(9 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is no doubt that one can think of serious aggravating factors in relation to these offences. In Committee I supported the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. However, I understand the difficulty that there are so many possible aggravating factors that it is very difficult to cover them all adequately, and that as they change and the circumstances change, the description of these aggravating factors may change. One of the problems is that, if you specify aggravating factors, the courts are apt to proceed on the basis that these are the aggravating factors that Parliament thought were important. Therefore, when the judge comes to pass sentence, he is inclined to give these full emphasis and possibly place less emphasis on other aggravating factors that may occur in a particular case.
At the time of the introduction of the Misuse of Drugs Act, when provision was made for aggravation, the statutory system of sentencing guidelines which has since been introduced did not exist with its statutory authority, which is binding to a substantial extent on the discretion of judges. That system has the great advantage of flexibility. To take the example of children’s homes, let us suppose it emerged that the people who were seeking to take advantage of vulnerable children had changed their method and, instead of trying to give these drugs out near the children’s home, found some way to get them into the children’s home so that they were possibly given to the children by others. I do not know exactly how this sort of thing might happen, but these situations can develop. These people are set on trying to overcome any obstacle to distributing their drugs to all who will take them, and to a greater and greater extent, if possible. I wonder whether it would be best no longer to have a provision for particular aggravation in the individual statute, but to rely on—and if necessary make reference to in the individual statute—the sentencing guidelines system, which is a flexible, influential and effective system within the criminal justice system as a whole. That has certain advantages, but it certainly would not work against a background in which a new Bill had other aggravating factors. Then, the question is: are the sentencing guidelines’ aggravating factors more or less important than those in the statute, if they happen to be different?
As I have said, I support the theory behind the amendments, but I wonder whether the more effective way of operating this within the criminal justice system is to make these amendments references to the sentencing guidelines. Instead of having a list of aggravating circumstances—conditions A, B and C—perhaps the statute before us should refer to the fact that aggravating circumstances are set out under the sentencing guidelines, for which the Coroners Act has statutory authority. That might be a more effective way of dealing with this matter—focusing on individual circumstances that are important and may change. Both the circumstances referred to—involving children, and prisons—are vital in the fight against the damage caused by such substances. Therefore, whatever happens, I want an effective method of treating these circumstances as aggravating circumstances to be before the courts on all occasions.