Armed Forces Bill

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the Armed Forces Bill 2021 and support the principle of strengthening the Armed Forces covenant in law. As the Lords Defence Minister at the time, I was responsible for the passage through this House of the Armed Forces Bill 2011, which received Royal Assent in November 2011. It amended the 2006 Act, most notably by requiring an annual Armed Forces covenant report to be presented to Parliament—which has been done each year since. Following the present Government’s manifesto commitment, this Bill makes provisions to further incorporate the Armed Forces covenant into law. I very much welcome the Government’s stated support for this position, and I am grateful to Poppyscotland for the briefing that it sent me.

Maximum advantage should be taken of this golden opportunity to enhance the delivery of the covenant to the Armed Forces community and ensure that it is fit for purpose for the next 10 years. During the consideration of the Bill by the Commons Select Committee, a wide range of oral and written evidence was received from those who regularly work with the Armed Forces covenant, often daily. They included Armed Forces charities, representatives of local and devolved governments, the Veterans Commissioners in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman. The committee also undertook its own online survey of the Armed Forces community. The evidence repeatedly highlighted the desirability of the Bill being enhanced, and in particular the need to apply the same legal standard to national government as would be applied to local government.

Members of the Armed Forces community access public services through national, devolved, regional and local bodies, so it is important that there is a consistent approach, so that all public bodies recognise their responsibilities under the covenant. However, the Bill as introduced largely applies only to local government and some education and health bodies. National government should be subject to the same legal standard on the covenant that it seeks to apply to councils.

Many of the policy areas in which members of the Armed Forces community experience difficulty are the responsibility of national government or are based on national guidance provided to other delivery partners. This is particularly relevant to ensure that serving personnel, for whom many services are the responsibility of the MoD, benefit from the Bill’s provisions along with the rest of the Armed Forces community. I also suggest that the Scottish Government, in addition to Scottish councils and certain public bodies, should be within the scope of the new “due regard” duty. Many issues affecting Scotland’s Armed Forces community are the responsibility of the Scottish Government. Without the application of the Bill’s covenant provisions to all aspects of devolved government, national policies developed in Scotland will not be subject to the duty of due regard, as will be the case at the local level. On this point, I welcome the view expressed by the then Scottish Government’s Minister for Parliamentary Business and Veterans in evidence to the Select Committee, indicating that he would be content with such an expansion.

The overwhelming backing for widening the Bill’s scope would suggest that improving the Bill in this way would be an uncontroversial step for the Government that would command widespread support and consensus.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I join my noble friend the Minister in paying tribute to our Armed Forces and their families. I welcome the intent of the Bill and believe that it will provide greater certainty for service personnel and veterans in respect of vexatious claims concerning the prosecution of historical events that occurred in armed conflict overseas.

I am only too aware that many claims were made without foundation and have subsequently been discredited. This caused unnecessary distress through repeated investigations of members of the Armed Forces. I therefore welcome the Bill’s further safeguards to address the impact of those claims. I also welcome the introduction of measures to consider the impact of the mental health of veterans involved in legal proceedings as a result of overseas operations.

This Bill polarises opinion, so it is important to bring back some objectivity in the scrutiny of this legislation. It is understandable that we can lose objectivity when discussing issues such as torture, war crimes and genocide. However, there is nothing in the Bill that prevents the prosecution of such acts, even outside the period of five years. There is nothing in the Bill that prevents the investigation of such offences, and there is nothing that suggests that those tasked with defending our country are able to act with impunity. If any criminal behaviour is alleged to have taken place, individuals can be prosecuted.

The triple lock will give service personnel and veterans greater certainty that the unique pressures placed on them during overseas operations will be taken into account when prosecution decisions are made concerning alleged historical offences. My reading of the Bill is that there is no lock to prosecutions—only three additional steps in the decision-making process for a prosecution to proceed.

The first step is an exceptionality test, to be applied by an independent prosecutor. Although I cannot say how a prosecutor should apply this test, I would guess that serious breaches of the Geneva conventions, for instance, are not the norm but would be exceptional.

The second step ensures that the context of the overseas operation is rightly considered. Yes, the prosecutor will take such factors into account, but making this a statutory requirement sends a strong signal to our Armed Forces that their unique circumstances will be at the forefront of the decision-making process.

The final step is the consent of the Attorney-General. This consent function is not new; an AG already has responsibility for giving consent to war crimes prosecutions. These three additional steps do not amount to the state being unwilling or unable to prosecute, which means that we would continue to adhere to our international obligations and does not increase our risk of the International Criminal Court seeking to prosecute our Armed Forces personnel.

May I ask my noble friend the Minister: what do veterans think about the measures? Is there general support from our veterans? How have the proposals changed as a result of public consultation?

Finally, several noble Lords have referred to the Northern Ireland Troubles. Having served in the Army there, I look forward to seeing the legislation to address the legacy of Operation Banner being prepared by the Northern Ireland Office. When might we see this?

Reserve Forces and Cadets’ Associations

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a former honorary colonel of a Royal Engineers reserve regiment. My comments are focused on the effect on the costs of what is proposed in the draft report.

Her Majesty’s Treasury’s publication Managing Public Money says in chapter 3, under “Accounting Officers” that

“the accounting officer should ensure that the organisation, and any ALBs it sponsors, operates effectively and to a high standard of probity. The organisation should … use its resources efficiently, economically and effectively, avoiding waste and extravagance”.

That is much in line with a common-sense approach to controlling costs properly and obtaining value for money. MPM also says that the accounting officer should

“avoid over defining detail and imposing undue compliance costs, either internally or on its customers and stakeholders”.

The draft report on the review is complimentary about the ability of RFCAs to control costs. It says at paragraph 4.0.3:

“The Review found that the RFCAs deliver a great deal on tight resources, proving strong value for money.”


Paragraph 2.10.6 says:

“The RFCAs are able to exploit synergies by combining their work across functions to deliver greater than the sum of the parts.”


Tellingly, and with masterly understatement, it says at paragraph 2.5.7:

“Evidence from customers is that efficiencies would be unlikely to be realised if the maintenance tasks were transferred to the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, which is responsible for the equivalent function for the regular forces estate.”


Paragraph 8 of annexe B to the draft report says that the review proposes to

“identify activities conducted across Defence that could be done by the RFCAs more effectively and/or at less cost.”

The report then comes up with quite a long list of new tasks that the RFCAs could be considered for taking on, apparently improving efficiency and value for money, such as managing small training areas, working on the injured servicemen’s living accommodation project and delivering elements of the MoD’s veterans’ strategy.

This all seems to imply not only that the RFCAs are highly competent at controlling costs and obtaining value for money but that the author thought so quite strongly. He is not beating about the bush. Yet recommendation 5.6a proposes that board chair and members should in future be OCPA-regulated and that regional board chairs should also be appointed on OCPA principles. It would be very unusual for those appointed to similar positions on other government bodies on OCPA principles not to be paid for their time. Indeed, recommendation 5.6d says that

“consideration should be given to remunerating RFCA board and regional council members.”

So here is the draft report recommending the introduction of a new and quite unnecessary cost, which would have to be funded by so-called savings elsewhere and would inevitably mean greater centralisation and less localism, going against what it is trying to achieve.

Currently, the chairs and board members work for the RFCAs for free. They live and breathe the volunteer ethos. They understand the Reserve Forces and the huge pressures that apply to members in reconciling the demands of family, civilian work and military responsibilities. Purely in terms of value for money, let alone the casting aside of the network of experienced volunteers, I suggest the need for a rethink.

D-day: 75th Anniversary

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 4th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister briefly mentioned Operation Bodyguard and the deception carried out surrounding the D-day landings. I want to say something of the small number of courageous and imaginative MI5 case officers whose work underpinned the success of D-day. My late uncle, Hugh Astor, was one of the British MI5 operators who ran a group of double agents feeding false information to the German military intelligence and who the Germans believed were spying for them. An elaborate game of deception was implemented in which the aim was to trick Hitler’s generals into thinking that Normandy was not the main target, and also to try to understand the enemy’ plans and intentions. One of my uncle’s double agents was codenamed Brutus, who, together with Garbo, focused on this deception.

For all the Germans’ preoccupation with the approaching invasion, even though the allies were furiously preparing for it, they did not actually know where or when it was coming. German forces in occupied France would greatly outnumber the invading allies but if they could be kept in the wrong place, the numbers appeared less daunting. To dupe the Germans into thinking that the attack was going to take place at the Pas de Calais—the shortest route across the Channel—the operators set out to convince them that any landings in Normandy were a large-scale diversion. As the real army mustered in the south-west to attack Normandy, the allies created a mythical American army under General Patton, which boasted 11 divisions in Kent and was visited very publicly by King George VI. To support the deception, two fake corps headquarters maintained the constant radio traffic that would be generated by a real army. Dummy aircraft and inflatable tanks, together with 250 fake landing ships, all contributed to the illusion.

Crucially, the threat to the Pas de Calais would be maintained for as long as possible after the Normandy landings to ensure that the Germans did not send troops south to repel the real invasion, and half a million German troops remained in the Calais area until early July. Under my uncle’s direction, Brutus also sought to lure the Germans into preparing for an attack on Norway. A fake army was created in Scotland for a likely raid there, successfully keeping Hitler on high alert on a second front. At no point did the Germans redeploy their 250,000 troops from there.

My uncle was also the handler for a double agent, Bronx, who focused on the south-west of France. The Germans had substantial forces deployed in the Bordeaux area, notably two Panzer divisions. Once the Normandy invasion was under way, their tanks would certainly be deployed north to try to repel the allies. Every hour that the Panzers could be detained in the south-west would save allied lives. Amazingly, two weeks after the invasion, Bronx was still hinting at a looming second invasion in the south-west. As a result one Panzer division remained in position, defending it from an attack that never came.

The deception was built from myriad tiny fragments of carefully sown misinformation for the enemy to piece together. A great lie would be built up of snippets, gleanings and hints, some of them true. The work of these spies and their operators held a fascination for Winston Churchill, who described it thus:

“Tangle within tangle, plot and counter-plot, ruse and treachery, cross and double-cross, true agent, false agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and the firing party, were interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true”.


The codebreakers at Bletchley Park deciphered Nazi high command messages and revealed the confusion and disarray of the German troops before the invasion. By 1942 almost all the traffic of German intelligence services was being read, with more than 200 messages being decrypted every day.

From this trove of information, MI5 constructed a detailed picture of German intelligence; its personnel, methods, strengths and frailties. It knew who its enemies were, and what they were thinking. Amazingly, the allies controlled the German espionage network in Britain—every one of Hitler’s spies. Consequently, we could reinforce the misinformation being fed to the Führer and his generals. The invasion of Normandy came as a stunning surprise to the senior German commanders, who were not only unprepared but positively relaxed. On 6 June 1944, Rommel was at home, 500 miles away, lighting the candles on his wife’s birthday cake. Since this attack was assumed to be a diversion, it was not thought necessary to wake Hitler early that morning. As the Battle of Normandy raged, the Germans held fast, not to the reality, but to the illusion, so carefully planted and meticulously sustained. The failure to counterattack hastened the end of Nazi Germany. Once the allies were properly established ashore, the Germans were bound to lose in the end.

What do we know about these MI5 operators? They had an instinct for how other people thought and reacted to situations—they possessed empathy and imagination, in addition to a superior intellect. They had to tread a fine line between passing on accurate information and not giving away too much, which would imperil British interests. Lives were at risk. Every case officer was acutely aware that a single slip could bring the entire project crashing down, with catastrophic consequences. The Germans were constantly assessing and reassessing their agents, trusting and doubting them at the same time. Just as the double agents lived double lives, so each MI5 officer had to try to inhabit the life of his agent. With the stakes so high, handling them was an emotionally demanding and highly stressful business.

These MI5 handlers were real heroes. Their ingenuity, spirit and heroism were truly remarkable, contributing in no small measure to the success of D-day. The most ambitious deception campaign ever attempted saved thousands of allied lives and helped shorten the war. Their work remained secret for many years after the war and, under the 100-year secrecy rule, many of the files will remain secret until 2044. My uncle received no public recognition for the work he did, and he never mentioned his involvement until the very end of his life.

Royal Marines

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 28th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, said. As a young army officer many years ago, I served alongside the Royal Marines in Hong Kong and Northern Ireland, and ever since I have had the greatest respect for them and their ethos.

I believe that a serious cut to the Royal Marines would put our international credibility at risk. The noble Lord mentioned General Ben Hodges. I hope that the Government will take on board what he said: that some of the best officers whom he has served with have been Royal Marines, and that he would hate to see the institution that produces men like them degraded. He went on to say that, if Britain cannot maintain its amphibious capability commitments, it risks,

“going into a different sort of category”,

of ally, which would,

“make the job simpler for a potential adversary”.

The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, drew attention to the importance to the United Kingdom, as a maritime nation relying so heavily on trade moving by sea, of a strong Navy and a strong Royal Marines. Without maritime expeditionary strike options, there is a reliance on access to friendly ports or airports, and historical evidence indicates that such access can often be denied or be conditional or unsuitable. A lack of access will narrow options, increase operational risk and potentially make current crisis response plans unviable. Global reach and flexibility are inherent characteristics of a full spectrum Royal Navy able to protect the nation’s vital interests. The ability to act across a spectrum, from disaster relief to expeditionary strike, preserves political choice.

The United Kingdom’s comparative advantage in maritime theatre entry—something that few can emulate—is of critical importance to our key partners. The Royal Marines have a leading allied capability, interwoven with NATO and European initiatives, and are the United States’ partner of choice in the littoral and the Arctic. Their cold-weather-capable commando force is hugely appreciated in north Norway.

Chaos is a dominating feature of our world today. Islamic fundamentalism is a threat that grows more vigorous and malign by the day and it has reached our own shores. Russia mobilises in all dimensions to press her advantages from the Balkans to the Baltic and from Libya to Damascus, to erode the West’s sphere of influence, both conventionally and in the hearts and minds of many of its citizens. The United Kingdom remains a key player in global politics, but it competes in a world where many regional powers, nation states, criminals and extremists are expanding their influence. If we want to have an effect where the vast majority of the world’s population lives, the ability to operate between the sea and the land is vital. Battles may be won at sea, but wars are won on land, among the people. Despite the huge technological leaps that have characterised the last century, this remains true; to have a decisive effect on an opponent, you must at some point land and close with him.

The US recognises the importance of an expeditionary strike capability. With the recently approved littoral operations in a contested environment concept, it seeks to better integrate existing naval and Marine Corps capabilities to overcome the emerging threats within littoral areas, which it sees as rapidly expanding in operational depth, complexity and lethality. This concept will provide the United States with an enhanced geographic flexibility and a range of options with which to respond to the threats within the littoral. To give some indication of the scale of US investment in this concept, it relies on the delivery of a multi-purpose, 38-unit, amphibious fleet. I very much hope that we do not become a “different sort of category” of ally.

Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2017

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 21st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the very warm words of the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, about my noble friend the Minister.

I want to say a few words today about legacy issues arising from the Troubles in Northern Ireland. This is relevant to the morale and recruitment of our present-day Armed Forces. I pay tribute to all those who helped bring about the Northern Ireland peace process, and am aware of the huge effort and difficult compromises that brought about the current settlement. It is in everyone’s interest that the peace process continues and endures. Along with the police, the Armed Forces paid a huge price for the part they played in the Troubles: 520 Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force regulars, reserves and veterans, and 243 from the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Irish Regiment, including veterans, were murdered by terrorists. Countless others were seriously injured, and left to bear the mental and physical scars.

We should not forget that the Army was originally called to Northern Ireland to restore order and to protect Catholics. Quite by chance, serving with the Life Guards I was one of the first soldiers sent to Northern Ireland in August 1969. I can vouch that our soldiers, mostly young men, conducted themselves to the highest possible professional standards, despite some very difficult times. I am concerned, however, about the legacy issues and, as an example, want to raise one particular case—that of former Life Guards Corporal Major Dennis Hutchings, whose committal hearing took place in Armagh today. I declare an interest in that I am on the Life Guards regimental council and served with Dennis Hutchings in this country and in the Far East. However, I do not raise the issue for this one case alone. It is of great interest to other veterans who may face similar problems to his in the future.

In 1974, the Life Guards were sent to Northern Ireland. In June, Dennis was on patrol and came across an IRA unit with weapons being readied for an attack. He exhibited great bravery in engaging the terrorists in a firefight; several terrorists were arrested. This shows that Dennis was an exemplary soldier who used proportionate force and exhibited great bravery. A couple of days later, while soldiers were sweeping a locality for terrorists who had escaped, John Pat Cunningham was shot dead. This was a tragic incident. The soldiers who are alleged to have fired the shots, including Dennis Hutchings, were interviewed under caution at the time. A file was submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who concluded:

“I do not consider that the evidence warrants any criminal proceedings”.


The incident was reviewed by the PSNI Historical Enquiries Team—the HET—in 2012, which concluded that there was no new evidence and that nothing had changed. On the basis of the HET report and following a request by their solicitors, the MoD issued an apology to the family of Mr Cunningham in January 2013.

The HET was disbanded by the PSNI and replaced by a legacy unit, which again reviewed this case. There was no new evidence. Nevertheless, the PSNI was determined to arrest Mr Hutchings and in April 2015, without any warning, did so in an early morning raid at his home in Cornwall. He was immediately escorted back to Northern Ireland, held in police cells and interviewed under caution over four days. He was then charged with the attempted murder of Mr Cunningham.

Dennis has now been on bail for nearly two years. Friends report that his health has been damaged by the stress of this matter. He has had heart surgery and been measured as having 13% renal function. He went into hospital last November to receive surgery, in the expectation that he will start kidney dialysis soon. Yet the Northern Ireland PPS was determined that he should be in court, which is where he was today, having been committed for trial in a Crown Court in Belfast on a charge of grievous bodily harm with intent.

Many members of the Life Guards, and of the Household Cavalry as a whole, believe this to be a grave injustice and that scrutiny has been applied to the security forces in a way that has not been allowed for others. In particular, John Downey was charged in relation to the Hyde Park attack on the Household Cavalry’s Queen’s Life Guard in 1982, when four soldiers and seven horses were killed by a nail bomb. But John Downey’s trial collapsed after a ruling on a letter sent to him by police, assuring him that he would not be pursued as a result of the Government of the day’s secret amnesty for terrorists. One hundred and eighty-six other people wanted for terror-related offences in the Troubles received similar assurances, yet no British soldier has received any assurances, despite 90% of the deaths being attributed to terrorism.

One could well ask: why was Dennis in court today but the case against John Downey dropped? Is it really fair that soldiers should face trial for their alleged misdeeds more than 40 years ago, while the perpetrators of terrorist activities are ignored and their victims forgotten? I really feel that the whole system of addressing the past in Northern Ireland is not balanced, and is unjust. Dennis was sent to Northern Ireland by our Government. They cannot now wash their hands of their responsibility and pass on the consequences to the Northern Ireland Executive. That is a fundamental breach of the Armed Forces covenant.

It must be very difficult being the magistrate who hears cases such as this one, with so much riding on the decision. That magistrate is someone who lives in the local community and will have to be a very brave man or woman to find no case to answer. Does my noble friend agree that a great deal of time, money and anguish on all sides would be better spent if an independent QC or judge were to be retained in all similar cases in the future to review the evidence and confirm whether there is a case to answer?

Naval Warships: Repair at Sea

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 13th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trefgarne]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what arrangements will be in place for the repair of naval warships at sea following the proposed sale of RFA “Diligence”.

[Lord Astor of Hever (Con)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Trefgarne and at his request, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in his name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, RFA “Diligence”, the forward repair ship, is one part of a system providing support facilities to deployed ships and submarines. This support is regularly supplemented by commercial arrangements and international agreements. When bespoke afloat capabilities are required, these are contracted on the open commercial market. This solution is not dependent on “Diligence” and has proven effective. Of course, we continue to consider all our capability requirements, depending on the operational task.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, “Diligence” has provided wonderful support to Royal Naval ships. What is the cost of her recent refits and is my noble friend satisfied that her sale will not affect the maintenance of Royal Naval ships when away from home ports?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there was a refit of RFA “Diligence” in 2012-13 and another in 2014-15, both driven by mandatory certification requirements. The aggregate cost of those refits was £28.6 million. I reassure my noble friend that the withdrawal from service of RFA “Diligence” will not have a material effect on the support provided to the fleet. We are always considering different and innovative ways of providing that support to deliver the best value for money for the taxpayer. The Royal Navy is confident that, through a combination of the measures that I have outlined, the required support will be available.

Defence: UK Territorial Waters

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trefgarne]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they are satisfied with the present arrangements for detecting and shadowing non-NATO naval units which may enter the United Kingdom’s territorial waters without prior authority.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)]

My Lords, this Government take security of our maritime boundaries very seriously. Our Armed Forces have a multilayered submarine detection capability, using highly effective assets including frigates, submarines and anti-submarine helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft support from NATO allies. We, in turn, often support them when they have capability shortfalls. It is routine for NATO allies to support each other in this way and demonstrates one of the benefits to the UK of NATO membership.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that reply. Is he really satisfied, though, with the maritime patrol aircraft arrangements that he described? Are those arrangements permanent, or does he have some better plans for the future?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we have a robust range of measures for detecting and shadowing non-NATO vessels that may seek to enter our territorial waters without authority. We continue to develop new detection capabilities to maintain our operational advantage. SDSR 2015 will allow us to review the full spectrum of submarine detection capability, including maritime patrol aircraft. Meanwhile, RAF air crew are flying in allied MPA to retain the skills to regenerate the capability, should we decide to do so.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that the National Maritime Information Centre, established by the last Government but funded since then by the current Government, gives very good situational awareness of our waters, but we need assets to track and monitor things. Normally we have three offshore patrol vessels; one is in the West Indies, filling in because we do not have enough destroyers and frigates. We have only one frigate in UK waters, acting as the fleet ready escort—only one, in a great maritime nation such as ours. That shortage of assets is bad.

My question, though, relates to the helicopters that he talked about. I asked two years ago, a year ago, and I ask again now: has the Merlin Mk2 incorporated fully the ASW capabilities of the MRA4 Nimrod? Each of the previous times the Minister said, “Yes we’re doing it, yes we’re doing it”. Have we done it?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, on the first part of his question, I agree with the noble Lord about the National Maritime Information Centre, but he will know that I cannot answer the second part of his question.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord West, about the numbers of destroyers and frigates. The fact is that the size of our destroyer and frigate force is inadequate to meet all the tasks demanded of it both by NATO and nationally. Indeed, a number of important tasks have been gapped over the years, including the Article 5 operation in the eastern Mediterranean, and of course we have increasing threats as we speak. What are the Government doing, and what will they do, to ensure that the current inadequate number of destroyers and frigates does not drop below 19 and that the destroyer/frigate force actually increases in size?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I assure the noble and gallant Lord that this will be a matter that SDSR 15 looks at very closely.

[Lord Lee of Trafford (LD)]

My Lords, I realise that this is a very sensitive area, but I do think that the public and Parliament are entitled to a little more information in this area and that the Minister and the MoD should not shelter behind generalisations. Specifically, how does Russian submarine activity off our shores compare with activity off the shores of our allies? Secondly, is the Russian activity increasing and, thirdly, is it very much focused on Faslane and our deterrent capability?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I am sure my noble friend will appreciate that for reasons of national security I cannot discuss the detail of such events, as to do so could allow conclusions to be drawn on the UK’s capabilities. However, I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord West, and my noble friend that we take the security of our maritime boundaries very seriously.

[Lord Soley (Lab)]

My Lords, I appreciate the sensitivity of this, but can the noble Lord go a bit further and tell us whether we have an estimate of activity around the waters of Scotland and whether the Scottish Government are aware of any problems of this nature? Although it is not a matter for them, it is a matter of interest to the people of Scotland.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, again, I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord; I cannot discuss this issue, but I can tell him that defence is a reserved issue and is not the business of the Scottish Government. We will not compromise on the defence of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Bilimoria (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned the SDSR. Under SDSR 2010, brutal cuts were made and Nimrods were physically destroyed. Would he now say that the Government regret the decision to destroy that amazing capability, which we could use right now?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the severe pressure on the public finances in 2010 and the urgent need to bring the defence programme into balance meant that we could not retain all our existing programmes and that we had to prioritise between capabilities. The aircraft’s future high support costs were a clear factor in that decision. It is also well known that the MRA4 project suffered from repeated delays and cost overruns, and was still suffering from technical problems in 2010.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, further to the Minister’s answer to my noble friend Lord Soley, we all understand that defence is a reserved matter, but would it not be sensible to let the First Minister of Scotland know the threats from Russia so that we get a more sensible policy in relation to the Trident nuclear deterrent?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very good point and I will make sure that my department passes that on to the Scotland Office.

Falkland Islands Defence Review

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)]

My Lords, with permission, I shall repeat a Statement on the Falkland Islands defence review. The Statement is as follows:

“Safeguarding our citizens and their way of life remains the most important responsibility of government and of defence. In March 2013, the Falkland Islands referendum reaffirmed the islanders’ overwhelming wish to remain British. Of the 92% who voted, 99.8% voted in favour of maintaining their political status as an overseas territory of the United Kingdom.

We will always defend the right of the Falkland Islanders to determine their own political future. The Ministry of Defence retains responsibility for the external defence and security of British interests in the south Atlantic, and to that end undertakes regular assessments to ensure that we have in place the appropriate defensive capability.

In autumn 2013, my predecessor asked officials to undertake a thorough review of the forces that we hold on the Falkland Islands and our contingency plans for their defence. The objective was to ensure that our enduring commitment to the defence of the islands is sustained effectively. That review has now been completed.

The review’s conclusions remain operationally sensitive in the light of potential threats, and I hope that the House will understand that I cannot disclose much of the detail.

However, I can tell the House that we have updated our assessment of any threat to the islands. This includes a consideration of the changes that may arise from the islanders’ plans to develop their economy, including the potential for development of an oil and gas industry. We continue to discuss these issues with the Falkland Islands Government.

I have endorsed the assessment of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Commander of Joint Forces Command that the current military presence is broadly proportionate to the threats and the risks that we face. Our forces in the south Atlantic are entirely defensive, and are at the level required to ensure the defence of the Falkland Islands against any potential threat.

However, I have also agreed a number of measures designed to ensure our resilience for the short, medium and longer term. I can tell the House that these measures will include the return of military support helicopters, which were removed in 2006 to support operations in Afghanistan. On current plans, this will involve the deployment of two Chinooks, which will be operational by mid-2016. This is a significant capability, which will provide reactive, 24/7 tactical mobility in order to allow a swift and decisive response to any emerging incidents. The helicopters will also bring a heavy lift capability and will enhance the training opportunities available to the resident infantry company.

We also have plans in place to deliver enhanced operational communications for the headquarters at Mount Pleasant to better enable the sharing of real-time operational data, and I can confirm that we will be renewing the ground-based air defence system when Rapier comes out of service around the end of the decade. We will also maintain our commitment to provide a Falkland Islands patrol vessel, currently HMS “Clyde”.

In addition, we intend to carry out a number of projects to replace some of the ageing infrastructure, for example the refurbishment of Mare Harbour and the replacement of the existing power generation systems at Mount Pleasant Airfield. A major modernisation of the fuels infrastructure is also under way and is now nearing completion.

In total, we expect to invest up to £180 million in improving and modernising our infrastructure on the islands over the next 10 years. In addition to the operational improvements that I have already mentioned, we are also taking action to improve the quality of life of those who serve in the Falklands, including planned improvements to their accommodation, and a new primary school.

Although there will be some changes in personnel numbers as the Sea King helicopters are withdrawn and the Chinook force stands up, I have decided that for the foreseeable future we will keep our numbers at around their current level of about 1,200 personnel, military and civilian.

I know that the House will want to join me in taking this opportunity to pay tribute to our brave men and women, military and civilian, who leave behind their families and friends for months or years at a time in order to ensure the right of the Falkland Islanders to remain British. We will always remember the bravery of the 255 British servicemen who gave their lives for that cause.

I am aware of the close interest that the Defence Select Committee takes in the Falkland Islands, and of the committee’s most recent visit there earlier this year. I am grateful for its insights, some of which echo the findings of this review. I have written earlier today to the committee chairman.

The review that we have undertaken confirms our commitment to the Falkland Islands. We will continue to defend the right of the islanders to determine their future and maintain their way of life against whatever threats may exist. This review ensures that we will continue to have the right mix of people, equipment and infrastructure to deliver that commitment in the years ahead.

We are not complacent. The Government will continue to remain vigilant, but on the basis of the review and the follow-on measures that I have established I am satisfied that the Government can be confident in their continued ability to defend the south Atlantic islands. I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place by the Secretary of State on what is a busy day for the Ministry of Defence, with one oral ministerial Statement and no fewer than five written ministerial Statements.

In his Statement today, and on the radio this morning, the Secretary of State—in response to a question about a newspaper report that Russia was working on a deal to lease 12 long-range bombers to Argentina—said that he had been reviewing the defence of the Falkland Islands and it was right to do that every so often. He went on to say that we needed to modernise our defences in the Falklands to ensure that we had sufficient troops there and that the islands were properly defended in terms of air maintenance and maritime defence. He added that our commitment to the Falkland Islanders having the right to remain British, and to proper protection by our forces, remained absolutely clear. We would certainly endorse that commitment, not least in the context of the outcome of the 2013 referendum when the Falkland Islanders made clear their emphatic wish to remain British. We, too, wish to express our gratitude to our personnel who have served, and continue to serve, in the Falklands, and in particular to our 255 service personnel who made the ultimate sacrifice and the hundreds who were injured in action retaking the Falklands.

Can the Minister say whether the Government regard the threat to the Falkland Islands as having recently increased and whether the Statement today is the response to that? On the radio this morning, the Secretary of State simply said that the threat had not reduced; he did not say that it had increased. Do the Government regard Russian influence in the region as increasing? What, if any, new diplomatic initiatives are taking place with the Argentinian Government and other Governments in South America, as well as with our allies?

In the Statement, reference was made to the refurbishment of the harbour in the Falklands. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate when that work is likely to be completed. Can he also say how soon the missile system will be upgraded?

We certainly support the measures that the Government have announced today, but I would like to ask where this announcement fits in with the pending strategic defence and security review, since the Government have presumably decided that the announcements today could not wait until the SDSR planned for later this year. On the radio this morning, the Secretary of State said that he had started a review of the defence of the Falkland Islands last year—not, as I think is indicated in the Statement today, that it had begun in 2013. Last year, the Secretary of State said in the other place that he was,

“very clear that the next SDSR is being carried out next year”—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 662]—

that is, in 2015; and that the Government had not started on the review in 2014, since “that awaits next year”. Now we know that a review of what is surely one important part of our existing and future defence commitments was in fact already taking place when the Secretary of State made that statement. Can the Minister say what other aspects of our existing and future defence commitments are currently the subject of review at ministerial level? I ask that in the context of the Government’s apparent lack of willingness to engage with the public in general—and key stakeholders in particular—on the 2015 strategic defence and security review, which is now scheduled to be completed in some nine months’ time. Yet we now find that what appear to be key decisions have just been made in respect of the defence of the Falklands, which will surely have implications for the 2015 SDSR, on which very little significant progress, if any, has apparently been made.

Indeed, it appears that a further key strategic defence decision has already been made by this Government since the Secretary of State repeated on the radio this morning the statement made by the Prime Minister that there will be no further cuts in the size of the Regular Army, a statement that likewise must have some considerable significance for the direction and content of the SDSR. The Prime Minister’s statement was an interesting one. Does the reference to no further cuts in the size of the Regular Army also extend to no cuts in the future size of our intended 30,000 Army Reserve strength, or was the silence on any commitment in respect of the Army Reserve both deliberate and significant?

Have any other decisions impacting on the 2015 SDSR recently been made before there has apparently been any attempt to involve the public or key stakeholders in consultations on the 2015 SDSR? Finally, while I reiterate our support for the measures that the Government have announced today, do the Government feel that the situation in the Falklands from a defence point of view is such that the decisions could not have been announced later this year as part of, and in the context of, the 2015 SDSR?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his broad welcome for our conclusions to the review. I join him from these Benches in paying tribute to those who are currently serving in the Falkland Islands. Like him, we remember those servicemen who were lost in the battle long ago.

The noble Lord asked me a lot of questions; I was not able to write quickly enough to get them all down, but I will undertake to write him a letter with the answers as soon as I possibly can. He mentioned the recent referendum and the democratic right of the Falkland Islanders to remain British. This Statement sends a strong message to the Falkland Islanders.

The noble Lord mentioned the review. We review all our activity routinely. However, in 2013, given the time that had elapsed since the comprehensive review of the Falkland Islands, officials and Commander JFC advised that such a comprehensive review would be appropriate. Ministers agreed with this advice and provided clear direction for that review.

The noble Lord asked whether Russian influence had increased in the region. The Ministry of Defence undertakes regular assessments of potential major threats to the Falkland Islands to ensure that we retain an appropriate level of defence capability to address such threats. He asked if the threat had increased. There is no current evidence of Argentina’s intent or capability to launch a credible military attack on the Falkland Islands, but we are not complacent and the Government remain absolutely committed to the protection of the Falkland Islands and its population.

The noble Lord mentioned the story in the newspaper this morning. I have no idea where that came from; I have asked officials at the MoD and they do not know either.

The noble Lord asked me about the missile system being upgraded. Our current short-range air defence system—Rapier—is due to go out of service at the end of the decade. Due to the age of that system it would be impractical to sustain it in the longer term, and therefore it needs to be replaced if UK forces are to continue to be able to provide defence to our deployed forces against an air threat.

The noble Lord asked about diplomacy. We have warm relations with most of the South American countries. I meet a number of Foreign and Defence Ministers from these countries, and I assure him that none of them has ever mentioned the Falkland Islands to me. Still, I am sure that these diplomats have noticed the Falkland Islands referendum. We want to have a full and friendly relationship with Argentina as neighbours in the South Atlantic and responsible fellow members of the G20, but we will not negotiate away the rights of the Falkland Islands people against their will or behind their backs.

The noble Lord asked when the harbour is going to be refurbished. It will be done by the end of 2017. I am afraid I could not keep up with all his questions, but he asked me about the 2015 SDSR. As he knows, a lot of background work is being done on that. The decisions on the Falklands Islands announced today are separate from the SDSR, and in all honesty the Statement is not making very big decisions.

[Lord Burnett (LD)]

As this is probably my noble friend’s last defence Statement as a Minister in this Parliament, I congratulate him on his exemplary service as a Defence Minister over the past five years. I understand that HMS “Clyde” is an off-shore patrol vessel. Does my noble friend agree that we should strengthen the permanent Royal Navy presence in and around the Falkland Islands?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his very kind, totally undeserved, words. The Falklands Islands patrol vessel capability will be retained when HMS “Clyde” leaves service in 2017. I assure my noble friend that we always have either a Type 45 destroyer or a Type 23 frigate available to reinforce the Falklands Islands.

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

I have no idea whether this is the last appearance of the noble Lord at the Dispatch Box—of course, on this side we all hope that the Government are defeated in the forthcoming election—but if it is his last performance in this role, I shall say how much our side have appreciated the courtesy and conscientiousness which he has always shown in fulfilling his roles in this House. The depth of his genuine commitment to our military and to the defence of the nation has never been doubted by anybody.

As the noble Lord knows from many discussions and debates, I have always believed that capability and threat are not independent variables. It is not an accident that since NATO started cutting its defence expenditure Mr Putin has become ever more bold and ever more aggressive. At present, Cristina Fernández is in a very difficult situation and is facing a major scandal and the collapse of the Argentinian economy. She could well be tempted to have a go at some adventure if there was a quick trick to be taken. A strong signal needed to be sent and the Government appear to have done that—that is how I interpret the Statement today. All of us on this side of the House will endorse my noble friend in giving the Government support on that.

There is one question I want to ask. Everybody who knows the Falklands knows that we cannot go on much longer there unless an effort is made to refurbish and rebuild the barracks which were constructed after 1982 and at that time were due to last for 20 years. They are already in a state of embarrassing disrepair. Are there any plans to replace them or to refurbish them?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his very kind words. I understand that the barracks are going to be refurbished. I can write to the noble Lord with specific details on the plans.

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement that the Minister has made, and I endorse the comments about his conduct and attention to the House in his time as Defence Minister, which have been admirable. If there is any relevance in the story that appears today, I hope that the Government are making the strongest representations to the Argentinian Government about the unwisdom of becoming involved with Russia at present and what that might mean for the continent of America. The United States of America has previously taken a slightly detached view about the relationships and has viewed the Falklands as a matter between the United Kingdom and Argentina. Were there to be Russian involvement in some way, it would be of keen Interest to the United States.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his very kind words. As regards Russia, the Ministry of Defence undertakes regular assessments of potential military threats to the Falkland Islands to ensure that we retain an appropriate level of defensive capability to address any such threats. We remain vigilant and are committed to the protection of the Falkland Islanders.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I lost 22 of my boys when my ship was sunk in the retaking of the Falklands, so the islands are particularly close to my heart. I am very glad that we are showing a commitment to keep defending them. The Argentinians’ behaviour is consistently extremely bad; for example, they are calling the new class of frigates they are buying from China “Malvinas class”, which is a clear statement of intent, even if currently they do not have the capability to do much about it.

I am concerned that our strategy for the whole South Atlantic has not been cleverly put together as regards things such as the British Antarctic Survey, how we look upon Antarctica, the other islands we are responsible for, the mail steamer that goes from Tristan da Cunha, as well as the defence aspects of the Falklands, all of which should be looked at together. Every time I go to the Falklands I am delighted to see that society there is now wealthy and vibrant, getting wealthier—and, my goodness me, if they get oil, they will be like Kuwait. Are they going to pay a large chunk of that £185 million? We seem to have almost no money, looking forward to our large defence budget, which will plunge to below 2% of GDP.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I pay tribute to those brave sailors who went down on the noble Lord’s ship. He asked me about the oil situation. The Falkland Islands Government have said that if the oil exploration is successful they would wish to share some of their revenues with the UK to offset the costs to Her Majesty’s Government of the defence of the islands.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, we on these Benches share in the complimentary comments on the Minister’s contribution to all defence questions—I thank him very much indeed. I hear what the Minister said about there being a destroyer or frigate available to go down and help the patrol ship should the occasion arise, but sometimes these destroyers or frigates can be quite a long way away. Does the Minister agree that the best form of defence for the Falkland Islands is to have a visible, upthreat, maritime presence of significance? A patrol ship does a good job, but it is not a very serious deterrent. Therefore does he agree that the frequency with which the destroyers or frigates can get down to the Falkland Islands and show themselves there from time to time should be increased—and that there should be the odd submarine visit as well? As a corollary to that, we need a destroyer frigate force larger than the 19 we currently have.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I can assure the noble and gallant Lord that the destroyers and frigates are within a certain number of days’ sailing distance from the Falkland Islands—we are very insistent on that. I think he will agree with me that sometimes an invisible deterrent is as effective.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister has made an important Statement, but it really says, “We’re continuing as we are, doing some routine maintenance” —which after 30 years is hardly surprising—“and we’re sending a couple of Chinooks there next year”. That seems to beg the question: why has this become an Oral Statement rather than just a Written Statement?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I understand that it became an Oral Statement because the Opposition asked for that.

[Lord Swinfen (Con)]

My Lords, after the reports in the news today that the Russians are providing the Argentinians with military equipment, will the Government undertake a fresh review?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

I can tell my noble friend that we will not undertake a fresh review, but we keep the situation under constant and continual review.

Conflict Zones: Protection of Interpreters and Translators

Lord Astor of Hever Excerpts

Wednesday 18th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, on securing this short but very important debate. This is a subject in which she has a particular interest, which is reflected in her taking on the chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Modern Languages. We share with her a concern to ensure that the lives and safety of our locally employed civilians, in Afghanistan and more widely, are not put at risk as a result of the service that they have given to this country. I agree with my noble friend Lord Patten that we have a duty of care to them. We have put much effort and resources into trying to meet that responsibility.

I personally take a close interest in this subject, particularly as my former assistant private secretary is now in Kabul supporting LECs with their visa applications.

[Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon]

I recognise that the Minister has limited time, but will he allow me one brief intervention? He lumps interpreters with locally employed staff. Does he not agree that interpreters face significant greater risk and danger than locally employed staff?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

I assure my noble friend that I will come on to that point.

I was talking about my former assistant private secretary, who keeps my office well informed on the LECs and their concerns. We share the noble Baroness’s view that the service and sacrifice given by our interpreters deserves proper public recognition and we have sought to ensure this. It was on this basis that we had the pleasure of inviting two of our former interpreters to the commemoration ceremony at St Paul’s on Friday, where they were looked after at all times by Ministry of Defence staff. The two gentlemen have recently relocated from Afghanistan to the UK and were there to represent the local staff contribution to the campaign. They were able to share their experiences with a number of guests at the reception afterwards, including Prince Edward and the noble Lord, Lord West, who I know takes a great personal interest in this subject.

This is only one small aspect of the Government’s programme to meet their responsibility towards former and current locally engaged staff in Afghanistan. This local workforce comprises not only interpreters but a wide range of staff including cooks, guards, storemen and vehicle mechanics. Their lives are all at risk, but I agree with my noble friend that interpreters and translators are at special risk. We have established two schemes to meet this responsibility: a generous ex gratia redundancy scheme and a separate intimidation policy. The two schemes have been carefully designed through a cross-Whitehall process driven by Ministers, led by the Cabinet Office and endorsed by the National Security Council. The schemes take account of a variety of factors, including consideration of the security situation in Afghanistan.

Our concern for the welfare of local staff starts the moment they commence their work for us. Our recruitment and security processes are designed to prevent staff becoming victims of intimidation by those hostile to the coalition forces. We have generally recruited people from areas away from their place of work so as to maintain anonymity, and we advise staff throughout their employment on how they can keep themselves safe.

The ex gratia redundancy scheme recognises the service of those local staff who were employed by us on 19 December 2012—the day we announced our drawdown from Afghanistan—and who have served for a minimum of 12 months. The scheme has been designed bearing in mind the publicly expressed desire of the Afghan Government not to remove the most capable talent from Afghanistan following our departure but, as my noble friend Lord Patten said, to help grow that country. The benefits awarded are in addition to the standard redundancy package to which local staff are entitled.

Some 842 staff are eligible under this scheme, which comprises a generous package of offers: an in-country package of training and financial support lasting up to five years; or a financial payment worth 18 months’ salary; or, for those who fulfil additional eligibility criteria, the opportunity to apply for relocation to the UK. Approximately 60% of all those eligible for the ex gratia scheme are also eligible to relocate to the UK. Of these, some 95% are interpreters.

We have made good progress in implementing the ex gratia scheme. A total of almost 230 visas have been issued to local staff and their families. Of these, 77 local staff members, along with 67 family members, have now been relocated to the UK. A further 29 are due to arrive later this month. They will include an individual who was injured in the course of his service with us. Since January, we have been hitting the target of relocating 30 to 40 Afghans to the UK every month.

We take every care to welcome our local staff and their families, and to ease their arrival and integration into the UK. Prior to departure, we provide staff with an information pack on living in the UK and offer a question and answer session. On arrival, working through local authorities, we provide staff and their families with support for the first four months to help them settle into their new neighbourhood and access the benefits and services to which they are entitled, including schools and healthcare. It is worth noting that not all those offered relocation to the UK have chosen to take it; some local staff have decided to stay in Afghanistan to build a brighter future and have benefited from one of our generous in-country offers.

Let us consider briefly the 96 local staff who have chosen the training offer to date. I am particularly proud of this offer, which contributes directly to development efforts in Afghanistan and is unique among ISAF nations. Of these 96, some 36% have chosen to undertake higher education, with courses ranging from law to medicine to computer studies. Some 40% have chosen to study English. Thirteen staff members have gifted their training offer to a family member, and I am pleased to report that we now have six daughters of local staff members in education, which the families would not otherwise have been able to afford. For all students, the course fees and a living stipend are funded entirely by us. In no case has the safety of these individuals so far been a significant concern. The same is true of those more widely who have eligibility for options under this scheme.

Separate from the ex gratia scheme, we have designed an intimidation policy, which is open to all current or previous local staff, regardless of period or length of employment. The policy addresses the concerns of local staff who are being intimidated as a result of their employment with us, and it fulfils our moral duty to keep them safe. It is an enduring commitment. I cannot comment on the specific claim of intimidation reported in the Times, as the investigation into this incident is ongoing. However, I can assure the noble Baroness that this, like all claims of intimidation, is being investigated thoroughly by experienced, professionally qualified investigators in Afghanistan.

Cases are subject to early initial triage to identify and respond quickly to those where there is an immediate threat. In some cases it is necessary to do this by phone rather than face to face, but face-to-face interviews will follow quickly on those cases judged to be urgent. In cases of immediate, serious threat, we will take steps to make the individual and immediate family safe in the mean time.

Findings are considered on a case-by-case basis by a panel in Afghanistan, which includes both civilian and military personnel. This ensures a fair outcome for each staff member. We are keen to ensure the integrity of our work here, and last year we initiated an independent review of cases to ensure that they had been properly handled. I will ask for further information on the Bosnian case, mentioned by the noble Baroness, which I understand is a dispute about pension entitlement, and will respond to her in writing.

The judicial review hearing for Afghan interpreters challenging our scheme commences on 6 May. The Government’s position has not changed and we are confident that our LEC policies are fair and lawful. The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are very different. There was clear evidence of severe intimidation and risk to those local staff we employed in Iraq and many were killed off duty because of their work for us. The offer of relocation made to them was partly to mitigate this risk. In Afghanistan, there is much less evidence of significant threats to our former local staff, negating the requirement for a large-scale relocation of former staff on the grounds of safety. In addition, unlike in Iraq, we are in a position to investigate the claims of former local staff and provide a range of mitigation measures to reduce any risk and allow the interpreters to remain in their home country. We tailor each scheme to meet the requirements of the location in which the local staff were employed and any risk faced by them.

I will try to answer all the questions but if I do not have time to do so, I undertake to write to noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Ashdown asked about LECs being at risk in areas too dangerous for our investigators to go to. Most LECs are recruited from areas remote from the areas where they serve to protect their identity. Most Afghans can return safely to their homes but when they cannot we will relocate them to a place of safety. My noble friend Lord Ashdown said that we did not reply to his letter. He raised two cases, and the facts he has quoted covered both. We have responded to one; and I understand that the other is taking a great deal of research but we will respond to it very shortly. My noble friend also asked whether any had applied for asylum and been deported. We are not aware of any former UK-employed Afghans who have been deported but we are aware of a small number who have sought and been granted asylum.

The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked whether applications are coming in at the same rate or declining. They are declining as those eligible complete their moves to the UK. The gateway scheme is working well and has allowed a number of Iraqi LECs to come to the UK. We consider that the bespoke arrangement put in place for Afghan LECs better meets their needs.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby asked whether we have learnt anything from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The arrangements put in place for Afghanistan reflect lessons we learnt from Iraq. We will carry forward to future operations the lessons learnt about LECs and their safety. He also asked how we are avoiding a brain drain of the best and brightest Afghans. Our offer of in-country training and financial support is designed to encourage former LECs to stay in Afghanistan, and many have. It also builds skills for the country’s future. The right reverend Prelate asked whether the US and Australian schemes are more generous than ours, and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, also asked about comparisons with the US programme. The US scheme, like ours, requires former local staff to complete 12 months’ service. The Australian scheme provides resettlement only to those who are able to provide a credible and substantive risk of harm. We consider the UK scheme to be generous in comparison to other nations’.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about progress with the offer of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, to help former LECs into interpreter jobs in the UK. Thanks to the noble Baroness’s facilitation, the Home Office has liaised with the Chartered Institute of Linguists. The institute is keen to provide assistance to Afghan interpreters arriving in the UK and is currently considering options as to what support will be most helpful to them. My Lords, I am sorry—I have run out of time.

House adjourned at 6.59 pm.