European Union (Withdrawal) Bill
Debate between Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lord Mackay of Clashfern(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, I have not spoken on this subject but today I am moved to do so: first, because I had the honour of serving in government with my noble friend Lord Patten of Barnes before he was a Member of this House; and, secondly, because I held the responsibility for most of the justice arrangements in Northern Ireland for about 10 years in the middle of the Troubles. Therefore, I am extremely conscious of the difficulties of Northern Ireland and of the immense privilege of it having had a great degree of peace since the Belfast agreement and since John Major initiated the first talks, which was quite difficult to do, during my term of office.
I am convinced that the only real solution for the Northern Irish and Irish border is in some form of treaty to deal with customs matters and with trade. At the moment, we have a law under the jurisdiction of the European Union for these two matters. The Government have said, and I understand this, that we are leaving both arrangements. But it is possible to make similar arrangements under a treaty: we would not be part of the EU but part of a treaty arrangement with the EU, which would reflect that. I believe something of that kind is absolutely essential. The Belfast agreement did a terrific amount for the peace of Northern Ireland and long may it continue.
Lord Bassam of Brighton
My Lords, I have a few words to add to what has been a hugely interesting and entertaining debate, led off by the eloquent and entertaining noble Lord, Lord Patten of Barnes, who speaks with great knowledge and experience on this, as do many others. My amendment was stimulated by anger at those former Ministers who decided that it was worth the price of Brexit to suggest that we should rethink the Belfast agreement, which has brought so much peace, tranquillity and good order to governance in Ireland, and the north of Ireland in particular.
Amendment 316 seeks simply to ensure that, when this Bill passes, there should be some further thought because I do not think that much thought has yet been given. This is one of those debates that happen simply because of the unintended consequences of Brexit, and not enough was thought of by the Brexiteers in the run-up to the leave vote on 23 June 2016. That is why that amendment is there, although the one proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Patten, is far superior, because it takes us to the principles that are fundamental and lie behind it.
I can see that both Front Benches want to get on, so I shall speak only briefly to my amendment, but it is right that we have these things at the forefront of our minds. Perhaps when we come back at Report, we will have something there enabling us to focus on this and give it further thought, as well as enabling the Minister to say something better than what has been said before—that instead of the Bill being merely about transposing one set of legislative rules into a new set, we recognise what has happened before and the impact of the Belfast agreement on the future governance of our country post-Brexit.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Debate between Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lord Mackay of Clashfern(9 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, there is no doubt that one can think of serious aggravating factors in relation to these offences. In Committee I supported the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. However, I understand the difficulty that there are so many possible aggravating factors that it is very difficult to cover them all adequately, and that as they change and the circumstances change, the description of these aggravating factors may change. One of the problems is that, if you specify aggravating factors, the courts are apt to proceed on the basis that these are the aggravating factors that Parliament thought were important. Therefore, when the judge comes to pass sentence, he is inclined to give these full emphasis and possibly place less emphasis on other aggravating factors that may occur in a particular case.
At the time of the introduction of the Misuse of Drugs Act, when provision was made for aggravation, the statutory system of sentencing guidelines which has since been introduced did not exist with its statutory authority, which is binding to a substantial extent on the discretion of judges. That system has the great advantage of flexibility. To take the example of children’s homes, let us suppose it emerged that the people who were seeking to take advantage of vulnerable children had changed their method and, instead of trying to give these drugs out near the children’s home, found some way to get them into the children’s home so that they were possibly given to the children by others. I do not know exactly how this sort of thing might happen, but these situations can develop. These people are set on trying to overcome any obstacle to distributing their drugs to all who will take them, and to a greater and greater extent, if possible. I wonder whether it would be best no longer to have a provision for particular aggravation in the individual statute, but to rely on—and if necessary make reference to in the individual statute—the sentencing guidelines system, which is a flexible, influential and effective system within the criminal justice system as a whole. That has certain advantages, but it certainly would not work against a background in which a new Bill had other aggravating factors. Then, the question is: are the sentencing guidelines’ aggravating factors more or less important than those in the statute, if they happen to be different?
As I have said, I support the theory behind the amendments, but I wonder whether the more effective way of operating this within the criminal justice system is to make these amendments references to the sentencing guidelines. Instead of having a list of aggravating circumstances—conditions A, B and C—perhaps the statute before us should refer to the fact that aggravating circumstances are set out under the sentencing guidelines, for which the Coroners Act has statutory authority. That might be a more effective way of dealing with this matter—focusing on individual circumstances that are important and may change. Both the circumstances referred to—involving children, and prisons—are vital in the fight against the damage caused by such substances. Therefore, whatever happens, I want an effective method of treating these circumstances as aggravating circumstances to be before the courts on all occasions.