D-day: 75th Anniversary

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 4th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister briefly mentioned Operation Bodyguard and the deception carried out surrounding the D-day landings. I want to say something of the small number of courageous and imaginative MI5 case officers whose work underpinned the success of D-day. My late uncle, Hugh Astor, was one of the British MI5 operators who ran a group of double agents feeding false information to the German military intelligence and who the Germans believed were spying for them. An elaborate game of deception was implemented in which the aim was to trick Hitler’s generals into thinking that Normandy was not the main target, and also to try to understand the enemy’ plans and intentions. One of my uncle’s double agents was codenamed Brutus, who, together with Garbo, focused on this deception.

For all the Germans’ preoccupation with the approaching invasion, even though the allies were furiously preparing for it, they did not actually know where or when it was coming. German forces in occupied France would greatly outnumber the invading allies but if they could be kept in the wrong place, the numbers appeared less daunting. To dupe the Germans into thinking that the attack was going to take place at the Pas de Calais—the shortest route across the Channel—the operators set out to convince them that any landings in Normandy were a large-scale diversion. As the real army mustered in the south-west to attack Normandy, the allies created a mythical American army under General Patton, which boasted 11 divisions in Kent and was visited very publicly by King George VI. To support the deception, two fake corps headquarters maintained the constant radio traffic that would be generated by a real army. Dummy aircraft and inflatable tanks, together with 250 fake landing ships, all contributed to the illusion.

Crucially, the threat to the Pas de Calais would be maintained for as long as possible after the Normandy landings to ensure that the Germans did not send troops south to repel the real invasion, and half a million German troops remained in the Calais area until early July. Under my uncle’s direction, Brutus also sought to lure the Germans into preparing for an attack on Norway. A fake army was created in Scotland for a likely raid there, successfully keeping Hitler on high alert on a second front. At no point did the Germans redeploy their 250,000 troops from there.

My uncle was also the handler for a double agent, Bronx, who focused on the south-west of France. The Germans had substantial forces deployed in the Bordeaux area, notably two Panzer divisions. Once the Normandy invasion was under way, their tanks would certainly be deployed north to try to repel the allies. Every hour that the Panzers could be detained in the south-west would save allied lives. Amazingly, two weeks after the invasion, Bronx was still hinting at a looming second invasion in the south-west. As a result one Panzer division remained in position, defending it from an attack that never came.

The deception was built from myriad tiny fragments of carefully sown misinformation for the enemy to piece together. A great lie would be built up of snippets, gleanings and hints, some of them true. The work of these spies and their operators held a fascination for Winston Churchill, who described it thus:

“Tangle within tangle, plot and counter-plot, ruse and treachery, cross and double-cross, true agent, false agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and the firing party, were interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true”.


The codebreakers at Bletchley Park deciphered Nazi high command messages and revealed the confusion and disarray of the German troops before the invasion. By 1942 almost all the traffic of German intelligence services was being read, with more than 200 messages being decrypted every day.

From this trove of information, MI5 constructed a detailed picture of German intelligence; its personnel, methods, strengths and frailties. It knew who its enemies were, and what they were thinking. Amazingly, the allies controlled the German espionage network in Britain—every one of Hitler’s spies. Consequently, we could reinforce the misinformation being fed to the Führer and his generals. The invasion of Normandy came as a stunning surprise to the senior German commanders, who were not only unprepared but positively relaxed. On 6 June 1944, Rommel was at home, 500 miles away, lighting the candles on his wife’s birthday cake. Since this attack was assumed to be a diversion, it was not thought necessary to wake Hitler early that morning. As the Battle of Normandy raged, the Germans held fast, not to the reality, but to the illusion, so carefully planted and meticulously sustained. The failure to counterattack hastened the end of Nazi Germany. Once the allies were properly established ashore, the Germans were bound to lose in the end.

What do we know about these MI5 operators? They had an instinct for how other people thought and reacted to situations—they possessed empathy and imagination, in addition to a superior intellect. They had to tread a fine line between passing on accurate information and not giving away too much, which would imperil British interests. Lives were at risk. Every case officer was acutely aware that a single slip could bring the entire project crashing down, with catastrophic consequences. The Germans were constantly assessing and reassessing their agents, trusting and doubting them at the same time. Just as the double agents lived double lives, so each MI5 officer had to try to inhabit the life of his agent. With the stakes so high, handling them was an emotionally demanding and highly stressful business.

These MI5 handlers were real heroes. Their ingenuity, spirit and heroism were truly remarkable, contributing in no small measure to the success of D-day. The most ambitious deception campaign ever attempted saved thousands of allied lives and helped shorten the war. Their work remained secret for many years after the war and, under the 100-year secrecy rule, many of the files will remain secret until 2044. My uncle received no public recognition for the work he did, and he never mentioned his involvement until the very end of his life.

Royal Marines

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 28th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, said. As a young army officer many years ago, I served alongside the Royal Marines in Hong Kong and Northern Ireland, and ever since I have had the greatest respect for them and their ethos.

I believe that a serious cut to the Royal Marines would put our international credibility at risk. The noble Lord mentioned General Ben Hodges. I hope that the Government will take on board what he said: that some of the best officers whom he has served with have been Royal Marines, and that he would hate to see the institution that produces men like them degraded. He went on to say that, if Britain cannot maintain its amphibious capability commitments, it risks,

“going into a different sort of category”,

of ally, which would,

“make the job simpler for a potential adversary”.

The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, drew attention to the importance to the United Kingdom, as a maritime nation relying so heavily on trade moving by sea, of a strong Navy and a strong Royal Marines. Without maritime expeditionary strike options, there is a reliance on access to friendly ports or airports, and historical evidence indicates that such access can often be denied or be conditional or unsuitable. A lack of access will narrow options, increase operational risk and potentially make current crisis response plans unviable. Global reach and flexibility are inherent characteristics of a full spectrum Royal Navy able to protect the nation’s vital interests. The ability to act across a spectrum, from disaster relief to expeditionary strike, preserves political choice.

The United Kingdom’s comparative advantage in maritime theatre entry—something that few can emulate—is of critical importance to our key partners. The Royal Marines have a leading allied capability, interwoven with NATO and European initiatives, and are the United States’ partner of choice in the littoral and the Arctic. Their cold-weather-capable commando force is hugely appreciated in north Norway.

Chaos is a dominating feature of our world today. Islamic fundamentalism is a threat that grows more vigorous and malign by the day and it has reached our own shores. Russia mobilises in all dimensions to press her advantages from the Balkans to the Baltic and from Libya to Damascus, to erode the West’s sphere of influence, both conventionally and in the hearts and minds of many of its citizens. The United Kingdom remains a key player in global politics, but it competes in a world where many regional powers, nation states, criminals and extremists are expanding their influence. If we want to have an effect where the vast majority of the world’s population lives, the ability to operate between the sea and the land is vital. Battles may be won at sea, but wars are won on land, among the people. Despite the huge technological leaps that have characterised the last century, this remains true; to have a decisive effect on an opponent, you must at some point land and close with him.

The US recognises the importance of an expeditionary strike capability. With the recently approved littoral operations in a contested environment concept, it seeks to better integrate existing naval and Marine Corps capabilities to overcome the emerging threats within littoral areas, which it sees as rapidly expanding in operational depth, complexity and lethality. This concept will provide the United States with an enhanced geographic flexibility and a range of options with which to respond to the threats within the littoral. To give some indication of the scale of US investment in this concept, it relies on the delivery of a multi-purpose, 38-unit, amphibious fleet. I very much hope that we do not become a “different sort of category” of ally.