption that have psychoactive effects. Its aim is to capture substances that are not currently controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, but, as with all drugs when misused, carry health risks.
Subsection (2) provides that,
“a substance produces a psychoactive effect in a person if, by stimulating or depressing the person’s central nervous system, it affects the person’s mental functioning or emotional state”.
We accept that this definition has been drawn purposefully wide. The nature of this market and of experience to date shows that producers of the substances are constantly and actively looking for loopholes to exploit, thereby fuelling this reckless trade. This learning has been central to how we have designed this Bill and in particular our definition.
By using a definition based on a substance’s effects rather than the chemical composition of substances, this legislation will avoid the issues that we have continued to face with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Many new psychoactive substances are still legal due to the speed at which they are produced, with manufacturers inventing new substances by tweaking chemical formulas in order to avoid the existing controls. The need to capture such a wide range of substances, and any that might be invented in the future, necessitated a broad definition. The definition is in two parts: the trigger and the effects. The main effect of psychoactive substances is on a person’s brain, the major part of the central nervous system. By speeding up or slowing down activity here, psychoactive substances cause an alteration in an individual’s state of consciousness.
Amendments 7 and 8 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seek to restrict the definition of a psychoactive substance so that it captures only synthetic substances. The nature of this market and of experience to date shows that producers of new psychoactive substances are constantly looking for loopholes to exploit, thereby fuelling their reckless trade. There are any number of natural products—such as fly agaric mushrooms and salvia divinorum—that are openly on sale in head shops and elsewhere which are far from safe though they are not banned under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The Bill should give us a proportionate way of dealing with these substances as well.
Amendment 9 seeks to import the definition of a psychoactive substance—
Lord Bates
That is a fair point, in that it is asking how this will be tested. We will come to those points because we are going to deal, to some degree, with medical testing and how it is possible to license some of these drugs so that they can continue to be tested. We were talking earlier about how universities and research institutions can continue testing on drugs such as cannabis. That is a key point: that testing will go on. I will make sure about that before Report.
Lord Tunnicliffe
May I take that as a commitment to write to noble Lords before Report? This has raised a very big question mark. Trying to hammer it out in words is too difficult; hammering it out on a piece of paper may give us much more confidence.
Lord Bates
I am happy to do that—let us set the matter out in writing. However, I want to state two basic principles that I hope that the noble Baroness in particular may just accept and will enable her to withdraw her amendment. First—going back to the first point—is that what is being sold in our streets and in head shops has never been tested on anything or anyone, yet is consumed by people in this country. That is the basis on which we are taking action. Secondly, we are mindful that the skilled perpetrators, manufacturers and distributors of this drug are in the sights of this legislation because we want to target them rather than the individual user. When they see a written definition they then go and find a potential loophole, something else appears on the market and the Bill becomes ineffective. We want to avoid that. Those are the two principles in play.
In the context of those two principles I am very happy to write with more detail on the mechanics of how that might be done, and perhaps a little more—looking at the Bill team—about the process we went through in consulting, to arrive at this definition. I hope that that will be helpful to the House and I undertake to do it before Report.